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1. General, Introduction and Synopsis 
The thesis tries to test certain propositions about the applicability 
of "economic integration" to a group of small, poor countries, as a means 
of increasing the efficiency and scope of industrialisation. The Central 
American Common Market is used as a practical example of an integration 
scheme, for which these hypotheses can be tested. 
The introductory chapter attempts to test the validity of the 
'rationale' for integration as it has evolved with reference to developing 
countries in general and Latin America in particular. 
First, the "traditional!' or "static" customs union theory is rejected 
as irrelevant: its assumptions are inapplicable and empirical calculations 
indicat~ that gains or losses in static resource allocation terms are derisory. 
Second., the "dynamictt or non-traditional case for economic integration 
amongst poor countries is ex~ined • 
. The case rests ultimately on a preference for greater emphasis 
on manufacturing rather than primary production. A theory of customs 
unions based on 'industry preference' has been built up by Cooper and 
Maseell; Andie, Andie and Desser, and others. Is this preference 
rational in a Central American context? It was found that co~~odity 
exports did not Duffer from noticeably serious fluctuations or unfavour-
able income terms o~ trade, and that manufacturing has been inefficient 
in utilising surplus labour, though the level of manufacturing was below 
"normal" for countries of that size and level, when multinational x-oection 
regressions equations were analysed.' 
Given "industry preference", rational or otherwise, how should 
manufacturing be developed? It was considered that exporting to richer 
countries on a large scale was at best an uncertain prospect. And at 
least with the present distribution of income, the market for "traditional" 
manufactures was largely saturated by local production by 1960. This meant 
that intermediate and capital goods industry would have to be considered, 
to produce substitutes for overseas imports. Yet these industries tend 
to be subject to economies of scale and local markets are very small • 
• Regionalisation can perform the crucial role of market enlargement. 
A regional market, then, permits greater efficiency in import 
a~bstituting industrialisation through economies of scale; permitting 
the establishment of plant~ that would otherwise have beeL below the 
technically minimum size, and the diffusion of 'external t dynamic 
effects. Calculations of the "normal" levels of manufacturing value 
added predicted by a joint market indicate that the level could 
be 20 per cent greater than for separate markets. A considerablo 
""Iso 
volume of micro-economic data on economies of Bcale iB~available 
'~ 
which indicates the extent to which the necessary level of protection 
is reduced by a larger market. 
However the rationale for economic integration which is evaluated 
in chapter 1 does not necessarily imply that the best form of integration 
is a customs union, but, rath~r, a sclective and planned development of 
those sectors in which economies of scale are important. The second 
, 
chapter tries to assess the development of the Central American Common 
Market in this respect, by way of a comparative qualitative comparison 
.--.--------------~--------, .... --~-.-. 
... --.--- l 
of economic integration schemes. In particular, an attempt was made to 
evaluate the widely held belief tllat the Central J~erican Common Market is 
(or was until .i ts disruption) one of the most' advanced and successful 
attempts at integration amongst developing countries. This success was 
largely confined to securing a tariff-free area (though not one perfectly 
so) and to modest progress in monetary jntegration and harmonisation of 
fiscal incentives. Very little however has been dona to evolve joint 
planning, a common industrial policy, or a compensation mecllanism; and 
in this respect the CACm looks less "advanced" than the "Andean group" 
or the Turkey-Pakistan-Iran grouping (R. C.D.) • It is clear how this 
arose. The technocrats who promoted the integration concept wished to 
avoid conflict over political matters and over loss ,of sovereignty. 
They therefore took the line of least resistance. 
In chapter 3-an attempt is made to quantify the gains and losses 
to member states from regional development rather than from development 
within national markets. The author's study is the first comprehensive 
it\. UG.o ~ I; 
... attempt to calculate gains and losses~using . -: - ~range of known 
methods; though there have been three or four published papers dealing 
with one or more aspects. The whole exercise of quantifying gain and 
loss is a difficult one: statistics are unreliable and there is a 
persistent 'identification problem'. A disaggregated analysis of trade 
.~ 
flows and particularly of the local value-added content indicates that 
previous estimates'of the contribution of the CACM (about': of ~ecorded 
1 
regional growth over 1958-68) are Bubstantiated. It was also felt on 
the basis of a. detailed study of the external tariff that the "costs" of 
protection (i.e. trade "diversion") were far less significant than might 
be indicated by the nominal tariff. The most important specific hypothesis 
4. 
which is tested (and which no other ~ajor study has looked at seriously) 
is the view that not all members of the Common Market have benefitted 
'"""'-from membershiI), and~would gain from withdrawal. The author's findings 
'indicate that Honduras in particular can identify little gain. Much 
of its regional exporting would take place anyway. lAuch of its regiontll 
importing could be c,onverted quite easily into industries using the 
national market, :Lts losses from customs duty remission on regional 
trade and "trade diversion" are~roportionate1Y great __ Abovc ell, 
, " ' ,~ 
the attr~ctions of "growth pole" centres such as San Salvador and. 
At..w~ 
Guatemalalhave beco~e cunulative. 
The quantitative findings (chapter 3) and the qualitative observations 
(chapter 2) are now brought together (chapter 4). 
customs unio~ arrangement may bring substantial gains in efficiency and 
an impetus to growth but an unequal distribution of gains easily develops 
arid is cUmulative. In addition, the autho/s anaiysis of firm and pla,nt 
size in Central America teI,ds to suggest that uncoordinated development has 
resulted in the 'establishment of manufacturing tmits of small scale, 
not only Bub-optimal in size but with substantial duplication of 
capacity, and there is also evidence to suggest that large scale 
projects have been discouraged because of competing plans in partner 
countries. A further consequence of lack of planning has been that 
there havo been very few "basic" industries, with much of the industrial 
development taking the form of plants with high effective protection and 
high "import content". There is then an evaluation of the instruments 
which a common market authority might introduce in these circumstances 
to cope with the misallocation of resources and the tendency to 
unequal ga.ins. It wa.s considered that some form of "investment policy', 
~ 
regional a.uthority over location, Bize,~ ownership .:(. • implying control by the 
I 
-------------------------------------------
" 
. 
---.... .., ... _----_. 
of some important industrial sectors, was necessary. Previous experience 
GI\:t4L Af\\~n~ 
however is not too encouraging: theAlntegration Industries Scheme is not a 
proven success. Yet it is difficult· to see how large scale industrial 
plants relying on the regional market are likely to develop in any other 
..{;.k 
way; if a balanced distribution of returns islmaintained. 
Given the need for a "regional investment policy" how should it 
operate if we are to avoid the arbitrary and uneconomic allocation 
procedure that one would get from a. 'package deal' divorced from economic 
criteria; or on the other extreme, an impossibiy cumbersome framework of 
multinational planning? Models have been developed for establishing the 
costs of different sizes and location' of plant on an industry basis and 
this could give us some estimate of the extent to which a 'regional' plnnt 
in a particu1a~ indUstry was preferable in cost terms to 'national' plants 
--in.various perrnutat~ons, trading off economies of scale against diseconomies 
(notablY transport costs). A static integer programming model has been 
. used in several contexts similar to this, and an attempt it made to 
apply it here. . Use was also made of a dynamic programming model showing 
the gains that might be derived by existing plants coordinating their 
time phasing of investment in new capacity in the future. The use of 
these models did not involve original work ei th.er in the model construction 
or the programming but the use of these techniques is new in th~ 
. . 
"-
context of Central America, and seemed to the author not to stretch 
unreasonably the availability ot data or practicability. 
Using this approach, an attempt was made to do a detailed case study 
of two major industries which have been eetabliahed in Central America, 
albeit on the basis of national rather than regional marke~ cement 
-, '- - ,. -" . -"--' -- - ) 
6. 
and petrol refining. It was calculated that delivered cost from the 
o.V\r 
present given units (exclusive of tax and retail/wholesale margins) is 
of the order o~ 10 per cent higher than for an optimal distribution (one 
rather than six oil refineries and two rather than five cement plants). 
if we ,trade off transport costs against economies of scale, other things 
being equal. There are of course simplifying assumptions and sensitivity 
Rr..s 
analysis Ato be applied. There are also problems of valuing private 
and social costs and benefits; and industries cannot be considered in 
isolation (e.g. the pattern of petroleum refining chosen preclude5 
petrochemical development). The time phase model was also applied and 
costs of production in both industries could be reduced by 5-10 per cent 
by a judicious planning of capacity expansion. 
Research needs to be done on a broader range of industries than that 
covered here and the author has tried to extend subsequently the analysis 
to cover industries like caustic soda. steel. plate glass and paper • 
. 
What the various case studies demonstrate is the gain from a 
planned development of the 'economies of scale industries', whose 
establishment ia the basie for the integration rationale in the region, 
-
and which in the absence of some degree of control or planning are 
likely to be established either at sub-optimal sizes or locations, or 
in a manner that fails to giVe an equitable share to one or more states. 
Whether or not the states will accept a degree of multinational 
pooling of sovereignty necessary to mako a Bcheme of this kind work is 
questionable. and a function of political variables which are beyond the 
scope of the thesis. However it is certain that without such a sacrifice 
of sovereignty ~ integration Bcheme will survive anywhere for long. 
Diagrp.Jn Ie. Macro economic arwITegates in Centr~J. America 
1. 
-
Gross National Product in 1966 Prices. 1950-70 (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
1950 1955 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
tAFTA (Total) 4-~111 ' ,!)~},~. 
CACM (Total) I/~Sl 
546 
~,130 . 
Costa Rica 258 373 468 469 500 528 593 631 669 721 776 799 
El. Salvador 385 480 583 608 608 713 764 801 845 880 912 940 968 
Guatemala 711 .795 1029 1072 1110 1215 1270 1327 1388 1438 1519 1598 1646 
Honduras 255 332 429 430 449 460 485 516 536 556 58; 602 620 
N i c a.rae,"Ua 242 351 402 428 473 507 538 584 600 624 655 677 697 
2. Eer Ca~ita Gross National Product in 1266 Prices l 12~0-10 (U.S. Dollars) 
1950 1955 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964' 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
LAFTA(AVer~ge)298 344 383 392 395 393 401 416 421 427 439 457 455 
GACM(Avera e) 230 249 266 266 275 283 288 296 299 302 307 311 315 
Costa Rica ~, 300 36; 31'; 361 372 380 379 398 409 420 437 454 467 
El. Salvador 207 225 238 241 264 265 275 278 284 286 286 285 293 
Guatemala 253 240 263 265 266 281 284 288 292 293 300 306 315 
Honduras 176 199 221 215 217 215 220 226 227 227 230 230 237 
Nicaragua 228 287 285 295 316 329 337 353 350 352 354 355 365 
Agricul ture Mining Manufacturing Construction Transport Trade Public Total 
Admin. Product 
LAPl'A 21,595 5,743 25,;10 4,454 8,120 19,687 22,459 107,388 CACM 1,376 24 742 143 270 1,151 1,020 4,730 Costa Rica 189 145 38 30 133 263 799 
. El. Salvador 261 1 175 34 61 257 178 960 Guatemala 47l 2 235 31 87 504 ;'316 1,646 Hondura.s 249 11 89 23 45 97 105 620 Nicaragua 206 10 98 11 41 160 158 697 " 
4. Growth Rates in Real Terms (1266=100). 1260-70 (Percentage per Year, Compounded) 
Agricul ture tUning Manufacturing Construction Transport Trade Public Total 
Admin. Product 
-=- LAPrA 4·0 3· 4 4·6 4·6 5-0 4-6 5- 3 4·6 
CAClIi 3-9 5- 5 6·4 5·0 5·0 it 5,0 5· 5 4,8 Costa Rica 5·2 6·1 5· 6 2·6 3·1 7-2 5· 5 El Salvador 3·6 0 7- 5 6·0 6·0 6-4 3· 9 5·2 Guatemala 4·2 0 5· 9 4·0 4'4 5·8 3-8 4·8 Honduras 2·7 10·7 5- 5 4·3 5-6 4·6 2·8 3-7 Nicar~a 4·4 5· 3 6-7 4'5 6-1 6-2 6·3 5-6 
Source: United Nations (E.e.t.A.)_ Mexico. 
I Q f 
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" I ~:Cb BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS OF DEVELOFP1ENT IN THE CENTRAL AJlmRICAN ECONOMIES I I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
I Gua tel!l.a1a El Salvador . Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica Rest of· Latin America 
Popu1a tion Go. 
r (~rexico) (Peru) (1) 
(millions 1970) 5.18 3.44 2.58 2.02 1.80 49.0 13.2 
(2) 
. b (L. A. Q...c~ :Brazil) Real per capi ta ~P growth 
1960-70 (~ f'~ 2.2 2.5 1.7 3.6 2.9 2.3 
(3) Population Growth (tr.o..) 3 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.9 (L,A~d., e,~) 3.0 
(4) P.ate of Inf1ationct '1 . 
1960-69 
. (~ f'~) .7 .4 2.5 1.9 2.2 (Latin America.) 
Share 01"' - Agriculture 
_CO.J.l 
(5) ~ 27.5 26 38.5 27.9 22.4 23.4 
in§DP - Manufacturing tt 16.0 19.5 15.0 16.0 19·3 \9"" 
J: (~exico) (6) Share of" - Agricu1 ture t 64.0 60.5 66.0 56.0 48.0 50 ~ EI:l'plo~ent - :r-ranufacturing t 14.1 16.9 9.5 17.0 18.9 22 
(7)- Population Density Population rr 
per ~2 of cu1tUtab1e land (1970 252 315 61 59 116 (~,c.o) 44 
(8) to 36 26 36 50 C.M.:w..ic.,o) Urban PO~~~~(1970) 38 42 
. 
(9) Central Government Tax F.e91enue ... 
over GDP 7.5 9·4 10.4 8.5 . 11 
I .. __ . -------------~------- -~ 
) 
l_. 
~ . 
. a'" (10) Illiteracy over 15.(1968) 
• t, (11) % of school age enrolled 
1968 
(12) Nutrition l 
. ' c.o..U-. per day per capita 
Chru7ges (1955-67) t r~ 
~C)....t. r, 1) Protein~er day~96 
Ch~gesQ.955-67) t ro... 
, 
(13) ... Life expectancy at birth 
(yrs) 19'5' 
19S'D . 
I 
(14) Infa.'1t mo;tali ty 1968 L ~ 
per 1000 births 
• l-(15) Doctors per 10,000 inhab-
itants 
(16) Housing with sanitary fittings 
running water i. 
electric light 
63 
(1969) 
36 
2200 
7.8 
~6.8 
2.5 
47 
43.6 
28.5 
2.2 
;0.6 
29.5 
22.0 
(1964) 
49.2 
52 
1840 
-9.4 
44.2 
-22 
56.9 
5~.4 
10.4 
2.; 
53 50.2 
(i960) (1963) 
55 42 
2010 2350 
-;.4 22.2 
51.0 59.0 
4.9 5 
42.6 51.0 
36.9 38.6 
12.7 7.0 
2.1 4·2 
19.8 21.3 
24.9 44.3 
14.6 32.9 
(1961) (1963) 
14.4 
62 
2610 
7.9 
57.9 
7.4 
63.3 
56.5 
3.3 
5.7 
68.3 
74·5 
54.6 
(1963) 
(.HeXi~ 
23.0 
. . 
61 (f'fu,oc.i r..o ) 
(Mexico) (France) 
2560 3100 
(~I"..o) 
65.4 "(~ . 100.4 
(France) 
11.5 
(~) 
2.1 
(Mexico) 
'\ 5.5 
32.3(r~~) 
a. U.N. National .Accts. Statistics; b. U.N. Demographic Yearbook; c. EC':'~ data; d. Average annual percentage increase 
of consumer prices. l}~ F1nancia1 Statistics; e. }hnufacturing excl. mining but excludes construction and ~blic utilities, fron 
U.N. Yearbook of National Accts; f. }~ufacturing includes construction but excludes electricity, transport, utilities etc, local 
data. _ .' . g. '''.Dator: basicos de Poblacion en America latina';1970; OAS (Dept. of Sociai .Affairs) from 
L~~~~eric~~pographic Centre; h. Urban areas are those with 2000 inhabitants or more, data~as in g.; i. Social Indicators 
f~o~~co~mi~ latin A~eri9~ (1970) and the I.A.D.B.-Socio-economic Process in latin ~erica,1969~based on United Nations. 
"Population and Vi tal Statistics Report,. 1910" and Pan American Union: "American ~ GJ-trJo.S" • 
Note on the Central American economies and Common M::\rket 
It ia not intended to describe at length the Central American economies 
though Diag. 1. is an attempt to draw together some of the key economic\~(~~ 
o~ development, and the st'andard of living of the people. Central American 
statistics are extremely unreliable and Appendix I is devoted to explaining 
their deficiencies. One must, however, use something. 
Equally it is not intended to describe in detail either the history 
or institutions of the Common Market. 
obl;ip;:l~'i.(,n.o aud lbapter 2 discusses the most important features in a 
comparative framework. 
--
Chapter I. The Economic Theory of Interrration as a Rationale 
for central American 'Integration. 
In this introductory chapter an attempt will be made to review tho 
theory of "economic integrationlt runongst"developing countries".(l) However, 
in order to show the relevance of different aspects of the theory, the 
assumptions and predictions will be checked against Central American data. 
The distinctive features of the theory of integration involving as its basis 
a customs union arrangement, is that it must simultaneously deal with the two 
features of the union: one, the existence of free or freer trade between 
partner states which represents a move towards freer world trade and second a 
discriminatory tariff against third countries which involves a consideration 
of the reasons for protection. The benefits resulting from economic 
integration may come from different sources. Lipsey's survey of the 
theory lists five: • (i) gains from specialisation, (il) economies of scale, 
(iii) terms of trade effects (of the external tariff), (iv) forced changes 
in efficiency from increased competition, (v); an increase ill the rato of 
growth resulting from structural changes.(2) 
It will be argued that "static gains" from freer trade and more efficient 
resource allocation according to comparative advantage are unimportant in 
the Central American context, and that "dynamic" benefits are more relevant.) 
- oJ,to 
andAthose doriving from economics of scale enjoyed in a regional market by 
the m~nuracturing industry which is protected by the external tariff. It 
is important, however, to see how the theory ha3 been built up, step by step. 
(1) For a basic definition of economic integration, we assume the ~inimum 
existence of firstly; tho elimination or substantial reductioll of barriers 
on trade among p"r~ fI .. .r.s; and, secondly, discrimination against non-members of 
the group. 
(2) R. Lipsey: "The theory of cuntoms unions: a. general survey" Economic 
Journal, Sept. 1960 p. 486 • 
. _--- --- ---- ----- -----------------------------... _- -------
2. ' 
,'!he Traditional Theory 
It has been said that the main concern of the "traditional theory" 
is "to ovalu~tc customs unions from a world welfare point of view using 
/ static effects as a criterion". (1) 
Viner in his analysis of customs unions sets out a series of prop-
ositions which form the basis of the "traditionnl theory of customs 
unions". (2) Viner and those who wrote in a similar vein wore dealing 
with a model which had the same basic underlying assumptions as the 
static theory of comparative advantage. 
Within these very unreal assumptions it is shown that regional 
, economic integration creates both gains and losses from changed resource 
allocation. Trade "creation" is a beneficial effect resulting from 
--
a switch of demaqd from inefficient protected firms operating nationally 
to more efficient firms in a partner state: trade "diversion" occurs 
when goods !orrner1y imported from outside the region arl replaced by 
goods'from less efficient firms within the union. The net of these 
two effects (3) indicates the contribution of the customs wllon to 
(1) Yu Min Chou: "Economic integration in less developed countries: 
l 
"the case of small countries" Jounla1 of Development Studies, July 1967, p. 19. 
(2) J. Viner: "The Customs Unions Issue" Ca.rnegie Endowment for Inter-
national ,Peace, 1950, esp. chI 4: also B. Balassa "TheorY of Economic 
Integration", Allen and Unwin, 1961 (ch. 2). 
(3) Alternatively, positive and negative "production effects". 
i 
_.~" __ --------..J 
, 
improved global resource allocation, and it will not necessarily be 
positive. (1) This is one of the implications of the\heory .of the 
'I 
second best: that, given obstruction to trade, a partial movement 
towards the "first best" of universal free trade under pareto optimum 
conditions will not necessarily result in greater welfare. (2) 
This only takes into account production effects and assumes demand 
curves of zero elasticity and supply curves of infinite elasticity. 
However, changes in relative price could clearly affect the level of 
consumption, too, for an individual product,· and between products, if 
elasticities o,f demand are positive. (3) Even if production effects are 
negative, the consumption effects can still be positive due to the effect 
of the elimination of the duty on regional trade, i.e. prices to the 
consumer may be lower even though procurement is not from the cheapest 
source. Gehrels conceived of positive consumption effects "as the 
• 
response of consumers to a drop in import prices caused by the tariff 
removal" i.e. a reduction in indirect taxation if there is no off-
setting excise tax. Aasuming a two-product model (one domestic good; 
(1) ~le actual magnitude of this benefit can be simply assessed by cal-
culating changes in the trade flows. Meade demonstrates that if demand 
curves are totally inelastic the welfare measure can be obtained by com-
paring the values of diverted and created trade ~eigllted by cost differences 
between alternative sources: ,_ 
J. Meade: "The Theory of Customs Unions", North-Rolland 1955, p.34-36. 
Alao 
13. 13entink: "E"3timating trade creation and trade diversion", Economic 
Journal, June 1963, pp.80-93. 
(2) R. Lipsey & K. Lancaster: ",The General theory of the second. bost" 
Review of Economic Studies 1956-51 pp.11-32. 
(3) The Vinerian model aasumed that demand elasticities were zero and that 
goods were consumed in fixed proportion regardless of price. Meade dealt 
with cases where these assumptions were relaxed and first introduced 
'consumption effects'. 
\. 
<~ 
~ 
.. ------.. ~--.--.-----. --~---- j 
~--;; .. 
one import) he argues that conaumption effects must have a positive 
welfare effect.(l) Lipsey argues that the end result is indeterminate:(2) 
i~~ consumption effect like the pr~duction effect can work either to 
raise or to lower welfare. Meade showed that the net consumption effect 
depends on the initial structure of tariffs and the demand ela~ticities.(3) 
The overall ~elfare effect will be a combination of production and con-
eUIDption effects and in aome cases the consumption effect could outweigh 
a. production effect i. e. trade "diveroion" could raise welfare. 
, " 
The basic weakness:,of this type of partial a:nalyais(4) is the fact 
that the assumptions which underly the theory are untenable and thereby 
render the findings of limited value. For example if there are unemployed 
resources (as in Central America) then production engendered by "trade 
diversion" will result in the movement of labour from a situation of 
negative to positive production, generating real income to offset the 
efficie~cy' loss. The efficiency factor is still relevant, but only one 
aspec~ of the possible gains. Or under conditions of economies of Bcale, 
trade "diversion" ma~ cease to be negative if additions to output tend to ~ 
c fall in average unit costs and below the original third country' ost. For 
~(l) F. Gehrels: "Customs union for a single country' viewpoint", Review 
of Economic Studies, 1956-57 p.6l. 
(2) R. Lipsey: "Mr. Gehrels on customs uniona lt : Review of Economic 
Studies, 1956-7 p'.21l. Also R. Lipsey: ",The theory of customs unionsl 
trade diversion and welfare", Economica Feb. 1957 p.4l. 
(3) J. Meade: "Xbe Theory of customs unions," OPt cit. pp.40-52. 
(4) Attempts have been made to build up a general equilibrium model on 
similar assumptions: M. Johnson: "Dj Bcriminator;y: tariff reductions: a 
~arshallian analysis" in "Money Trade !'" Economic Growth", Allen & Unwin. 
1962; R. Lipsey: "A Theon of Customs Unions", Weidenfeld &,NicholDon, 
1970; J. Vanek: "The Case of Customs Unions", Harvard Univ. Preas, 1965; 
N.C. Kemp: ",A Contribution to the General Equilibrium Theory of Preferent!:t1 
~ading", North-Holland 1969 • 
.. ---~...,..,.- - -- ...... ---------~--~---.- ----- - .. _---- - - ~ 
this reason we should not attach too mllch importance to the conditions 
for successful economic integration which follow from the stntic theory.(l) 
However, for completeness, they will be listed: 
(a) Viner suggested that the more the partners are competitive in 
the sense that they produce similar products, the greater the potential 
from I~traae creation" gains. r~{ower and Morton added that the larger 
the cost differences (i.e. "complementarity" in cost) in identical 
products the greater the gain too.(2) Spra~s also questions whether over-
lapping economies are~sufficient. conditior,v' for gain and he points out that 
the degree of "competitiveness" or "complementarity" is only meaningful 
if considered relative to that of extra-regional trading patterns. (3) 
In the Vineran sense the Central American economies are "competitive" 
but in a trivial manner: their exports consist largely of primaf1 pro-
d~cts (coffee is ~ l~ading export of three of the five countries) which 
are competitive in the world market and have negligible local demand anyway. 
The concept of "trade creation" is more relevant to locally produced manu-
factures and foodstuffs which enjoy protection, but which are ,not important; 
and in new industries not yet established. The economies are in fact 
neither complementary nor competitive: production is geared to ~)<.~r-.'\cJ... 
demand and demand is geared to external production. The theory, there-
(i) These predictions are drawn from a variety of sources and are set out 
in J. Viner: liThe Customs unions Issue" OPe cit. pp.52-3 • 
...,·r .. D. l3alasaa: "The Theory of Economic Integ;:ation", OPe cit.pp.29-49. 
Also J. Meade: "The Theory of Customs Unions", OPe cit.pp.107-1l5. 
R. Allen: ",Integration in less developed areas", Kyklos 1961, pp.3l5-34. 
(2)' M. MoJeower and G. Morton: "A contri but ion towards a theorz of customs 
un:f.ons", Economic Journal, 1953 pp. 33-69. Unfortunately, there has been 
a good deal of unnecessary confusion over the use of the concept of 
"complementarity" in the two senses. 
(3) J. Spraos: "The condition for a trade-crf:o.ting customs 'union", 
Economic Journal March, 1964 pp.10l-1Q6 and also "~omment,~" by E. Miohan, 
Economic Journal 1965 p.238 and J. Spraos.Economic Jottrnal 1965 p.24l. 
; 
~! 
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6. 
fore, would be pessimistic of the outcome. 
(b) A second prediction ig that gains will be greater the higher 
the proportion of trade with . partnerP, considered ex-ante, 
and the less 'in. th the '\'lorld o\l.tside. This condition should be taken 
, 'together with another which indicates that a customs union is more 
likely to raise welfare the lower is the total volume of foreign trade 
(1) 
as a proportion of GDP. As Central America derives about 15,% of its 
GDP from foreign trade (i.eo imports and exports) and had only 4% of its 
2 
total trade, intra-regionally, at the inception of tho Common Market, it 
'Would appear to fall into the, category of "countries which are likely to 
lose from a customs union •••• are those in which a low proportion of 
; 
trade is domestic especially if the customs union does not include a high 
proportion of their foreign trade". (2) In this respect the Central 
American nations have much in common with other underdeveloped areas (in 
1958 the proportion of intra-resional trade in West Africa was 1%; the 
Middle East 10%; and Latin America 9%) and less in common with \1. Europe 
where 30% of total trade was intra-regional at the start of the EEC. How-
ever, even if ,.,e limit ourselves to "efficiency" gains it is still con-
ceivable that small volumes of intra·regional trade could be attributable 
more to poor transport, lack of knowledge and non-economic barriers rather 
than lack of opportunities for specialisation. 
(c) 1radi tional theory suggests that the gains are likely to be 
greatest the higher the initial tariffs between the partners nnd the 
lower the common external tariff. This condition seems likely to be met 
in Central America as there are generally very ~igh tariffs on locnlly 
produced manufacturers and agriculture and low tariffs on impor~caPital 
goods and raw materials (see Appendix 4). 
(1) R. Lipsey: "The Theory: of custOOls unions: or eeneral sUrvey", 
Economic Journal, 1960, op. cit. p. 509. 
(2) J. Mende: lITheot:! of Customs Unions", op. oi t. p. 109 
'---- --- - --,--" -' 
, 
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Cd) There has also been raised, the importance of the size of union 
as a determinant of success. (1) Common sense Vlould lndicate that the 
larger the unit, the greater the scope for specialisation but there are 
limiting factors of transport costs, and negotiating complexities with 
large numbers. 
Generally speaking the predictions of the traditional theory do not 
offer a very clear indication of gain from.economic integration in LDC's, 
and this has been used to cast doubt on the medium of inteeration.(2) How-
ever, it is more convincingly explained by the unrealistic assumptions 
of the theory~ thus, "the traditional theory of customs unions will be of 
. 
little use for evaluating the desir~bility and the possible consequences 
of integration among less developed countries"(~) and "l seriously 
question the applicability of the generalisations of the theory of customs 
unions which relate complementarity, competitiveness and trade patterns to 
t~e potential gai~ from customs unions".(4) No doubt it could still be 
(1) The question of "economic size" is discussed later, in chapter 5. 
The question of what constitutes an • optimum' sized regional unit has been 
an important policy isr-ue. The CAm~ is due to integrate ultimately with 
LAFTA and there have been discussions of the possibility of includir.g 
Panama in the present framework: Ta'I't~s GOTllez Ramon: "Aspectos Economicas 
de la Vindi!-~c.i.on de PAnamA. al Mercado Cornun Centroa,merlc,an.Q," Panama 1966. 
E. Del€,'ado, F. de Sola and E. Lizano: "I,a. Part.icinacion de Panama. en la 
ProBtamArui'e Integra.cion Economica" Guatemala 1967. 
'11he Dominican !lepublic also applied for membership in 1968. 
,(2) R.· Allen: "Integration in less developed areas" OPt cit. "An extremely 
low level of economic development will tend to keep economic bencfits to a 
minimum ••• the higher the stage of economic development the greater the 
potential gain". pp.315-29. 
(3) 13. 13alassa: "Economic Development and Integra.tion" CEMLA Mexico 1965, 
p.35. 
(4) R. Mikesell: ".The'theory of common markets as apnlied to regional 
,arran,o,-ements among developins: countries" in ",!pterna.tional Trflde Theo.t.Y..J...!l 
a Developing World" Harrod & Hague (Ed.) 1963 • 
. \ 
Diag. I-I C3S0 studies of static wolfare estImation 
.$tud;y: 
E,.. Verdoorn: 
"./).. customs unions for 
~stern ~roJ?e -
,!dvant.alfes of Feasibil-
fu" World Politics July 
1954 pp.482-500 
T. Skitovs)sy: 
"Economic Theory and 
!,estern European Integration" 
1958 pp.64-70. 
I. Wefuelsfe1.aer:' 
",TI1e short-term effect of 
lOViering import duties in 
Q.ermany" Economic Journal 
1960. pp. 94-104. 
li. B~.1assa & M. Kreinin: 
"Trade liberalisation and the 
Kennedy Round: the static 
,tffects" Review of Economics' 
and Statistics 1961 pp. 125-
138. 
,b.. Sin£h: 
Ph.D. thesis - reference in 
Leibenstein 
"}.llocative efficienc;y: v. x-
.!.fficiencyll American Economic 
Review 1966 pp.392-415.· 
lit John~on: 
~he sains from free trade 
!.ith Europe; an estimate": 
Manchester School 1958 
PP.41-66. 
Effects of a customs 
union in west Europe of 
Scandinavia, the EEC, a.nd 
the U.K: (ex-ante). 
Effects on pattern of 
trade of Customs Union amongst 
EEC countries; Scandinavia & 
Britain in 1962: (ex-ante). 
Effects of lowering tariffs in 
Germany in 1956-1. by more than 
50%: (ex-post). (N.B. this was not directly con-
cerned with a customs union 
arrangement). 
Effect of Kennedy Round tariff 
reduc~ions: (ex-post). 
Gains from trade in LAFTA 
using Skitovsky measure: 
(ex-post). 
Effect on value of UK trade 
from joining EFTA (est. 1910) 
(ex-ante). 
"--~---.----------- ._----
Gai.n to G1~ 
'05% of 
GNP 
.005% of GNP 
\"lith equivalent 
loss to rest of 
the world. 
• OOlEf;6 of GNP 
-03% of GNP 
(from -5% 
expansion of 
trade as pro-
portion of GNP) 
.000015% of 
GNP 
increase in 
trade of £225m -l 
no estimate of ! 
welfare gain: ! 
(possibly about 
- 02%). 
I/' 
o. 
areued that "efficiency" gains represent one element of the gains, thoUS'p. 
there is considerable scepticism een~rally about the magnitude of gains 
from a reallocation of resources seen stat. _ JCally.(l) 
Not a great many studies have been made, endeavouring to calculate eains 
and losses from improved resource ~, ation. However, the results of 
some of them are summarised in Diag. 1-1. Generally, static welfare 
effects resulting from tariff reductions are very small indeed when con-
ver-ted into real income terms. However, with the exception of the un-
published Singh study, the calculations refer to the effect of small tariff 
reductions on advanced industrial economies - a different situation from 
the one which we are studying, but nevertheless, an environment in which 
from theory, one would expect the gains to be greater. It should also 
be remembered that "gains can be realised only if a high deeree of sub-
stitutability of factors and products exists., Countries which have trans-
formation problems will be unable to reap the potential allocation gains 
for trade creation. Specialisation will be increased not by exphndirtgy 
one industry and contracting another, but simply by destroying the new 
unprotected industries and creating unemplOyment~(2) 
If we are concerned with the benefits of trade creation then it will 
be realised most effectively by reducing all tariff barriers through open-
_}ng any individual economy to free trade. The traditional theory does 
not begin to explain why we have a common tariff especially at a higher 
level than existed before integrations it merely assumes its existence. 
"These arguments ••• are equally·arguments for unilateral tariff eiimina-
tion which would have the advantage of entailing no. losses from trade 
diversion".';) For this reason, we must look at arguments for maintaining 
(1) Tayseer Jaber: "The relevance of traditional integrntion theory: to 
*ess developed countries", Journal of Common Market Studies, !t.arch 1911, 
pp.256-216. He refers to the study by Liobenstein "X-national v. X-
sectional efficiencY", American Economic Review 1960, pp.392-415, which 
expresses the view that ••• "allocational or "static" welfare gains from 
customs unions, or a more "com etitive " market structure will be amall com-
pared with the dynamic effects?', (~274-5).. . 
-~-~.~- -- -- - <~~ --~-.- .~~~.---. ___ ~ __ ~ _____ "':_ ......... r_..J.""""""~-, ~ ___ J.._!l ___ .....n. O'----___ ~ _______ ~,_J 
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or erecting a common tariff. From this point of view the 'case for customs \ 
unions rests on the following propositions. (1) \ 
(a) ~ optimal strategy for the area (whether actually optimal 
or believed t.o be) is to bias development to industrialisation realized 
-------,--,_ .... -
by import substitution behind a protective tariff rather than by subsidised 
exports to the world market. (2) 
(b) f\S indust~ is sensitive to 'economics of scale', the costs of 
protection will be less and gains greater, if the market is as large as 
possiblo. Moreover, we are not solely concerned with internal economies 
of scale to the p1a.nt,.but with a whole raIlge of "dynamic" effects derived 
from the expansion of ma~ket size.(3) 
See also K. Griffin "The potential' affects of T .. atin American Economic 
Integration" Inter-american Economic Review Spring 1964. 
(2) K. Griffin & R. Ffrench Davis "Customs Unions and JJatin American integ-
ration" Journal of Common Market stud"ies 1965, pp.13-l4. 
(3) H. Johnson "An economic theory of protectionism ta.riff barga,ining And 
the formation of "customs untons", Journal of Political Economy, June 1965 p. 
280. 
(1) This summary argument is distilled from a whole set of readings which 
(with' differences of emphasis) basically constitute the "dynamic" theory 
of integration e. g. R. Mikesell: "Jhe theory of common ma.rkets as ftpnli.ed 
to regional arr.a:ng-ement among developing countries", OPe cit.; S. Linder: 
"Customs unions and economic development" and H. Kitamura: "J1:conomic 
integra.tion of underdeveloped regions" both in M. Wionczelc: "~ American 
Econo.mic Intee;rationtt , Mexico 1965; R. 13hambril "CustOr.1S unions and unde,r-
developed countries" Economica Internazionale, 1962, pp.235-58. 
(2) In developing this theme one is ignoring those arguments which are 
, ba.sed on the role of integration in helping agriculture; for example the 
- idea tha.t joint negotiation over cornmodi ty exports might improve the terms 
of trade; or the argument that there are considerable gains from special-
isation by crop: M. Yude1mann & F. Howard: nAgricuJ.tural Development 
and Economic InEfITatJ~}1_1F_J..~nJ.merica", Allen & Unwin, 1970. 
/(3) The distinction between "static" end "dynamic" effects is blurred but 
( the following is a working distinction: static effects assume that resource 
~ndowments, tastes, technical knowledge etc. are fixed wllile dynamic effects > are manifested when they are allowed to vary. ( . I , "~, ~ 
---------...----
-.....--.,~--•. ----------, 
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10. 
Integration TheorY and InduRtry Preference 
The first proposition which is at the root of contemporary integration 
theory as applIed to developing countrien is that there is a preference 
within the partner states for a strategy of major structural transformation 
including industrialisation by import substitution which should be pursued 
behind an external tariff if necessary. There is a very large literature 
about the theory of protection which will not be discussed here. It should 
be stressed however that there are some arguments for external tariff pro-
(11 
tection which can be dealt with in nstatic" terms; the "terms of trade argument 
"balance of payments" (2) argument, and the traditional infant industry case. 
We are not directly concerned with these 'partial' arguments, only with the 
case for across-the-board application of·the "infant-industry" concept in-
volving fundamental structural change, leading to industria1~sation.(;) "The 
problem is one of fosterin~ the structural transformation of these economies; 
a disposition to interpret comparative advanta.ge as somethine; which is not 
only changing but which can forcibly be changed; emphasis on the existence 
of unemployed resources which tradi tiomU theory disregards; ....... 
(1) It is argued that if 'trade diversion' results in a fall in demand for 
the imported foreign product and if the region is a significant purchaser 
then a fall in import prices could result. hven if the argumont is theoreti-
cally valid, it is irrelevant to Central America which is a marginal purchaser, 
M. !<'landers: "prebis"R on protecti.onism", Economic Journal 1964, pp. ;05-320. 
R.A. Mundell: "1etiff preferences and the terms of trAde", Ma.nchester School 
1964, pp.1-l3. . 
S •. Arnct ~: "On di::;crj.r!'d.natory V8rRUS non-p'Y'AferentJ~.l tariff policies.'~. 
Economic Journal 1968 pp.91l-9. . 
(2) It is possible for a tariff to be import saving without being import sub-
stituting in as much as the price elasticity of demand for the imported S~ods' 
is positive while domestic supply is infinitely inelastic. Tariffs and control 
can be used to change consumption patterns altogether. 
D. Seers: ".A model of comp~r."l.tive rates of E!:,owth in the world economy", 
Economic Journal 1962, p.45. An example of tariffs being used as an import sur-
charge occurred with the San Jose P~otocol, introduced in 1968. 
(,) We shall also endeavour not to fall into the fallacy of arguing purely in 
terms of "agriculture v. industry", a false antithesis t and a ~ross over-sirn- ' 
plification. Nevertheless the line of areument overlaps to a con!l:i.de:rn.ble 
extent: M. Flanders: "Ap-ricul ture v. inclustry in (levelopment poli~y: tl1!i' 
planners' dilemna re-examined". Journal of Deve1opmont Studies, April 1969. 
pp.111 189.' . 
. I. LiVingstone: "Industry and agricul tura in economic development". Journal of 
"-"-·.-_ .. __ .. _~tud.ie.s. •. ~968. Dn. 329~~41 •.. __ ._ ...... _ ........... _ . __ . __ ... _.." 
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; emphasis on the persistent trend toward 
imbalance dramatically portra7cd in the statistical estimation of the 
"trade gap"; arguments for reducing export dependence in the interests 
of promoting domestic stability; and in pa.rticular the favourable 
Jl (1) 
effects of protection on the influx of capital. The Latin American 
variant of this approach - "the EeL! doctrinel! - rejects the traditional 
role of specialisation in primary products for export to the world economy, 
in favour of manufacturing for domestic or regional production aD a more 
probable source of sustained economic growth; ~is case for industrial-
isation will now be looked at more closely, in context. 
The traditional basis of the Central American economies has been the 
hi~~ly specialized export of primary commodities: "In the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the long search for new export lines came to a 
successful end. ~rom then on, and for the next one hundred years the 
agricultural economy was to be based upon the production of, coffee and 
bananas •••••• The enlargement of the available market through inter-
national tr4de and the growing demand for a commodity which was particularly 
adapted to the capabilities of nations resources, opened unprecedented 
possibili tie~ for economic gain ... (3) 
'-(1) P. Robson: "Economic Integration in Africa", Allen & Unwin 1968, 
pp.34-35. 
(2) This "doctrine" traces its origin mainly to R. l'rebisch e.g. ~,'COmTl1erciAJ 
noliey in underdeveloped countries", American Economic Review Papo;s and 
Proceedings 1959, pp.26l-264. 
See also M. Flanders: "Prebisch on nrotectionism", OPe cit. 
(3) C. Castillo, "Growth and Integration in Central America", Praeger 1966 
pp.12-13. 
" 
12. 
This form of development h~d repercussions familiar to students' 
, (1) 
of "dualism" in a development context with an absence of "spreadu 
effect to the rest of the economy: "there gradually emerged the now 
familiar inertia of the monocultural economy that has limited the 
horizon of possibilities for the expansion and diversification of the 
productive structure of the region. Railway development for example 
, (2) 
solely met the needs of the banana and coffee "Finqueros"!" Though 
the process varied from country to country~e.g. Nicaragua deve19Pcd 
on the basis of cotton later in time, and Honduras's "banana boomtl 
resulted in a spatial-separation of the economy on a North-South basis -
the distortions introduced in this period lasted throughout 1850-1950 
leaving the tradition~ subsistence sector isolated and backward, a 
source of seasonal labour (some forced) and land onto whiCh plantation 
cash crops could expand at the expense of wheat and cotton. 
However, the main problems of the economy after tho 1940's resulted 
from demand defioiertcy for the main export products: "after fifty 
years of steady growth followed by three decades of j.ncreasing deficiency 
the agricultural economy is no longer capable of performing as it did 
at the turn of tho centurytt. (3) 
(1) The word is used in the sonDe of tttechnological dualismlt as used by 
Hla Myint: "1m interpretation of economic backwardness" Oxford Economic 
Papers 1956, p. 46; 
A Lewin: "Economic development with unlimited supplies of 1 ab our tt , op.ci t.! 
and D. Higgins, "Economic Development, II New York 1959, p. 59; to refer 1 
to a divergence within an economy, into one sector which is commercial, \ 
export-oriented and mechanised and another which is based on a primitive I 
subsistence technology. The tem "dualism" is also used to apply to 
spatial dualism as in Italy, (V. Lutz: ttA study in aconomic development tt , 
Oxford 1962 pp,13-42Jand to international inequalities based on 
difference in technology (II. Singer: ttDna.limn Revisi ted": Paper of the 
Institute of Development Studies. Sussex 1970~ 
(2) C. Castillo, Ope cit. p. 19. 
(3) C. Castillo, 2p. cit. p. 60. 
-----.-----~-.".--.<.--
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Ji~tf', .kJ if/I Stl1loture 01 Jbl'ei@ !!rade 01 the Central heJ'icaJJ tOl1lJtJ'ies, 
Guatemala El Salvador . Honduras 
1958 1968 1958 1968 1958 1968 
Coffee 74.2 73.4 Coffee 84;~ 93.6 Coffee 10.9. 20.6 
Cotten 5.4 41.0 Cotton 18.1 14.5 Cotton 2.6 3.8 
& m.) Bananas 13 .. 1 8.0 Bananas 37.6 79.7 Fresh Timber 6.5 1405 
meat 8.6 Cattle & 2.5 7.5 
ORTS Sugar 8.0 Meats 
Others 11.4 83.6 Others 25.2 Minerals 
(silver, 
lead etc. 2.5 7.5 
Others 8.1 34.0 
Total 107.5 226.7 118.0 212.0 71.3 179.0 
i Uicaragua Costa Rica Central .America ! 
! ill m.) Coffee 24.2 22.7 Coffee 50.5 55.3 Coffee 241.2 265.8 
I Cotton 24.9 59.7 Bana.."las 26.5 43.7 Cotton 51.0 119.0 
EXPORTS Sold 7.3 5.0 Cocoa 5.8 3.3 Banal!as 77.3 88.7 
sugar 5.5 Cattle & Timber 10.0 1601 
shri~:ps 5.1 meat 3.2 12.0 Cocoa 5.8 3.3 
timber 300 1.6 sugar 8.7' Meats .& 
Cotten seed 3.9 3.3 Others 5.6 47.8 cattle 4.7 19.5 
Others 16.0 54.3 sugar 2.9 22.2 
Others 59.7 411.5 
I 
I Total 70.4 157.3 91.6 170.8 458.8 946.0 
\ 
\ 
I 
I , 
" 
j 
I 
I \ 
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Looking at the contemporary economic structure we should first 
draw attention to the degree of concentration of exports. As can be 
seen from Diag. l·lthe five economies exports are totally dominated by 
. 
a few primary products, notably coffee. This can be shown formally by 
using an index of commodity concentration (Diag.I;~ though there are (1) 
deficiences in this method. Central American exports are seen to be 
highly concentrated thpugh no more so than other primary producins 
Latin American countries like Colombia and Brazil.(2) 
Such a concentrated pattern would .in theory be expected from a 
system of multilateral trade specialising according'to comparative 
advantage. Indeed, it was seen in that lieht, pre-1914. By contrast, 
an economy so specialised is also highly dependent on the vagaries of 
the market for one producto Two specific complaints have been made 
regarding such dependence. The first relates to short-term price and 
carnings variations when one or two export crops contribute a substantial 
• 
proportion of national income. The second and more important focuses 
are not on fluctuations, but on long term trends;' the slow long term 
grQwth of export demand, and the secular decline in export priceo. These 
two aspects are now briefly looked at, separatel~", 
(1) Notably the fact that many products are split in the standard classi-
fication which would show less commodity concentration than was meaning-
fully the case. However, if we take· 100 as the maximum of total concen-
tration, .then this is almost approached by Mauritus; while at the other 
end of the Deale France has the most diversified exports. There are 
some richer countries (like Australia) with approaching the same index 
and some poor ones with much less (like India). It is interesting also 
to note the sharp decline in concentration over a decade, partly due to 
Common Market trade, but also to diversification into timber, meat and 
sugar. The import coefficient is generally low (under 20) as in most 
other countries with generalised import requirements. 
(2) Michaely found a· strong correlation between export diversification, 
development and industrialisation; M. Hichaely: "Conccmtration of 
Exports and Imports: J~n International canparison" , Economic Journal 
Dec. 1958, pp. 122-736. 
[ources: 
" ~.---~-
DiaE!., r.!. 3. 
A table showing d.ifff:~rences in Cammodi ty concentration indq?;; 
rnnonf~st a sample of countries: 1954 - 1961,. 
~ l2.€4. 
Honduras 63 43 
Costa Rica 60 50 
Guatemala 72 47 
El Salvador 86 56 
Nicaragua 58 47 
Hauritus 99.5 
Colombia 85 73 
Brazil 61 54 
Australia 51 36 
Argentina 29 30 
Japan 24 13 
UK 19 13 
Venezuela 71 
Tanzania 13 
India 22 
France 9 
Notes: the index used is the Gini-Hirschmann coefficient of concentration • 
. - 2 
The index can be expressed as 100 / (xii), where xij is the value of '\. 
x;' . 
country j's exports of i to the rest of the world and xj represents the 
total value of countr,y j's exports in the same period. Commodities arc 
defined in three digits SITe (Standard Internal Trade) categol'ies. The 
index is discussed in A. Hirschmann: "National Power & structure of 
Foreign Trade lt pp. 6-18. 
1954 da.ta and methodology from M. Michaely: "Concentration in Intemntionnl 
trade, or else computed from national data (as in OAS: F£onornic Su~A~ 
of Latin America, 1962 p. 265); 1964 data from P.J. Lloyd: "International 
Trada Problems of Small COWltries", Appendix II and Central American 
figures from World Bank Surv9l (1967) Vol. 2, Table 25 a-f. 
,. .. _-. -.-..... ------------_.,-_.- ,. ,--
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15. 
Deteriorating Terms of Trad~. 
First of all let us take the hypothesis that the export sector 
has been a "lagging sector", due to the influence of declining commodity 
terms of trade; the essence of the Prebisch thesis.(l) The argument 
is very briefly that due to low income elasticities of demand in developed 
(2) 
countries for agricultural products and (most) raw materials, attempts 
by the LDC'a in general to increase output faster t~ the slow growth 
of demand will lead to a fall in prices which because of low price 
elasticity will not markedly increase demand; therefore, a secular 
deterioration of prices over time results in the fruits of technological 
progress being transmitted overseas (to the "centre ll ) from the exporters 
(lithe periphery") while the same does not happen in reverse trade., This 
is because monopolistic influences in the labour markets of the developed 
countries hold up export prices, and the high income olasticity of 
demand for manufactures sustains a high growth of demand for their 
exports. The general explanations for this unfavourable development are 
contained in the FAOr,s Indicative Horld Plan tor agricul turo; "the 
progressive saturation of per capita requirements in those importing 
countries already in higher inoome levels; increased competition from 
sy.ntheti~s; competition fran production in the high income countries; 
import duties on processed products; (and) low allocation of foreign 
(1) R. Probisoh: "Commercial policy in the underdeveloped countrie!", 
op. cit. 
"The Economic development of IJatin America and its principle problems" t 
EconOmic Bulletin .of Latin America. Feb. 1962 pp. 1 - 23. 
(2) The UN "'orld Economic Survey: (1968) gives the following fiGUres for 
coefficients of income elasticity of demand in developing countries (A) and 
industrialised countries (B). ( ',. : . . 
A 
-
Food & Beverages .6 
Crude Ha torial s .5 
Hanufactures 1.9 
B 
-
.75 
• 6 
1.25 
Elsewhere tho incomo elasticity of demand for agriculture and food-
supplies in tho Central American countries is estimated nt .4: FAO 
"Agricul tural Cornmodl ties Projections 1975-85" f Vol II Rome Plh28-33 
"---
I 
16. 
II (1) 
exchange in centrally planned economies for exports of tropical products~ 
Empirical evidence tends to support a.pessimistic view.(2) 
The implications of this for development are essentially that a 
slow rate of export growth arrests the rate of capital formation which, 
depends upon imported capital equipment unless capital inflows can be 
Att~'~e/2.8~~ induced. r~~results in a. "trade gap", a discrepancy between exports 
required to maintain a given growth rate, and actual exports.(3) In an 
extreme form (which is not so evident in Central America) the "trade gap" 
manifests itself in a. gap between imports which are at a tixed minimum ~ 
(fuel, spare parts, capital equipment etc.) for a given growth rate and 
exports at fixed maximum because of supply and demand difficulties. (4) 
~- , 
However, before accepting such an extreme interpretation one would need 
to be convinced of the existence of an nexport maximum", of the im-
..---
possibility of substituting consumer goods by capital goods on the import 
side and on the impossibility of affecting the net inflow of capital. 
This is not the place to review the whole empirical and theoretical 
basis of the hypotheSis regarding commodity exports. Tho question is 
(1) ".The Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development". FAO 1969 
Vol.III p.12. 
(2) e.g. A. llabels: "Industrial Growth &, World Trade!' Cambridge 1963 
p.409 (Survey) and B. Cohen: ".rylhe less developed countries export" of nrim~,:r.;v 
p,l'oducts ll Economic Journal 1968. pp.334-34;. However this would be con-
tested inter-alia. by C. Kind1eberger: "The ·Tems of 'J'rRde" New York 1956; 
S. Von HarblLer: uTerms of trade and economic development", iti''r;conomic 
Development for La,tin American, Ellis & Vlallich (ed.) p. 275-297; '1'/. Baer.' 
"Economics of Prebisch & ECLA" OPe cit. . 
(3) S. Weintraub: "Tho Fore:f.{ffi 'llrade Gap of r;uc'sll l'rinceton Papers no. 48. 
(4) S. Linder: "Trade & trade policy for development" in "Theon:: of economic 
integration" in M. wione~,ek 'loP. cit... . . . If 
£c.o"9""·'" :Gta~ "" £.4;t;... A~ 
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I 
whether Central .America has had this unfavourable terms of trade ex-
perience and \-Thether it has been paralleled by a short .. fall or slow 
. (1) 
growth of export earnings. 
If an estimation is made for the post-war period in Central 
America (Dl:h~ I-~' and as far as 'het barter terms of trade" are con ... 
cemed there is a distinctive decline since 1954-55 when the post-war 
boom in commodity prices ended. Between 1957-62 the coffee price fell 
by 4Q%; banana prices were also adverse. However, the income terms 
of trade which \'lere not so obviously favourable in the "boom" period 
for prices are now considerably improved and havo more than outstripped 
the fall in cO$nodi ty prices up the middle sixties. This is true even 
when intra-regional trade is excluded. Cotton exports benefited 
particularly from volume increases, with the opening up of the Pacifio 
coastal lands. 
(1) This point' leads one to the question raised by Wilson and others 
that the conventional measure of the "net barter terms of trade" 
(N .,. ~ where Pox is a price index for export~, and Pm io the price index 
Pm 
for imports) is not a meaningful indicator of the purchasing power of 
exports which is better defined by the "income terms of trade" 
{I D .!2£ x Qx where Qx is the quantity index of exports~. Assuming 
Pm 
that an individual country is Bufficiently small to have no effect on 
the world prices, and that it has unemployed land and labour there is 
little economio cost (to itself) of expanding its volume of sales, even 
in poor world market conditions. The "/ilson study concludes (on the 
basis of 1950-65 data) that I is rising substantially in many cases while 
N was falling (taking the whole world economy there is an obvious 
causal connection): "the rises that have taken place in I often in the 
fuce of deteriorating or static net bal'ter terms afford an encouraging 
indication that progress can be made even when on general grounds neither 
the initial structure of trade nor the elasticities may have appeared to 
be particularly favourable". There is an underlying assumption that 
exports have a role as a "vent fOr surplus". In fact soma scarce factors 
are tied up even in commodity exports. 
. . 
T. Wilson; R. Sinha,& J. Castree: "The income terms of trade of devoloE-
ing countries" Economic Journal. 1969 pp.8l3-832. 
Ilso G. Heier: "J.ntematipnal Trade & Dvolopment" New York 1964 pp.40-45 
for the significance of various definitions 0fh~~s of trade. ) 
._------,---_.------..... _-- ---_. 
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Another ~~y of looking at this problem is to contrast the 
growth performance as it occurred with growth performance as it 
could have occurred in the absense of terms of trade deterioration: 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Actual growth of 
G.N .Po: 1960-68 
6.5% 
6.1 
5.0 
507 
7.6 
Growth without 
'te'rffi's of trade 
deterioration" 
Source: World Economio Survey 1968 p. 1; 
There was ~omD,all deterioration in the performance of the first 
, 
three countries as a result of the terms of trade; but an improvClment 
in the case of iho other two. The early 1960'0, however, was not a 
very.suitab1e base period as it was tho nadir of the post-war commodity 
price deterioration for coffee and bananas. 
'. 
--------~------ -- ""--------------------
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Di!l.a!i-:-A Commodj ty. p.nd In2.~rarrns of 'l'rc.u9_or~~fim.ef:'.i.£0!!. 
i;Xport~. 1 t 
Guatemala I El :::ialvador Honduras 
I' 
Nicaragua 1. Costa Rica 
I' N I r N I I' , II I N I N I 
1938 ~ . 45 30 74- 47 
1940 76 74 62 :;8 92 87 '74 32 71 53 
.. 
1950 113 97 124 S't 112 99 10J. 53 111 72 
1951 118 89 123 81 109 98 126 93 112 '74 
1952 120 108 ~'7 .l ... 82 117 101 116 79 109 83 
1953 119 117 101 
1954 J.44 115 164 101 121 85 143 99 133 104 
1955 132 116 125 96 121 87 125 126 124 10.') 
1956 J.41 130 121 9'7 J.20 110 128 101 132 79 
1957 128 117 • 120 120 110 100 116 106 120 95 ~ 1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10~ 
1959 83 . 99 91.5 84 101 94 90 90 88 89 101 90 82 
1960 85 105 102 83 102 95 88 83 81 90 '76.5 85 86 
1961 79 92 86 78 101 94 87 100 98 85 72 . 81 84 
1962 '{8 94 88 71 116 lOa 101 98 92 85 79 73 85 84 
1963 r{3 123 109 72 128 115 112 103 98 . 85 81 81 89 84 
19G4 83 132 113 70 152 131 115 115 104 89 95 93 86 95 06 
1965 06 J.54 137 18 112 J.41 114 140 139 91 126 126 80 90 79 
1966 90 193 155 77 162 121 114- 187 177 96 158 142 . 79 102 90 
1967 90 1'12 138 72 166 123 114 200 190 97 165 148 70: 113 HS 1968 91 197 154 . 75 20, 152 66: J.4J. . 112 
1969 92 72 • 203 150 ~ 
- -~, 
N: Cc. ...... -i~ ~\O£f~~ . ... 
l:: ~W4. -'l~. ~ t~· 
. , 
I J: ... .... -' . ' . . . . .. D;c~:..s W"it' ... t..o~lc.v~l ~ • 
'" ~U1'co: IMF Financi~l Statistics. 
. . 
. ~ 
.' 
• It • 
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,'. 
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Long period improva~nts in income terms of trade mask changes 
in coromodi ty composition (even if '{Q exclude common market trade) and 
the relatively more favourable picture shovm by the income terms of 
trade is partly due to supply flexibility as well as increased volumes 
of the traditional specialist crops. 
As regards future capacity for increasing export receipts most (1) 
sources have been pessimistic though the picture is variegated. 
(1) (a) the OAS predicted (wrongly) a 2.7% growth rate in export income 
over 1962-67 which could be as hieh as 5% or as low ao~; OAS (Pan 
American Union) Economic Survey of Latin America 1962 p. 295. 
(b) lInnsen predicted a 3"4% export income growth rate from 1966 
cf. :;-.~/~: R. Hansen: "Central, America. Regiona.l Integration and 
Economic Development" National Planning Association 1967. 
(c) The \vorld Dank has predicted over 1965 .. 10 a decline to a 2.~ 
growth rate in incomes from exports rising to 4.~ later: World Bank 
Report (1961) Vol. I Hain Report pp. 11-15. 
(d) One can also gain some insight from the national plans wh:tch the 
follol-ling proj.ections for extraregional export receipts. 
in traditional exports 
(i) El Salvador: a growth rate of 1.9% only~is predicted over 
1968-12 as against 8.~ for all exports and ~ for GDP.' No growth at all 
is anticipated in coffee receipts. This pattern is consistent with the 
slQwing of growth in the later 1960'0 in this sector: El Salvador: 
"Plan de desarollo economich :y social 1968-72" 
(ii) Guatemala: over 1910-15 a growth rate of 2~~~ in traditional 
non-Central American exports receipts is anticipated, with an absolute 
decline in coffee receipts: Guatemala: "Plan de desarrollo: 1911 ... 15" 
Whereas in these two cases the growth of extra-regional exports has 
been below the regional GDP both before and after the planning period 
the picture is quite different in, 
(iii) Honduras: in the 1969-12 planning period export growth rates 
(outSide Central America) were t~ rise 5 .. 6'fo; though this was follo'l'ring a 
period in which banana receipts had more than doubled since 1962. 
Honduras: "Analysis de la economica nacional en 1969 X perspectives parA. 
1970-71 ". 
(iv) in Costa Rica: 1968-12 planned extraregional trade increases 
ot 20% were forecast,mainly on the basis of banana growth, following a 
period of slower growth when coffee was still the dominant crop. By mid 
1911 the predicted growth had materialised. Costa Rica: "Provisions del 
desarrollo economico y social 1969-72 y plnnes del sector publico" 
(v) in Nicaragua: there is no plan but for the early nin'eteen sixties 
there was a very substantial expansion based on cotton (over 1~ p.o.. 
receipts increase for 1962-61). 
~ l, ,,,,--, _____________ '--------
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Some crops have favourable prospects, notably banrulas. Others have 
served as a considerable source of growth, notably cotton, but also 
sugar. "In this connection as in many others in economic analysis, 
aggregation is a tool which has greater power than finesse".(l) Only 
in the coffee industry is the scene generally bleak and future prospects 
are inhibited by the terms of the International Coffee Agreement anQ 
past overproduction leading to surpluses. Part of the ~~ '1s that 
coffee is still profitable at existing prices and existing export taxation 
plus quotas are an inadequate constraint.(2) The'general problem is 
, supply inflexibility as rauch as demand qeficiency for there are many 
alternative lines of production such as meat, foreBt products~ seafoods, 
fruit and vegetables with good export prospects and ecolog~cal suitability.(3) 
There are, however, problems with these "new" products:(4) competition from 
established producers, health regul,ations, transport and marketing problems, 
, (5) 
lack of responsiveness of traditional landovmers. 
; ~hat cannot be doubted is the cQntinued importance of 
the'commercial agricultural export sector.(6) Tradi~ional exports still 
contribute well over l~/o of regional GNP directly (not counting multiplier 
effects)}~?~iS the major source of foreign exchange. The precise point 
.-(1) M. Flanders: "Prebisch on protectionism" OPt cit. 1'.346. 
(2) World Bank Report (1961) Vol. II Main Report, p. 12-14. 
(~) R.M. stern: "Policies for Trade Rnd ))evelopment", International 
Conciliation No.548 May 1964. 
(4) See page 43. 
(5) "Latin America"; Oct. 1911 refers to the large scale misuse of World 
. Bank development funds by cattle ranches in Central America as being typical 
of efforts to diversify in the large-farm commercial sector. 
(6) However, it is also of note that recent discoveries of bauxite (Costa 
Rica) and nickel (Guatemala) will introduce a new source of foreign exchange 
earnings. 
(7) The Guatemalan Plan 1969-72 1'.;0 makes an assessment of the multiplier 
for exports as 3· 6 as compared with 2· 72 for Government consumption and 1.28 
for Government investment. These figures seem improbable, and more plausible 
values are discussed 1n ch. 3 • 
~----------------
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at which one should continue to invest scarce resources (capital, skilled 
labour and also seasonal labour) in ~his sector rather than manufacturing 
is iueally a matter for a general equilibrium programming mOdel~(l) 
~~) in the absence of such planning tools one can merely say that there is a 
predisposition to believe that at least after an initial infant-industry 
period) • /' resources could be morc productively employed in manufacturing 
than in traditional exports, where there are diminishing returns, especially 
in Guatemala and El Salvador. There is some, if qualified, support for 
accelerated industrialisation, from "terms of trade" deterioration. 
mxPort Instability 
The other basic objection to specialisation of production in 
primary products for the world market is that it results in excessive 
"instability". Indeed, the World Bank introduce their survey of the 
Central American economies by saying "variations in exports which have con-
stituted 18-22% 6f GDP in the last decade have markedly influenced invest-
ment, imports and national output tt .(2) It is argued that these fluctua-
tions are inevitable given the commodity concentration of trade; and the 
low price elasticities of demand as well as the uncertainties in. 
• . in supply which are characteristic of the main export ~ ..... ' 
products. 
(1) Consideration of potential returns to scarce factors is in Dlarked 
.~ 90ntra.st to the "vent for surplus" approach to the traditional export 
sector - which assumes an infinitely elastic supply - and which requires 
abundant land and zero opportunity cost for the employment of factors. 
Bla Myint: "The Classical theor;x: of 1nternation1tl trade in underdeveloped 
countries" Economic Journal 195/3 p. 317. 
(2) World Bank Report (1967) Vol. I Main Report: Summary & Conclusions p.{i) 
~ II;' --------------:..-------
However, recent empirical work (notably by Mcllean) han co.st 
considerable scepticism on the degree of severity of this problem 
in eeneral: (1) "while not denying that problems of export instabi1~ty 
can be serious for some countries, recent statistical work in the field 
has cast doubt on the frequently argued premise that the magnitude of 
fluctuations in export earnings of LDC's is significantly larger than 
that of developed coUntries and has questioned the seriousness of the 
damage caused by export instability to LDC's in general". (2) MacBean 
made a study of 45 LDC's and 18 DC's over a twelve year period using a 
Coppock index (the log variance about a trend curve). In all cases the 
figure is below that for the average of the LDC sample and even below 
that of the DC-sample. 
Diagram 1-5 Bhowin~ measurement of instability of 
export values by Coppock index 
,I,' MacBean II Erb. and Shlavo-Cam,po 
All countries (mean) 21·8 t- Dev. 11- 5} 45LDC's 23·1 st. Dev. 12'9 LDC sample (mean) 13-4 18 DC's 17·6 st_ Dev. 7·1 DC sample 6,2 
Costa Rica 14' 3 Costa Rica 12·6 
Guatemala 10'7 Guatemala 9'9 
Honduras , .. ; ... ,..,,~~... •• 16·1 Honduras 13-2 lUcaragua ~----.~);~ 14·2 ::'Uicaragua 14,6 
El Salvador 13' 9 E1 Salvador 8'4 
(1) A. MacBean: ":EXport Instability and Economic Development" London 1966 
also J. Coppock: "Q9ncentration in International Trade", New York 1962. 
13. Massell: "Export concentration and fluctuation in export earnings: 
X-section analYSis". American Economic Review March 1964 pp,47-63. 
(2) A. MacBean. ;thid.. ' 
'. 
( 
I 
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Further tests have been carried out over a longer time period 
(1946-66) using the MacBean sample and index~l) The "stability" of !' 
the developing qountries expo,rt proceeds is even more emphasised. ", I 
(;. • 
\\ 
"In every caso except Nicaragua the economies are more "stable" 
than in the Mac]ean study, and all five economies are more "stable" than 
the USA, France or Australia. It is still possible to argue that the 
measurement of instability used is defective, as there are differe~t 
measures. (2) However, Kingston using a different measure (the ave'rage %' 
deviation) shows that the Central American economies with one exception, 
, , 
have more stable export proceeds than a 112 world sample averaee or a 
19 Latin American country average over 1948-65, while Venezuela, ~razil 
and Argentina have much 'worse problems. (3) The evidence of llacBean and 
others is equally negative when they try to corre~ate instability with the 
,-
stability of the eCQnomy in general, or to specific components of it, i.e. 
regarding the effects rather than the degree of instability. '!he author 
ran a correlation between ch"'nges in export earnings and changes in GNP 
over the'1950-67 period.(4) 
. c:~~~~"i:i~· 
(1) G. Erb and S. Shiavo-Campo: "Economic Instability level of development 
and economic size of IJDC's." Oxford Institute o~ Statistics 1969 pp.26;-283. 
(2) Unpublished paper by Susan Turnbull, Glasgow University. 
J. Clarlc Leith. "A decline in world export instability: a comment" 
Oxford Institute of Statistics August, 1970. He uses "deviations from n 
connected linear trend" as a measure of instability and finds significant 
discrepancies from other measures • 
. (3) R. Kings ton: "~I~ns:::-t~a:.;b~i:.=l.::::.it'::"'I-:f:::.:;::~~o:..:::r;.,;;t~P=:-r:;;.;o;..;c;;.;:e~e.:;:d,;;.s ~o:;.;;f;...:=S:.;::.e,;:;.l e;;:.:c~t~.e:.:;:d~rJA.~t~i~n 
American Countries, 1948-65". 1970 Microfilm. 
(4) This procedure ignores lags, which may be significant. 
~-----------------
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Correlation coefficients 
Honduras -47 (significant at 9~~ of confidence). 
Costa Rica' 
Guatemala .~6 (significant at a 9~~ level of confidence). 
San Salvador • 33 (significant at a 9<Y/o level of confidence). 
Direction of fluctuations 
Honduras (12 out of 17 fluctuations the same way) 
Costa Rica " " " " 
Guatemala 
(1 out of n 
(12 out of " II II " " 
San Salvador (1 out of 16 " " " " 
Except for Honduras (Wllich also has consistently high instability 
indices) these are rather poor correlations though the results are of 
limited value because of the approximations and smoothing which (one 
suspects) distort the official natio~al accounts. 
One is inclined to treat the "instability problem" as not of serious 
dimensions.' Some 9f the instabi1ity~which is of quantities rather than 
price is absorbed domestically by buffer stock arrangements, marketing ~ . 
board policies and counter cyclical policy, but in fact there is no evidence 
that these are vi tally important. More probable is the stabilising influence 
of expat'riate o!f!1ership (in bananas especially) which can ensure that some t 
instabili~y~~~~;t proceeds is borne by head office and is not reflected j 
in the receipts of the local operation.(l) 
(1)' Also much of the instability which existed gener.ally prewar has been 
largely eliminated by successful counter cyclical policies in the richer 
countries: L.E. Stekler: "F-ffects of U,S. Business Fluctuations of Inputs 
.of Primary Commod! ties" Yale Economic Essays - Vol. 9 No.2 1969 pp.202-289 
Central American central banks also hold smaller reserves than most other 
countries. 
Rearnes a,:;! ~ o.r· !:iDP .as~of~· 
1961 1ml 1961 1971 
.. All 5 6·6 41 53 W.Q.sba.r'f\ He ..... ·,'f~ 3' 8 4·6 36 46 
4 1"'1 Salvador 4' 4 6· 4 21 30 
~ .. Guatemala 5' 3 5-0 40 33 
~ Honduras 3' 2 . 3-1 17 10 
f~ ~}: -------------------------
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The two most important arguments for a reorientation of development 
away from agriculture, namely the alleged secular deterioration of terms 
of trade and instability of the main ex~ort crops, have been dealt with an~ 
the latter, if ~ot the former were found not wholly convincing in t~liB con-
B~ I 
text. pessimism about commodity exports has led to a rethinking of overall 
development strategy based on one hand on restructuring (towards new exports 
and/or industry) and on the other to more self-sufficiency and less trade. 
The import-substituting industrialisation (I.S.I.) approach covers both 
simul taneously • Diversification on the oupply side to produce new agri-
cultural exports is another possible strategy. 
Traditional Agriculture 
Another poss! bili ty is import substitution with an emphasis on agriculture,' 
effecting a transformation of the traditional food producing subsistence agri-
-culture and food producing commercial sectors,(l)using productivity raising 
inputs such as fertilisers, extension services, farm machinery and improved 
seeds. Without doubt there is an unsatisfied demand for locally produced 
- n foodstuffs and this has sp~~~ over into imports in the past as can be seen 
. " 
below; though it should be stressed that there is no economic argument for 
self-sufficiency in foodstuffs rather than any other sector • 
. £,~~~~~~, 
", 
1959 
-1961 
1966 
Source: 
piagram 1-6 showing imports of food~tuffs from outside 
Central America: and intra-regiona.l trade in foooRtuffs 
outside 
5S.6m 
61·6m 
71·6m 
Intra-trade 
IS·lm 
1S'4m 
55·1m 
"EI COMmercio He,d.onal de la Production A8Topecu!'trio en eentr9-
America." SIECA. 1968. 
(1) About half the overall ~entral American agricultura.l production is 
destined for the local market; $623m. out of ¢1,250m. in 1965, bu"~ it is 
difficult to separate out food and non-food elements. 
~ t" ----------
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To substitute theseJ would !lave substantial foreign exchange and of . 
the ¢12m. spent in 1966, ¢30m. was on cereals, ¢Om on dairy products, 
¢4.2m on livestock food, ¢Sm. on salt, ¢2m. on fish, and n good deal 
of this could be substituted locally at least in the long run. Critical 
observers have long recognised the basic stagnation and weakness of the 
traditional agricultural seotor which is a consequence of the Ddualistic' 
nature of the econoIDy~l) Not only has the traditional sect~r been neglected 
technologically, but its earlier effioiency undermined by the loss of 
better land to the plantations, by competition (from imported wheat for 
example) and by the disruptive effect of seasonal plantation labour (Which 
used to be forced) on the efficiency of foodstuff produotion~2) Tho 
Central Amerioan eoonomy became sucked into a vicious circle: "the pro-
ducing sector was left with an insufficient amount of resources to main-
tain a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency •••••• ~ •••• and in the absence 
of governlllent measures 00 0'. 0 food shortages \-Iere met increasingly with 1m .. 
ports from abroad ••• these policies tended to perpetuate the isolation 
of the ~ood sector from the money economy and to favour the production 
, (3) 
of export crops" •. 
·Of the various factors which contribute to the present defects of 
. 'F'~. f'I ' • .:~, ¥II! " ~, 
subsistence proauction are small land-holdings, poor soils, archaio methods 
of production, lack of credit, and "the mos,t important because of the 
pervasive nature of its impact is that of land tenure. Studies testify 
'~,.to the under utilisation of fertile acreage among many large holdings and 
(1) The "dualism" of Central American agriculture is described in relation 
to Guatemala's coffee economy in K. Griffin: "Reform ond DiVersification 
~n a coffee econom:(-the case of CUnte ... ·:tala" in P. strcetcn (m.) I1Unfashion:-
able Economics: Essays in Honour of T. Balop;h". Weidenfeld 1970 pp.75-98 
(2) C. Castillo, OPe cit. pp. 38-42. The general magnitude and effect of 
migrant seasonal labour (in Guatemala) is described in R. AdDJIlS "Crucifi-
cation by Power" Austin,: ,Texas, (1970) pp. 124 .. 1370 
(3) c. Castillo, OPe cit. p. 43. 
r---------------,~-
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the ·over ... intensive cultivation of poorer soils among the smaller 
(1) 
farmers". But this naturally raises political issues which strike 
at the basis of the ppwcr of the ruling .groups in Central America which 
is largelY' vested in land ow.nershiP~2) Suffice it to say that in the 
present political and social structure, traditional agriculturo is unN 
. 
likely to respond rapidly to productvity raiSing inputs. 
To some degree there is no conflict between emphasis on industry 
and simultaneOusly in traditional agriculture. There is some comple-
mentarity in respect of inputs ~ ought in by industry and also in so 
much as the better income distribution resulting from land reform and 
investment in peasant agricul turo would lead to a higher demand for con-
sumer goods, while increased incomes from industry would lead to a higher 
. (:~) 
demand for foodstuffc. This io one of the components of the "balanced 
growth" approach to develoIJl!1.ent. (4) But there is a oonflict too, over the 
allocation of scarce capital resources: agriculture could not be ox ... 
• 
. pected to prosper with land reform alone, only with the application of 
feeder roads, drainage Rystems, storage facilities, rural education and 
irrigation~5) Also tho protection (rather than subsidisa~ion) of either 
. r ... l-:'1;,oH ~~' '" 
(1) R. Hansen;- "Central America. Regional Integration and Eoonomt2, 
Dovelopment" Na.tional Planning Association, Oct. 1961 p. 11. 
(2) The sociology of Central American interest groups is diBcus~ed in 
J. Nyc: "Central American Common Harket" Carnegie Endowment for Internat-
ional Peace, International Peace, International Conoiliation No. 562 
~ New York, 1961. 
, .' .. " This matter is discussed in greater length in Appendix Ilt 
(3) B.F. Johnston & J. Mellor: liThe role of agriculturo in economio 
develonrnent A.E.R. 1961 pp. 566-593. As far as food stuffs are cOllcerned 
Dome additional demand will certainly be required since even if all the 
overseas imports could be oubstituted this would only add 1(~ to the 
present agricultural product destined for local markets (i.e. about ~70Om). 
(ll) R. Ntwcke: "Problems of Capital Fomation in Developing Countries" 
1953. 
(5) United Uations: "A Central American Common Market for Agricul turnl 
CommodH:..ie,slI Economic Bulletin for Latin America Vol. VIII No.1 1965 
p.ll. 
Iv---.-___ --t---. 
agriculture or industry would tend to turn the terms of trade aeainst 
the other. As the level of protection of consumer goods is very high 
and that on newly produced agricultural inputs (e.g. fertilisers; 
machetes) is significant, it is probable that with industrialisatlo!l 
the deterioration would work against the peasant. (1) As with the agricul-
tural expo~t eector, the trade-off between investmen~ in traditional 
Gio\t 
agricul ture and manufo,cturing is not clear. A Until there is a major 
political change relating to the Central American countryside it ia 
likely that any comparison would be unfavourable to the traditional 
agricultural sector. 
Labour - absorbtion by Industry 
There are several other arguments that have been advanced for an 
accentuation of industrial development. One is the existence of a 
pool of 'surplus labour' in the agricultural sector which diminishes the 
productivity of agriculture and can only be used efficiently by with-
drawing it from agriculture. A moderate form of this argument is that 
the marginal productivity of labour is lower in agriculture than e1se-
where (usually assumed to be the 'modern', industrial sector). Another 
version is~~~;~ marginal productivity is zero or negative in agricul-
ture.(2) Labour is abundant, capital scarce; and with a risine population, 
(1) I. Mttle, T. Skitovsky and M. Scott, ",!!ld,ustrz anU:rade .iJl_.SO.~~'\-'\ .. , 
,Developing Countri,es" OEeD 1970 p. 346-47. ~ ') . 
(2) A. Lewis: "Developreent with u~limited sunplieR of labour" The Man-
chester School of Economics and Social Studies; l\!ay 1954 " 
G. Jorgensen: ".The Development of a Dual Econom;y"" Economic Journal, June / 
1961, pp.309-335. Fei and G.Ranis: "Development of the SUlJ?lus Labour 
Economy". Homewood 1964. The argument io summarised, criticised and updated / 
by B.F. Johnston: "Agrlcul,:ture anel. Tr,~~formation in develop..inf,: countries: / 
a survey of resea~: Journal of Economic Literature, vol.7, 1970 • 
. ' ~ 
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30. 
a limited area of fertile land and fixed production coefficients 
there is a deterioration of the situation over time especially under 
condi tiona where. over-use of the land. produces erosion. Labour 
saving technical innovations (tractors or the "green revolution" 
high yield seeds) improve the yield of a fixed acreage of land, and 
add to the pool of surplus labour. If (unskilled) rural labour has 
a zero social opportunity cost, its transfer to industry, at whatever 
money cost, is justifiable: Uin as much as the output of industrial 
products can be increased by an underveloped country without reducing 
the output of agriculture then this is a net gain in real income to the 
economy. And this is regardless of the inefficiency of the industry 
since the alternative is to let resoui-ses stand idle". (1) Protection 
(or subsidisation) enters this argument in as much as market pricing 
is held to overstate the opportunity cost of labour (becnuse of 
maximum wage legisla.tion or ~ionisation) so disfavouring industry 
.... -~ 1 ....... "... ...., ... 'f"" ~ .. ,,'" 
,I, ,_ ~ •• 
. ~ : . ...,. -. .- .~.\. protection of indu." trial 
value added would (indirectly) offset thio imbalance,(2) 
. .. 
~~~~~ .. ..s.' 
Does Central America conform to a surplus-labour Inodel? ·First, 
the population is employed overwhelmingly in agricultUre (Diag,I-7n). 
As far as unemployment is concerned there is little statistical data 
and ~ittle attempt by governments to draw attention to the existence of 
unemployment in their plans or statistical reports.(3) Open unemployment 
(1) s. Dell: '~Trade Blocks and Common Markets", London, 1963, pp.192. 
(2) E. Hagen: "An economfc justification for protectionism", Qua:rterly 
Journal of Economics, November 1958 pp.494-514. 
(3) Of the 1969-72 Plans only that of Costa Rica even discussed the 
manpower implications of forecasts made (PP.91-101) • 
. \ 
\ 
-----------------------------------------------------~ ,,.,. 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Costa Rica 
A. 
1· 5% (1964) 
5% (1961) 
6% (1961) 
1-7% (1963) 
6·8% (1963) 
officiall 
a.ctive" 0 
2.8% 
• 80;6 
3-4% 
(8% in San Salvador of economically 
active; 1961-68). 
I I, 
Source: SIECA; Quinto Compendia Esta,distico 1967 Cuadra A - 1.05 Ii 
Unemployed in the City of San Salvador from p.20-22, Indic~tores de ConAplan 
~pril - June 1969. 
Notes: the "economically active'" population consists of people over 10 years: for 
Costa Rica it is 12 years and over. I 
Diagram 1-7b showing "activity ra.tes" of men and women: "economically 
active tl personal as a percentage of popula.tion in a given aRe group. 
Guatemala: Total population: 
Economically active 
El Salvador Total population 
Economically active 
Honduras Total population 
~ .~, 
EconC~:":=:!:~·active 
Nicaragqa Total popUlation 
Economically active 
Costa Rica Total population 
Ec'onomica11y. active 
.!2.5Q 
2,790,000 
,_ 968,000 
: 34' 5% ' 
.l9.5Q 
1,856,000 
653,000 
352h 
l2.5Q 
1,;68,000 
647,000 
47% 
lliQ 
1,055,000 
330,000 
31% 
l25Q 
800,000 
281,00iL 
35?{ 
.,.l2§A 
4,285,000 
,1, 317,1.2.~ 
3120 
1261 
2,750,000 
807,000 
29% 
. ;1261. • 
1,885,000 
568,000 
300,& 
1.9M 
1,535,600 
476,000 
31% 
1.9.23. 
1,336,000 
400,000 
3<Y'OJ 
Source: International Labour Organisation Statistics. 
1968 
(4,900,000) 
(1,480:000) 
: ~30~) 
l222 
3",0,000 
807.000 
(2~) 
J.96j! 
2,360,000 
? 
? 
19.§.2 
1.520.000 
469,000 
31% 
Notes:", ': ,"Economically active" does not include students and housewives and family 
, workers. 
'. 
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Diagra.m 1-7c showing labor force distribution of CA.CM countries, by class 
of worker, latest census. 
Guatemala 
Class of worker 
. 1964 
All classes 
Number (thousands) l,292·2 
Per cent 
Employers 
Self-employed 
Wage earners and 
salaried employees 
Unpaid family workers ) 
Not classified ) 
100·0 
45'9 
Honduras 
1961 
568'0 
100'0 
1'4 
37' 9 
39·8 
16'4 
4·6 
El Salvador 
1961 
807·1 
100·0 
1· 9) 
21'7) 
67·0 
7'9 
1-5 
Nicaras:ga 
196; 
.475·0 
100·0 
Costa Rica 
196; 
395'3 
100·0 
65' ; 
10·0 
;·0 
Note: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. 
§ource: National population censuses. 
'. 
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is not high (Diag.I-7o.) but in the ca.ses where statistical data io 
more reliable (Salvador & Costa Rica) there is indication of 8-l~~ 
unemployment in the capital city, and E.C.L.A. believes that the "opcntt 
(1) 
rate doubled from 2· 5% to 5% from 1955 to 1965. Participation rates are 
low and generally declining (Diag.I-7b): in part this is due to a greater 
amount of educ~tion amongst the 10-15 year olds, but in Honduras and 
E1 Salvador the large falling off in participation rates is due mainly 
to women withdravd.ng from the labour force. (2) There is an abundant in-
.. 
direct evidence of underutilisation of labour: In Honduras well over 
one half of those "economically active l1 arc unpaid - "family workers" 
or self-employed'''' Then there is the waste of time due to seasonal 
fluctuations ip activity in the country side: "there are no published 
and::availa.ble::Ji.tistorical data on the length of work per year in any of 
the Central American countries and there w~s very little information 
on the length of ihe working week",(;) but evidence suggests that both 
are short.(4) The unemployment equivalent is estimated by one source 
at between 30-4~;6 (5) 
(1) United Nations (E.C.L.A.), Annual Report (1970) p.59. 
(2) The nverall participation rate in·Latin America (1950-65) has remained 
steady at about 35% of the population. 
Estaban Ledeman: "Towa.rds a pollcy on Irnmen rCf10urces in the economic anet 
Bocial develo.nrn~llt. of Latin America": ILPES Chile 1968 p.10. 
... ,_ -'t'"":'". 
(3) U.s. Department of Agriculture, Datelle Institute: "?,rojections of 
,Supply and Demand for Selected A/?iricul tural Products in Centrrtl AmericA. 
,through 1980". 1969 p.10. 
(4) Evidence summarised in lrv. Beller: "TJatin America's unemployment 
problem". Monthly Labour Review Nov. 1970. 'll1e U.s. Dept: of Labour 
Report 345, "IJabour in the Central American Corrnnon Market Countries", 
notea that in Costa Rica 47% of the economically aotive population are 
idle for up to 8 months. 
(5) "fTI.ementos para lA. elaboracion de una Folicia de d.es~rrollo con inte-
eracion para America Latj nat! lLPES Santiago 1968 t (P. 9) and 
Manuel Gollas-Quintero: ",lTndf):rpmployment ll.'ld the marginal productivity of 
labour in the traditional sector of the dual economy in 'maternala". 
Ph.D. Wisconsin (1961) (Microfilm). A recent publication; E. Thorbecke & 
A. stoutje,sdyk," 10 ant and Out utt A. Methodolo A lied to PAru Rnd 
. ~1f. (OEOD 1971 , estimated that effective labour use in Guatemala 
was 56-7C1}~. 
" i 
, 
.. 
i 
Ii 
.l 
.~iA£ram I-Sf showing changeD in employment by sectors (1) (by % of 
economicallY active). 
. '-"'--' -n 
L::t.test Estimate 
195.0 
Gua.temal A. Primary 68·4 
Agriculture (68.2) 
secondary 14· ~ 
Manufacture (11·5) 
Tertiary 11· 3 
El Salva.dor Primary 64·1 
Agricul ture (630 8) 
Secondary 15· 6 
Manufacture (12·3) 
Tertiary 20· 3 
Honduras Primary 71·6 
Agriculture (76·8) 
Secondary 11·2 
Manufacture (9· 4) 
Tertiary 11·2 
l2.5Q 
Nicara.&!a: 
Primary 68·7 
Agricul tura (67·7) 
Secondary 14·2 
Manufacture (11 0 4) 
Services 11-0 
Q,ost.a "Rica: 
Primary -." ;5- 9 
Aericul t{;~~;~'::cl1.k{-?5· 6) 
Secondary 16.6 
(11·5) 
Services 
~ 
66 
14 
20 
59· 5 
(59·4) 
11·1 
(12.8) 
22·8 
63·8(2) 
(63' 5) 
11·1 
(8· 5) 
25.·1 
~ 
59·6 
(58·7) 
15· 7 
(11- 7) 
24·7 
18·6 
(11.6) 
~ 
1966 
64·5 (62.0) 
16·5 
(14·1) 
19·0 
60·5 
17·1 
(12.8) 
22·4 
66.0(3) 
10·5 
23· 5 
l2§1. 
58.0 
18·8 
23· 2 
48-0 
20·4 
I. 
~ ! 
! 
>, 
, 
;. 
Ii I: j: 
I' 
I, 
i 
L 
! 
\' 
I 
Ii 
I: 
r 
. ! 
I· 
r \. 
I I: 
I: 
£lources: .~ UN Demoll;r~phic Yea.r Book 1955 (for 1950) II 
World Bank Report (1.262) Vol. II. Statistical Appendix Table 6 (for 1964) I, 
1969 figures for El Salvador from Ito Yearbook. 
and pate.s Basica.s de PoblA.cion en America TJatinq 1970. t' 
-IN9~es: (1) Primary sector includes a.gricu1ture, mining, forestry, fisheries. ; 
Secondary includes manufacturing; construction and utilities. Tertiary includes commerce (I 
banking, government personal services, transport (except for Guatemala where transport I 
is a 'secondary' activity). ' I 
(2) EeLA adjustment for agriculture employment. 
(3) I Approximations of the Inter American Development Bank. 
11 Ii 
.J 
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However, the model of endemic surplus labour, and the related problem 
of factor price distortion conflicts with local experience in several ways 
and furthermore industrialisation is not an entirely self-evident solution. 
First, rural labour does not have a zero opportunity cost in as much as 
seasonal peak labour requirements on plantations are substantial; a "paradox 
of scarcity with underutilisation of labourll.(l) Second, employment is not 
'costless' as complementary inputs such as capital and skills, housing and 
infrastructure are required and may be under-valued both when used by planta-
tion agriculture and industry, and may make 'the labour supply less elastic.(2) 
Third, it is very doubtful if the marginal productivity of labour is zero 
in rural areas even if we ignore seasonal requirements from plantations, 
Jet assumes extreme land scarcity so that returns to the fixed factor have 
in fact become negative, but in Central America land is not universally 
Bcarce and rectification of the uneven dist~ibution of land-ownership would \~~-' 
release considerable unused "hacienda" land. Fourth the 'factor price dis- '\ 
:i 
tortion' may work mo;e decisively in terma"of a 'traditional v. mode~' 
sector analysis rather than for 'agriculture v. industry' in as much as modern 
industry ~ike the plantation sector, has access to cheap credit from expatriate 
(' 
banks, duty free inputs of capital goods etc. and 'traditional' or artisan 
induBtry whi(~~~~~n}stantial in Central America does not, but has access to 
(1) C. Castillo: OPt cit. p.4~. Unskilled labour is in great demand between 
November and March; in Nicaragua and Guatemala for cotton; in Costa Rica 
for, sugar, coffee and cotton. This phenomenon has given rise to the notion 
of "labour-slack" rather than "surplus labour". L. Reynolds; "Economic 
Development with surplus labour: some complications" Oxford. Economio Paper 
March 1969 pp.89-l0~. 
(2) The crucial importance of skilled labour ia emphasised in H. Myint: The 
.• F.conomics of Developing Countries" London 1964 p.137 and W. 13aer and.M. Ham, 
'''Employment and Industrialisation in developing countries", Quarterly Journal 
of Economics Feb.1966, p.lOO~ 
~ I 
I 
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cheaper non union (often family) labour on similar terms to much 
of the agricultural secto~;) }~fth, and related to the last pOint, the 
considerable range of capital-labour intensities within the manufacturing 
sector means that the possible "absorbtion" of labour by industry will 
depend on which sector '\"ithin industry "Ie nrc dis·cussing. Many 'inter-
mediate' industries like chemicals have a very hi~l (und relutively fixed) 
incremental capital-labour ratio(2)and even modern lieht industries could 
result in a net loss employed of labour if they displace existing artisan 
(:3) 
producers operating very labour";'intensive processes. The employment 
available may vary considerably in composition and unskilled male local 
labour maybe a relatively small component of that demanded. Therefore, 
tho argument is not on~ of 'agricultuIav. industry' but a more specialised 
argument about factor proportions in different sectors and projects. 
Central American expericnce(as far as can be seen) is not conducive to 
the view that 'modem t .;_in~U3try can absorb the supply of 'surplus labour'. 
~Q,.. • -
From Diag.I~ '·.it can be seen that the rate of growth of manufacturing 
employment is mu~h less than the growth of output and less even than tho 
growth rate of population. The rate of increases of employment is ereater 
(1) In ;"'h~~i'Hin'\}racturing sector the % of- employment in manufacturing con-
tributed by the artisan sector was (in 1960) Guatemala 64%, El Salvador 
56%, Honduras 70'/0, Nicaragua 7810, Costa Rica 56% i.e. the majority, (bear-
ing in mind the doubtful nature of much of the statistical material; and 
the arbitrary classification of artisan establishment as having 5 or 
under employees). 
~, (2) There is an enormou~ dispnrity between marginal and averago cnpital-
labour ratios. The average industrial investment is about ¢150.200 per 
\lorking person, but in 1960 it was estimated that new investJUent per 
worker in manufacturing predicted by the development plan~ was: 
1 , 
\ 
! 
II 
I 
. Ii 
I' Guatemala ¢"OOOm; El Salvador ¢2,40C4l:: Honduras ~2,200~H lTicara~a ~4,OOO!;!1 Costa: Rica ¢1,20Q.... - II 
II 
(3) Whole industries ~ike ~lue, rope and shooa are exceedingly vulnerable I 
to this kind of substi 1.-ution of modem :for traditional techniques. Other I 
industries such as textiles, basket-making, carpet and blanket-weaving, j. 
pottery and jewellerYl all exist in Central America and have been ndversely 
affected by competition :from the "modern. sectorlt • However there is an 
inevitable conflict between the need for hi~ler productivity and efficiency 
on one hand (especially if exporting is envisaged) and full employment. 
After all "any society .. , if it could rid i taelf of enoUrJl technique and 
capital, could keep everyone of its ambulatory members fully employed i 
grubbing for roots and berriesll (A quote of J.P. Lewis reproduced in :1 
United Nations 11I}'pe • .need fQJ': an mort-Oriented Pattern of Indnotrifilizntion~l 
Induotrialization and froductivi ty No. 140· ____ ~._> ___ ".,~ _____ • __ ,', ____ , _ __ ~:-j 
~ 
"" 
Dil1trrnm 1-911 showing nvera,r.r,e Annual increMeWn.. employment by the thrQ~ 
main sectors (Agriculture, Indu:'Itry [I,., GervicoR) during' the 1950's &].9hO'I:'. 
CountrY 
Costa Rica 
(1950-63) 
lionduras 
(1950-64) 
Nicaragua 
(1950-63) 
El Salvador 
(1950-6~) 
Guatemala 
(1950-64) 
Output 
Sourc~1 the National Development Plans, 
Di Sectoral Productivit 
) . 
}.960 
, 
,. Agrioulture Industry Services 
Guatemala 44·6 115' 7 311· 4 
.. El. Salvador 55·6 128·0 188,4 
Honduras 61'8 192'3 197·6 
Nica.ragua 60·2 135' 2 191·0 
costa Rica 51'4 132. 7 169,6 
£':<:'.L.A • 
Sou-rce: . . ;..", J970 Annual Report' 
.. . # 
Jinployment 
Agric. 2.1% 
Industry 4'1% Total 
.2'~~ 
Services 4·2% 
Agric. 
Manu. 
Services 
AgTio, 
Manu. 
Services 
!gric, 
Manu, 
Services 
!gric, 
Manu, 
Services 
Diffarencee 
ll1Q 
Agrioulture 
42·2 
46. 3 
57'5 
49'8 
45' 4 
• 'flo 2·1% 
1.8% 
Total 1,2% 
1· 93 
2·12 
~. 3 
Tota.l 2· 3<}~ 
er man 
Industry 
Services 
134·8 261·6 
150.8 182·3 
252.0 146·6 
155'7 169·2 
157·1 150,1 
~---------------------
34. 
in ind'lstry than agriculture with a much greater increase in output; which can 
be explained part by capital intensive processes. 'l'aking the region as E\. ,whole, 
between 1950 and 1968 the induntrial product rose by 6·8%; industrial product-
ivity by 4·1% and thus ,employment in industry by 2·"(0/. On the other hand there 
are indirect benefits because of the derived demand for construction services 
and agricultural inputs which may make industrialisation seem more generally 
a good generator of employment. 
Commercial agriculture absorbed only a small fraction of the increased 
, 
'labour force, partly as a result of slow growth, partly because the laree 
plantations do not, for many crops, employ labour intensive techniques. In 
practice 'surplus labour' was absorbed in small part in industry and more in the 
urban "service sector,;' : street peddling, domestic service, shining shoes 
.J 
and other forms of underemployment which are visible in the capital cities of 
most developing countries: , the service sector "io largely a aponge which ab-
I 
sorbs the 'excess population of the rural areas and its growth represents vir-
tually no in'crease in economic welfare". (1) The productivity of the service i 
1 
\ \ sector (on avera~e) ls, with ind~stry,much higher than of agriculture (Diag.I-9b}! 
but less so at the margin. 
! 
~here may be a good argument for Bubsidising the more intensive use of 
unskille~ labour !elative to capital .(in industry, agriculture, construction or 
'Whatever) in. o'l:'?cr., t9 correct for any factor price distortion, but this would 
........ ~ ....... __ .,"""'".rJ~ J 
not necessarily result in an industrial bias and indeed practical experience 
in most developing countries is conducive to pessimism regarding the role of 
induotrinliaation.(2) Nevertheleas in the absence of revolutlon~~ changes ", 
.... ' _,k > __ •• __ ~~-,~",,-, ... "" ~ ~." •• ..,~.-..... --....--.... "'~ ...... ~-~ ... 
,.,..-~ .. -~ .. 
in society, there is an immediate problem of employing the urban underemployed 
~ in productive work and industrialisation (with related services and supplier 
sectors) oifers the only avenue open.(3) And the situa.tion is continually 
 
deteriorating: in 1970)un~mployment (recorded) had rieenin Ea Salvador to 
(1) A.X. Griffin~ ",R2,nect:tons on JJntin American development" Oxford Economic 
Papers March 1966,p.2. . " I' 
(2) D.Seers: "The role of indllst 
of Modem A.frican Studies 1965, p.4 4. 
UNIDO: '1Recent overall progreSR in Industr1alls~tion achieved by doveloRi~ 
countries" U.N. Bulletin of Industrialisation and Producivity No.1; p.ll. ,I (~) ~~is position is adopted by othera nevertholess sceptical of tho direct ~ 
contribution of industryl R. sutcliffe: "Industry \?'; Development" Oxford 1971 p.58.1 
\ 
• I •••• J 
,/ 
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10·5%, double that of 1961.~, 
External Economics 
One of the moot powerful and frequently repeated arguments for,greater 
emphasis on manufacturing industry io that industrialisation brings in ito 
train substantial "externalities", such that there is a divergence between 
social and private returns justifyin~ government subsidy or protection for the 
sector in general. ~herea8 internal economies of scale in one plant or firm 
can be dealt with in an essentially static framework .:.,:. .... : ... ", ,~ , 
0' the existence of "external economies" can be used 
to constitute a case for industrialisation in general. 'External economies' 
rigorously (and statically) defined refer to the effect of the expansion of 
one f~rm resulting in reduced input costs (or increased input efficiency) to 
another firm; b?t the notion has been used more generally to refer to ,"the 
most important contribution is not its (industry'S) immediate production ••••• 
and immedicate social benefits but perhaps even further, its effect on the level 
of education, skill, way of lifo, inventiveness, habits, store of technology, 
creation of reward.;,(l) Others have argued that because of the "primitive" 
nature of the economies of many developing countries the scope f~~ external ec-
onomies ja greater than in advanced economies.(2) But on the other hand high 
cost production creates direct "external diseconomies" and competition for 
scarce fact!~:.:,~~1:.CJ..'puis up~rioes of scarce factors eener~llY' and creates bottle.! 
necks. Furthermore the existence of external e~onomies cannot be confined to 
manufacturinff and is likely to be manifest in conntruction, electriCity, «as, 
transport, services etc. though they arc probably unimportant in the primary 
prO~Ucing sector. (3) Nor can external! ties be quantified and thin lim! ts tho .. 
1 
I usefulness of the concept. 
(1) '~. Singer: "Tho distribution of fillins between invcstinp,' and borrowinlt, 
cou:itrien", American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 1!.ay 1950, pp.473-485. 
A distinction is usually made between "pecuniary" and "technological" exte:rnal-
i tics (T.Ski tovsky: "Two concepts of extern!;!.l economies" Journal Political j' 
Economy 1954,pp.146-15l). The formor refors to the effect on the level of skill· 
technical knowh~w, etc., on cheapening costs,. .. . . 
(2.) H.W. ArnJt.: "r~ternal' ecoru:>mie~ in economic gro\vth" Economic Record, Nov, . 
1955, p.202. M. Fleming: "}~ternrt.l ecorlomien and the doctrine of b~lnncf)d J 
growth". Economic Journal, June 1955,p.249. . 
(;) P..Bardhan: "External ccOnOmir.lR. economic develonmcnt and the theory of 1 
protection" Oxford Economic Papers, jl'.arc~ 1964, p.52. 
.J 
Another point of tho argul'll(mt concerning "external economia a" io 
the theory of linkages of Hmchman~;) It is arguod that industry ho.s a 
uniquely powerful rolo in oetting up "1inka8estl or ') "input/output" 
connections, ,backward to the producers of inputa and for,,,ardo to those 
industries of which the product io an input. To eive an examplo, the 
establishment of a caustic soda plant in Central America should provide an 
incentive to produce soap and paper pulp which use caustic coda intensively 
and should enable economies of scale to be reaped in olectricity supply 
which is a major input. However, in some cases local production may dis-
courage a forward linkage industry if it is protected and raises the price 
of the input; nor is there any guarantee that backward linkages will be 
for.med locally rather than overseas. In practice the eotablishment of 
• screwdriver' assembly industries tends to lead to research and labour 
intensive (and scale sensitive) production beine done elsowhere. In omall 
countries with few input-output connections one would not realistically 
" (2) 
expect demand to .be mutually reinforcing. An attempt to give some empirical. 
backing to these generalisations was made by drawing up a crude input-output 
table tor tho manufacturir.~ sector based on the very limited material avail-
able." fhe author constructed a table based on 1967 data from El Salvador and : 
" " (Dia,~.J ... lOa. and lOh'. 
an earll.er ~~~le for Costa Rica is simplified and reproduCed. ).Thouel:! one 
• C:-"}<~ -..... ~ ... "1.., sJ;,.t 
would que~tl~;th~ingfulness of the coefficients which nre based on 
C':-
static assumptions and on dou~_~.rul f (N.D. 'the largo reSidual, !tothorott), 
It is clear that there are many blanks in tho table and most coefficients 
'-
are ver,y small, even if intraregional trade transuctions are cmloidered. Tho 
scope for substantial "linkaGe" formation io not at all olear from t he tabl~.1 
I 
The situation is evon lesa helpful in aBriculture: total material inputs 
(3) (for Guatemala) wero estimated at 9.~ in Guatemala; mostly fortilisers. I 
(1) A. Hirschmrml1: !t1..he strategy for Economio DAvAlopml"'.nt", Yale University, j' 1958, Chi 6.. - ,. -
~2) A. H~~chmann: "The poli,ticnJ economy of irnport".Dubstituting in,dustrinl ... , 
:Lsntion ~n TJatin Ame:r:icn", Quartlory Journal O,f Economico Feb. 1969 pp.l ... 3"2:" I 
(3) C. Fletcher, E. Grabor, W. Herrill & E. Thorbocke: "Guatemala's Economio:; 
the role of Aericulturoll UniVersity O,f'Iowa, p.23. 1 
J 
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Note~1 1. the coefficient includes regionally imported as well as locally 
~roduced goods. A 
2. only four deoimal ~laces considered. 
El Salvador industrial census statistics, as reproduced In t~e 
statistics or the Planning lAiniatry (1967). 
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~r~dEstry Prefer~ncet 
Bearing in mind the heavily qualified case for Central America indus-
trialisation under each of the heads discussed, does this constitu.te nn 
argument for protection on a regional or national basis, on non-static 
grounds? To some extent this is less a question of 'yes' or 'no' but of 
degree. lJ:'here is a clear difference of emphasis betlleon Nurske who argued 
for protect~o cases where tariffs were modest and no disin-
centive to exports, and the earlier v~itings of Prebisch which endorsed 
(1) 
more indiscriminate industrialisation. The basis of much modern writinG 
on the theory of customs unions is that vThether or not the governments are 
correct to adopt an industrialisation strategy, the fact is that mOllY or 
most developing countries do in fact regard industry as a "collective con-
sumption good" and this is taken as given~' "Concern is bound to concen-
trate on the potentialities of a customs union for increasing the industrial 
output of the country and the efficiency of its industrial production 
rather than on the potentialities for satisfying private consumption demand 
at lOvTer cost by increasing imports, but to regard these inputs as n cost 
rather than a benefi t~(2)Cooper and J-1assell erect the basis of a "general 
Lr 
theor,r of customs unionY for developing countries on the premice: We do 
..... 
not attelL~;;':~~.::;"'~::amine the conditions under which n protectionist policy 
makes good sense; rather we accept industriali$ation as a legitimate policy 
gcrlI. and consider how membership in a customs union may enable a less 
",developed country to achieve more economically the ends served by protection. 
1 
I 
, 
I, 
! 
------------------------------------------------------__________________ I 
(1) Prebishh: "Economic develoPplent of Lntin America: its ;principle problem!?". : 
His later writin.~s Deem to show more sensitivity to the costs involved: : 
ttTovTal'ds a D;xEamic DeveloEmont Policy .for Lntin America" U.N. (E.C.L.A.)1965 : 
p. 71. 
~~ R. Nurske: "Patterns of trl'lde and dovelo;gment" in "EqUilibrium and m:owth 
in tho 'varld EconomYJ.. 1961. . - . . 
This difference of viei'l as hiehlighted by B. Balassa: "Rep:i.onru. inteEg'ntion 
and trade 1iberalisation in Latin A.meric~H" Journal of Conwon Market ... 
StUdies, Sept. 1971 p. 59. 
(?) .Jt~G. Johnson: "An econEmic the.o:ry o~ protectionism", Journal or 
Po11t1cal Economy, June 19~5 p. 280. 
--.,~--------------------.---------.---.-- .. - ... ~-~ .... -'------
.~ 
Specifically we aSAllme that economic planners in a lesn (3fJv(>J.op(~d 38. 
country may be wilJ ine to accept some reduction in national income to 
h ' , ., d t 'l d t' ,,(1) . ab ~ove an ~ncren8e 1n 1n us .r1a pro uc 1on. Johnson evolved n 
similar theoretical fra.mclfOrk simultaneously, based on the ideas of' Breton 
rnd others. (2) Both represent an attempt to reach an optimal solution 
under second-bost assumptions. 
One way of qu.antif'yine the "industry-pref'crenceu notion is to use 
the concept of "normal" levels of industrialisation. It has been sham 
. 
that there are sOITIe general patterns in the level and structure of' manu-
facturinr, industry and in the composition of manufactured imports, ~ich 
-
take place as the result of different rates of growth in the demand and 
( 3) 
supply of difforent products as a country progresses. In the t\olO most 
important studies, of the United Nations and Cheney, regression equations 
were derived by X-section analysis which "explained" the level of in-
dustrial value added and its strUcture by the variables of per capita 
(4) 
income, and size of country (population size as a proxy). These results 
have been used in several cases to decide on the liD" or "de6I'ee of 
industrialisation", the actual manufacturing valuo added as a proportion 
, 
. of that predictedJ the assumption being that any difference must be 
(5) 
attributable to something specific such as policy OriE,~ltation. These 
(1) C. Cooper and B. Massell: "!owards a' Reneral. thoor;y of, cus,toms unions 
for dev'::,"_-'''':·~A.:.tcountries''; Journal of Political Economy, Oct. 1965 pp.742 .. 
47. 
(2) H.G.' Jolmson: "An economic theory of pro-tectionism, tariff' bargainintr 
and the fonnation of ,customs unions". Joumal of Political Economy 1965 
pp. 256':83 • 
. ~ A. Breton: "Econ91.Ilics of Nati0E.a~" , August 1964 Pp. 376-87. 
American Economic Review . (3) H.B. Chenery: "E£tt,terns of, industrial grow~" Sept. 1960 PP. 624-54. 
Uni ted Nations: itA Study of Indu.strial Growth", ~e", York, 1963. 
s. Kuznets: "G"uantitative As"pects of the Bconomic ~o,ofth of Nations" 
Economic Development and Cultural Change (Supplement) 1957. 
The general equation is of the form; 
Log Vo .. ao + bo log Y' + co lop P '<lmro Vo .. manuf.acturing va~ue 
added per capita in t~.x 10 at 
1953 prices. .I 
(5) As for example in A. Stoutjesdijk: 
'~Normal Patterns of Industrialisation 
• ~n East Africa" l'lakcrcre Fapers no .• 
360, 1966(unpublished) , 
and 
S.R. Lewis: "EQQDOmic Policy and 
. Industrial Gro:vth in Pakistan", 
y ~ incomc per capita at 1953 
u.s. dollars. 
P A popUlation in millions • 
bo = income clastici t-y of manu-
facturing output. 
co A popUlation elasticity of 
manufacturing output • 
___ ._ .. ___________ ~_··'_'_· __ ·'_~~.~L~Q~D~d~Qn~lL9~6£L2 .• 
~ ... -~ '-~----
equations were used to tell us something about "D" in a Central American 
context bearing in mind that the exercise is frought with methodological, 
statistical (and logical) difficulties. These, and the results, are fully 
discussed in A~pendix 2. The calculations in the Appendix show that until 
1967 and later, all Central America countries were substantia.lly "under-
industrialised", with the possible exceptions of E1 Salvador, in terms of the 
index "D". At a sectoral level the direction of the deviations eive an ind.i-
cation of strong bias in development; generally towards "traditional" food, 
tobacco, textiles and clothes, and away from ttintermediate" and "capital fl 
goods. One must treat the findings of this type of comparative analysis 
with considerable reserve, the equations are after all of no normative or 
causal significance, but merely represent the best fit of a large sample at 
one moment in time. However, the figures do appear to justify the view 
that industry is deficient in Central America for the size and income level 
of the five countries, and within the manufacturing sector there is a de-
(1) 
ficiency the "non-t~aditiona1" lines of production. 
. In Central America industrialisation has always been assumed to be the 
mai~ object of the common market. In 1956 when the CACM "as being conceive(t, 
a local "economist wrote "the case for economic integration depencls primarily 
on indu~trialisationlt.(2) Whether or not this doctrine is correct is not 
.-..... 
. C::~::::.::r::..;~' 
proven. However, it is not crucial whether or not it is correct in order to 
justify the existence of econonic integration only that the policy makers 
believe it to be correct. 
D{tf:,e.l'~nt Approaches to Industrialisa.:liE!! 
The connection between the case for industrialisation and that for 
economic integration is that integTation lowers the economic cost below that 
which would prevail in a national market where economies of Bcale cannot be 
exploited to the full. 
(~) B. Hoselitz: "Economic Development in Central America", Weltwirtahafts 
Archiv. 1956 pp.267-308. 
(I) It should alao be stressed that mu~h of Central America's current 1ndu~­
trial production is in very small artisan establishments (five or fewer workers). 
In 1962 in Central America, there were 150,000 industrial workers in factories 
and an estimated 210,000 artisan employees; with a value added per capita of 
only one quarter. ( 
40. 
However, there are various steps in the argument which need to be 
scrutinised; (1) first, co\ud not an expanded market not be achieved by 
exportin6 manufactures to the world market (if necessary with the aid of 
subsidies)? 
(ii) second, are the possibilities for import substi tutionr! in a 
national market exhausted, assuming an inward looking patten} of development? 
. 
(iii) 
pt' U4.t~ __ ~~c-/ 
third, can economiCl~scale be realised best within a~common market 
arrangement? 
Exporting Manufactures to the World Market 
Manufactures could be -expanded by subsidising exports or protecting 
import substitutes with tariffs. On a purely theoretical level, with 
perfect markets, homogeneous products, perfect knowledge and certainty, 
nascent industry would be better protected by subsidies bepause thcre":CBlt'r, 
be identical production effects without adverse consumption effects to aomes-
tic buyers. It is also argued that subsidies should be used in preference 
. 
to tariffs in correcting factor price distortions (like overpriced labour). (1) 
On a practical level subsidies have been supported on two p,rounds. First 
because bigh tariffs tend to have not only adverse consumptions effects for 
domestic buyers, but ',for other industries whose costs are pushed up and 
whose exp~~6~;g~iitiveness is consequently erpded~2) In as much as 
expensive tariff protection also leads to overvalued currencies exporting 
is further handicapped. Secondly it is argued that in m~ contexts 
leas foreign exchange is saved by import Bubsti tuM. on than if the same 
scarce factors were employed in exporting. This is because it is 
(1) H.G. Johnson: "ORtimal trade intervention in the preflence of dornesUc 
distortion" in R. E. Baldwin et al: ",Trad.e. Growth and the Ballmce of PBYJ!lents", 
Chica{!;o 1965. 
J. I3hagwati & V. Ramaswami: "})omestic distortions, tariffs Pl..nd the theo::z;y of ~ 
optimum Bubsid;y:lI Journal of Political Economy, JJ'eb. 1963. 
(2) I. Little, T. Skitovsky & M. Scott: It,Industry and Tra.de in some Dovelop-
inp,' Countries" OPe cit. pp.12B-144. . 
P. Streeten: "The Case for Export Subsidies": Journal of Development Studies, 
1968 pp.220-253. 
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administratively easy to impose tariffs even to the extent of highly 
inflationary "promiscuous protectionl1 (l)while e).."'Port subsidies require 
government expenditure and impose a fis~al bnrden.(2) There are also 
stron5 GATT obj~ctions to export subsidies for reasons that are not par-
ticularly related to the problems of developing countries.(;) Because 
tariffs are eo 'easy to impose, relative to subsidies, levels in many semi-
industrialised Latin American countries are very high. There are many 
horror stories - nominal tariffs of several loog,·. and effective tariffs 
even higher. (4) 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott estimated that an average 2~~ effective 
protection rate for manufacturing was probably justified to allow for the 
eflect of externalities and factor price distortion, certainly no more.(4)a~~ 
a protectionist like Prebisch,has been moved to remark "the criterion 
. 
by which the choice was determined (in many countries in Latin America) 
was based not on co~siderations of economic expediency, but on immediato 
feasibility, whatever the cost of production. (5) 
(1) J. Viner: nlnter.na.~iona.l Trade and. Economic Development", Oxford 1957,9.41-
(2) This is not sO much an economic as an administrative problem. Even there, 
the difficulties are probably exaggerated. Taxes could be raised on other 
cornmodi ties t':,'': ':'~Y"llay, import substitution also leads to loos of revenue be-
cause of import duties forgone and only partially offset by excise duties. 
Another great virtue of subsidies in this connection is that reluctance to ex-
tend them may lead to continuinG government supervision of efficiency in the 
subsidised enterprise in a way that tariff protection does not. In this thcy 
combine the virtues of planning and the priae mechanism. 
(3). Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
(4) United Nations: ".QY.stoms duties and other :Import charges and re9tr~ctionR . 
in J,atin hmerican count:r.i~!'H average levels of incidence"; Mul tilatera.l Economic 
s- Cooperation in Latin America 1952 vol.I. pp.106-l23. 
S. Maca.rio: "Protectionism and industrialIsation in I,~tin America" Economic 
l3u1letin for Latin America, 1!arch 1964 p.6l. 
,T. Sci tovsky: "Prospects for Latin AmeriCAn IndustriAlisation within the 
framework of Economic Integration, 13a.sea for analysis61il 11I11heProcBsR of 
Industri!!:,lisation in I,atin America." Inter-American Development Bank, i9'69 p. 31. ! 
I. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott, OPe ctt. pp.158-9. (.5> R. Prebisch: "Tow~,rd9 a Dynamic ])evelopment Policy for Latin America", pp, cit. 
p.11. 
" 
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It is a little difficult to fit Central America into this picture. 
~t has high nominal tariffs but in Appendix 4 this is shovm to be very 
misleading. (1) Various suggestions have b~Gn made for trying to obtain the 
effects of an export subsidy while not havine the necessity for extensive 
government expenditure: one of the more ingenious is for devaluation coupled 
with consequences would be identical to a subsidy without additional expend-
iture.(2) The major problem which it would face is that (like subsidies) it 
would probably not circumvent the major non-price obstacles to exports. 
Exporting new products requires good entrepreneurship and risk taking. Im-
port substitution is easier: "imports provide the safest and most incontrq-
vertible proof that the market is there". (3) 
The difficulties involved in exporting to industrial markets can be 
seen I! we consider the two different types of 'manufactured goods in which 
central America might specialise; first 'processed goods and raw materials, 
and second, labour-intensive "traditional" industries. (4) , In the first case, 
• 
several reports have argued that there are potential markets for exports of 
products such as processed fruit and vegetables, frozen meat, wood products,(5) 
(1) This is because of "v{ater" in the tariff: See also J. Flanders tlM.,eaf'lurinp; 
protectionism and predicting trade diversion", Journal of Pol! tical Economy 
1965 pp.165-: 1.~..o " ...:.' ;~. 
(2) D. Schydlo')dsky: "From import-substitution to export promoH.ol1<..for semi-
growing industTl': a policy reappraisa.l" Journal ,of Development Studies, July 
1961 1'1'.405-413. 
(3) A. IU~hmann: "Jhe strategy for Economic Developmenttt Yale 1958 1'.212 • 
. (4) The general problems are reviewed in R~ Vernon: "Problems" and prospects of 
Exporting Manufa.ctured Goods from !JDC' a". Papers and Proceedines of UNCTAlJ. 
Vol. IV: "Trade in Manufactures" pp.200-210. • 
H.ll. Lary: '~Importa of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries" New York 
1968 pp.l-IO. " , , 
13. 13a1assa: "Trade Prospects for neveloping Countries'" Illinois 1964 Ch. ~ al'ld 120: 
! (5) (Eldrick & LC\vidge) Economist Intelligence Unit "Report on potential new ' 
manufactures" (restricted). United Nations: tlShort and medium tern prospects 
-for ex orts of manufactures from selected develo in countries": CentI:a1 
American COIn.':lon Market countries": TB/B/c. 2 61 May 1969. 
and some diversification into these industries has already occurred with 
the production of banana puree, (¢lm of exports from Honduras~ shrimps 
(El Salvador) and meat.(l) However, there are serious problems on the 
supply side of sustaining adequate quantity and quality (a management con-
straint essentially) and problems on the demand side of selling in a hi&h1y 
specialised, distant and discriminating market. (2) A. U.N. stu(ly commented: 
"marketing and financing problems of exports are those which are noted with 
the greatest emphasis for almost all the products ••• whereas on the contrary 
the "pricet! factor of products would not constitute an obstacle of very fre-
quent significance-e.g. ~t the present time soluble coffee enterprises are 
running at 3~~ capacity utilisation because of marketing (rather than price 
or supply) problem:~(3) 
A second type of enterprise which could in theorY be eDtablished locally 
would be those using "cheap labour", such as textiles and clothing. However, 
these products face import restrictions in the industrialised countries, 
. 
income inelastic markets and severe competition from Asia where countries 
combine lower wage costs with higher productivity. Some interest has been 
shown in producing in developing countries standardised labour-inten,sive 
components of complex capital goods such as computers and automobiles which 
-. 
• l<M ... ·' ,~}, .. ~~ ;'w'_~.f'vf • 
have a rapidly-rising demand and face no reBtrict~ons on imports into the lnrge 
markets for which multinational company strategy> dictates overseas low labour 
cost production. This is in contrast to the less cosmopolitan interests of 
(1) Joint Planning Mission: "ProlITama de divors.ification cle las exportaciones 
on Central America", Nov.1964 e.g. exports of chilled meat products have risen 
from ~l. in 1957 to ¢25m in the mid 60's. . 
(2) For these reasons the Eldrick and Lavidee study was pessimistic about 
exploiting many of the products which from a superficial inopection had a 
good local resource endowment and excellent markets, such as: clothes; tobacco, 
timber cabinets; flowers and fresh fruit; electrical components. ~1is is in 
addition to problems presented by obstructions to trade, particularly tariffs 
which discriminate against processed products. 
(3) United Nations: "Short and medium term prospects" OPe cit. p.61. 
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industrialised country producers in the traditional industries.(l) However, 
Central America does not have overwhelmi~g advantages ao a "cheap-labour" 
producer. 1the unskilled semi-skilled labour costs in expatriate firms in 
Hong Kong and ]!'ormosa is as low as 10c per hour: in Central America average 
semi-skilled wages vary from l8c (Nicaragua) to 27c (Costa Rica)(2) while 
productivity. is variable and the ports are poor.(;) Continuity of supply is 
a dubious prospect in the light of the region's political instability, and 
this perhaps is crucial as individual components of an electronics assembly 
unit may be small as a proportion of cost but indispensable technologically. 
It also assumes a willingness to accept subordination to the global strategy 
of multinational companies; and to productio~ patterns technologically de-
~ 
termined by the state of evolution of the product cycle. 
One cannot, therefore, expect too much from this alternative approach, 
and it may be that expo~t industries, at least of the second kind, are better 
developed when provd'd successful in doroestic or regional markets, as "Janus-
faced-industries" facing inward and outward siroultaneoUsly.(4) Indeed, it is 
often argued that tithe most effective base for the export of manufactures is 
in a lar~e domestic market lt .(5) However, one of the main criticisms of an 
import Bubstit'lti0n approach was that it led to high costs and discouraged 
.......... -.... .. ~:.. .. ~. 
exports. 
(1) G. Hirsch: "Location of Industry and International CompetitiveneEls", 
Oxford 1969. 
R/ yernon: ",International investment and internl3;t!onal tra.de in the produ.ct:, 
cycle". Quarterly Journal of Economics May, 1966, pp.202-207. 
(2) W~rld Bank Report on Central America (1967) OPe cit. Vol.4 (Industry) pp. 
60-61. 
(3) United Nations: "Carrateras, Puerto8 y PerroclU'illas dfl Central America" 
E/CNI2/CCE 324, 1965. 
(4) D. Pearson: "Industrial Development in EAst Africa", Nairobi 1969 pp.66-
68. 
(5) D.B. Keasing: "Outward lookinG' policies anel economic d.evelopment", 
Economic Journal, June 1961 p.87. 
S. Linder: "}tn Essay in Trade and Transformation" t Uppsala 1967 pp. }03-31. 
I).,'s 'I;..o.! cL.. ... ~~".....;t is ,4.,~ ~ ~·~-.A(:~~1rY4~ ~ MutbtWtJ~" 
~~~n ff'''L'-f4.'l • ~ rc:il~ u....t-~ tw ~j'-O ~ ~ 8w fk. ,M,.Jj ~ ~ 
--I"" __ ""~ ___ '_A_~_~""'_~"~ ~ ~~u.S,_~ ~ lJ ';:'H.~ 14 ~:Is (;/:~-tJ~ 
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Johnson has argu~iven that firms are established to supply an exiatine 
market)they are unlikely to become exporters since the existing market typi-
cally connists of a large varioty of goods whereas successful exporting for 
a small country typically demands concentration on quantities of products for 
a limited rang~ of standard 1ines.(1) One may, therefore, be faced with a 
stark alternative of trying to develop manufacturing exports or "if in an 
underdeveloped country the stocks of productive factors is growing, but if 
development through increased exports to advanced industrial sectors is 
blocked for any reasons there arises a possible need for promoting increases 
in output that are diversified in accordance with domestic income e1asticit-
ies of demand so as to provide markets for each other locally in contrast 
"J. It (2) 
to output expansion which is specialised according to comparative advantage. 
Can this be done ~ationa11y or is there need for a regional market? 
Import Substitution Nationally? 
Superficially, there would appear to be a good deal of scope for import 
substitution on a national basis. Imports per capita were ¢47t5 in 1966 
as compared with ¢4'5 in India and ¢29 for Africa as a whole. The regional 
import ratio (excluding regional trade) stayed in the range ·18 to ·21 in 
the period 1950-62 and has kept at that level since. 
One method of assessing the scope for national and regional import sub-
stitution is to assess the proportion of supplies provided from domestic pro-
duction. An attempt has been made to show this. However, the terminology 
and concep~s in the field of 'import substitution' are somewhat tangled.(;) 
(1) M.G. Johnson: "Tariffs and economic development: some theoretical issues", 
Journal of Development Studies 1968 p.25. 
(2) R. Nurske: "Eguilibrin. and Growth in the World Economy" in "Rconomic 
,ESSE/.YB by Nurske", ,G •• f.arbeler (ed.) p.;19. 
(3) Attempts to sort out the conflicting definitions are¥made in C. Winston: 
"A Preliminarx survey of import ~'lUbstitutionlt Williams College, Sept.20,1965. 
\
F. Clark: "Planning Import Substitution" North Holland 1970 pp.25-28. 
F~osh Mai tra: "ImJ?o_r.t_~bsti t~tj!l£...P.Q..t.efLt.ial in E:ist Africa" East African 
Institute of Social Resear.ch Occasional Paper No.2 M~kere 1967 1967 pp.7-9. 
P. Des' air "Alternati'<ie me3.Elures of import Bubstitution": Oxford Economic 
Papers 1969 pp.~17-324. 
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Import substitution is sometimes defined in absolute torms;(I) sometimes as 
a relative concept; relative to total SUPPlY;(~) to domestic consumption 
expenditure;(~1 total incomesj(f) domestic expenditure minuB services; 
domestic value added. In each case the calculation will be different. The 
definition used here will be that of Maizels where import sUbstitution over 
a period of time (i to 0) is given by 
IS = (mi - mo) so 
D = mo (si - so) 
where S is the aggregate supply (i.e. production 
plus import). 
where m is the import content of total supplies. 
which is the difference between what total supply (domestic output and imports) 
would have been had the ratio of imports to local supply remain unchaneed, 
and actual total supply: any other change in imports is explained by changes 
in demand. 'This method of analy~is is subject to considerable methodological 
cri ticism. (6') 
\ (I) W Baer and I Kerstenetzk,'y: "Import substitution and induEJ,tria1 isation in 
~razil", American E~onomic Review. Proceedings and Papers 1964 p.4~7, measures 
import substitution by the percentage decline (or increase) in the constant 
dollar values of imports by categories. This is criticised in, J. Sakomoto: 
"Medicion de las repercussions del nroceso de indl,.;,strialisaction sob,re In 
economica. Un anal sis critico del model J3aer-Kerstenetsk ". Trimcstre 
Economic:o Mexico April-June 1969 pp.247-271. 
': <:1) A. Maizels: "Industrial growth and world tra.de" OPe cit. pp.522-52;. 
H.B. Chenery: npatterns of Industrial Growth" OPt cit. pp.625-653. 
M. steuer & C.,VoiVidas: "Import substitution and Chenery's patterns of in-
dustria.l R,row \. .. , a further study" Economia, Internazionale 1965 pp.47-71'. 
J. Ahmed: "Import substitution and stru.ctural change in Indian manufacturin,g 
industry" Journal of Development studies, 1968 pp.350-379. 
(3) B. Havelock & C. Thomas: "J),;aHl.micB of West IndiAn Integratio11.". 
University of the West Indies. 
(4) N. Leff and A. Netto: "Import substitution, foreign investment and inter-
nat'ional disequilibrium in ;e·~'azillt. Journal of Development Studies, 1966 
pp. 2l8-234. ' 
i 
I 
(S) This definition and related measures have the ~ollowing basic deficiencies. I 
Firstly, over a long time period, tho import ratio is likely to change, parti-
cularly in r~spect of indiVidual sectors, as the region's economic structure 
and consumption patterns change, quite regardless of any import substitution. 
Secondly, sectoral analysis for intermediate and capital.goods has limited 
quantitative significance because of interdependence between sectors: import 
substitution of finished consumer goods generates a demand for intermediate 
and capital goods which was hitherto implicit in the consumer goods and which 
now have to be met by a diversion of domestic supply or by explicit importation. 
Therefore, to replace an import, production must rise not only in the final 
processing industry but also in the industry supplying its imputs and in their 
~~~~~J~~t~~~ustries in their turn. Therefore, conventional measures of import 
( eo~i:) 
l. 
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import sUbstitution overall. The main influence on the level of domentic 
wv~ 
supply~changes in the level of demand which were offset only to a small 
exteu't by import. substitution) most of, which was, in the "traditional It 
food-stuffs and textiles and to a lesser extent (later) from oil refining 
and metal products~ 
At national level there are some differences. The scope for import 
substitution in "traditional" industries is greatest in Honduras and 
greater for textiles in particular in Nicaragua and Costa Rica than in 
El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Dut the main implication is that'the main scope for import substitution 
\S 
,in the non-traditional industries: "We are moving into the stage of 
import substitution in respect of intermediate and capital goods or 
durable consumer goo.ds, which, besides bein~ difficult to manufacture, 
require markets much l~rger than those of the individual Latin American 
countries. ,,(1) At this level import-substitution has to re seen in a 
regional'rather than a national context. An attempt was made by the 
OAB to calculat~ the implications (explicit and implicit) of tho 1964-69 
I ., 
. ~~~~~~.;:~1~t 
plans for import substitution at a regional rather than a national level 
i.e. additional import substitution (taking the region as a whole) made 
possible by the Common Market. (2) It was foreseen (and correctly) that 
~ . 
the-gross import substitution relative to domestic ,supply would in 1969 
amount to ¢340m (1962 prices) of which ¢200m Vlould be substitution through 
regional trade. 
(1) R. Prcbisch: "Towards a PYnamic Development Policy for Latin America." 
OPt cit. p.6. 
(2) Pan American Union: "Report on the Central American Na.tional. Development 
Plans and the Process of Economic Intet\ration" 1965-69 pp.82-89. 
h-----,------,----~----'-',. " . , 
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It is interesting to relate this back to the traditional theory. 
A policy of regiona.1 impol"t-Dubsti tution is now seen as based on "trade 
di version,r, which is no longer regarded as a cost: t:r.ade diversion is 
almost the very essence of the customs union. liThe point at issue is 
not whether the new producer is more or less efficient than the former one. 
The question is rather whether it is not more advantageouB to buy a commodity 
from a new producer than to waste foreign exchange on importation from an 
advanced country.tlCl) Trade "diversion" is seen as a necessary consequence 
of mobilisine unemployed resources and ra.ising real income; of utilising 
spare capacity and saving f~reign exchange. (2) 
There is little doubt that by the end of the 1950's Central knerica 
like most of Latin America had reached the end of the phase of "easy" import 
substitution and need to move into the production of intermediate and 
capital goods and consumer durables where economies of scale are important,(') 
ana: ~'I'h~td production would only be economic in a larger market. 
Economies of scale in a regional market. 
~lere is a~superfluity of definitions where economies of scale are con-
o ~ ;':~~~~""\t":" 
cerned, but what we are initially referring to are tIle empirically observed 
economies in average cost with increased capacity internal to the plant.(4) 
(1) . S. Linder: "Trade and Trade policies for Development" OPe cit. p.126. 
(2) One might qualify this in respect of trade "diversion" from other de-
veloping countries wi~ identical problems. 
(,) "Central America: industrlal polley problems". Economic Bulletin of 
Latin America 1964 OPt cit. pp. 120-121. 
(4) The role of economies of scale is discussed in great detail in Ch.5 and 
so much of the definitioned and descriptive material is omitted here. 
50. 
A large market is necessary for many products to prevent either sub-optima~ 
scales of investment or underutilisatio~ of optimal capacity for cxcesnive 
periods (or simply non-investment); and this needs to be considered in a 
dynamic context 'in which 'minimum' scales ~re increasing with technological 
advance. 
There is a good deal of evidence in support of the importance of economies 
of scale in manufacturing. (1) But generalisations need to be heavily Qualified 
as empirical findings have suggested that for large ranges of capacity economies 
of scale are unimportant, the average cost curve being horizontal after a re-
lntively small range in which declining costs are manifest; and in many in-
dividual products there is an absence of economies.(2) One cannot strictly 
generalise and as, Mikesell cOJlunents, "the possibilities for realising econom-
ies of scale differ greatly for different types of commodities for the same 
market and for the same commodity for countries of varying market size.,,(3) 
However, while accepting reservations about the magnitude of internal 
economies of scale, their existence is not and in many industries they are 
probably very substantial. Economies of scale are important in a Central 
American r.egior"l'3.~.~market for several reasons: 
' ........ .:;,._ ..... "" .. """".1I'~f 
(i) first they allow certain new industries to be established whose minimum 
economic size (or 'threshold') due to indivisibi1ities is above that of national i 
markets but below that of the regional market.(4) If these industries could be 
~ 
(1) See Ch. 5. . . . .,1 
l~ni' ~1~~tf~oa-.tI-.ljJ 
(2) A negative v~ew1is given in R.L. Allen: "Integration in le~s developed 
areR-slI Kyklos 1961 pp. 232-324. A balanced summary of the argument is given 
in R. Halevi "Regional Integration and Industrial1Aat.:I.on of IJDC' flit UlUID 
ID/Conf.l. 1/11/1969. 
"'-};; 
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established there would be not only an efficiency gain but income gain from 
the mobilisation of unemployed resources. Various studies were carried out 
in the early nineteen-sixties to identify possible industries of this kind; 
glass bulbs, flat glass, caustic soda, chlorinated insecticides, rayon, tyres 
and tubes, flat glass, caustic soda, chlorinated insecticides, rayon, tiles 
and tubes, ~ertilisers. copper wire and cable and possibly sulphuric acid, 
electrolytic copper, plastic raw materials and electrical applianoes. (1) 
(ii) in some cases, plants which would have been established anyvlay, can 
now be built at lower cost in a regional market. This is particularly true 
of process industries where the plant has continuous economies of scale in 
the'lower size ranges.(2) Most of the case studies reviewed later in the 
thesis come under this heading e.g. estimates by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America for the pulp and paper industr,y showed that the cost of a metric 
ton of paper pulp decreased from about ¢250 per ton at a capacity of 50 tor4,s 
per day, to about $150 per ton at a capacity of 200 tons per day. Another 
study by EeLA showed the importance of economies of scale in the steel industry. 
Inc~easing the capacity per annum from lOO,~OO to 1,500,000 tons, the total 
, .n.(4-o,' 
cost of pig iron decrea.sed from ¢55 per totlr\ that of steel '~"5otT from 
~5 to ¢96 per ton and of flat rOlle~ products from ¢235 to ¢121 per ton.(3) 
• :-~_\~, ~~~~f 
(1) United Nations (ECLA) "Possibilities of lnte l"A.ted Industrial Devp.lo ment 
j.n Central America": New York, 1963: 63.I.G.l. J. Moscarella: "Econonlic', 
integration in Central America" in M. Wionczek ",Latin Amorican Economic, 
,):ntegraUon" OPt c1 t. p.275. 
(2.) T. Skitovoky: "International tra-Cla rmd economic inte ration as a mGl!!ns of 
overcoming the disadvantages of n. small nation" in EAG Robinson Ed. 
"Economic Consequences of the 81700 of NaUons" MacMillan 1963. 
(;) United Nations (E.C.L.A.): "Programming data and critorla for the p,ulp 
and paper industry", and ".The steel indm~try in T,ntin America" both included in 
"Report of the Latin America,n Sy!"posium on .IndustFiA,l Development" Santiago 
(ChilO) 1966. ' 
, 
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(iii) there are also economies of scale to be derived by existing 
i~dustries, in part by consolidation of existing units, but also when technical 
economies are exhausted: "outside of a few exceptional industries most tech-
nical economies-are exhausted by firms of the maximum size to give full, or 
almost full, technical efficiency. But in industries of this kind, often 
where the product is hetrogeneous, there may be gains from interplant special-
isation; as in textiles and clothing. n(l) Recent literature has stressed 
this very considerable and neglected aspect of intra-industry specialisa-
tion as a source of economies of scale in regional groups.(2) 
In these industries," where product differentiation is important", multi-
product firms can specialise in a narrower range of products and have longer 
production runs; benefitting from economies of scale through specialisation, 
'learning by doing' and better capacity use. For example in 1958-60, many 
firms in the traditional industries were operating at very low rates of 
capacity use~3)"current sales'in the Central American countries are in the 
zone of 25-50/~ of capacity. Economies of scale are a fact of life in 
Central America. The Industrial Census of Costa Rica (1;57) showed soft 
drinks to have a rate of capacity utilisation of 
table oil/m.i~:~.;!!r.liture 40~n(4) 
EVidence on capacity use is, from Diagram I-I;. 
~ 
. shoes 20%, and, vege-
Generally, the rate 
ia about 1 but it varies with the definition (regarding shift~for example) 
and by sector. 
(1) E.A.G. Robinson: "F..conomic consequences etc.1t op. cit. Introduction 
p.XVii. 
(2) H.G. Grubel: ".Intra-industry specia.lisation and the pattern of trade": 
canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. August 1967 pp.374-388 
also "The theory of intra-indust;q; trade lt in McDougall & Snape (Eds.) 
",Studies in International Economics lt and M. Adler: ",!-Specialieation in the 
Coal and Steel Communitx" Journal of Common Market Studies 1969 vol.8. p.l79. 
(3) The latter refers to economies of scale in the economic 'short-run' -
different from the conventional definition of economies of scale. Also one 
" should be careful not to leap to conclusions. Poor capacity use could be it explained by supply problems such as poor management. 
1" i~ . (4) C. Staley: ttCosta. Rica and the Central American Cornmon Market'i:Economica ""--....... " ... _ .. lnternazionale, Feb. ~962. pp.112 and 117-20. " ~~, '< • - • •• 
Diat;,rcm I 13 Uj. i.lif~nt,ton of Cnpnci ty in the Factory S('!ctor 19()2. 
1. n ill (III) .(I;rIl 
,(All sectors) Textiles Chemical Products 
Cqatemala 075 064 071 .67 .86 
~l. Sal vEldor 
.. 73 .64 .71 .94 .81 
lle>nduras .63 _ .63 .70 .60 .56 
lr :tcaragua 
.82 .81 .90 .97 .52 
~C)sta Rica '.72 055 .61 .63 .41 
I is by declaration of the firms t~emselves 
II by porcentage of capacity (in theory) 
, -e.:.."" .. J,.o:"'"! ""!: • 
.. , .. ~ ", ',' .'4"1'" 
III by percentage of cap'ac~ty, effectively utilisable 
.Qou!'cc Joint Planning Mission. 
'-
: 
J~.,~oo_.. --- ... ~' ~--_ .. -.. -
Taking these various different clements of 'economies of acale' together 
"there seems little doubt that a pa.ttern of industrialisation based on greater 
specialisation wi thin the regime will be more economical than one based on 
production by e~ch country for its ovm domestic market". (1) Hovlever, this 
specialisation will not occur spontaneously. To maximise economies of scale 
requires the "creation of a mutually supporting complementary industrial struc-
ture within a regional framework" which in turn necessitates "a combination 
of national and regional planning to accomplish the goal of a more complemen-
tary industrial structurett .(2) The necessity for intervention is made bTeater 
by the fact that 'restructuring' and the new investment may favour some 
partners rather than others and an equilisation mechanism may need to be im-
posed. Considering these various aspects Cooper &rt~ssell stated that gains 
from integration would be greatest; . 
(i) the steeper the marginal cost of protection. 
(ii) the stronger the "industry preferenceft • 
(iii) the greatftr the degree of complementarity between the economies 
in resource endowment and eXisting industrial structure. 
(iv) If neither partner has a cost advantage, intra-~"nion, in all or 
most industries.(3) This is necessary in order to ensure that one 
partner does not unduly benefit or suffer from integr~tion. (4) 
• "~"~~""""'~ J ~": ... r.'~f_.' tri ......... _ ... (.;.,~ 
(1) R. Mikesell: "The theory of common markets as applied to regional 
arrangements etc." OPe cit. pp.209-210. " 
(2) H. Kitamura: "Economic theory and the economic integration of unde!:-
,g,eveloped regions" in ~~. V1ionczek (Ed.) "Latin American Economic Interration" 
op~ cit. p.56. 
(3) R. Cooper and n. Massel1: "J'owards a general theory of customs un,ions for 
developinl{ countrie~", Journal of Political Economy Oct. 1965 pp.461-7. 
(4) The 'distribution' question is dwelt with at length in chapters 3 and 4. 
Perhaps the clearest attempt to incorporate it within a basic customs unions 
theory is in D.C. Mead: "The distribution of eains "in customs ;unions between 
developing countries" Ky~los vol. 21 (1968)pp. 713-36. 
~~ 
.\ 
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'1'he Cooper and Uaseell framework r:tlt;o enable some precision to be 
introduced into what could otherwise be regarded as an extremely ad hoc form 
of economic development in which industrial projects chosen at random are 
made less inefficient by oper~ting in a lareer market. 
The supply eurve for the industrial sector here is a national ranking 
of industrial projects in tenns of their true cost in economic resources (the 
nature of the demand curve is less clear). Andic, Andie and DOBser have tried 
to build on this concept and suggest how industrial projects can be ranked on 
various criterion of. costrtenefit (re: employment, foreign excllange, savings 
etc.). (1) 
So far, however, we have been concerned with internal economies of 
scale. Larger markets may also promote external economies. Some writers 
neglect this supposition on the grounds that externalities are empirically 
unimportant, though Jaber has· argued that the overwhelming majority of 
economic gains (in LAFT!) comes from external rather than internal economies.(2) 
External.economies from economic integration manifest themselves in various 
forms. . First, internal economies result in lowe~ costs and this can be 
passed on in lower input costs; though the opposite w01ud happen if increased 
..... ""'t; ....... industrial 'a.':'t._·i'~j;·~;?·lead.s to higher prices for scarce factors and for this 
reason factor mobility will be necessary to m!ni~ise external diseconomies. 
Second, a larger market may encourage the development af.specialisation and 
skills so increasing the efficiency and lowering the cost of factor inputs. 
Third, a larger market induces i.nvestment by faoilitating the formation 
(1) S. Andic, F. Andie & D. DOBser: If}\. Theory of Economic IntegrA.t).on for 
Developinl{ Countries" University of York Studies No.6. 1971. 
(2) T. Jaber: "The relevall~f tr~.di tiopA.1 economic th~0rY.:to the IJDC ',s", 
Journal of Cornmon Uarket Studoes on. c1 t. also "A theoreti CA.l Malysis of the 
d amic effects of economic inteRration atl'1on 1,))(;' a tl : Un{versi ty of California 
1970 Phd. (Microfilm Ch.5.). 
'. 
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It 
of linkages locally: (balanced growth) ca.n hardly be applied to very small 
Bcales and lack of variety of resources will preclude the simultaneous 
establishment of large numbers of industries all producing for the domestic 
market, however,- it can be of some ~pplicability to small LDC's only in the 
context of economic integration".(l) These backward linkages may in their 
turn manifest economies of scale 60 widening the externnlities (in electricity 
and railways for example as well as manufacturing). Certain implications 
following from eiving external economies an important role. ,The first is to 
affect consideration of the time horizon: "the creation of a customs union 
or free trade area usually involved relatively long time periods for fruition 
so that the initial impact and perhaps the most important one, is on expecta-
tions regarding future market opportunities rather than on existing trade 
patternsu • (2) Skills, similarly take long to diffuse. Second, one of the 
main elements of externalities is the phenomenon of agglomeration; which im-
plies industrial developed clustered around favoured locations rather than 
evenly spread under·laissez-faire conditions. Chapter 4 will deal with this 
phen'omenon in depth but it i~ clear even from this that trade liberalisation 
would need to be reeulated. 
One ~a.~Jl~5~~tifYing the overall economies of scale benefit from economic, 
integration would be to use the x-section regressions referred to earlier, by 
studying the signs and magnitudes of the "size" coefficients. If one con-
trasts the "normal" industrial""value ad.d~d of the five countries separately 
with that of the region considered as a single unit then the difference should 
give some approximation to the "internal" nod "extemal'!, economies combined of 
the regional market. The re[,rressions imply that the larger a market (measured 
by population size) the greater the contribution of ma,nufacturing i.e. a laree 
, 
home market is a significant comparative advantage, which is compatible with 
our earlier arguments. The bigger and more varied the natural resources, the 
(1) W.G. Demas: "~economies of development of small countries with special 
reference to the Carribean"; McGill University 1965 p.56. . 
(2) A. Kolinski: "Customs Unions of underdeve10:Eed nations: the ca~se Mof Cery,E& 
America" Economica Internazionale 1969. Pp.130-131. 
--'-'----------------" ---- "-- ----
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In.rg~r the number of indu!3't.rie5 likely to be capnhle of op",'r::1tint: under 
optirmm conr!j.t5.ons. T'nis exercise hf!.~,l been trier! both for ~~~c Cast !'.fric;:}J.l 
union and a pocsiblc Aust.raliejXcw Zealand link. (1) 
Central A!DOrica and the follovrinG projection obtained for 1970. 
Normal value added; fivG countries collectively ... $1050 million. 
" " 
tI separately = VASO Du11ion. 
Tho difference of 2()/ over the Dum of separa.te valu~ added is the 
potential Gain from co~pletc economic union. (2) . Part of Appendix 2 iB de-
voted to the calculatIons in this excTcise, and i t~, application to fl. Aectoral 
level. Ms ,d th the application of the "normal" equations referred to c;:;.rlier't 
there are major doubts nbout their application for thin and rel .... tctl pl\rp'~Be3. 
The Appendix discuss:rs tLis problem ln depth. One'Jof the m:tin difficulties is 
the assumption that a 'coI:n;lon mar~et' ie equivalent to economic union, which 
sidesteps noat of the rc~-world obstaclE's to trade such as uncertc.1nty, !:;us-
picion, transport coat, product differentiation. ~'he fiCU1'es r.:9.Y II however., 
represent a r-axl~um' gain. 
l:;1kan ha~: shown hol'! in 1975/76 !~ew 7.eala."ld cou111 h!'\.ve SO:: more Induotl'inl 
value added in a free trade arranf"emant with Au-"JtraJ ia than eepa.t'ately, 
R:J.9u-"nlng (a big- if) that tho benefits from tho cnlf\r~cd rnal:'kc-+, 'Aere not 
reduced by Australia imports to };ev: Zea.landers investing in B. E • • 4.u(ltr~lin' to 
take advant~ge of the lareer market by locating nearer to it. stoutjesd:tyk 
did n study of tho possible effects of economic unjon in F,,'s't \fr.i('=l ~nd con-
eluded tha.t an ovorall incro"ee of l4(~ tlanui'actllrlns value adJed by 1970 \rould 
be P083ible in a xeeicnal group, with the ~~1n gains, in ch~ica13 and w.ct~l 
productD. 
, 
~~----------. ------ t (1) 7/. Elkan: ".El!j;,in,illni:- ~T01f ~~.1t'l;'1rl' :1. Tll!:l!'luf~tc'!~u .. !J.ng o.lftm:!..tj.-:.~o..D:"Sill..Jll;~ti:.~)' I 
,!lith ,~.!l.ili"\lia" !:e'l Zealand Institute of :,convi':l~ :P.e~;eal'C~\; Tec;-mica1 :,el~o- : 
randum ~ro. 3"(-.Yelllntrtol1 J.9(,5). 
This papor han been attlcKcd in F.;':. Holr:;es: nFreer t.~Rd/~ .,.':fth ~u:3tMJia" 
N.Z.I.:-,.:? Discunsion Paper !~o.10 (,ie11inf:ton 19~~~6'):-- .. ._-_ .. -
a1f.lo A. Stoutjesdlyk: "Z2.!:;;.,\1~ Patterns o~· in},\).~Jtrf:1) \f'i-ttion in ~~$t, A.!'rlca'·. 
?!a~e,:e 196. (pa.per ljo. 360). - .... _ .• -
(2) The Chencry study also indic::l.ten that impcrt needs are inv'ereBlY relr.ltc(l 
market size and a lore-er r.l:-trkct could a.lso help thereby to overcome ~ _40'f.'~:VTl 
to \ \ 
exchange bottleneck aS5u.!lling 8carce reeourcca were not diverted frt);n the -
" export SF.:ctor. 
""",,~,~---,,-----------
. ... 
, 
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The purpose, therefore, of a larger regional market is to minimise the 
cost of the import substitution of manufactures by enabling interna.l and CJC-
ternal economies of scale to operate, and also to deepen the process of im-
port substitution by encouraging the establishment of new regionally based in-
dustries, provided that scarce factors could not have been employed in export-
ing outside ~he region at less cost. 
One point sometimes advanced by critics of integration is that for tradi-
tional manufactures, market enlargement could take place by other means than 
the formation of a reuional ~oup notably by income redistribution. This I 
is an important criti:ism Wh::h is looked at in deal in Appendix 3. (1) Figures :f 
are given there for the type of market enlargement that could occur for con-
surner goods were the spending power of' low "1\c.o~.e. ~,¥ ~ La4. ~. 
However, it is felt that there is no reason why such a policy should not be 
supplementary and additional to that of regional integration and there is any-
way little political-indication of its being realised at present on a sub-
stantial scale. 
side factora.(2) 
The argument also suffers seriously from neglect of supply 
other. Benef~~g_fIo~Integration 
.... ,\. ...... "<~~ ...... ~ 
The argument so far has been based on economies of scale, internal or 
external, and the extent to which a regional market makes it easier to realise 
them. However, there are certain other factors to be considered which might 
bring~'gains through the regionalisat~on of markets: 
(a) it is argued that there may be dynamic benefits from competition 
amongst firms which at national level would be near monopolies{3) "In 
(1) Two articles advancing this line of argument were contained in the oym-
posium edited by R. Hilton: "The Movement Towards lA-tin American Uni,tytt 
Praeger 1969; 
c.~. D. Solar: "The Case arrainst Latin Amer.icM Intee::;:atioT!:. economic. and 
political factors" pp.llO-132 • 
.. 
(2) There is however a basic economic difference between enlargement of the 
market through trade, and though demand-inflationary mechanisms which include 
i t,i 
I 
{ 
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(2) .Q,ont.'d. 
running a budget def icit, or switching resources from the rich to the poor, 
who consume proportionately more of their incomes (they may, due to the de-
generacy of the 'rich consume not more or even less! But that is a difforent 
argument). The latter approach would suffer from a. neglect of supply-side 
factors since some factors are scarce and demand expansion would in most cases 
lead to inflation and/or greater net importation. 
The ef.(ect of market enlargement throueh regional trade by contra.st is 
structural, shifting resources to manufacturing and capital goods especially; 
and would increase 'aggregate supply' by opening profitable opportunities 
for overseas vapital and unproductively used domestic ea.pital. Income dis-
tribution might have, incidentally, structural offects of a beneficial kind 
(switching demand from imported or locally produced capital intensive 
durables to local labour intensive textiles etc.), but it would also tend to 
reduce 'aggregate supply' since saving (and investment) would tend to fall, 
unless there is a speedy and efficient compulsory mobilisation of resources 
by the state, or better utilisation of capacity where there is genuine . 
... . "Keynsi<in" unemployment· In Central America) a1s01 half of 
consumer expenditure is on food, more for the poor, and pressure of increased 
demand would be brought immediately on the inefficient supply- inelastic food 
producing sector; thence inflation in food prices, which land reform ner ~ 
would not solve. . • Other supply-side factors, lack of skills and 
management, rather than lack of purchasing power, may be important in some 
contexts. In the absence of a total transformation of society, politically 
as well as economically, "income distribution" could be considered in no 
way comparable in its effeets. 
(3) This argument has been used by T. Jaber (Ph.D. thesis) Opt cit. Ch. 6 
but has been more commonly employed in advanced market economies; T. Skitovsky 
, "Economic Theory and Western European Integrationlt Unwin 1958, p.l;;. 
. ... 
. ~;Sy,. 
:-:---
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sectors characterised by national monopoly, oligopoly will be the dominant 
stricture, while in oligopolistic industries the size of the group will in-
crease". (1) In this manner it is po~sible to limit abuse of the monopoly 
power that would otherwise be characteristic of economi~s of scale industries~2) 
and force them to pass on "external economies" in lower prices, It is also 
argued that competition will breakdown complacent and inward looking business 
practices and improve entrepreneurial qUality,(3) In Latin America anti-
oom]?etitive practices are a pervasive phenomenom: "well equipped establishments 
operate beside those whose costs are high, in a Bart of mutual benefit society, 
the latter safe~guarding their marginal existence and the former reaping the 
biG' profits that accrue from the cost different!al!,~4) The effect of in-
tegration,is partly to provide a competitive "jolt", but in the long run, 
"the benefits are realised as a result of entrepreneurial decisions arising 
out of the new market structure and out of the acute awareness of the con-
tinued generation of new products, new processes and new methods of distribu-
tion on the part of 'the competitors in the new regional market", (5) 
(1) E. Balassn: "The Theory of Economic Integz:at1on" OPe c1 t. p.l65. 
(2) M. Merhav: "Technolcgical Dependence, Monopoly; and the Limits to Growth" 
Oxford 1968,~. ~: ...... 
.... ~~"<!~. 
(;) J. Baranson: "Industrialisation and He -ionalism in the Central American 
Common Market" Inter-American Economic Affairs 1962 (.Autumn p.63. 
(4) R. Prebisch: ".Towards a D;ynamic Development Policy; for Latin America" 
Ope cit. p.72. 
(5) . R. Mikesell: "The theory of Common Mqrkets etc." srp. cit. p.205. 
._--------------- --
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However" it has to be accepted that this argument might be in conflict with 
the case based upon maximising economies of scale gains at a plant level and 
for "complementarylt specialisation; elso that it may well lead to a polar-
isation in gains to the most "competitive" partner st1'tte and forced closure 
on plants in the 1eS8 competitive states. Also, abuse of monopoly or other 
anti-competitive practices could be prevented in other ways - by direct con-
troIs or lowering the external tariff unilaterally. 
(b) there 1s also the possible gain from engendering more certainty amongst 
producers especially in those industries where one of the concomitants of 
economies of scale is a long Itlead-time" between the original conception of a 
project and eventual production. Though original research is unlikely to 
be sienificant in the Central American Common Market there are many industries 
where long term market planning is iwportant: and the effect of economic in-
tegration by fostering cooperation, joint planning, breaking down suspicion 
and increasing knowledge should help to engender optimism about the ability 
of regional markets.(l) Unfortunately integration agreements - like the 
. 
Central America - that are marred by frequent ruptures, border closures (and 
wars) will not achieve these gains. 
(c)' hitherto we have been entirely concerned with deficiences of market 
size as "a constraint in industrial growth and with the efficient use of avail-
. I.' ,~_-r' ~ ~":.rt'}d.f.! 
able investrnent,~""L In practice supply factors such as capital and skill may 
be a more immediate constraint. 
-- A supply of capital conotraint" 10 of no real importance when there is 
underutilized capacity but will be when new investment has to be connidered. 
It is important to see how integration might affect the supply of capital fro~ 
different sources. Capital could come from domestic or foreign sources, pub-
lie or private sectors. The relative proportions of theDe four components 
(1) W.E. Git,;"r~: "The Centrnl Ar'lerican Common },;~trket" Inter-American [:conomic 
Affairs 1961 (Aut~) p.65. 
also, "With respect to manufacturin~ products there was an almost tota.l l.!lck of 
a Central Amc:dcan marketing mechanism ,prior to 1957 •••• there is a It:tck of 
relation betvreen the structure of demand and the d'istribution of Central 
American production, which occasionally leads to assumed saturation of a Central 
American market •••• connection will depend on the volume and regulnrity of 
transactions". Q.,AS :Econorrl,ic Survey of Latin America 1962, pp.4l8-9. 
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are sho\\'n in Diagl-14. First, as far as local private investment is con-
eerned (based on local private savings) there would be scope for investine 
more from any rising real incomes subsequent'upon integration (assuming 
there w~s no su?stantial income distribution). However, this fails to take 
into account the behaviour of the ruling classes: "up to now the main entre-
preneurial group has been small and the bulk of domestic private investment 
has been made by wealthy land-holders who have selected the most promising 
and least risky situations in their respective countries usually for smal1-
scale investments, while the bulk of their liquid funds has been invested 
or deposited abroad.,,(l) Also experience of import substitution policies else-
where does not provide positive evidence for the supposition that domestic 
savings and investment rates are affected.(2) Indeed it has been argued that 
there has been a very high propensity to consume from additional income in 
recent years. (3) As far as the public sector is concerned the governments 
are faced with a declining revenue base due to import substitution reducing the 
taxable imports, a problem accentuated by the process of integration; and 
in the light of this the scope for financing investment from budget surpluses 
is reduced. 
eign aid" •. 
The third clement is overseas public sector :nvestment or "for-
" 
, , 
However, a substantial volume of assistance to regional institutions has pro-
bably bee~ ~l~~~~' from national projects.(4) The fourth and most important 
(1) J. Pincus: "The Central American Common Market" ROCAP (U.S.A. ID -
Guatemala) 1962, p.18. 
(2) N. Leff & A. Netto, "lE1l>0r~ substitution forei€J1; invesj;:nent etc." 911. ,cJ.i. 
(3) R. Hanson, op. cit; p.87. The ra.tio of savings to disposable income in 
Costa Rica. fell from 13· 3% in 1958 to CJIc. in 1964 due in part to the liberalisa-
tion of consumption induced by domestic durable good production. "As import 
substitution of consumer goods proceeds there is an automa.tic decontrol of 
consumption due to (a) the availability of scarce consumer goods, (b) the fall 
of government revenue •••• ". Ie. Griffin: "Under develonment in SpnniRh 
,America" London 1969. 1>.224. 
(4) John F. McCamant: "Development Assistnnce in Centx:a.l America" Praeger 1969, 
Ch.2. 
' . 
... --.._ .•. _ .. _._------------
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component is private foreign investment. Johnson has a,rgued that the 
attraction of large markcts in encoura,ging foreien investment is one of the 
main benefits or economic integration. (1) The particular consequences of greater 
foreign investment involvement will· be dealt with in Ch.4. Central American 
experience has been that "foreign private capital inflows to manufacturing 
countries have also apparently increased rather sharply followine the estab-
1 0 hm t f i 0 t ti ,,(2) 28 en 0 econom c 2n egra on ••••• 
However the only supply constraint is not the supply of capital. In 
IIonduras particularly the lack of skills, high quality management and infra-
structure has long been regarded as an obstacle to investment in the region:(3) 
in Honduras there have been major regional projects earmarked but have not 
materialised because of implementation difficulties. (4) Regional integration 
is helping to eliminate this bottleneck by having the regional institutions 
to project preparation and industrial research • 
. (d) Finally, the economics of scale argument is applicable not only to 
industry but to administrati~n, to' infrastructure (power and transportation) 
and possibly education. Robson argues on the basis of East African experience 
(1) H. Johnson: "Tariffs and Economic Development: some theoretical issues" 
Ope cit. discusses the positive effect on capita~ inflows of an import sub-
stitution policy. 
(2) World Bank Report (1967) 9;P. cit. Volume 4 (Industry) p. (Viii) of 
introduction. 
(3) OAS RepoFt on central America; John Hopkins 1962. (Chapter on Centr.al 
American integration). 
(4) e.g. a steel mill. glass factory and pulp and paper factory. 
/ 
(1) 
that these economies are as ereat as in industry. Robinson is 
(2) 
more sceptical. 
(e) There is another justi1'ication for economic integration amongst 
primary produqers, which is that they should band together in order to 
negotiate more effectively over commodity prices. However, in the Intcrnnt-
ional Coffee Agreement the Central American coffee producers have competed 
vigorously \r.Lth each other for larger quotac and have not presented a united 
front. On ,the other hand the five countries did coordinate their representa-
tions to UNCTAD. I & II, and more recently they have cooperated over coffee. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
\~t we have evolved is somethin€ muCh more than a theoretical rationale 
largely 
for customs union. The rationale is based on the commitmsnt to industrialise 
the Central American coun~~s, and the hope that integration ,dll cheapen 
also . \ 
that process. It pas been implied that a good deal more than a oustoms union 
is required: that there is a need for machinery to plan the allocation of 
industrial plants to obtain economies of scale,") that mecllanisms are required 
to ensure a spreading of gains between pnrtner states;; and that economies 
of scale will~.be realised more in the long run than the short run. Ch. 2 and 
. C::~:~I~.~~~ ~~-" 
, deal with the success of the Central American Common Market in reading 
these objectives, by creating the relevant insitutions (Ch. 2) and in its 
actual performanoe (Ch.,.). 
(1) P. Robson: "Economic Integration in Africa" OPe cit. P. 89. 
(2) E.A.G. Robinson: "Si~e of the nation and the (lost of .~tdministration~ in 
Robinson tt Economic Consequences etc"op. cit. po 238-239. . 
. 
--- -- .-~-- .. -
Chapter II Central Americfln Integration: A Comparative Appro;;Jch 
This chapter is concerned with describing the main elements of the 
integration process whose rationale is discussed in Ch. I and whose main 
consequenc~s are discussed in Ch. III and IV. The chapter will try to 
test two propositions: 
(i) that the Central American Common Market "is clearly the most 
successful example of economic integration that has been undertaken by 
independent developing countriestt.(l) The suspicion is that (even dis-
regarding the 1Football War' and its aftermath) this verdict is quite ex-
cessively flattering to the region. Nevertheless the impression is 
widely diffused: two observers have commented that CACM is "one of the 
most successful examples of economic integration amongst sovereign nations 
anywhere in the developing statestt ,(2) and "of all the attempts at integra-
tion among developing countries of the world, the Central American haa 
been the most successful.,,(3) 
(ii) that whatever its achievements, there is n considerable dis-
junction between the structure of the CACM and the rationale which in-
dicatcd that "economic integration of developed countries concentrates 
... ~J~.::" ... ~'',...~' . 
on customs policy whereas that of developing countries concentrates on 
investment policy. ,,(4) 
(1) United Nations: 
,ve1opinp; Countrie['lll 
ation A.man De-
(2) U.S, Committee of Economic Development: "Rconomic Development in Centr~.l 
Juneric!!:" 1964. 
(3) 13usiness International Corpor3.tion: "The CantTl'll America.n Common YtRrket" 
New York 1969. 
(4) A. Inotai: liThe central American Common MA.rket" Center for Afro-Asian 
Research, Budapest 1971 p.19. 
Rather than describe the operations of the Central American Comon M::l:t'ket 
in isolation it would be more revealing to deacribe its ma-ln features in 
the general context of the movement towardo "subregional integro.tionll.(l) 
In the post war years (2) more than a dozen customs and monetary lmions, 
common markets, free trade areas, regional investment agreements and co-
operative ar!angements of variouo kinds have been established. 'lhere nre 
several rea.sons why the subject matter is SO fashionable. J?irst there is 
a considerable "demonstration effElct" operating; deriving in part, but not en·-
tirely from the EEC "success". For example in the discussion procedin.g· the 
establishment of the East African Community, economists with Central American 
experience advised on the applicability of institutions like the Central 
American Integration Bank. (~) The U.N. agencies now have a substantial 
"cadre" of specialists in economic integration who advise from comparative 
experience. (4) Second the "rationale" appears to, be well accepted and has 
the support of the U.N. specialist agenCies.(5) With substantial numbers of 
very small states still becoming independent, and with a general desirc, ra-
tional or otherwise, among these states for industrialisation, it is accepted 
, 
that economic integration has a useful role in minimising the cost: "as 
(1) Comparative studies are: M. Wionczek, --,Economic Coo:perl'l.tion in JJ::I.tin 
.h.!!!£.rica, AfT~"~-:';,':~1.Asia". M.l.T. Press 1969. F. Kahnert, P. Richards, A. 
stoutjesdijk and P. Thomopoules: "Economic Inte~ation amon~ Develo in Countri~s 
OECD 1969, UNCTAD "Trade ansion and iiconomic Inte ration amon at Dev.elp,:Q-
"ing Countries" UN TD78 85 Rev. 1, 1967. -
(2) Customs unions and preferential agreements have a much longer history in 
fa~t. The German Zollverein is an early example. 
(3) M. Wionczek: "Exneriences of Centr!l-l American economic integration ~s 
applied to East Africa": Industrialisation and Productivity Bulletin ll. 
(U~ited Nations) pp. 15-31. 
(4) R. \1. GreB'e: "The pnited. Nations Re/donal Commissions & Inte atlo" in the 
Underdeveloped Regions:" in R. Gregg and M. BarIum (Ed. "The UN_System a,nd i tf! 
~nctions:" Princeton 1968. UNCTAD: "Trad,e Expamlion and Economic Intel!Tatlon 
,?-mongst I.DC'~.It.C?P' ell. 
(5) e.g. in the Pearson Report: "Partne,rs. in 1)evelonment" 1969 p. 94, "these 
efforts to expand trade among developing countries should be supplemented vlhere 
appropriate by regional trading blocks. Many developing countries especially 
the samller ones rind it easier and more convenient to enter into coouorative 
arrangements with their neighbours." ' .. 
Diagram 2-1 Difltribution of Countries b;y: Gross :nome~.t:i.c ProducJ nnrl Populat:i.on 
Size, 196.1 
Number of countries according to GrOOS domestic pro'duct 
Population Under $5,000- ~10,000- ¢20,000- ¢40,000- $100,000- Over in ¢5,OOO 9,000 19,000 39.000 99,000 299.000 ~300,OOO 
millions million million million million million million million 
Over 300 1 
150-300 1 
75-149·9 1 1 1 
30-74·9 1 1 2 3 1 
15-29°9 7 2 2 1 
5-14·9 16 2 4 1 
Under 5 34 3 
Source: United Nations 
Notes: The 85 countries in the 1964·(UN members} sample has now expanded to about 
120. Only two of the new additions (]angda-dash and China) would not be in the 
smallest economic category. J)\creased population and GNP have also moved the 
whole diagram bodily to the N-E. 
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long as modern industry expands in urlderdeveloped areas the pressure will 
grow for increased economic integration". (1) The general relevance of 
these prescriptions can be seen from Diagram 2-1 which shows the number of very 
small and very poor "microstates rt with under 5m. population and under ¢5 
billion GDP.(1966): this category now comprises a majority (increasing 
every year) of members of the UN. But of those countries that could be 
designated LDC's (about 70) only about 10 have internal markets of ¢5 
billions which is equivalent to that of Norway or Greece. Even in the few 
larger countries the effective market size is further fragmented by internal 
boundaries such as high transport costs and uneven income distribution. 
In Diagram 2-2. an attempt is made to set out in tabular form the main 
post-war attempts at economic integration. Inev~tably the swmnary is highly 
abbreviated and fails to reflect the considerable complexity of the schem~ 
Three of these are for cross-reference purposes as the most successful ex-
periments among 'advanced' industrial countries; the EEC,(2) EFTA,(3) and 
COMECON. (4) Of the others s~veral have collapsed and most cannot be said 
(1) A. Scaparl~l'ldat "The politicn.l ecOnomy of economic int,em:ationll in R. 
,Hilton (ed.j.-"l'll';;'movement Toward JJatin American Unity;.11 Ope cit. pp. 
291-311. 
,-
(2) Data on EEC from: I. Walter: "The European Common Market", Praeger, New 
York 1967 Ch.2. 
D. Swann: uThe Economi cs of the Common ~"arket", pen;;uin 1970. 
G.- .Denton: (Ed.) If,Economic Integration in l!:urope" Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1969. 
(3) Data on EP.rA from: It'puHding EFTA: a Free Trade' Area in Europe"s EF'rA 
1966. 
II. Corbet and D. Robertson (Ed.). "$urope's }<'ree Tra.de Area ;E!xperiment". 
(4) M. Kaser: "Comecon: Intefj'!'aUon Problems of Plfll'lned Economies" Oxford 
Universi ty Press 1967 t and Un! ted Nations "E,conomic Intee:ratlon and Inc1u13tria.l 
.specialisation 8,."Tlong Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic' 
Assistance": U.N. 66.11.13.4. 
to be flourishing even in terms of their often lilnited frames of reference, 
and this includes the two which have lasted longest and achieved the greatest 
degree of harmonisation, the Central American Common Market and the East 
African Community. The former's problems are discussed elsewhere and the 
latter has just been reconstructed after virtual cessation in 196511.(1) A 
Caribbean Free Trade Area was founded in January, 1968, and appears to be 
flourishing though it is still in its formative stage: (2)(it had sufficient 
promise to attract Jamaica, the Leeward and Windwards in June 1968). The 
(1) Of the many contributions on East Africa, the following deal with the 
1967 Treaty: (Treaty of East African Cooperation), Nairobi, Government Printer 
1967 and its aftermath: 
P. Robson: "Economic Integration in Africa" OPe cit. pp. 154-165 and "The new 
setting for economic cooperation" in D. Rothchild (Ed.) "Politics of Intee;:r:a.tion" 
East African Publishing House 1968. 
P. Ndegwa: uTJ:le Common Ma;rket & Development in East Africa", East African 
Institute for Economic and Social Research, 1968 CR.IO & 11 
D. Mead: "Economic Cooperation in F.;ast Africa" Journal of Modern African Studies 
1969. 
At the time of writing the Community appears to be recovering from near dis-
int~gration due to conflict between Uganda and Tanzania on non-economic issues. 
(2) Preliminary discussion of integration prospects in: 
M. J3rewster & C. Thomas: "The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Inte ration" 
University of the West Indies Jamaica 1961. 
A. Segal: "The Politics of Caribbean Economic Integration": Institute of 
Caribbean Studies, Puerto ~ica 1968 CR. 1 & 2. 
N. Maritano: "A,.!.atin Americ;:!n J.~conomic Community" University of Notre Dame, 
Indiana 1970 ~l£ • ..:. '.&-' 
A fr.J.t Co_ M~ ~s ~_~ i,." 'T~ l~i3. 
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same can be said of the ,Andean Group, which emerged ao 0. result of 
frustration with the slow progress of the Latin hnerican Free Trade Area.(l) 
The largest prospective integration group was tbe Latin American Free 
Trade Area • After a hopeful beginning following the 1960 Monti1ideo Treaty, 
. 
the process of trade 1iberalisation in LA}~A slowed down and there was a 
failure to aeree on the second major round of multilateral tariff cuts on 
the "common list" in 1967. (2) There ViaS also failure to proceed far by 
national bilateral nego"tiation after 1962, and relatively little sectoral 
integration as planned. The Punta Del Este Declaration in 1967 failed to 
provide more than a deolaratory stimulus to further integration, aiming for 
a Common Market by 1985,(3) and under the 1969 Caracas Protocal reduces 
(1) This group was formally established in 1969 after preliminary discussions 
in 1966 •. At the time of writing agreement had just been reached on a corr~on 
policy towards foreign investors following upon agreed programme for 0. develop-
ment bank trade liberalisation, and joint planning of the chemicals industry 
(with metals, machinery and new cars): see liThe Anrlean Group: a promisi.nl) 
start" Bank of London and South American Review, Feb. 1911. 
F. Vicuna: "The dfiamics of f'.ubregional agreements within the TJAFTA movement" 
in R. flilton" '(Ed. "'The Move~ent Towards Latin American Unitt' ·op.c1t:---
E. Milenky: "From Integration to development nEl.tionallsm: the And.ean Gz:.oup 1265-
11" Journal of Inter-American Affairs 1972. 
(2) UnitedF~t.~vns.,(E.C.L.A.) ."Mul tilateral Economic Cooperation in I,atin 
America" Vol. -JIlo.1· "Texts and Documents" (U.N. 62.I1.S3). 
J. Navaretto: "Latin American economic integration a survey of recent liteI.O:-
~" Journal of Cornmon Market studies, Dec. 1965 pp.158-177. 
V. Urquidi: "Free Trade and Ficonomic Intefiration in I,atin America", University 
of California Press 1962. 
United Nations (E.C.L.A.) "The Latin American Common M:uket" t Mexico 1959. 
S.' D(lll: "A Latin American Common JA::'Irket?" Oxford University Press, 196';. 
M. Wionczek (Ed.) "Latin A'lJerican Econo:mic Integration Experiences & Pro.snects lt 
Pracger 1966. 
(3) Baaed lareely on the recommendation of R. Prebisch, P. Herrara, J. Mayobre 
and C. de Santamaria as in "Pro12osals for the crent:ion of a IJatin American 
COl1ll1'on Markot" Journal of Common Market Studies, Sept. 1966. 
the f~'e of 1iberalisation: the tareet for complete free trade was put 
bacl<: from 1973 to 1980. (11 The two maill participants in LAFT! trade, Brazil 
and Argentina hav,e recently (in 1968) formed their o"m 'subreeional
' 
group in-
volving Bolivia, Uraguay and Paraguay ("la Cuenca del Plata") which us so 
far directed at selected joint projects; a river fleet, a port terminal, 
a regional lumber project, iron and steel development and a development 
finance corporation. 
Asia, the Arab World and West Africa have been conspicuously less success-
ful in producing viable integration schemes than elsewhere. S.E. Asia has 
been subjected to destabilising military -conflict, and political uncertainty 
has prevailed in Burma, Indonesia and elsewhere: in this area there is so 
far only a highly tentative grouping, A.S.E.A.N. arld this lacks a full 
treaty. (2) The Federation of Malaysia (signed 1963) incorporated a Common 
Market, but proposal~ were never adapted for implementation(3) and the whole 
idea-died with the Federation in 1965. India is sufficiently large to feel 
little need for integration, and its trade with Pakistan is limited for 
political" reasons. The only successful project so far has been in West Asia 
• ,f'f:'!"JI"! "~f',':~" "~;.y&.' 
(1) The pre~~i:d;y Latin America situation is described and analysed in: 
R.lIil ton (Ed.). 11IJ.'lhe Movement Towards J,atin American Uni tI" OPe c1 t. (Intro-
duction). . 
M. Wionczek: "Rifle and decline of Latin America inte.2;ra.lli.U": Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 1970. Vol.IX no.1. 
E. Gale: "Lafta progress, problems ~.nd prosnects" WashinRton 1969.* 
W. Krause & J .F. Mathis: "J.ntin America and Economic Inte~l":lt.i5>n: neeional 
Pl~nnine for Development" : Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 1970. 
*extract in P. Robson (Ed.) "Interna.tiona1 J<1conomic Inteer~t:ion" Penguin 1912. 
(2) O.E.C.D.: IIJ1conomic CooperA.tian in ARi,!!:" Paris 1970. 
(~) I.B.R.D. (V,'orld Bank) Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia 1963. 
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between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (the n.C.D. group) and these countries 
are largely concerned with coordinating (specific industrial) investments, . 
rather than free trade. (1) 
. 
The Arab world east of Tunisia has been working towards closer economic 
integration since the early 1950 l s and some progress has been made in 
tariff reduction throu.e;h the 1963 "Arab Economic Unity" which deepened into 
specific agreement in 1965 aiming for a Common Market in 1975. (2) However, 
progress so far has been hampered in trading and coordinating manufactured 
. 
products despite relatively free trade in agricultural and mineral products, 
small tariff cuts on most manufactures, and partial elimination of quantity 
restrictions. Kahnert observed of the Common 1:;arket that "its achievements 
in virtually every field have been extremely meagro;~reover neither the 
institutional framework established to supervise the execution of the agree-
ment nore the progress made in the formulation of 'concrete plans give much 
hope for an early realisation of the aBTeements objectivesll .(3). The N~grab 
. 
Group ("Permanent Consultative Committee of the Mahgrab. countries") set up 
provisionally in 1964 haa so far been largely concerned with investigation 
ways of coordinating industrial development without necessarily embarking upon 
regional free trade,(4) has launched a development bank. Libyan political 
-... 
eccentrici tf'':-';~~:,~\~=!.·arrested its growth; but have fostered another Arab 
grouping with Syria, Egypt and Sudan. 
(1) Nurul Islam: "Resr,iona1 Cooperation for Development: PftkiRta..n, Irlm &. 
,Turkey" Journal of Common N:arket Studies, 1.~arch 1967 pp.283-302. 
(2) A.G. llusrey: ";" Study In Inter-Arab Trade Re1A-HonA 1920-67" Praeger 
1970 and "Fj.rst steps towards Arl'!.b economic uni t;y:" International Development 
Review No.1, 1971. 
Diab Muhammed: "The Arab Common Market", Journal of Common Market Studies; 
May 1966, pp.238-250. 
(3) F. Kahnert, et. a1 "F.conomic Integration runonr.;st Developing Countries" 
op. cit. p. 52. 
(4) The prospects of the "Uahgrab Group" are discussed in B. Muthallica: 
"Towards t~ul tin~tiona1 Economic Cooperation in Africa" Praeger, 1972 1'p.294-299. 
, 
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Finally, West Africa has suffered from several failures of political 
federation (Guinea/Ghana; Mali/aeneeal) and of economic integration. 
IIowever, schemes are still being actively canvassed and tried. (1) Arisine 
from the French colpnial practice there were customs unions in both'equa-
tional' and 'west' Africa. The former provided the basis for the Central 
African CUstoms and Economic Union (UDEAC),(2) which appear to have disin-
tegrated, two ;ears after its formation in 1966,(3) but still exists on paper. 
The latter formed the basis of the West African Economic and CUstoms Union, 
(UDEAO) which "has virtually ceased to exist" despite re-negotiation in 1966.(4) 
It is now hoped that it will be subsumed in a larger Economic Community which 
includes English speaking states and Guinea, and Liberia too: .and a Group 
including Gambia and Ghana was considered in 1968. However, such a group 
has yet to become effectively operational and has the probably insuperably 
divisive problem of separate monetary systems notably the franc area, which 
is grouped into a west African llonetary Union (UMAO ) with a Common Central 
.f' ; 
: I 
J 
: I 
I 
, ! 
.. ! 
i 
bank,(5) the ~terling,area (Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria) and the dollar 
'enclave' of Liberia: the limited agreements reached so far on tariffs have been , 
(1) B. Muth~ka ibid. pp.286-294. He estimates that there are about fourteen 
overlapping groups in the region. Adebeyo Adedeji "ProspectJL!.or regional 
economic cooperation in west Africa" Journal of Modern African Studies 1970 • 
• lIw~c" "'. !,- ... ,!, -<II~f~' • • 
(2) A. Hazelwooa.' (Ed.) "African Integra.tlon B.nd Disintegratjon" 1969 (Ch.2 
by Robson): P. Robson "F.conomic Integration in Africa" OPe cit. ch.5. 
(3) The Central African Republic and (Chad.) left'in 1968. Then these two 
countries with Congo (Kinshasa ) thon formed a Central African Economic 
Union (UEAC) excluding Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo (Brazzaville). Also the U.N. 
Agency E.C.A. is tryin~ to promote the idea of a larger grouping involving 
Congo Kinshasa, which sent observers to UDEAC. As far as can be, seen however, 
UDEAC (now minus only Chad) is still the basis of economic integration in the 
area. Africa Research Digest, 1971. 
(4) Quote from P. Kahnert, at. a1., OPe cit. 1'.52. 'Ilhe background is de-
scribed in P. Hobson "Economic Integration in Africa" OPt cit. pp.244-248. 
The group was subsequently reconstituted i~tp'a West African Economic Community 
(1971).. (African nesearch'Digest and ~~~ItD. r ill.d,) 
(5) Despite their other problems the ~ West African and Equatorial 
African areas maintain substantial monetary integration. 
----------------_ ... -...... 
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between UDEAO countries. ~1ere have been various cross-cutting proposals 
often aimed at breaking down linguistic barriers; the proposal of IlSenegrunbia,,'l) 
a proposed customs union between Ghana and Upper Volta (1961); a free trade 
area between Gui~ea, Ivory Coast, Liberia ~d Sierra Leone. Failure of t10re 
grandiose schemes has led to modest arrangements like the Consell de l'Entente 
to develop projects jointly within the UDEAO umbrella - involving naBomey, 
Volta, TOgO,· Niger and Ivory coast.(2) There has been discussion of a 
West African Iron and Steel community, which would fit within the Economic 
community(3) and there have been agreements on industrial projects (Togo and 
Dahomey), and for multi-purpose development of the Senegal River and Lake 
Chad. (4) In Africa, generally there is a bewildering array of bilateral 
trade agreements and limited agreements. 
'l'here are many other past or present or potential schemes that have been 
ignored. For example no mention is made of free trade area, common markets 
and economic unions of colonial vintage, which have not survived independence 
(1) . P. Robson ibid. pp. 280-285; A. Hazelwood (oP. cit.) African IntegTation 
and Disintelrration" pp. 115-128. There have been joint projects arising from 
this proponal. 
(2) Mentioned in E. Muthafika OPe cit. p.288; United Nations ",TradeExpansion 
and Economic Integration etc. II OPe cit. ch.3 and United Nations: "Industri.fI);, 
Development Suryey: Volume II" UNlLO New York Ch.5. This is a. flourishing 
group which <..... ~.~ .. t~loped a mutual investment guarantee fund; and is planning 
joint industrial projects for cement, tyres and petrol. 
(3) Inter-American Development Bank: tI}:fultinational Investment in the F.c.onomi.~ 
Development and Integration of I,atin Amer~1t Colombia. 1968; paper on "l!:Qn 
and Steel in ,,!'est Africa" by Bax Nomvete pp.281-303. 
(4)' The Organisation of Senegal River states (Guinea, Mali, l::auI'etania' and 
Senegal, has been developed into an active little group, coordinating agricul-
ture and telecommunications, and providing the basi~ of a plan for industrial 
coordination (paper to Guinea; Iron a;nd Steel to r..!al,i and Mauretania, petro 
chemicals to Guinea). 
--_._------..---
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such as the Rwanda-Burundi Economi,c Cuntoms Union, the Malaysian Federation 
and the Central African Federation. (1) After restructurinff arrangements, East 
Africa, the west Indies, possibly UDEAC nnd UDEAO have survived in a modified 
form. (2) Second~y there are cases of multinational cooperation on tra.de policy 
such as OCM~, the French-speaking African countries' cornman market in sugar, 
and even amorphous e;roups such as the "Group of 77" within UlJCTAD. Thirdly, 
no mention has been made of "preference arrangements" between metropolitan and 
former or presently subject nations which have ,had a sienificant effect on 
trade flows, such as Commonwealth preference, Portuguese relations with its 
overseas territories and the connection between the former French Union and 
France, now incorporated in the framework of E.E.C. (3) Fourth there are some 
ca.ses where political federation has occurred and this has involved economic 
union. (4) Fifthly, there are many ideas currently being canvassed which mayor 
may not come to fruition: proposals for New Zealand/Australian integration, (5) 
o (6)' (7) (8) for free trade between Canada and the U,~" for P.A.F.T.A., N.A.F.T.A., 
(1) The Central African Feder~tion, now defunct had important experience in 
respect of its attempts to balance gains and losses; A. Hazelwood ",Africa:!! 
Integration and Disintegration" OPt cit. Ch.6. 
(2) One should also mention a. group which is still surviving, the South African 
Customs and Monetary Union (South Africa and three former protectorates), which 
was recreated in 1969 and has a common market, monetary integration, substantial 
joint services and a revenuo sharine a,greement. 
(3) The imp~_~ :",.. .... i\,:pf these 'preferential' connections is brought out strongly 
in H. Linnemann: "Econometric Analysl.R of TrRcle J!11ows" North-Holland 1966. 
Also P. Kenen and fi. Lawrence (Ed.) "The Open Economy"; article by R. Lawrence 
"Primary Products, Preferences & Economic Welfare: the Ega and Africa" pp.240-
260. 
(4) Somalia and Cameroon (discussed in A. Hazelwood ~.). 
(5f' P, Elkan: "Blueprint for an area of gURntitativcly :'-inn, structurally b<tlp.nc-
ed free trade,": Journal of Development Studies. Sept. 1966 pp.1-13. ' 
(6) R. Wonnacott and P. Wonnacott: "Free. Trade between CAnada nnd the U.S," 
Harvard 1967. 
(1) PAFTA = Pacific Asia Free Trade Area. Viyoshi Kojima: "A Pacific Economic 
.community and ARiAn leSf! DeveJoped Countrif!s": Hitotsubas'Kt Journal of Economics 
June, 1966 pp.17-37, .. ho".Ta anese interest in PRciric Tra.de Lx ansion: PAI'1J'A 
reconsidered": June 1968 pp.1-32. Criticised in H. Ax c: "PAFTA: an 
Australian assessment". Inter-economics 1967 pp.271-6. - • .• 
(8) UAFTA = North Atlantic Free Trade Area: "Uree Tradp. 0n~ion: Oppo!'tunity 
for Britain" Maxwell stamp Associates, 1967. 
R. Cooper and H. Johnson in D. Ba1assa and M. Kreinln "Studjea ln Trade L.iberal-
i.~a.tion" OPt cit. Ch.II esp • 
• 
(1) (2) ASPAC J and Nordek ,and a host of other concoctions. 
These various attempts at economic integration llave been clasoified 
together above, but they include agreoments concluded on the basis of 
entirely diffez:ent philosophies. If one were to catcgorioe them then the 
following basic distinctions should be made: 
(a) on. one band those groupings that are largely concerned with making 
a move towards freer trade and to maximise the trade "creation" factor in 
the Union and minimising trade "diversion": EFrA, NAFTA, PAFrA, and (oddly) 
CARIFrA, appear to have this end in view. The other arrangements are with 
varying degress of thoroughness trying to use the regional market as a means 
of minimising tho cost of protection based on tho external tariff and import 
substi tution, if necessary by encouraging "trade diversion": with the RCD, 
COMECON and LAFrA this goal is fairly explicit. This distinction would 
broadly correspond to one between industrialised and industrialising countries ) 
based upon the differences in the theoretical rationale for integration in 
the different circumstances. . 
• 
. (b) One can also distinguish a "liberalis~" rather than a "dirigiste ll 
approach~3) The for.mer sees the gains from unions coming largely from un" 
restricted competition induced by freer trade with authorities at a mUlti-
national level intervening to-stop distortions 'in comDetit!on developing 
~ . 
• . ~\,J',~"", " 
(EEC, EFTA);- Th~'~"iatter is largely concerned 'With using the role of Dn inter-
stato executive to ensure planned specialisationo At its highest level as in 
COMECON one has something approaching a troul tinational plan' and in most 
integration agreements there is some attempt to indulge in sectoral or projeot 
industrial coordination of some kind (as in the CACM Integration Industries 
and "Andean" 
Scheme, the R.C.D., the LAFrll/Complementary ABI'eemcnts, or the East A!rican 
tlKampala Agreement"). However, in practioe many of these sohemes have a hi~ 
(1) ASPAC = Asian and Pacific group : or Australia; New Zealand, Japan, Korea, 
Laos, Malaysia, Plrlllipino3, Thailand and S. Vietnrun. 
(2) Uordek is n proposed Scandine~an Customs Union which wa_s envisaged if 
negotiations to join the EEC faif"ror Nonray and Denmark. ~t is unlikely to 
materialise. 
(3) The distinction is made in Balasaa "E~onomic Theory and Economic Integrntiod 
OPt cit. pp. 7-10. 
-----------------~.-----
"liberalist" content regard.less of its seeming irrelevance to the under-
lying rationale for integration in developing countries, while "liberalist" 
groups like the E$C may have a substantial degree of 'planning'. 
In, fact these distinctions are far from perfect and there are consider-
able internal contradictions in both the Treaties and operational arrangements. 
CENTRIiL AJI,~ERICAN INTIDRATrON. 
The first major step forward in the post-war period{l)was in 1951 when 
the five governments agreed after a meeting under the auspices of the U1~ 
Economic Committee for Latin America to promote the "gradual and progressive 
integration of their countries nationai economiesll~2) A committee of economic 
cooperation was set up which explored "the interest of the governments in 
developing agricultural production and industry and systems of transport in a 
way that promotes the. integration of their economies, the formation of larger 
markets facilitating trade, coordination of dovelopmentplans and the creation 
(l) There had been a large number of attempts to integrate the region ever 
since the failure of federation in 1839, following independence in 1821. It 
has been estimated that twenty five official attempts were made. None succeeded 
as their linkA wQrE\~~ th Spain rather than each other and overland transport 
was very poor, these economic factors proving stronger than the cultural bonds 
of religion, language and tradition. The large scale development of a plant-
ation economy based on the export of coffee and bananas to the world market wao 
a further factor causing an aliement of modes of co~~unication on an extra-
regional rather than inter-re$lonal basis. Even in this later period attempts 
were made to integrate in 1896/8 (uRepublica Major"), 1910 (the Washington 
TreatJes) and 1921. Sources: T.L. Kanes liThe Failure of Union: Centr:=tl Aml?rica 
1924-1960" Chape1hi11 1961. 
F'.D. Parker: !"The Central American Republics" 1964. 
13. Solnick: "A historian's view of Central America: economic inte ation and 
'po1i tical uni tyll in R. ~Hil ton (Ed. ChI 37 t "The Movement Towards Latin American 
Unit:'!". 
(2) Resolution 9. Report of the Economic Commission, for Latin America; 
Fourth Session: United Nat"ions Economic and Social Committee, New York, 1951 
(E/EC 12/275). 
of companies in which all have an interest".(l) 
three phases. (2) 
76. 
Subsequently, there were 
(i) the formation period to 1958 when the basic problems were discussed 
and studied mainly under the influence of the Economic Cooperation Committee.(3) 
Several influential studies were carried out and bilateral agreement reached. 
(ii) the'second was the organisation period from 1958-60 when the main 
treaties were signed under EOLA guidance. (4) The 1958 Uul tilateral Treaty 
established free trade for some products (2;9 tariff groups) and aimed for 
a free trade area in ten years. The Treaty also aimed for harmonisation of 
industrialisation incentives (Article V), and equalisation of the external 
tariff (Article IV). Concurrently was signed the agreement on "Integration 
Industries" concerned with regulations for building large industrial units 
based on the regional market. 
(1) United Nations (E.C.L.A.) It,Informe de Ia Primera Reunion del Conlite de 
Cooperacion EconomicQ del TAlmo Centroamericano", Honduras Aug. 1952, 
(2) This classification is used by J. Pincus: liThe Central American Commt)Jl 
Market" 1963 USAID (Guatemala). 
and A. Wardlaw: tiThe Onerations of the Central American Comf":')n flA.J"ket" t 
USAID, 1965 p.6. 
(3) United Nations (E.C.L.A.) "The CentrA-l American integration Ill'ocrammfl: 
eva.1urtt5.on and prospects" Economic Bullotin for Latin America, Oct. 1959 and 
",Pocu,mentaclv.. '-~ r~mito de Cooperacion EconomicA. de Ioi"mo Centroamer.fcan.q," 
Mexico 1965. 
(4) The texts are in United Nations ttConvenios Centro-americanos de intosrac,ion 
~conomicalt (ECN 12/CCE/315) 1964 or United states Aid "Economic Integration; 
Treaties of Central America" Guatemala 1964 • 
. 
\ 
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Also in this formative period was signed (1959) nn agroement to 
equalise the external tariff within five years of the effective date of 
signature, and introduce a uniform tariff classificntion (NAUCA). In order 
to speed up the integration process a ~Teaty of Economic Association was 
signed between Guatemala, Salvador and Hond:uras in 1960~1) This was super-
ceded by a General Treaty of Economic Integration, aimed in 1960, taking 
precedance over previous agreements and laying the framework for the Common 
Market, and to which all the five countries had adhered by 1963. The General 
Treaty aimed to create a free trade zone (after 5 years) and a full customs 
union. 
(iii) the third phase was concerned with implementation of the Treaties 
and the many subsidiary ;features of the arrangement such as setting up an 
Integration Bank and a Clearing House ;for currencies, as will be discussed 
below.(2) / 
(1) Motives were complex: see J. Nye "Central American Regionfl.l Integration": 
International Conciliation No. 562 March 1967. 
(2) The process o;f implementation is described and evaluated in many texts, 
inter alia; J. Cochrane: 1I~'he Politics of Regional In,tegration : The Central 
American Case" Tulane University, Ne"T Orleans 1969 Ch. 3. 
I. Halter and W. Vitzhum: "The Ce-.ntral American Comnon Harket": The Bulletin 
of !rew York University. (Graduate Business School No. 44). 
United Nations (E.C.L.A.) "Evalllacion de In Integracion Economic en Centro~ 
america" 6C :-' .... Q. and "General situation and futuro outlook of the Central 
/.tneX':f.can Integration": Economic Bulletin for Latin .Alnerica 1963 :.' . 
and "Documentacion del Comi te de Coo erRcion Economica del Islmo Ccntroamericam' 
CEPAL HEX 5 5 19 ,. 
SIECA: "Cinco Anos do l..abores" Guatemala 1966. 
G. Lava: "Incidencia de In intecrracion en In economica Centroamericana" EconOlllbl 
·Salvadorena 1965 pp. 17-21. . 
S.'Nogiera: Horales: "Evaluation de los resultadoes obi'Cnidoa con la intolf!::acion 
econornica centroame'l'icana" Economia No.5 University of San Carlos, Gua.temala, 
1963 pp. 16-33. 
c. Staley, "Central Arne,rican economic integration" : Southern Ebonomic Journal 
Oct. 1962.:' . 
J. Crow: "Economic int..enation in Central America," Finance and Development 
March 1966.1· , 
--------------...--
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Many writers have considered the institutions of the rlarket (l)to be 
more important than the Treaties.(2) There are so many escape clauses and 
open ended commit~ents that the real success of the arrangement has been to 
resolve the endless minor disputes that have arisen and to maintain until 
1971 the involvement of the partner states. For example it has been necessary 
for every Treaty or protocol to a treaty to be ratified by the governments 
individually before it is effective for that goven1ment and in some cases 
ratifications have been delayed for many years (in fact, to 1969 for most 
agreements). The burden of day to day management and of sustaining interest 
falls on three bodies: 
(i) the Economic Council, consisting of the five Economic ministers -
the top policy making body, 
(ii) the Executive Council consisting of the five permanent officials, 
who interpret and implement the treaty, 
-, 
(iii) SIECA, th~ Secretariat, and arguably the main force behind the 
Market. 
(1) Described in detail in F. Villegran-Kramer: ".I.ntegration Economica. r.entro-
americana" Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala; Guatemala 1967. 
D. Sidkanski: ",ill.mensiones lnsti tutionales de lao Inte,.m:acion T,n.tino Americano" 
INTAL, BuenoC.::.:::,;':,1967. 
(2) This argument is suggested inter alia in; "Business International Corpora-
tion.. . ('ii"ijihe" Central American Common Ha.rket: Prof! ts and Problems in 3.n Integ:raH.Jlg 
Economy". ,1967 -; ····op. cit. . 
P. Schmitter "Central American Intogration, Spil,lover" ~lln.round! t;'ncap~ula.­
..!!sm" Journal of Common Market Studies, sept. 1970. p.5. He areued also that 
the General Treaty is not simply a once and for all agreement to eliminate 
barriers on mutual trade ••••• " but rather on ingeniously contrived Bet of 
continuous obligations". 
'. 
19,. 
Since the rapid establishment of the Common Harket in the early sixties, 
serious internal crises developed round about 1968 when a Itsummi ttl was held 
in San Salvador~l) However in 1969 Nicaragua withdrew after disputes over 
a collective approach to the regional balance of p~ents problem, and 
shortly afterwards rejoined. Shortly after that the "warlt broke out and 
there has been n continuous disruption of operations since then. In order 
. 
to establish a pattern for future development D. !Nodus Operandi' was di'scussed 
in 1910,(2) though this failed to prevent Honduras issuing Decree 91 in 
the same year, rei¢.posing tariffs on Central American trade and thereby 
Costa Rica followed. 
effectively leaving the CAC11. Efforts are currently being expended to restune 
the CACl! through a "Normalisation Commission". 
,The lInin El(,.TI1p..nts in An Integration Process. 
I Trade Liberalisation. 
As argued in Chapter 1 trade liberalisation is a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself, but it is also a necessary condition for clos~ integ-
ration whether it iakes place on a 'planned' and sectoral basis or unilaterally 
and "across the boari". The Central American programme will first be 
describea3)W1d then put in a broader setting. 
(1) Results of ·t':ds ttsummi tit are recorded in S.I.E.C.A. "Actn del .terce:c: 
Period de Sess10nes de In Torcer Retmion de Ministeros de Economia de Centro-
america" Guatemala 1968t and also S.r.E.C.A. Ca.rta Informativa No. 81. 
The summit agreed to (i; a stabilisutine fund for intraregional p~ents 
problems. 
(ii) better coordination of agriculture and industry; (iii) an improved 
regional capital market; (iv) greater labour mobility; (v) a regional tele-
comm.unication~ and electriCity policy; (vi) to strengthen CABEl (the reeional 
bank); (Vii) more funds for ICAITI (the regional research institute). 
(2) The terms of the 'modus operandi" are described in S.I.E.C.A. "Acuerdos 
de los Ministerios de Economica A.ra el estnblacimionto de un 'modus 0 ernndi l 
,del l1ercado Comun Centronrnericw1o",S.I.E.C.A. R.J.I.B.G.-M-3 D.T.4 Rev.2 Sept. 
1910. They agreed to (i) a c~ecial fund within CADI directed mainly to help-
ing the poorer parties, (ii) the need for a clear ].l,anned industrial policy; 
(iii) the need for an overhaul of tho external tariff and definitions of 
"origin" and to redefino elcgibility for fiscal incentives to prevent abuse; 
(iv) the need for a regional agricultural policy - urgent action on storage 
and price regulation; (v) tho tolerate emergency balance of p~ents measures, 
if necessary, against deficits on reeional trade. , 
(3~ The free trade provioions,of the ~;eaties are diScussed in S.I.E.C.A. 
nQincsLAnos._.de .. Labores_.JlR..la llltegrac10n economica .centro-tlIIlericana.". Guatemala 
Ci ~y, 1966, and n.l.E.C.A •. ":r:P_f2..;me sO_b~e_)._Qs'-i:'{anQeILdel..prQet~e de. Integ,-8.QJ.Qn eCQnQ.m;ica Ce.ntrnamerl.cana. SIECA/69/S.G. 52. Guatemala J.~b9. - " . ..,.-..._u .•. 
'~--------------------
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The 1958 Multila.teral trea.ty envisaged immediate free trade in 200 
i terns followed by periodic produc~ by product multilateral negotiations 
leading, after ten years, to free trade in moot products. This approach 
was very cautious, especially as many of the agreed items were not locally 
produced and others were already the subject of bilateral agreements.(l) 
Frustration led to the 1960 Tripartite Treaty which was more fundemanta1 
in approach and aimed for "across the board" free trade except for 50 commo-
dities to be dealt with in a 10-15 year transition. This quickly led on 
to the General Treaty which extended this bold approach to the four (later 
r-
five) countries. Immediate free trade was designated for all except a few 
products, mainly about 50 "tempo.rary exceptions" v;hich could create special 
problems of disruption of production or revenue collection. Many of those 
exceptions disappeared after a five year transition in 1966, but two cate-
eories remained: first, there were 23 pro~ucts such as sugar, coffee. and 
cotton and alcoholic beverages excluded from free trade, some because of 
the conditions of international commodity agreements. Secondly, there are 
a few others (SUCh as petroleum and some consumer durables) which are tempo-
rarily ex~epted pending agreement, though some of these, like glass 
bottles, peans, rice and maize, have been recently settled. In addition, the 
General Treat:· :~3~~'ti9i ted dumping in intraregional trade, and agreed to 
eliminate the "protective" effect of ·internal taxes • 
. ~ It should not be assumed from this that trade is without impediment. 
First there is no provision for free trade in transit trade - re-exporting. 
Second there 1s a eood deal of checking at each border and on low unit value 
product the cost of loading, unloading and w~iting can be equivalent to a sub-
stantial tariff.(2) There have also been conflicts over origin, labelling etc. 
which lead to delays and disputes.(3) 
0{i) United Nations: "Central American Integr8.tion Progrl!l.mrne, E!valuation an,S 
Prospects" op. cit. 
(2) Klaus Huber: "CentrCl.l American Road Pricing studt' World Bank 1970. 
(Unpublished) • 
(3) S.I.E.C.A.: "Problems del Merc:;l.do Comun" (Seventh Reunion of the FJconomic 
Council) S.I.E.C.A.!CEC-7-0/DT3 Guatemala 1967. 
------------------
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In its sweepine elimination of obstacles to free trade by automatic 
and linear liberalisation, the Centr~l American group has at least until 
the disruption in 1969, a good performance. Among~t developing countries 
only CARn'TA has. been comparably radical in approach aiming for free trade 
over the 1968-71 period for most products with 50% local value added, but 
allowing quota restrictions if one partner has balance of payments diffi-
culties ("hich were rejected by the CACM). 
Part of the reason why Central America has advanced so easily to free 
trade is that tariff reduction is politically more difficult if there arc 
strong vested interests in existing protected industry (both in ownership 
of capital and on the labour side if there is substantial~mp1oyment). It I III 
is usually much easier to negotiate concessions for products which might be ( 
produced in the future. With such a small industrial base there have been 
\ 
limited foci of resistance. Vested interest of existing producers have been I 
partly protected by the five yer'lx transition, in a few cases by exemption, I 
but mostly have been ignored. 
In LAPTA this was less easy and an approach wa.s adopted in the 1960 0" 0 
Montevideo Treatv similar to that in the 1958 Multilateral Treaty. 
. ~~-~.:':- "~:~:,:,.,~" Tariff 
reduction in LAFTA proceeds by two mechanisms: first, individual countries 
enter into annual negotiations to place products voluntarily and only semi-
permanently on a "national list"; second there is a "corrunon list" of perm-
anenOtly agreed reductions which are negotiated triannual1y with the original 
intention of achieving free trade 12 years ,after initiation ieee, 1972. It 
was mainly the "common list" negotiations which caused ECtA to founder when 
the second stage was not a~eed in 1967, but even in the 'voluntary' national 
list negotiations where there are more escape clauses and concessions are not 
irrevocable, progress was strictly limited often on non-produced items, largely 
between Argentina and Brazil and for agricultural items (75% of' trade in the 
82. 
1960 t s). Planned annual reductions have now been reduced from 0% to 3%: 
the 1969 Caracas protocol envisages a free trade area only by l~~O at which 
time it is hoped to integrate CACM to the eroup to~. (1) Just as LAFTA 
ran out of steam by its 'step to step' . approach and by its willingness to 
make exemptions in all cases where tariffs were of importance to the domestic 
economy, the prab Common Market had identical problems, and negotiations 
failed at the ~rd and 4th stages of tariff negotiations by which time much 
agricultural and 'non-produced' industrial items were freed with escape 
clauses but tariffs on manufactures were out by less than half. 
An entirely different approach has been adopted by two of the African 
Common Markets)which inherited a·free trade situation very largely, in trying 
to deal with the problems which unrestricted free trade had had for established 
industry. The East African Community allows the deficit countries (Uganda 
and Tanzania), to impose "infant industry" tariffs (called "transfer taxes") 
. of up to 50% of the ~ternal tariff and for up to eight years on any intra-
regionally trades good on which a deficit country on regional trade is pro-
ducing. In the west African Community ( UDEAO) it was agreed that 
tariffs at 50% of the external tariff should be allowed on intra-regional 
trade and 7~6 whc~~ products were competing. In these cases the arrangement 
• t~, ,~;.~ -4:,-
is more of a preference arrangement than a customs union and as such appears 
to conflict with GATT requirements, (2) though th~- advantage in terms of prc-
venting serious dislocation, are considerable. UDEAO permitted quantity 
restrictions in regional trade; but not East Africa. In the other groupS 
(1) The Andean group has. a similar ta.rget - for free trade,largely by 1980 and 
completely by 1985: bla.WJ"e important agricultural products. 
(2) Under the terms of acticle XXIV, participants may derogate the uncon-
ditional "lr.ost favoured nation" clause only if they establish a customs union 
or free trade area. Any other form of preference is illegal unless existing 
. previously. However, it is believed that greater flexibility has now been 
introduced into GATT. pp.90-91. 
Un! ted Nationo "Jrade IPmansion and Economic InteRTation" 67IID20. 
In Central America, only Nicaragua is a member of GATT. 
'. 
--------------------------
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little progress towards generalised free trade has been made. (1) 'rhus as 
far as regional free-trade is concerned, the CACM has gone further and faster 
.. ,$ S,rls , 
than any group outside of the EEC/m'TA 
,II. Common External Tariff. 
The need for harmonisation of the external tariff derives from 
'\ 
. 
several factors. First, if there are differences in rates of duty on 
imputs of raw materials and capital goods then this could distort cost di-
fferences. Second there is worrY over 'deflection', with goods entering 
a region through a low-duty partner country and being re-exported duty 
free to a high-duty country to avoid duty: though this can be dealt 
w~th by not allo;,r~~~xports (as in Central America) or having clear 
rules of origin (EFTA and CARIFTA).· . Third and most important in this con-
text, a low duty in one national market may weaken the advantages of scale 
and of market certainty, especially when transport costs between producers 
and peripheral consumers are already large, This aspect is crucial in 
. . 
Central America as the external tariff is perhaps the most important element 
in industrial promotion. 
The common tariff wa~ adopted in the 1959 Agreement on Tariff Equalis-
ation and 'i;"ri~:~~'q~ent protocols (1959,60,62,64,65). (2) There were re-
latively few problems as the countries ha.d similar industrial structures and 
relatively little divergences in industries dependent on substantial protection; 
(1) There is considerable free trade in UDEAC, but this is limited by quot~ 
and discriminatory taxes especially between Cameroon and the rest, and all . 
"regional" industries have to be oollectively approved before being allowed 
free trade. The Magr.Q.b scheme has made little progress in trado liberallsa-
tion. The South African Customs Union involves free trade but with a ~mal1 
volume of goods. 
(~ Technically.,it is not a common tariff in as much as revenue ia collected 
nationally 'not by a joint body: also allowed until recently were nationally 
permitted duty drawbacks. 
') 
~ __ ~ ......... ~ •• c __ "~ ____ _ 
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as there were relatively feYl monetary and exchange controls, or quantity 
controls, to complicate the negotiations (as in LAFTA) and no cross-cutting 
preference agreements (as in west Africa). 85% of items were equalised 
immediately and most of the others over a five year transition. Exceptions 
now make up only 2% of the items in the tariff schedule, but these contribute 
17% of the total Central American ilnports (1968) (1) and 8% of the tariff 
revenue. The Treaties also reorganised the customs classification to 
a common code. 
The tariff negotiations resulted in a significant increase in the 
average tariff from 65% on consumer goods to 82'5%; 3~/o to 34'4lfor 
intermediate goods and raw materials; 20~t to 32· 2% on building materials 
and l~/o to 13% on capital goods. (2) The increases were largest for Honduras. 
Also the gove~~ents have taken the cnlcin1 atep of agreeing to submit all 
tariff increa.ses to approval by the Common Market, thus ensuring that the 
Common Market C.E.T •• is adequately policed, though the procedure agreed is 
that'every tariff change has to be separately approved by protocol by all 
the partner states; which is ~umbersome. The next step is a major'revision 
of C.E.T. carried out jointly by S.I.E.C.A. and the Normalisation Commission. 
Despite its many exceptions, the Central America, CIE.T. is more con-
." 
solidated than ,that of most other schemes. In Dome, like the Ar~b Common 
. Market (and COMECON) it is meaningless to talk about 'a common tariff' as 
protection operates through quantity controls and the preferential buying 
of state importing organisations. The problems presented by the tangle of 
monetary controls and exchange rate distortions were so great that the LAFTA 
(1) Details in "Central America: the process of integrati!2!3,lt. Bank of London 
and South America Review. June 1968. The l7~· is accounted for by, 7% cars; 
4' 5% petroleurn products; 2~'~ wheat, plus refrigerators, jute sacks and others. 
(2) I. Walter and W. Vitzthum Opt cit. p.~4. As will be shown in Ch.3, these 
average tariffs are largely meaningless measures of the level of protection. 
'. 
r 
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Montivideo Treaty did not envisage a common external tariff for LAJ.ill.rA, 
except in Complementarity Agreements, and the Punta de Este declarations 
did little more than envisage fa common market' of all Latin America 
in 1985. The Andean Group are aiming for 1980. The East African 
Community does have a common external tariff.(l) UDEAC has 'one in principle; 
though there are' exceptions. (2) The west African Community in the 
form of ODEAC is committed a common tariff in principle (lldroit de duane rt ) 
though any tendency to draw together English and French speaking areas will 
make this impossible in the short run, and little had been achieved in the 
French-npea.king area; much less than in UDEAC. 
Taking free trade and common external tariff provisions together Central 
America emerges as tho "purest" case of a customs union (in an economic sense) 
amongst developing countries, U .-p.>~I'\. c:...~. and East Africa are advanced 
too but they spring from colonial, customs unions, and this makes the Central 
American achievement seem all the greater • 
• 
III. Rarmonised :Balance of rayments and r,,~oneb.ry Policy. 
~le'main relevance of monetary integration is duo to tho fact that tho 
process of trade liberalisation, unless done on a narrowly reciprocal basis 
~ .... 
• ~:,';,:~". I'-~·ft;&.; 
is likely to create surpluses and deficits on regional trade which presents 
some partners with a "payments" problem especially if substantiq.l trade 
diversion is involved. If currencies are completely convertible as in the 
EEd.then the problem merges into the general balance of payments problem • 
I 
I 
i 
i ~ ~tt) 
J On the other extreme, if there ia a common -, I balance of payments problem by definition. currency, then thore is no "regiona.l ll I \\~ Problems arise for non-convertible I overvalued separate currencies when either one partner accumulates Durplus 
(1) However, it is being croied as countries arc allowed to fix the tariff 
unilaterally. P. Robson "Economic Inteeratlon in Africa" OPt cit. p.108. 
(2) 1.E.!!!. p.188-190. There are, hO"ll'ever. many "supplementary taxes" allowed 
on imports which enable differences to persist; also there is a 'two-column' 
tariff for different countries of origin in view of Dritain's position viz a 
viz West Cameroon. 
---.-------------=--------------~-
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non-convertible currency which it cannot use or when a partner is oblised 
to settle regional deb! ts in "sca.rce" convertible currency. A second though 
in some ways related major problem area is that if individual countries attempt 
to settle their overall balance of payments unilaterally by exchange rate 
charges, export subsidies or tariffs then this either conflicts directly with 
Market rules or else affects money costs and cost advantag'e Wi thin the areas 
as well as the confidonce of investors and member countries. ~1hus it is very 
desirable from the point of view of long term investment decisions and trade 
realignment that there should be stable exchange ratos and freedom from con-
troIs. A nation going into an integration scheme with an overvalued exchanee 
rate may suffer from a short fall of exports in the new market and immediately 
subject its balance of payments to even greater strain.(l) Thirdly, sub-
stantial trade in new markets reqUires financing and a good deal of techni-
cal cooperation amongst banks and Central Banks. 
Coordination in.Central America was not initially directly concerned 
with the first two basic problems. (2) 
(1) The whole principle of monetary integration as a neces~ary or desirable 
concommitant of ~egional economic integration is discussed in J. Vanek: 
"Payments uni!>n~ ,amonl3' the less developed countries and.. their ~conofT'li,c. inte,,-
. ~t.i0.l1", .Jou..u • ...: v!',' Common 11arket Studies, 1966 pp.187-191: ]'. Keesing and 
P. Brand:"The possibilities amonG' the less developed count.ries And their econo-
mic integration". H':F Staff Papers 1963 pp.187-l9l and "}.Jas Union es de pagos 
entre paiaeA de menor des,. arollo, eficax instru.rr.ento de intcgrJl...9 j on economi.c.K,. 
El Trimestre Economico 1865. pp.524-529. 
J. V. Mladek: "Currency Unions - Pro t. Con" Finance and' ,Development 1966. 
P.'"Robson ".F.£onomic Inte8'fntion in Africa" OPe cit. pp.49-54. 
B. Balasaa: "~heory of Economic Integration" OPt cit. pp.257-274. 
(2) The history and debate about Central American monetary intc8'l'ation is 
covered in: 
J.P. Young: "Central. American Moneta.ry Union" USAID.' 1965. , 
de Valle: "ProlJlemas de IntelQ'acion Uonetaro Cent:r.9ar.n.ericanott~ ~1'~Eoonomiatl 
University of 1'1 SalVador, 1964. "Monetary inte ration in Central America~ : 
achievements and expectation~". Journal of Common Market S U ies, 19 • pp. 
13-25. ".Intra-central American payments system And trade" in M. Wionczek. 
"J.!aUn Ar.lerica Economic Int,er;rrttion", OPe cit. 1966. 
J. Molina Calderson: ".~il. ueso centroA.mericano: Flltuacion y perspectivas" in 
Universidad de San Carlos LXXI Opt cAt. pp.29-65. 
'. 
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This was partly due to the fact that the area has had remarkable price and 
exchange rate stability and policies generally have been geared to maintaining 
those goals, (1) governed by the priority of protectlng agricultural export 
prices and preventing an expanding money supply leading to a sudden influx 
of imports and a deterioration in the balance of payments. As a consequence 
of this, Honduras and Nicaragua now have convertible currencies without direct 
restrictions on exchange a .(2) 1'hose in Guatemala and El Salvador' 
involve some licensing of foreign exchange transaction~' Costa Rica 
-4 had a complex system of multiple exchance rates,~s more comprehensive 
controls and historically, less of a coromi tment to pr,ice and exchange stability 
and convertability. (3) However monetary coordination is still of importance 
because external balance of payments difficulties exacerbated by a serious 
imbalance on intra-regional trade coul'd lead (md ~c:Ml.le~ to a demand for 
controls and revaluation affecting regio~al trade. 
(1) The Central American currencies are amongst the "hardest" in the world. 
The Honduran lempira (= ! US dollar) is unchanged in parity since 1924; the 
Salvadorian colonE}" (= • 4 US dollars) is unchanged since the war; the Guatemalan 
quetzal (= one dollar) has never been devalued against the US dollar; the 
Nicaraguan codoba was fixed at 7 to the dollar in 19~8/49. 
There is -also very little inflntion. Over the 1960-69 period the cost of 
living index rose in total in Guatemala by 4~G; Salvador by 8%: Honduras by 
21%; Nicaragua by 6% and r.osta Rica by 20% (n1' International }'inancial 
statistics). -, 
~~~~l~~' 
(2) See also M. Gomez Valencia "Infla.cion y inteer~cion". Universidad. de San 
Carlo LXXI OPe cit. pp. 67-7~. There have been.indirect restrictions e.e. 
on the extension of bank credit for imports. 
(3) At its accession to the common market Costa Rica has three rates of 
exchange (following a devaluation in 1959); all "official" ra.te of 6· 62 to 
6· 65 colones to the ¢; a ufree rate" of. colones to the ¢ used for non-essen-
tial, non Central American imports; and a bank note market offering 4-5% above 
the official rate. In 1969 the exchange rate was unified at 6·65 and the 
currency was made fully convertible. In tlle 1971 dollar devaluation crisis the 
colon was devalued acainst the dollar (to 8·6 colones in August and 7.9 in 
November)v:hile the other C.A. countries remained pegged. 
00. 
Following a lone standin~ recognition of the need for monetary coopera-
tion the first tangible step was the creation of a clearing house arrangement(l) 
in 1961, in order to facilitate payments in .. (\6:t1i!i'>,\~ currencies. ThiEl clear-
ing house allows central Banks to run up cl'edi ts of up to $~m. in their 
own currency with convertability guaranteed with a full settlement every six 
months. (2) This had the advantage of making regional transactions easier and 
economising on the value of reserves required to finance a given volume of trade. 
As a result, the proportion of trade settled through the clearing house multi-
laterally was over 90% in 1969. (3) 
The second major step was to set up a Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 
consisting of Presidents of the five Central Banks to procide agreement whose 
implementation "may be necessary to achieve monetary union". (4) They have 
established several basic policy goals~ 
(i) one aim was to extend and reserve exchange rate stability and conver-
" 
tability. One cris~s hanging over them was the Costa Rican mul~~ple exchanges 
and some effort has been expended trying to prevent a Costa Rican devaluation, 
, 
qnd to prevent a split rate being used to give Costa Rican aEpreferential rate 
for the regional market. Another problem was the acute balance 
of paymen'ts cril3~is faced to a greater or lesser 'extent by all countries in tho 
. 1-.1'o-t'·:-;;:~t· 
region in 1968;' eventually joint action to impose a tariff surcharge was 
a.ccepted. (5) 
(1) Though this was the first tanffible step there was commitment in the General ' 
Treaty to persue coordinationed policies to preserve exchange stability. 
(2) The credit limit was subsequently extended to ¢2m. 
(3) Most settlements are multilateral, but there are direct dollar settlements 
too. 
(4) Consejo Monetario- Centro americano "ili!.:t:.la It\~nion Monetaria Centro 
american~ San Jose, Costa Rica, 1968. 
(5) This Was the San Jose Protoca1: SIECA 'Trotocnl eobre rnedida~ de defen~a de 
~].lanza de Eagas, "June 1968. 
These measures that were collectively aereed despite ratification problems, re-
sulted in a 3~A surcharge on the tariffs of all extra regional imports: and 
'optionally' a l~~ consumption tax for 'non-essentials'. 
(ii) it was hoped to expand the multilateral clearing system and this 
has been done widening credit limits, and in financing an increasing amount 
of Central American trade and aloo extendine it to Mexican payments. 
• ~s~.I\Q..oI.~ 
(iii) greater mutual helpJto deal with cyclical fluctuations in the 
, .... ~fSF~ 
balance of payments. To this end it has been argued: ' that a 
Central American Stabilisation Fund should be established a kind of 
mini-I1~, empowered to make short term loans to deficit countries. ~1is 
represents a partial pooling of reserves (5-l~fo effectively or ¢4m. each) 
and in view of the fact that there are three major export crops all with 
different problems there are considerable economies in the pooling of reserves~l): 
The Fund was involved in its first major lending operation with Costa Rica in 
December, 1971~(2) 
414fA.r~ (iv)Astandardisation of credit laws: in Marc~ 1968 it was agreed to 
have common banking practices" including bills of exchange, letters of credit, 
management cheques, pertified ~heques, payments systems and commissions.(~) 
(1) It derives from SIECA/Co",sejo Monetario: .'.'El. 7rob].ema; de Balasza de PFlr,Ofl . 
Y Ia Integracion F.conornica Cent.ronmeric~,n8." SIECA CEC!CMCA7MM-I!. T. 2. Guatemala.' 
The Fondo' Centroamericano de J:!:stabilizacion Monetaria" was established on 
February 1st, 1970. It offers chort-term credit on a discretionary basis and 
is concerned with overall, not intra-regional deficits. In these respects it 
conforms to .1."'.: ,,''':!-,t,om approved of by the IMF who arc concerned with avoiding 
"introverted" mini-IMF's operati Ig on a regional level to finance "regional" '\ 
deficits. Articles by D. Segal .And R. Triffin in M. Wionczek: "Latin Arnorican 
Economlc Integr:ation" OPe cit. - --
(2) Also United Nations "Payments Arran~ement8 among Develoninp,' COllntrie~ 
1!'nde Expansion" UN TD/E/80 1966. 
(3) ~ank of London & South American Review, June 1968 p.327. 
-------------------
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However, there is no immediate indication of a common money being 
established. Also it is necessary that monetary unification should take 
place at the correct rate of exchange, and would involve acceptance of loss 
of sovereignty(l.l~'f the attempt is made to early before the processes of 
political and economic integration are sufficiently achieved the abortive 
results could set back the Central American integration movement.(2) 
There are thus considerable limitations of the Central American monetary 
integration, it has advanced as far as most other schemes in developing 
countries. Only in UDEAC'and UDEAO is there a common currency, the French 
franc. There is a joint Central Bank too, and reserves are pooled, but 
national banks can make fiduciary issues for credit purposes and thus the 
arrangement falls short of total monetary integration. In East Africa this 
used to be the case: ~ there was a common currency backOby the common reserves 
of a currency board. This has now reverted' to a situation where there are 
'. 
, separate currencies,. reserves and Central Banks. 
LAFTA has rudimentary clearance scheme set up in 1965 between seven partner 
states, but further progress ts limited by the considerable exchange rate 
(1) e.g; It would be necessary under full monetary integration to have co-
operation oy.-'",:,~·ir~'·rf.a.ses in the money supply at a national level which closely 
affects balance of payments position of partners. Over the 1966-70 period 
the money supply increased by less than 1% p.a. in Nicaragua; 12'5% p.a. in 
Honduras; 14% in Costa Rica; OOft in Salvador and 4% in Guatemala (IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics). It is clear that there have been sufficient 
divergences to create some degree of disequilibrium. Over the sixties differ-
ent~al rates of money oupply increase have been correlated ,with price increases 
(prima facie) and thus with competitiveness in intra-regional and extra-regional 
trade. . 
(2) From: R. Krieger "Problems of cunene unificatlon in IJatin America 
theory and policy", in R. Hilton (Ed. "The Movement Tovlaros I',attn American 
Unity", ope cit. 
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instability, different rates of inflation and controlo which are 
most cOlmtrios. Monetary integration is not envisaged. "the Monti video 
Treaty ,instead" sets out the principle of reciprocity which is that 
trade imbalance should be dealt with by neGotiated liberalisation to the ad-
vantage of the deficit partner; a clumsy and time consuming process and also 
o~which holds back the integration arrangements. The Mahgrab, RCD and. Arab 
arrangements have not taken monetary integration further than the discussion 
phase. (1) Also it is interesting to note that the future evolution of C01mOON 
is being llampered very largely on the 'monetary' question: surplus countries 
acquire inconvertible currency (roubles usually) which cannot be used for other 
purposes than importing from Russia. 
To summarise; Central American countries have advanced through three 
..(b/oQ..it 
stages in monetary integration; first'Aacceptance of a medium of account (the 
Upeson ) and local currences are an acceptable medium of exchange with the 
backing of convertability; second, there is a clearing system for multi-lateral 
. 
payments and third, there is a credit system for trade disequilibria. But 
there is no common currency, no generally pooled reserveS' and monetary poB.cies 
are uncoordinated • 
. - ....... 
IV Fi 1 I t - .. '. " <r~A' sea n "'p· __ v.l.~." 
Another aspect 9f economio sovereignty which.appears incompatiblp with 
a common market arrangement, at least in some aspects, is an independent 
fiscal pOlicy.(2) In so much as a customs union involves a common external 
tariff, some harmonisation is impliCit. Consumption taxes, if not applied 
(1) An Arab Monetary Fund has been proposed and in the meantime there are 
bilateral agreements. 
(2) D. Dosser: "Economic Analysis of Tax Harmonisation" in C. Shoup (Ed.) 
"Fiscal Harmonisation in Common U'1.rkets" Vol. 1 and 2 t 1967. 
---------------------------------------------
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uniformly impede trade flows and can be discrimatory. If factor mobility 
is an important goal of policy then substantinl differences in income and 
corporation tax rates and social welfare payments can bias factor flow move-
menta. Most significant of all is the fact that given the crucial importance 
overseas private investment in manufacturing industry, differences in tax 
rates and fiscal incentives may bias overseas investment to some locations 
regardless of other distributive effect and of the cost, in fiscal terms, of 
competing for its favour.(l) 
Fiscal integration in Central America is advanced, largely due to the 
heavy dependence of the region on the external tariff for revenue purposes. 
(32~b in 1966; and 42% at the inception of the Common Market in 1959). (2) 
The pentral Americans have also succeeded in achieving a joint Central 
American Agreement on Fiscal Incentives drafted in 1962 on the basis of 
• 
Article 19 of the General Treaty and finally agreed in 1969,(3) which is to 
prevent the Central American ~ations vying with each other for overseas in-
vestment by offering tax exemptions on profits and duty drawbacks on raw 
material 'and machinery imports. The agreement does not "significantly reduce 
(1) ~~e effect of this depends upon double taxation agreements. 
(2) Fiscal harmonisation in Central America is discussed in M. Gillin "!h2, 
PiscA.1. Aspects of the Central AmeriCAn Common Market" in C. Shoup OPt ,cit. and 
V. Watkin: "Taxes and Tax Harmonisation in Central AmericA.1t Harvard Law School 
1961. 
M. Munoz: "Semina-rio sobre problem atieR 1. insti tutionA.l de lA. integracion 
economica centroamericana sobre 81 conversio de :l.ncentivoR fj.scales 01 
desarrollo j.ndustri8.l!' ~2±:P44-A. Guetemala (SIECA 1966). ' 
S. V/iese and H. Pinada.: tip-rimer informe e;enerA.J so)J-,re los probelm!'!,s de In 
harmonisation trlbut::lfi'a en Centro-a,meriea" sn:CA 1968, 3-76l-C. 
United Nations(E.C.L.A.) ttI,a Eoliticn t:r~:~utari.A, desarrollo economico en 
,Centro-america" CE/CN 12/CCE/66. 1966. 
(3) The 1-year delay was due to the failure of Honduras to approve. Acquiesence 
was obtained in March 1969 when Honduras was allowed by separate protocol to 
extend tax exemptions for longer periods ru1d at higher levels. 
----------------------------~-------
the liberality or number of the tax benefits b'Tanted, to new industries 
which remain extremely generous".(l) However, the purpose of this paper 
is not to evaluate the policy of givin~ tax incentives, whose effectiveness 
as a stimulant to' investment in toto (rather thnll to individual competing 
countries) is open to considerable doubt;(2) rather to record tlle existence 
of an agreement and that "the agreement clea:t'ly represents an important 
step forward in relation to the chaotic situation currently prevailing". (3) 
The basic principle has been to "level down" tax benefits on existing industries, 
and to Ulevel up" benefits for new industries; and to ensure that import duty 
exemptions are uniform except for the special position of Honduras. 
A tax reform programme on a collective basis has also been proposed by 
a joint Organisation of American states/Inter-American Development Bank team, 
involving taxation of sales, prosperity and income but the chances of 
general acceptance are not verr_ereat (4) and have been implemented only in 
Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
(1) Clark Joel: "Tax incentives in Central American development": Economic 
Development and C~t~al Chanffe. Jan. 1971 pp. 229-252. Incentives vary 
according to whether or not the 'proj ect is livery useful" (capital goods and 
other goods with 50% value-cJ)'5t4) Central American), "Useful" (adding 
1 ess local va,' ";fY:;' r;,dacd) and "non-essential" consumer goods and ass£lmbled 
products with fow value added. A distinction is also made between "new" 
. and "existing" industries. 
(2) Various surveys conducted on Central America and elsewhere and recorded 
by Joel indicate that income tax exemptions havo scarcely any effect at all 
on overseas investment. There is more dispute about the value of import duty 
exemptions. J. Heller and II. Kauffman: ":r'ax incentives for Indufltry in leR~ 
Developinfj Countriea", HarVard Law School 19631 are sceptical even about that. 
(3) C.Joel, ~. p. 234. 
(4) Pan American Union/CAS: ",Report on the Central American National Devel0.pment 
?olano and the Process of F.;conomic Intep;rat.:ion" 1966 OPe cit. Appendix I. ~.fhen 
these jOint proposals were ,duo to be enacted in Guatemala, the Vice-President 
of the Hepublic, speaking as a. "Social Revolutionary" (the moot "loft" party 
in the country which is legal) denounced the whole notion of "progressive" 
income tax as a product of the "international communist conspiracy". 'lbe 
legislative rejected the (very modest) proposals. (Pross roports). 
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~ Fiscal harmonisation is about aD advanced as any other area. In East 
Africa, income and corporation taxes have ttteir structure established 
regionally and are administered regionally as well as the external tariff (i.e. 
about 75% of all, revenue). Uniformity of rates has been maintained by 
agreement rather than by law, but differences have recently appeared (l)and 
evidence of increased irritation as a result of the budgetary inflexibility has 
become apparent. Fiscal redistribution has also been phased out. There io 
no joint policy for dealing with overseas investment and customs duty draw-
backs have become common in Kenya. UDEAC also had a tradition of fiscal 
harmonisation and a commitment to equalise tax rates that affect regional 
trade, but divergencies in "harmonise.dlt direct and indirect taxes have 
appeared. (2) In this area there is also a joint "COnvention on Investment". 
The joint treatment of overseas investors has also been a crucial feature 
of the setting up of the Andean Group and (most remarkably) produced a 
combined policy covering both "Marxist'· Chile and I free-enterprise I . Colombia 
on a most sensitive issue.(3) " CARIFTA also envisages cooperation over fiscal 
(1) For example Tanzania and Uganda have "development taxes" which wero aid!o-
guised fqrm of rise in income tax. There are also differences in the "con-
sumption taxes tl that are applied. 
(2) There are differences in rates of income tax and corporation tax. P. 
Robson: ilEac:' ~-' ~:; 'T'ltegratlon in Africa" 01'. cit. p. 218-9. WEAC al:aQl ha.s the 
important "compensation fund" and "tax unique" as part of its fiscal har-
monisation. 
(3) Under "Decision No.24" there are common rules for the treatment of foreign 
capital, and on trademarks, patents, licences and royalties. The five countries 
accepted the need for common controls over repatrintion of profits, over the 
sectoral destination of investment, over relationships between local brulks and 
mul tinational companies, and over the need for local part ovmcrship. Specifi-
cally there is an objective of 51~~ local ownership in 15 years in mul ti-
nationals. . , 
The other attempt to treat investors uniformly (but less restrictive~y) is 
implicit in the Conaeil a,~tente "Mutual Aid and. Guarantee fund")\"\ ~ ~. 
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incentives. ~~t Communis·t economies have singular problems in respect oflhar-
monisation and even the EEC has so far failed to achieve agreement on anything 
more than the bare outline of a common taxation system. 
V. Harmonlned Pro.jcct and sectoral Coordination an~ Joint PlanninG'. 
So far we have been largely concerned partly with what Tinbergel1has 
called 'negative integration' or the elimination of trade barriers, as well 
as measures of harmonisation (of taxes and monetary systems) to' ensure expanding 
competition. (1) In this respect the development of the Central American 
Common Anrket is relatively advanced. However, we now need to look at joint 
cooperation of a more positive kind. 
(a) Plann.ed coordination of Industrial Projects: as one of the main 
aims of common market arrangements is to realise economies of scale in manu-
facturing there is a need to ensure that large scale plants are not unnecessar-
ily duplicated in the various parts of the regional market nor delayed because 
of fear of implication; and also that any monopoly or near-monopoly resulting, 
should be controlled effectively or exposed to competition: and to ensure an 
equi table distribution of inv(:3tment. (2) 
In Central America the need for industrial coordination \'las recosnised at 
• .~\o~4.~. ~.,~:.~~,&.._ •• ~'::-~~ ..... , .. .....- \~ 
an early stage and "the system of Integration Industries" was established 
in 1958 and later incorporated in the General Treaty. At that time there 
was a clear perception of the need to plan out the "Common market" industries 
for~which preliminary studies had been c~ried out.(3) Designated companies(4) 
(1) J. Tinberger: fI,Inte:rpational Economic TntegrR.tion" new York 1965 p.76. 
(2) The arguments are Bet out in detail in Ch. 4. 
(3) United Nations (E.C.L;A.) "PoRsibilidades de desarrollo industrinl interrrado 
. en Centro-a.merica" (i\'cxico 1965) Vol. II E!CN l2!CCE!323!Rev.1. 
(4) Designation is possible where "the mini11lUm capacity requires that they ha.ve 
access to the Central American market to operate in reasonably economic and 
competitive conditions". (Article II). 
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were accorded free trade, duty free imported inputD, and special tax benefits, 
and tarif~ protection against any competing regional enterprises diminishing 
over a ten year period. (1) In return they were to be tightly controlled as 
~~s location} capaci ty .. price and quality, and local participation. However, in 
practice this ambitious idea made only a nominal, lar~ely psychological contri-
bution to integration. Under the 'regime' only two separate enterprises have 
been established; a tube and tyre factory in Guatemala (GINSA) and a complex 
producing caustic Boda and insecticides in Nicaragua ~~ERCASA-ELPESA), while 
a flat glass plant has been desi6Dated, but not established.(2) Applications 
have been made for factories for nylon filaments, pulp and paper, iron and steel, 
but in~view of the lack of use of the scheme it is widely regarded as a failure. 
Another regional instrument,- the "Special System of Productive Activities rt , 
which accords free trade and tariff protection industries '.' of particular inter-
est", (3) had no licensing function or powers of direction and could scarcely be 
classed as representing project cooperation.(4) The only other attempt in this 
respect was the joint. textile plan which attempted to negotiate by prior agree-
ment new investment in the 1967-70 period and which appeared to have been ad-
hered to (the protocol of ManaQ~a specified tariffs and agreed allocation of 
capacity): However, in general terms Central America has had "a failure of 
serious coordination to avoid duplication and especially any regional alloca-
. .,.,y, ... ~ .... , r~" : .~,.. ~ "J::J:..f 
iion of'recou;;;;-h~s yet to come,(5) though hope has been expressed in the 
(1) Details of the benefits are described in Ch. 4. The benefits were somewhat 
eroded when free trade became almost universal and with the increasingly generous 
tax.concessions offered to most investors. 
(2) 
(3) 
I. \Valter and W. Vitzthum, pp. cit. p. 41. 
SlECA: "Sintesis del Mercado Comun Ccn,troamericana", Guatemala 1968. 
(4) See eh. 4. The epecialC'Etereo') system was introduced in the 1st Protocol 
to the convention on-Integration Industries 1965. 
(5) J. Nye: "Central American Regional Integration", OPe cit. p.}8-39. The 
Integration Industries scheme is evaluated in: J. Cochrane "Central Americ~n 
Jticonomic IntelITation: the IntoBIated Industries' Scheme" lnt'er-American Economic 
Affairs, Vol. 19 1965. 
P d 
I 
i 
I 
I 
D. Ramsett: "ReR'iona1 Industrial Development in central America" Praeger 1968 
1.1. Viionczek: UInta -ration Economica Distribution flo,riona.l de Act.ividades 
Industria.los" Trimcstre Economico No.l,l. l~exico and "Apnlic<1.tion It Africa I 
Oriente} del 19. ex eriencia. 'del ro a.ma de into acton economic Centro8.nericMa"! 
in Industrialisation and Productivity Bulletin United Nations Bulletin 11 (S67.II. ]10). pp.l5-3l. 
------------------""----~-....,~------~-------- -",--
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"Modus Operandi" that some attempt will be made to reassert government control 
at a multinational level. (1) 
Most of the common markets being compared have attempted arrangements 
of this general typo. As one would expect, the centrally planned C01mCON 
economies havp advanced the furthest, but nevertheless the 'internntional 
socialist division of labour' is still very incomplete and the East hUropean 
economies still have strong autarchic features. Much opecialisation is intra.-
industrial rather than inter-industrial; specialisation within petrochemicals, 
iron and steel products, engineering, in machine tools especially, rathe~ than 
in broader categories. (2) The R. C.D., scheme while not being particularly con-
cerned about free trade has advanced plans for industrial coordination and 
some projects are being implemented.(3) UDEAC also has control over multi-
national operations in as much as investment decisions in 'common market' in-
dustries need to be approved collectively: though disputes over an oil refinery 
location have seriously affected the operations of the group.(4) LAFTA did attempt' 
to promote a system of complementarity agreements involving specialisation of 
production between two or more partner states:(5) of the small number of 
indu~trie~ which have been dealt with, chemicals, data processing equipment, 
radio values""elfoictronic equipment and domestic appliances only chemicals could 
"4.,_ ,_,-..:..~_~_~. 
(1) Economist Intelligence Unit. Quarterly Bulletin t 1970. No.4. San Salvador 
however opposes the idea. 
(2) United Nations: "Economic Integration and, Industria.] Snecia.1isation among 
Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic A,SAistanne" OPt c-i:.t., p.26. 
(3) 'Nurul Islam: "Regional Cooperation for Dnvelopment" OPe cit. Amongst'the 
projects currently being implemented are the Alwaz aluminium plant in Iran. 
~~ Others being planned are plants for locomotives, oil refining, petrochemicals, 
cotton linters, pulp, wires, cables and ballbearings.' 
(4) P. Robson: "Economic Inte~ra.tion in Africa" OPe cit. p. 214-15. 
(5) Complementary agreements are dealt with under articles 15-17 of the 
Montivideo 'l'rcaty and permit free trade and common protection for products 
Bubject to R5~eement between two or more partner states, though agreements are 
extended to cover location, size of plant etc. Thcy tend to be more like the 
"Special Industry" agreements of Central America than Integration Industries and 
cannot strictly be classified as joint industrial planning. 
j" j: 
I J, 
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be said to be fundamentnl; and there lll'O sufficiently few to consider the 
scheme a failure. The Andean group has lllready formulated plans for speciel-
isation especially in petrochemicals where arrangements have been agreed in 
1971,(1) and twenty products arc scheduled for sectoral agreements including 
steel and cars. The East African Common Market has abandoned attempts to 
regulate specialisation following the failure of the 1964 Kampala Agreement 
(apart from s~me licensing powers)(~ and the new Community arrangement has been 
severely criticised bec~use of this.(~) Generally, industrial coordination in 
unplanned economies has proved to involve contradictions that are extremely 
difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, tho powerful case for an integrated 
approach propels most integration schemes to persist with various instruments; 
and new ones like that of the Mahgrab and the Andean Group to approach over-
all integration via this route rather 'than via free trade.(4) 
b) Non-industrial project/sector cooperation: ono of the main themes 
of the thesis(6) will be the limiting effect of infrastructural deficiencies on 
general and transport costs in particular, on intra-regional trane and industrial 
• 
coordination. If Vie take transport costs first, in the case of a low unit value 
~roduct such as bulk grains, timber or cement the cost may be equivalent to a 
fair tariff; and more important are the intangible effects of poor communication 
(1) "E,!'o;)ect,:, ~ ~"·~q.1.1.Brdo de Complement.~cion sabre Pronucton de la Industria 
Petrogui~ica." ~bile within the Andean group, this proposal has the legal 
framework of LAFTA's complementarity agreements under tho Montivideo Treaty. 
This agreement involves trade llberalisntion, a common tariff, common treatment 
of investment and most important, coordination of investment, size and location. 
Others are to follow; metals, cars, paper, glass etc. ~ 
the ~carteeena Aereement~ 
(t) Under the 1967 Treaty; the licensing of a restricted number of activities 
. ---., continues up to 1984. 
(~) • Julius Uyerere 
has recently gone on record deploring the ef.t'ect which the absence of a joint 
industrial policy is having in fra~entinB the future .steel, tyres, lorries.~r~ 
and fertiliser industries. (Africa Research Dulletin.;:.Jan./Feb. 1971) 
(4-) One might mention the Or;ranil"ation of Senegal River States Vlhich~ts n project 
sharinG agreement and plans; the Conseil d'Entente which plans to allocate cement 
tyres and petrol production 'j tIle Da:Romeyfrrogo Cement plant. ' . 
~S) Chapter 5. The problem leo discussed more generally in A. Scaparlanda: 
1b2.....Z:01e of tran1Jportation -in the economic intefITation of underdoveloped areas". 
Land Economics 1966. -----
~-------------....------
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in discouraging economic intercourse. The retardation of economic it1te~rn.tion 
in Central America for 100 years owes more to this factor than ru1Y other, 
partly as a result of nationalism and the distortion of tho economies in favour 
of extra-regional- trade;(l) partly a result of topographical difficulties.(2) 
The problems of Central Anlerica are by no means as serious as in more widely 
dispersed LA:r;:TA where trade is mostly d.ependent on a highly inadequate syntem 
of merchant shiPPine,(3) and whose problems are con~oundcd by con5ested and in-
efficient ports. The R. C. D.) CARIFTA,and Arab Common Marlcet have comparable 
problems. This factor may partly explain the preference for more compact 
groups like CACM, EACM and UDEAC, though even here "economic distance" may be 
very different from "geographic distance". 
The situ3.tion in Central America in the pre-integration period was such 
as to make intra-regional trade largely prohibitiv·e.(4) Since then considerable 
effects have been made to establish a regional hiahway system based on the 196; 
Central Hiehway Plan; though imp1ementat$on remains under national control and 
a good deal of effort has gone into helping Honduras with . 
(1) The role of infrastructure weakness as an impediment to regional integration 
in Latin lunerica is discussed in E. Angulo: "l'r:mnpor1:at:J.on ~m(l int.r~-IJatln':;' 
American Trfl,9-e"5n ~~ Wi' onczek (Ed.) "Latin Arne,rican l<'l2onomic Integration" OPe 
ci t. C. Castll.LV: "(;rowth 9.nd InteB;ration in Cent:r.:,al _America", OPe c1 t. 
loR. Erovm: "Xransport and the Integration of Rout? America" Brookings 
(Washington) 1966. In as much as transport costs .are an obstacle to trnde, they 
al.so of course inhibit the destabilising penetration of markets of the weaker 
partners. 
(2,) . S. Hansen: "Economic Development of J)atin America". 1951 p.34l-45. deals with 
the enormous costs and technical problems involved in constructing the Central 
Anerican stretch of the Inter-American highway. 
(3) R. Brown·, .!J2!!!. 
(4) United Nations: "El Transpor,ie. en Centrop..merica". (E/eN. 12/356) Mexico. 
1954. 
,;. .... -
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its national infrastructure problems. (1) The 1965-69 Plan envioagcd 13 
highways of 5321 kms and, by 1968, 3368 kms were completed. 
There have also been attempts to coordinate imp~ovements of ports.(2) 
other projects which have been collectively developed is a joint telecommunica-
tions projec~, COMTELLA, which involves a regional microwave system and is 
concerned with "unification.development, moderniDation of Central American 
. ~ 
telecolT'.munications lt • .And as far as other aspects of 'infrastructure' are 
concerned, the five countries have failed to a{;ree on a joint airline though 
they do have a joint navigations system ((OCESNA); there is better coordination 
of postal services and electrification is being jointly studied. (3) 
Superficially long though this list may be the cumulative total is not 
impressive. It is less advanced than the 'colonial' inheritance of integrated 
joint services (as in Africa). The East African Community did not break up 
the system of joint administration of railways, harbours, ports; and the 
regional airline.(4) Since independence/the major weaknesses in the regional 
" 
hie;hway network are being rec·dfied. Despite some disagreements there has 
until recently been a joint plan for electric ~ower with, considerable trade 
between Kenya an~ Uganda.(S) UDEAC also acquired initially the same range of 
. ~ -' "., ' .. "~~,,,,;~ 
joint services though they have started to disintegrate. (6) The Mahgrab 
(1) Also with a regional orientation was Transport Consultants Inc. (for CABEr) 
"Central American Transportation P-tudX" 1965. 
(2) SIECA (working group on maritime transport and part development). 
nAP-filys,is Y ~,rspectivas de In situncion Portuarift en ,Centro-America" 1968 
(3) United Nations (EeLA) Reports of Sub-Committee on electrification e.e. 
"Estudio Corn arativo de costes de la elec,tr,ifiC'd'l.tion en Centro-america A.nd 
Panama" E 1'12, CCE. ASC 5/6. The implementation of specific schemes is otill 
far away. 
(4) The location of tho h~adquarters, however, ha" Sbeem moved in the interest 
of "regional balance". 
(5) The massive Tan-Zam railway project is another aspect of this coordination, 
gOing outside the community. 
(6) P. Robson: "Economic Integration in Africa" OPt cit. pp.228-9. 
e.e. the posts and telecommunications agency has beon decentralised. 
--.".~---.--------------~ 
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Union has attached a good deal of importance to infra-structural coordina.tion 
of airline and air maintenance services, maritJme transport, railways and 
roads', and posts and telecolmnunications. R.C.D. has promoted a joint airline 
and shipping company, and a good highway from Karachi to Ankara is now cOrTlplete. 
The Cm:ECON group has also encouraged raHway coordination, and a joint-post 
and telegraph system. 
c) liB:ti.cuJ. ture and Raw Materials: the theory of economic integration as outlined 
in Chapter 1, the rationale was concerned with industry. Nevertheless a 
common agricultural policy may be crucial to an integration scheme from several 
aspects; (1) 
(i) as a provider of inputs to regional industry, 
(ii) as,a source of additional exports to partner states ~nich may have 
been unable to obtain a proportional share of the benefits on 
regional industrial trade, 
(iii) deriving po~sible benefits from specialisation, 
'-
(iv) opening possibilities for regional import subbtitution, in food-
stuffs particularly. 
(v) generating economies of scale in research, 
(Vi) giving :the integration group additional 'bargaining power' in 
. ~~~~:,'I>~!. i~k~. 
negotiating collectively with third parties. 
Many of these goals inspired tho BEG agricultural policy but elsewhero, 
especially where industrialiaation is the only major objective, this aspect 
is given little or subordinate attention. However, free trade in Borne 
agricultural products is an unimpeded tradition in many African territories.(2) 
(1) M. Yudelmann and P. Howard: "AP,ricul tural Development R.nd, F~conomic Intep;'rn-
tion in Latin America" Allen & Unwin 1970. 
,(2) However, the East African Co~unity permits quota restrictions on reeional 
trade in agricultural produce (Article 13) while at the saIne time El.greeing on ! 
the need for future cooperation (Article 14). An example of possible gains from I 
scale and speCialisation in aericul tura! production is sugar in gast Africa: C. I 
Frank: "The SURar Industry in East Africa" ,East African Institute of Social and lj 
Economic Research, ! 1965. . 
The li'rench-speaking OCAl~ group has also tried to benefit from specialisation and 'I 
free trade in sugar. 
----------------------------
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and trade liberalisation has proceeded fa.oter here than in other sectors, 
in the Arab Common Marke·t, for example. 
In Central America there are oblique references to agriculture in 
the Treaty, but ohly some products were permitted under the free trade 
provisions; non-elaborated products such as cotton seed, fruit, timber, 
fish and fibres and elaborated products like meat, animal food, leather, 
packaged or bottled fruit and vegetables. (I ) A Sub-Committee on 
Agricultural Development was set up in 1964 to begin coordination.~) 
The first major step forward was the Limon Special Protocol (1965) 
which incorporated an agreement on quotas of outside imports and on the 
stabilisation of prices of basic grains (maize, rice, sor~hum) and the 
agreement became effective in law (if not in practice) in 1968.(~) The 
Modus Operandi envisages more intensive cooperation, with regional storage 
silos and a regional fund to stabilise buying prices, leading to a 
comprehensive regional policy. The importance of the trade in 
agricultural products to Honduras and the considerable scope for regional 
, 
(\'-.1 The main exemptions are some that are likely to rema.in indefinitely: 
so too the main export products and others that~'ait agreement (wheat and 
tobacco) • 
('1.) United Nations (ELLA) "Informe sobre los. tFaba,1on en 01 Rector ftp,'ro-
p'ecuario den~ ... v ,:..,:;.. nro aIDa de Inte. racion economicR. del iAtmo Centro1tmericana". 
Mexico 1964 (E/CN 12 CCE SC/6/2. The question of ae,"ricul tural integration, 
present and prospective, is discussed in J.G. Vil~alobos: ",Inter,racion a~icoln 
en Centro America" Revista de la Univeridad de San Carlos OPe cit. Instituto 
Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas de la OEA: "Coordinacion y integracion de 
1-11 investi.~;1'l.cion af:ro-pecuaria en Centro AmeriNt y Panama" Guatem.'11a 1968. 
Mission Conjunta de Programacion para Centro America: "hlneami,entos de un 
pro&ama de desarrollo aero-pacuerio para Centro America 1965-69" Guatemala 1964. 
(q) SIECA: "Eva1uaoion de las Actividades d~ 18. Commis~ion Coord:fnadora. de 
M~rca.da.s y Estabili7.acion de Procioa de Centro America" SI'ECA/ AGRO -
PECUARIA/S Guatemala 1968. 
~~--------~----~~------
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import substitution maintain interest in the idea of cooperation.(l) 
'lhere has been little evidence of the five cou!1t.ries usine their 
bargaining power: indeed they have quarrelled bitterly over coffee 
quotas, one of their mutual interests'(untn 1968, when there was the 
beginning of an agreement). But there have been coordinated approaches to 
international conferences like UNCTAD. Also -there is currently an active 
programme of export promotion outwith the region. IIowever, there is 
nothing comparable to the impressive dinplay of unity exhibited by the 
East African countries in their negotia.tions for a special relationship 
with the EEC or in coffee quota discussions. 
d)"'~Lther Joint S§rvices: there are other than industrial projects 
where economies of scale and specialisation are to be reaped: some 
examples in agriculture and infrastructure have been given. Universities 
are another: however, with the virtual breakup of the East African 
University and the University of Brazzaville as a regional institution, 
the University of the West Indies is tenuously the only 'truly multinational 
University left in the world, except possibly the Universit/ of Lesothe, 
Botswana & Swaziland. In Central America there is a joint school for 
public administration training (IOAP) but little else in the higher 
• tJ~ .. ~ ~ •. -.. .!'" .~~f 
education field, except a rather unsuccessful University coordinnting 
body (CSUCA) • 
. One might in this context refer to mul tif~ceted. sectoral coordination 
such as the joint development of the Senegal River, the Chad Basin and tho 
Niger in Africa. 
(1) Thus far intraregional trade has helped the achievement of a reasonable 
degree of self-sufficiency in food staples and vegetable oilr~and dairy pro-
ducts have almost achieved self-sufficiency \'lith the aid of the Conur.on Market. 
:--------------,......--::------------_ .... _, .. , 
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Scientific research and development is a major DOurCO of economies 
of scalo and is one of the main ar&uments for economic integr~tion in 
the EEC and COMECON. Even in such technologically buckw~lrd a.reas a.s 
Central P~erica the point is relevant and one of the most successful 
regional institutions is the "Inst! tute ccntroamerican~:' de Investigaciones 
Technologia Industrial" (lCAn'I); others are an institute for plant 
diseases (OIRSA) and a nutritional research centre, including Panama, 
(INCAP). 
e) Joint Comprehensive Plannin~. In so much as economies are nationally 
planned, then with regional arrangements, joint planning is necessary for 
planning to remain effective. (1) "If plannin[~ is being increasingly 
regarded us necessary at the national level it is ovident that the same 
imperative will be felt when a reeional framework for economic development 
is being considered ••• Among the various purposes of planning tho 
following deserve special attention when the question of plannins ••• 
is examined in connection with the establishment of an integrated mt1.rket 
covering ~everal countries; 
(a) equitable distribution of b~nefits 
. 'c~~;~stablishing priorities 
(c) avoidance of duplication" (2) 
'~ There are two stages of integrating a planning system. One is 
"coordination"; the other is to formulate and implement joint plans 
binding on all partners. As the latter would involve a considerable loos 
(1) The argument is dealt with in detail in: .F' F1l1is "N(\tion~_J)evel..9.E.T!l£.l'lt. 
Planninr, and, R~Eional_E.£.Qll.omi.Q. ,;rnte.(gation" inll.N. CQn£erence ou t.he Ap'P1icnUoll 
of Scfence and Technolo6Y for the Benef! t of tho Less Developed AIe~,s: 
(2) U~JCTAD: "Trade Expansion and F.conomic InteBrntion Amol'l.P·st, Deve).oplng 
.9ountrles" OPe cit. p.32. 
---------
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of economic sovereignty, as in a full economic union under Inissez-
~ faire conditions,lt has not beeno..popula~ and even in COU'ECON, Hungary 
and Rumania particularly have resisted the idea of fully integrated 
planning. In Central America, a joint industrial plan was worked out by 
a Joint Planning Mission, but it was not consistent with national plans 
let alone binding.(l) The Central American Plans for the 1965-69 
period were synchronised but inconsistent and there was very little 
attention to interelated aspects. The plans have subsequently been 
sharply criticised: Itit is evident that the national plans that have 
been prepared so far do not contain specific elements directly designed 
to drive the process of specialisation of the production activities ••• 
nor for the same reason do they lead to a systematic use of the potential-
ities of the Common Ma.rket". (2) Some have argued that "the execution of 
(1) Mission Conjullta de Programacion para Centroamerica: (Guatemala 1965) 
"Ba.ses para un Programma Centroameric~no de J)esal"ollo Tnduf"ltria-l;". 
Fan American Union Organisation of American states; "Resumen de las 
Prog;:arnd.fl. Centro-american~s de lnversi ... C)"~b~" 1967. 
Pan J~erican Union/OAS. 
(2) ".lnformaOio.n.Jlobra los Planes National,as de De.§l!!'oYo y cl.J:roccsso 
de Integraciou -..... ~vhv;dca de Centroa.merican~1t OPt cit. pp.14-15, 85. 
~-------~---------------
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separate national development policies ha,s been at the bottom of moot 
of the frictions in the Central American organisationtt.(l) In the 
post 1969 period there has not even been synchronisation .... 
This p~tter.n is repeated in most other groups yet all pay lip servico 
to the need for plan coordination and "consul tatlon"; LAF"rA (Resolution 
100 of the Montivideo Treaty), the Andean Group, the Arab Agreement for 
Economic Unity, the R.C.D., the Mahgrab Group, UDEAC, East Africa and tho 
West Indies. The most thorough going coordination has been attempted in 
COMECON over the 1961-65 and 1966-70 planning periods where basic macro-
economic aegregates (investment, trade, output) are adapted to regional 
targets. 
However, much of this discussion is quite academic as there is, 
despite the voluminous documents produced, no serious planning in Central 
America. There is a large and growing school of sceptics who argUe that 
there is little intrinsic value in comprehensive.planning in underdeveloped 
private enterprise economies, which is often \mdertaken largely to obtain 
~ and ~OSS:i:~~~·.t?~use ~onomists: (2) "the :Planning Office (in Latin 
America) is little more than a'facade presented to the naive and ignorant, 
a screen behind which foreign loans are obtained to maintain and 
strengthen the existinG' political and economic system". (3) 
(1) SIECA Carta Informativa 61 (1966) by (Snr. Delgado). 
(2) P. Waterston: "Development Plannings IJest.ons of ~eriencell John Bopkins 
1965. 
W. stolper: "llanninp,' Without Fact,s" Cambridge (MatS) 1966. 
\ (~) K. Griffiu & J. Enos: "Planning Dev~lopmenttl Addison-Wesley 1970 p.204. 
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Their scepticism would have a good basis in central America (except 
possibly Costa Rica) where there are very poor statistics;(l) a small 
government sector and no tradition of intervention and controls over 
the private sector; a large agricultural and foreign trade sector subject 
to random fluctuation; economic decision-making and expertise concentrated 
in orthodox monetary and budgetary institutions, especially the Central 
Banks; and political instability. Some effort was made in Costa Rica to 
monitor the progreos and check implementation of the 1965-69 Plan and 
the 1969-74 Plan is more sophisticated in its model buildin~ and more 
specific in its disaggregation. The other countries are less ambitious 
and Nicaragua has not attempted another Plan at all. Generally, however, 
there appears little future for comprehensive planning on a multinational 
basis. More manageable, anel more immediately relevant, is coordination 
at a project and sectoral level. 
f) Factor Mobility. 'Ihe distinction between a common market and a 
customs union is normally made on the basis of factor mobility. Factor 
mobility may be ~mportant where there are complementary needs: when one 
country has un~rnployed labour and is short of land and capital (or skilled 
labour of a. certA!~ ~fnd), compared with another which hAS abundant l~d 
-....... '"" ___ ... "i ... ~I:w.~ 
and supply of capital but an inadequate labour force; and where factor 
proportions are sufficiently inflexible to prevent factor substitution. 
In this sense factor movements are a substitute for trade. However, as 
in the theory of free trade or the pure theory of customs unions, positive 
'(1) Appendix 1. 
~ 
"f 
lQ.e. 
gains depend on ceteris paribus assumptions about perfeot competition, 
full emploJ~ent etc. In practice, unless real world conditions do 
simulate to a high degree a rperfect' market (if necessary by eliminating 
differences in taxation and social security payments), then factor 
mobility is just as lilcely to be 'perverse' and to contribute to 
"agglomerative" tendency with scare factoro moving to artificially 
favoured locations. (1) 
Though the General Treaty did contain a general commitment to 
factor mobility, in Central American conditions it is marginally relevant. 
Unemployment, and human as well os physical capital scarcity are basic 
economic problems in all five countries, and differences of income, 
lobour productivities and skill are greater within countries than between 
them. Only in the case of labour relative to fertile land, which is 
scarce in Nicaragua and underdeveloped parts of Guatemala and excessive 
. 
in Salvador is there possible scope for transfer. IIowover, labour 
migration is also subject to national law, and there has bean only limited 
micr9;tion o~ workers. Very few central Americans live outside their 
countries.of origin,(2) and the largest flOVl, from El Salvador to 
Honduras Vias ~ .... :-:::~~;~!r.tillegal and helped to start a war. (3) 
(1) The theory is set out in B. Balassa: liThe Theory of Economic 
Integration" Ope cit. Ch.4. 
(2) .~ R.S. Smith: "Population llnd eoonomio erotTth in Cen,trnl Amar,ical!: 
Economio Development and Cultural Change •. J6n.~1962. pp.134-149. 
,- (3) V. Cable: "The 'Football War' and the Central Amerionn Common 
Market" in" Latin run;er{~,a and the Uni ted State~ in the 191°1 8.:" ~d.) .r::~ ,0. Gray} 
Florida University Press 1971. 
----------, ------ .---~---
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The near convertibility of currencias panni t a good deal of 
movement of regional capita.l and closer monetary integration would 
facilitate it. Local capital is, as 0videnccd by Guatemalrul " a..xcbange 
controls, as much sensitive to political uncertainty as to differential 
rates of r(~turn, and there is no developed capital market even on a 
national level. (1) Proposals have been made for a regional capital 
market, (2) but it is difficult to see how it would be of any value 
unless there has been a "notable charge in the traditional preferenoes 
of the monied classes for investment in real estate or for investment 
outside of Central Amarics,lI. (3) 
In fact the whole debate about intrarogional capital floVTS is 
academic in this context as a large proportion of invested capital, 
especially in those industries engendered by the Common Market, is 
extra-regional, mainly Amerioan, and not constrained by inter-country 
. 
barriers in Ce~tral America. 
Elsewhere in developing countries, the limited relevance of intra-
regional factor mobility has led to its being treated as low priority. 
The three "colonial' customs unions had some mobility of labour, but 
"<:' ,~ 
post independenc~ a~inistrations are now instituting otrict immigration 
controls. Intra-regional capital movements have been largely determined 
by the degree of monetary integration. In few other integration schenlas 
outai,de Europe has factor mobility ever been a major goal of the union 
(the Arab Common Market is exceptional) and implementation is generally 
poor. 
(1) ExceptinG' El Salvador which opened a stock exchange in 1964. 
'(2) C. Vleekly: "Towards a Central American capital market" Journal of 
Common Market studies. Vol. 7 (1968-9) pp. 119-128. 
(3) I. Walter & W. Vitzthum: OPt cit. p.60. 
,,>, 
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What, however, is a good deal more relevant than intra-regional 
mobility as conventionally understood is common treatment of overseas 
investment. To some extent, the central American Agreement on Fiscal 
Incentives goes some way towards achieving this but it is a leas 
radical and all embracing form of control than that envolved by the 
Andean countries which involves harmonising regulations governing 
profi t repa.triation, and local ownership. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous innovation to develop regional 
capital market institutions and to influence the flow of overseas 
private investment to common markets has been the growth of regional 
development finance banks. They have been associated with Common 
MarKets in developing countries for several reasonSb first, the 
banks can conveniently be used for recional projects under conditions 
where national banking institutions are not willing to take the risk 
of committing themselves to projects dependent on exports to a regional 
market; s~cond, the bank' can be used as a form of concealed "income 
distribution" between the main partner states and, therofore, has 
advantages in :"":'~::in~ to eliminate inequalities that are generated, 
third, they are a means of 'pump-priming' or raising funds from aid 
donors who are sympathetic to integrntion efforts. The advantages are 
sufficiently obvious that recrional and subreeional development banks 
have proliferated. 
--------r--...."..~....-----~----_---- ---
The Banco Centroamericano de Intearacion Ecouomica (CABEI) was 
e~:l'tablishcd in Tegucigalpa in 1961 after a ten year gestation period. (1) 
The various governments contributed ~4m each and loana or bTants have 
been raised from the u.s. Mexico, the Inter-American Development Bank 
and European ,countries accounting to ~15Om: of this total ~6Om has the 
form of a low interest Fund for Central Integration which gives low 
interest loans for infrastructure projects and was initiated by a 
U.S.A.I.D. loan: and.of the ¢l1Om financial resources in January, 1968, 
~112m had been invested.(2) The principles of operation are that 
investments should t~,e place (i) primarily for regional projects, 
(ii) to promote 'balanced growth', (iii) for economically sound projects 
only. In fact the first oondition has not always be,en,met as there is 
. . 
a good deal of lending for housing projects (about lqrb) and many of the 
industrial loans (about 4Cf~) are not for projects which depend, other 
, .. 
, i j ) 
than peripherally, on the Central American regional market.' I The 
largest amount of lending is mainly from infrastruotural investmen't in 
roads, power and teleco~munications. Despite criticisms of its 
efficiency, (J) " , ,·OA.l3EI has been one of the more popular regional 
... 
_
____ ~·:,~",?:~ ... "'-,Jtt •• _______________________ ~_ 
.. ,"-,. ...... ,d-a'-."-
(1) The operations of the Ban~are discussed in M. Ordonez Fernandez; 
!tEl Banco CentroQ,-l11.ericano en_ i proQ~sso de integracion oconon:i.qa" 
University of San Carloa, I;XXI op. oit. 1969. Also in the~~moria. de 
IJabores, Annual~ issued by the Bank. ,. 
~ 
(2) >,By 30th April, 1969, the financial resourcos had rison to ¢25Om. 
(~215m from overseas); total londing had reached ~15Om.and this figure 
had risen to ~193m.by the beginning of 1910. SIECA Cartas Informativas. 
(3) Critici~s of the Bank are quite serious. Clearanco takes considerable 
tioe, partly because of the need to clear projects with USAID ( which 0.100 
~imits its independence)~ little I regional , induntry per so has been 
encouraged. there has been little mobilisation of looal capital and the 
'redistributive aspectl han been extremely weak. (Soe Ch.5.) 
P. Schmitter: "Central American Integration: spillover , spillaround or 
e,!lcapula tj.onJ" 0p. oi t. pp. 9-10 
\ 
institutions and it haG beenavery ouccessful 'pump-priming' agency.(l) 
Its activities have survived the war; 00 much so tl1at the Moduo Operandi 
has designated it'the most useful mechanism for breaking the present 
deadlock and it is proposed to establish a 'speoial fundI to lean even 
more heavily to Honduras (and Nicaragua) in lending policy. 
Modelled on the Central American Bank is the one recently 
established in East Africa though the East African Development Bank is 
much more directly concerned with rediotribution.(2) A cornerstone of 
the Andean Group is the "Andean Development Corporation" which plans 
considerable industrial lending.(3) A Caribbean Development Bank has 
also been established involving' Bahamas and British Honduras as well 
as the CARIFTA group, (4) and the Mahgra~ group established a small regional bank. 
The other regional banks exist more independently of the formal 
integration arrangements and support them only indirectly. Tho African 
Development Bank which commenced lending in 1967 has not yet had enough 
operational experience to evaluate, but it has shown itself very anxious 
to avoid ~utside control by equity participation and its early lending 
haa been entirely on African funds. Quito different in orientation, the 
Asian DeveloI""""'"~\'::;a'P,;k put into operation in December, 1966, ombracing 
both Asian and non-Asian countries, with 4~b of the initial capital of 
~l,OOOm. subscribed by donor countries;(5) The Inter-American 
(1) 'Ibid p.9. "members seem to be aware that without it they would have 
received less individually ...... . 
(2) The Bank is an inteeral part of the Treaty, aiming to promote industrial 
development and eive priority "to industrial developments in the les6 
industrially developed partner states, thereby endeavouring to roduce the 
substantial industrial imbalances between them"; and to finance projects 
which make for "complementarity". ~"~l: '" .. ; J.; fl!tly ind'llnt.!'.t~l:. proj ects are 
eligible. Subscriptions are equal but loana and lnveatmenta are to be· 
allocated on a tr;~;t basis between Uganda, Tanzania nnd Kenya. 
(3) The Corporation was established by formal l\greement in 1968. Unlike 
the other groupo it is only concernod ,vith industrial and service enter-
prises directlr rolated to the integration process. 
(4) The Dank is due to have initial capital of ~5~;. (.0, • 
(5) m::CD.~'!Economic Cooperation in Asia" op. cit. p. 
Development Bank, which camo into existence as early as 1960, has been more 
actively involved with promoting economic integration. The bank is 
based in the USA and has been very active in obtaining finance from bond 
issues, commercial capital markets, and from the US Government as aid. 
In its first six years it had lent ¢2,OOOm. Its role in promoting economic 
integration has been through ~ pre-investment fund to undertake 
feasibility studios in potential multinational projects, and a fund for 
extending linea of credit for intraregional exports of capital goods on 
terms as good as those offered by exporters from industrialised countries.(l) 
Even in those areas where no financial institution yet exists, 
there are plans; especially in the Mahg1"ab. 'l11e Arab nations have the 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Development, which is a partial substitute. Even 
COMECON is trying to float a rogional investment bank. (2) Generally 
speaking, regional development banks have proved a useful adjunct and 
. 
stimulant to economic integration, especially where they have channelled 
extra funds to the area, and where they have used their posit~on to 
promote specifically regional projects which might otllerwise have involved 
cumbersome international negotiations. 
iI ... ·,. i";tJ:~,,~;,~C.~f 
(1) P. Herrera: "The Inter-American Development 'Bank and !Jatin AmericFm 
Integration" in M. Wionczek (ed.) "Latin American Intecrration" OPt cit. 
and "The Inter-American Development Bank And the T,atin Americ~n :r.~ovcTl1ent": 
Journal of Common l(arket Studies, Dec. 1966. pp.172-181, 
Inter-American Development Bank: "lfful tina-tiona! Invef"ltment in the Economic 
Develonment and Integration of Latin America". 0J'l' clt. pp.150-179. 
(2) Report in ~le Times: July 27th 1971. 
Conclusions and Some Explanat.ion~ 
The Central .{unerican countries are oeen to have been more 
successful than an almost all other integration arrangements amongst 
developing countries in establishinG a customs union and in harmonising 
their institutions to accommodate free trade. They have been very much 
less successful in developing a frame'work of planning to develop 
intermediate and capital goods industries. 
This fits badly into the rationale set oUt.~1ir~lG1t" 1, 
and the consequences of this disjunction are spelled out in Ch.4. 
However, what are the reasons for this form of developmen;? This takes 
us into the field of politics, but that cannot be avoided. 
Perhaps the most important factor, which explains the early success 
of the CACM in building a free trade area, has been the avoidance of 
steps which involve an cnroach~ent on the political discretion of national 
leaders and national sovereighty. Clearly, trade liberalisation and 
uther integration instruments do implicitly involve loss of sovereignty; 
~o~flloss ~f customs r~venue;~A$~ loss of control over industrico Ullo.blo 
to withstand regional competition. On the other hand, any steps to 
. ~:< . ::.,..:t· 
transfer major decision-making functions to SIECA'Lor any other supra-
such as . 
national executive bOd~,~control over industrial location, control over 
new tariffs, a regional budget and distributive pool, ware firmly 
resisted and decioiono were subject to national ratification. Equally, 
there was virtually no aUempt to move to political unifica.tion 
directly. (1he regional body coordinating foreien aff~irs - onECA - and 
the regional body coordinating military activities - COIIDECA - have 
played a subdued and relatively unimportant role). Integration was 
----.~-------....,....---
----- --_. __ ._---------_. 
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economic und non-contraversial.(l) 
This form of. evolution was related to the fnct that the dominant 
'pressure group' for integration were the 'tecnicos', senior officials, 
economists, m~nisters of economic affairs;~rofesSionals by training 
with no political constituency; the 'integration mafia' they have been 
called. IViost were influenced by the fashionable idea.s of Prebisch 
and the EeLA 'school', possibly only superficially in some cases, but 
in other cases informed by cosmopolitan experience. The Common Market 
appears to evoke relatively little interest amongst the main political 
components of the ruling classes; the Army, the landowners, and the 
Church. Even potentially threatened groups, such as the weaker local 
industrialists and overseas importers were mollified in the first case 
by relatively favourable experiences and in the latter by a sharp rise 
in the propenei ty to import and neither are, in themselves, dorrJ.nant 
groups. Labour ullions and peasants have negligible influence except in 
Costa Rica. Political leadors appear to have accepted the moves to unity, 
deriving 'kudos' from successful initiatives which did not threaten them 
directly. 
External innuences were exerlec.l also by the United l1ations (E.C,I.A.) 
(1) 'The areument in this paragraph is a rough paraphrase of the vieYlS 
contained in A. Segal: ~.£:rat.!.2.!l..Wd develonln~. cOllntl'ie.s.L!lQ.,me thouc;hts on 
-~ - ,East Africa and Cent~A~call, Journal of Common Market Studies, March 1967. 
pp. ,83,. J. Nye: It.central American Reeional Integration" OPe cit. J. Cochrane: 
"~e Politics of ReB'ion~l In~!lg'r~~io~: ,ttt!LCent~~J._~'1lerican,?~se" OPt cit. 
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team in the first instance (up to 1960). Later (after 1959) the 
United states, the main aid giver, trade partner and investor, 
reversed its previous general indifference. seeing the opportunities 
which might. arise for oversea,s investment and for enhancing political 
stability. They have patronised the CACM (or these parts of which 
they approve) through loans to regional institutes (mainly CABEr) and 
informal support. 
However, those conditions, which made integration easy at first, are 
now very considerable handicaps. The absence of deep political 
commitment and partial political unification meant that in the absence 
of what Nye calls a "myth of irreversibility" and of long run objectives 
and pooled sovereignty)the common market was extremely vulnerable and 
lacking in allies once the common market controversies did acquire 
political, especially nationalistic, overtones as with the major 
bilateral deficit of Nicaragua, 1969, 
O:J the "war" which led to Hond.uras' withdrawal. Sin1ilarly, the 
acceptance of !national sovereignty' as a constraint on all major decisions 
... ~~.:::;".;:::.~. 
meant that the most relevant instruments, such as a regional investment 
policy, have never been developed. This step has also been prevented by 
the opposition of the United states, whose assistance was so important 
-~ 
in the earlier stages. IntelP;atioll 'by stealth'~a.s prov£dr coull~er-
productive. However, the crucial determinant of continued integration 
and its possible deepening are material net ~a1ns flowing from the union 
and that all states are at very least no worse off within the union than 
outside it. Ch. 3 will address itself to this question. 
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Chapter III Performance, Benefits and Co~ts of the Central American 
Cornman Market and the Distribution of Benefits and Co~tfJ (1) 
This chapter attempts to test three propositions: 
(a) . that the Co~~on Market has made a significant net contribution, 
both to regional industrialisation and to regional G.D.P., 
sufficiently so as to justify its continuation. 
(b) that the net gains are badly distributed, e:uch that there is 
good reason to believe that Honduras may have made a rational 
economic choice in withdrawing in 1971. This would imply 
that the "balancing mechanisms" of the Common Market are 
defective. 
(c) that the Common Market has, so far, largely been exhausting 
the possibilities for "easy" import-oubsti tution aided by a 
-- . 
wider market opportunity but has made virtually no progress 
in attranting the basic "building-block","intermediate", 
ueconomies of scale lt industry for which the Common Market was 
designed: and, again, this might imply a defective institution-
{tal:-c::tru9ture. 
, ~.. "' ... ' #' 
(1) ~~en this che~+'er had been prepared in final draft the author obtained 
a copy of D.H. l\~cl '~l1and, tiThe Cenj.r.~l Amerj cfl!l_Common 1.~a.rktl" Pracger, 
1972. This was the first major attempt to calculate benefits, and the 
methodology a.ppeared. to be as rigorous as the data permitted. W.uch of 
Mc!, dland' s work was very similar in approach, and used similar data to 
mine, though arrived at quite independently of the author (we did have a 
_~. brief exchange of ideas in 1969 in the U.S.A.). The chapter has been re-
wri tten to accommodate references to McL, elland' s calculations and I 
felt justified in going over, to some extent, the eame ground, if for no 
other reason than to dispute a central point in Ucl elland's caso _ 
f~~demental ,to his argument, though not deeply explored - that no country 
appeared to have "loot" from m'embership. 
~-----------------------------~---
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It is necessary to calculate the balance of advantage from 
participation in r~gional integration for several reasons. Pirstly, 
nations enter into an arrangement of this kind either to increase their 
national income or to minimise the cost of industrialisation, and in 
order to establish its success (or otherwise) we need to quantify the 
effect as precisely as possible. Secondly, as we have seen in Ch. 2, 
and we shall see again in Ch. 4, an equitable distribution of gains is a 
~ 
precondition of the success of regional integration , and the measurement 
of equity may be necessary for political reaSons. In the absence 'of 
attempts by economists, governm9nts (notably Nicaragua) have gauged 
"success" by their bilateral trado balances with their partners, a 
, , 
dangerously misleading factor, based on the implicit assumption that 
regional trade is a 'zero-sum game'. 
However, there are. fundamental difficulties involved in making a 
numerical calculation. There is an "identification problem". A formal 
integration agreement may be only one of several inter-dependel .. ~ factors 
influencing trade flows and economic growth; and in Central America there 
was simultaneously a commodity export boom, an increase in fiscal 
. }",,",,~, l~ ",: ~~W.t.J..,f 
incentives to business and a major road buildinG programma. A further 
difficulty is that in order to' establish the costs and ben3fits of 
regional integration, we need to contrast this situation with another 
hypothetical situation - that of' non-integration • 
• ·l .. 
• U\:l '. 
-"- ---,- .. _-----------.....,.-
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This hypothetical question can be put in three ways.(l) First, I 
what would have been the gains and losses to partner states, historica.lly, I 
had there been no integration arrangement? This question is of no 
relevance for policy, is purely a.cademic, and requires time series data 
over a respectable period: in this case the Common Market has only 
existed from ~14 years, depending on one's definition. Second, what 
I 
would be gains and losses E.2.!! from partner states withdrawing or remaining 
assuming the alterna.tive was autarky or another specified group? 
This question is more easily answered but it is a 'comparative static' 
question which must overlook the dynamic, long term effects of the 
union on raising productivity, on the stimulation of innov.ation and 
Mf' 
new industries, the mobilisin~ of unemployed resources, the gains from 
economies of scale. ~ecause these factors are multifarious and 
cumulative rather than simple .qnd immediate in effect, it is difficult 
to see how they could ever be satisfactorily quantified. Third, what 
will be the cains and losses in the future from withdrawing from or 
remaining? This approach runs into considerable difficulties because 
of the problems of projection. However, the question of ,relaUve. ex-
pectationB.i~,~~~iel, especially as in Central America, two countries 
"'>'~-,., .~ 
in particular (Honduras and nicaragua) might well expect a favourable 
response from concentration in their traditional exports of cotton and 
bananas. 
• • .110 
There arelaspects of membership which convey a. sense of 'eain' or 
loss but which are not eVen potentially reducible to income terms; the 
(l) ~. Robson: "Economic Integration in Africa" OPt cit. p.l3l-2, and also 
in Un~ ted Nations: ",Current Fro bI emf! of Economic TntePJ:a.tiop.l . Fi,seal 
.Q..ompenR~tion nnd •• the ;n}stribution of renafits in FJconomic Grou':',?,inr,13 of 
Developing Countries", UNCTAD., Geneva, 1971, p.a. 
'. 
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IIpsychic" gains from raising a stronger industrial base, consumer 
satisfaction (or disatisfaction) with greater (or lesser) variety 
of goods; broader horizons and tho experience, hitherto denied, of freer 
movement and closer conduct with neighbourinc; countries; or for Costa Rica, 
the political "costs" of association with undemocratic neighbours. There 
are also more specialised aspects of the 'gain' and 'loss' account which 
include the effects of economic integration on fiscal receipts; and the 
balance of payments - both treated not in "income" tems, but as inde-
pendent policy variables. 
Unfortunately, these problems are often glossed over and too many 
central Am~rican studies have merely accepted the superficial index of 
a rapid intra-regional trade growth rate and a possibly spurious corre-
lation between growth rates and. cornman market membership; e.g. "during 
the years in which the Common Market has been in effect, the level of 
economic activity has noticeably increased in Central America •••• it 
seems reasonable to conclude that during 1960-67 the Connnon Market has 
acted as a stimulus to economic advancement",(l) or lithe expansion of 
trade among the Central American countries is a clear indication of the 
immediate re.:,~,~.~~,:.~ ... 'l~' the integration progrn.mm~n. (2) However, there are 
others who have remained sceptical. Schmitter described how regional 
growth has improveo. the "image of regional integration ••• but there is 
do~bt as to the extent and depth of its contribution ••• and the contri-
bution of regional trade expansion and economic cooperation to this sus-
,,.,,, tained, but fading, burst of prosperity has been marginal". (3) 
'0\ (1) D. Ra..'nsett: "Rcgipnal lndus.t,!,ial" pevelopment in Central America" 
OPt cit. pp.27-28. ' 
(2) J. tioscarella: "]!cpnomic. Inte{tl:atio!Li.n Central America", in M. 
Wionczek: llJ.atin American Econo~dc Integrqtj on" OPt ci t;-PP:-272-273. 
0) P. Schmitter: "Central American Ipieeration: SpilJover, Spillaround o~ 
Encapsulation" OPt cit. pp.15-16 • 
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Indicators of Growth .and structural Change 
Bearing in mind all that has been said about the t identification 
problem', about ~he complex chnin of causality, and about the quality of 
statistics, it is nevertheless of some interest to consider initially 
some of the major economic changes that have ~teE~ the inteerntion 
progress, whether or not they arc wholly caused by it. Changes in trade 
composition or industrial structure, for example, tell us how successful 
the countries have been in developing some l~ind of industrial base. 
Diagram ;-1 gives some indication of changes in key macro-economic 
variables in the throe periods 1950/62; 1958/62; 1962/69, which can be 
roughly used to evaluate performance in the pre-; post- and transitional 
periods of the Common Market. In the case of Guatemala thero is a 
significant improvement in real economic growth and economic growth per 
capi ta, and in manufQ,cturing growth; Vlhil e regional exports have grown 
very Tapidly and extra-regional exports at a rate significantly less than 
real G.N.P. In El Salvador there is no discernable improvf;,nent in G.N.P. 
per capita, but a sliGht improvement in GNP and manufacturing growth: extra-
regional exports.llave grown slowly and intra-regional exports very rapidly. 
• .i;.'i': . • ~~, L~ .. ""i·~ ~..c._ •• 
_., • .• -.,.vrbl 
In the other three cases, substantial improvements have occurred in GNP, 
GNP per capita, and manufacturing, but in all three, extra-regional exports 
(cotton and bananas) yielded a high growth of proceeds and it is much less 
'-
evident what separate contributions the common market made: indeed in 
Honduras the growth of regional exports was less thnn that of exports to 
the outside world. 
Diagram ~-2 gives a measure of structural changes in the economies. 
There is a marked decline. both pre- and post-common market, in the relative 
.----------------------~-----------
l 
Dlagram 3-1 M~in Economic Changes in Cent:t:,al...!.mcricA. 
l:. Gua t emal e, 1950-6~ 1958-62 1262-1262(10) 
0 1 7·) p. a.. % p.a. 1969 va\'IlQ z[p-. e,., 
GDP in ~. quetzales 
(1958) million 3' 5 4·2 1,679 6.1 
GDP per capita". It II ·6 '9 328 2·8 
Elcports outside 
Central America -millions 
(cur~ent prices) ·2 169 2· 4 
. :Exports to CACM-millions 
(current prices) 2'8 86'4 20·9 
}Aanufacturing product 
-value added - million 4' 5 4'9 260 1·6 
II, El Salvador 1950-62 1958-62 1262-62 
GDP in C-\. 1962 
colones; (million) 4·6 4·8 2324 5' 3 
l'er capita GDP in 1962 
colones l,a 1'3 686 1,8 
~ Exports outside the regions 
in current prices - million 2,2 180 1'4 
Exports to the reBion 
current pri~es -million 22-3 778 17'8 
Manufacturing product 
- value added - million ·5' 7 1,6 450 8'3 
~ III, Honduras 1250-62 . 1958-62 1262-62 
,GDP in 1948 lempiras 
(million) 3' 4 3-9 905 5-1 
GnP per capita in 1948 
. 
.. 
lempiras 
·6 ,°15 362 2'5 
Exports outsitle Central . 
America - current (million) 1'9 142 10·6 
Exports to Central America -
current (million) 1'5 23' 9 7- 5 
, Manufacturing.Product 
(1948 lempiras ~million) 7- 6 6·6 14' 5 8-9 
IV_ Nic~ragua 
GDP.Jn 1958 cordobo.,s 
.. 
' (million) 5' 5 4640 6'3 
GDP per capita 1958 
cordabO(:! 2·8 2·6 2429 3' 5 
Esports outside CA - current 
cordob~s (million) 5·6 128 S' 5 
, Exports to CA (million) 2·2 2',3 30,8 
Manufacturing Products 1962 
Cordob~s (million) 7-9 74 756 9·8 
\ 
\ 
(continued) 
'\[. Costa. Rica }.950-62 ;L958-62 1962-62-
GDP in 1962 colones 
(million) 6-4 9 4910 8 
GDP per capita 2'7 
Exports outside CA 5 154 7'4 
Exports to region 9 ~6·0 . 26 
Manufacturing product 
(1962 colones) 7' 3 5·8 960 10.~ 
Sources: United Nations National Accts, Joint Planning Mission: El Salvador 1968/72 
Plan. Honduras 1969 Central 13ank Report; Nica.ragua 1969 central Bank neport~ 
Costa Rica \ 1968/12 Plan. 
l 
l 
\ 
Diagram 3-2 structural Ch:mr,:eR :l.n pentral_America (in %) 
Guatemala 
1950 1962 1268 
Ao"Ticul ture; 
Forestry & 
Fisheries 
Mining ) 
Manufacturing) 1).'0 
Construction l,... ~ 
Electricity, l 
Gas & Water 4-1 
Transport &. 
Communications) 
Government (Civil 
Services &. ~ • C:. 
Defence) 
Misc. Services 
Ownership of 
Dwellings 
Commerce & 
Finance 
4o,~ 
,''', , 
El Salvador 
1950 1962 1970 
Nicaragya CORta nica 
1950 1962 1970 1950 1962 1970 
~iculture; 
Forestry &. 
Fisheries ct-6" 'n',j :2."1 ~4.i" ';1.'Cf. 2.1,'1 
Mining ) 
Manufactu:;-ing) 11, 4 
Construction 
Electricity, } 
Gas & Water ) 
Transport &. ) 
Communications) 
Government (Civil 
Oar/ices &. 
Defence 
Misc. Services 
Ovmership of 
Dwe):lings 
Commerce & 
Finance 
7·0 
1°'7 
Honduras 
1950 1962 1970 
Mexico 
1967 
\ l.'i" 
4-5 
Sources: 1950-62 Joint Planning Mission and generally Ul~ Yearbook of National Accounts 
P. T.O. 
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importance of agriculture and a counterbalancing rise in that of services 
and manufacturing even though the latter constitutes in all cases a 
small sector with under 15% of G1'T. The direction, if not the magnitudo, 
of the change is entirely expected ru1d is attributable to higher demruld 
elasticities and the multiplier effects of traditional commodity export 
growth, as ",.ell as to common market trade, 9~1o of which 10 in manufactures. 
It is, perhaps, more revealing to look at the patterns of "normal" 
development, traced in Appendix III. There is a general tendency for 
the liD" factor to rise, but only in the case of El Salvador and possib1y 
Costa Rica, has there been a dramatic' movement from "below normal" to 
Itabove normal" levels of manufacturing after the integration process be-
gan. In Guatemala, significantly enough (significantly because intra-
c...tr~~ 
regional trade is the only autonomous factor responsible 
for improved erowth performances), manufacturing has increased less rapidly 
than elsewhere and }fas remained at the same 'tsub-normal" level. 
Diagram 3-3 carries the analysis of industrial changes to a more 
detailed level. There is a continued, if modest, shift from "traditional" 
industries, .a.s ,119f,ined in the appendix, to "intermediate" industries in 
, t._,_~_ ::',.m.-.J.' 
~(2. 
particular, which is in line with ttnormal" industrial development;. .t Class-
ification in this way is necessarily arbitrary (textiles, for example, would 
include "now" and "intermediatell products such as rayon and nylon cloth). 
In the integration period there have been e;rowth increases well above the 
average in the three countries for which data is available, in paper products, 
petrol refining, chemicals and engineering industries, but all figures start 
from a very low base and ~n each country the traditional industries constitute 
over 70%0£ manufacturing value added even in the late nineteen sixties: ~d 
this is excluding the very emall firms. 
Diagram 3-3 structural Changes wi thin the Manufacturing sector 
Industry Group 1955 1962 El Salvanor Nicara a 
(Region as (Region as 1967 %. p.a. 1968 69 % pta. 
a whole) a whole) % ll'\~ increase 
% of V.A. % of V.A. 1962-67 1965/69 in.:,", 
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Table 3-4 shows changes in import· as between extra-
regional and intra-regional supplies. Extra-re~ional imports havo shovm 
an annual increase of over 5% over 1958-60 and the composition has 
changed markedly with a reduction in the proportion of consumer goods, 
especially non-durables)and fuels, and an increase in the proportion 
of other raw materials, intermed.iate and capital goods, especially 
transport equipment; in fact, to a more rigid~import structure. 
Intra-regional trade growth has been concentrated very largely in non-
durable consumer goods which accounts for half the increase>and capital 
goods (except construction materials) are still of, negligible importance, 
Table 3-5 breaks dovm impor~~ ~nd exports by the S.I.T.C. classification. 
It shoYls how the exports of 
categories 0 to 4 (foodstuffs and raw materials), are totally dominant 
among exports outside Central America both in 1960 al1d 1968; while 
regional exports for all countries except Honduras are bunched in ~ 1<13 ~"..( 
categories. Regional trade is seen to be providing a trade outlet 
for manufactures, vnlich is further underlined by Table 3-6 showing the 
destina~ion of exports by product-category. The U.S.A. and W,' Europe 
take insign~ .. ~~~~:~",a.uantities of manufacturos (the U.S.A. tekos less than 
Panama which is the only significant importer of manufactures outside 
Central America); while those areas which have a comparable economic 
structure to Central America (ALALC and CARIFIA) do virtually no trade • 
-Diagrrun 3-4 Source of ImD,.9rts bX FXld-une c,atego;ry 
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Diagram 3-6 central American Exports by Destination and Product Catee'on:; 
(1968 in ¢) 
Destinatipn S.I.T.C. 
category 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
CACM 53'4 2'5 7·6 3' 4 6·6 40·6 76-8 11'7 43'3 2·47 
. 
ALAIC (~~r.-T~ 
~) ·2 1'4 1·1 1,0 ·1 -I -I 4 
CARImA '-~'II\&I~.) 3-1 3' 5 
N. America 285·6 3-4 15' 7 1-4 2-0 '1 -4 314 
VI_ Europe 171'4 46·2 '4 '7 ·8 .. 218 
Rest of the world 49'5 
-
103' 8*. 2·8 ·1 2·6 1-7 I-I '7 164 
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The role of regional trade as a medium for promoting mMufactudng 
exports is brought out with greatest clarity in DiA.g. 3-7, where the 
conventional industry classification rather tha,n trade classification is 
used. Agricul tural products accounted in 1968 for about 10~C of reeional 
trade as opposed to 40X in 1958. ~le massive increases in manufacturing 
trade have been in absolute terms most important in "traditional" industry, 
notably textiles, shoes, clothes and processed foods, but the rate of 
increase has been greatest in intermediate industries especially chemicals. 
The base quantities are so low, however, that percentage increases mean 
very little. 
Nevertheless, it is important to identify those components of reeional 
trade which constitute a "dynamic" element and an attempt is made in Diag. 
3-8 to pick out over 1962-10 four cateeories on a three digit SITe basis-
"fast grower~tI (wher.e regional trade is graYling significantly faster than 
averag'e), "slow growers" (where regional trade is growing significantly 
slower than average), "averag'e growers" and "zero-growerslt • In the first 
category are rayon, nylon type textiles, "diverse" chemicals (mainly in-
secticides), tlgt;neral" manufactures (in which plastic goods are prominent), 
. . I:~)'- .' " .. : :.:.. 
pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment (mainly batteries and cables), glass 
bottles and organic chemicals. In the second are cloth.ing, perfumes and 
cosmetics, shoes and also metal manufactures, tyres, animal food and mis-
cellaneous prepared foods. "Slow" growers (still rapidly growing in some 
cases relative to trade ~~}l~) are cotton thread ~nd woven material, 
margarine, paints, leather, wood and fresh ve&etables. other products 
appear to be growing not at all or falling in absolute terms; fuels, 
fertiliser, sweets, unmilled maize, rice, cattle and furniture. 
It is also interesting to note the extent to which regional trade 
Diagram 3-7: Regional Trade bI Sector-origin CategorieA 
Agricultural products. 
Mineral Products 
Services 
Manufactures . 
~C'.I.U~ .... (1) Traditional ~ 
~o Food - Human 
Animal 
21 Drink 
22 Tobacco products 
23 Textiles 
24 Clothes 
25 Leather goods ex. shoes 
shoes 
26 Timber products 
27 Furni tUre 
28 Printing products 
Total Traditional 
(2) Intermediate Goods, 
29 Paper products 
30 Rubber goods 
31 Chemicals - industrial 
- others 
(largely pharma-
32 Petroleum p~dRa¥~iC~) 
33 Glass & glass products 
Other non-metal minerals 
Total Intermediate 
(3) '~Eh~in~~J:!in{r'::: "CarSi tar 'Goods 
34 Metals - iron & steel 
others 
35 Metal Products generally 
36 Machinery ex, electrical & 
transport 
37 Electrical equipment 
38 'Transport equipment 
Others 
plus Plastic products 
Sources: SIEeA Statistics. 
.. ' 
,8 
1968 (values in ¢m. cif imports) 
26·6 
2·0 
1'4 
45'1 
7·2 
2'1 
7·1 
5·0 
2·0 
123' 5 
7·6 
7' 3 
14'9 
26'4 
3·2 
2'9 
3-6 

NAUCA group 
013-00 
024- 01 
042-00 
051-01 
053-04 
J54-02 
J54-09 
055-02 
062-00 
091-02 
121-01 
243-00 
533-03 
541 
552-02 
599-01 
561 
611-01 
629-01 
651 
652 
653-05 
656-01 
661-02 
699-21 
642-01 
121-02 
821-01 
821-02 
841-01 
841-02/03 
841-04/05 
851 
899-07 
899-11 
~ 
Meat Preparations 
Cheese 
Rice 
Fresh Fruit 
Fruit Juice ~ 
Beans :~ 
Other Vegetables (f" ~sh) 
Vegetables (process~~) 
Sweets & Choco1ates~ 
Vegetable & Cooking 'oU 
Tobacco (llure) . 
Timber 
Paints 
1!edicines 
Soap (washing) 
Plastic }.fu.terials in bulk 
Fertilisers 
Leather 
Tyres 
Cotton Yarn (spinning) 
Cotton fabrics (~~en) 
Artificial fibre (wove~ l.aorl.cs) 
Saci:s 
Cement 
Metal Containers 
~~icles of Paper & Pulp 
Electric ~atteries 
Furniture (wood) 
Furniture (~eta1) 
Socks & Stockings 
Underwear & Clothing 
If & II 
Footwear 
Plastic Hou~zho1d Articles 
other Plastic goods 
1960 
1,049 
252 
588 
1,194 
225 
192 
10 
944 
621 
2,428 ' 
.1,670 
213 
2,480 
20,363 
2,608 
14,641 
4,394 
3,109 
1,125 
1,789 
24,588 
7,211 
1,786 
2,118 
1,440 
3,524 
2,416 
361 
1,477 
1,666 
1,558 
2,704 
852 
496 
1',113 
Imports 
1964 
659 
411 
1,346 
500 
419 
97 
223 
615 
251 
191 
1,125 
32 
626 
30,704 
960 
17,211 
7,680 
2,312 
7,983 
11,666 
19,978 
10,929 
917 
1,134 
3,058 
9,300 
1,587 
227 
983 
189 
1,860 
1,705 
332 
449 
1,682 
1968 
950. 
346 
300 
558 
241 
1,281 
26 
600 
212 
66 
564 
148 
1,801 
33,000 
857 
13,180 
15,543 
.1,493 
6,992 
19,000 
8,860 
12,308 
713 
450 
3,904 
1,122 
659 
418 
1,252 
156 
1,510 
1,192 
284 
601 
1,998 
Re&7iona1 Trade )( 
1960 
35 
134 
347 
509 
247 
1,123 
658 
26 
703 
820 
470 
711 
435 
194 
305 
3 
. 74 
155 
236 
1,224 
1,000 
1 
243 
97 
193 
272 
134 
70 
135 
248 
265 
626 
11 
236 
1964 
447 
319 
511 
2,002 
1,086 
),458 
1,020 
506 
2,823 
1,370 
685 
2,223 
1,700 
1,845 
6,431 
6,431 
500 
1,144 
1,438 
2,901 
4,589 
1,490 
1,583 
1,567 
599 
3,463 
1,372 
580 
713 
1,020 
2,005 
246 
3,669 ),601 
790 
1968 
2,212 
804 
4,590 
3,289 
1,200 
5,500 
1,,745 
1,321 
3,870 
4,188 
789 
2,198 
2,450 
8,566 
6,342 
3,831 
),196 
2,177 
6,C70 
5,141 
13,312 
5,141 
2,350 
2,213 
1,916 
4,859 
3,528 
1,132 
1,566 
3,773 
6,144 
5,001 
9,395 
1,509 
2,3.39 . I~ 
\.oN 
\.n 
'" 
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is in some respects performing a regi.onal timport substitution' function 
and in other respects is due to heightened competition between existing 
producers. (1) Diagrams 3-9 shows very clearly how for some products (e.g. 
paints, lea.ther, .woven fabrics, sacko,' cement, batteries, clothing and shoes) 
the impetus to regional trade has been import-substitution. Competition 
between existing producers has led to the development of J.~-industry 
rather than inter-industry specialisation: and Diagram 3-10 ohows hoVi far 
products such n.s textiles, clothing and shoes, such product speci.alis~tiQ.11 
is well advanced. 
So far developments have been described in general rather than precise 
terms. To what extent, then, is the growth of the region or the manufactur-
ing sector directly related to the existence of the con®on market and, in 
particula.r to the growth of regional trade? To answer this, two basic 
approaches were adopted. The first was to try to find statistically 
significant correlations between economic growth and t.he various apparently 
. 
independent and autonomous influences such as the growth of traditional 
exports, re(;ional trade or another proxy measure of the "CoI...mon rlarket 
effect", and government investment. The second approach was to try to 
isolate the various components of regional trade; the local value added 
. J~~ ~:':. , . A ,,::.t.,. 
generated in regional trade; the "cost" of regional trade diversion and the 
fiscal loss. The latter approach takes up the bulk of the chapter but the 
relatively unouccessful attempts to use the first approach are recorded for 
completeness. 
(1) This broadly corresponded to the distinction between 'trade diversion' 
and 'trade creation'. It is not a distinction felt to be quantitatively very 
useful in this context but it is of academic interest and Appendix 5 is used 
for indicating the possible application of these concepts to Central America. 
For what it is worth, it appeared that about half of regional trade flows were 
"diversion" and half "creation". 
651-03-00 
651-04-00 
652-01 
652-02-03 
652-02-04 
653-05-62-01 
-02 
841-01-02-01 
841-03-02 
841-03-04 
011-03-05 
841-04-02+03 
P41 -06-05 
841-11-01 
851-02-02 
851-09-01 _ 
Crude unbleached 
cotton yarn 
. 
Cotton yarn bleached 
unbleached cotton 
cloth (woven) 
bleached-
" 
2 80g per m 
80-150g per 
2 
m 
rayon wov~n cloth 
80g per m~ 
"" " 
ladies stockings 
others - i. e. 
socks etc. 
clothing, knit of 
synthetics 
It "of wool 
It If of cotton 
pyjamas, underclothes 
of Rvnt.l:E'tic fibres 
. t-'tJ-""~""~":'.;;'" 
of cotton 
Mats 
Leather shoes 
Shoes of plastic 
materials 
in intra-trRde amon 
f1t!Ures) • 
% of imports accounted ~~ of imports 
for by major supplying accounted for by 
country major import,ers 
95% El. Salvador 
88% El Salvador 
48% El Salvador 
71% El Salvador 
63~{ El Salvador; 
38% Guatemala 
98% Guatemala 
85% Guatemala 
60% Guatemala 
32% Costa Rica 
437~ El Salvador 
81% Guatemala 
68% Co~ta Rica 
56% Costa Rica 
42% Honduras 
36% El Salvador 
72% E1 Salvador 
60rx, El Salvador 
39% Nicaragua 
69% Guatemala 
59% Guatemala 
20% Guatemala. & 
Honduras 
65rc, Honduras 
36% Honduras 
27% El Salvador 
92% E1 Salvador 
73% Honduras 
43% E1 Sal vader 
34% Guatemala 
42% Costa Rica 
~a~~l.l·all circa. 
Hond. 30% 
32% Guatemilla 
37% El Salvador 
38% El Salvador 
;0% Nicaragua 
Honduras 
;7% Honduras 
30?o Honduras 
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I Direct Calculation of the ~ffect of JntegTation on Gro~ 
Gains and losses could be calculated by constructing a model in which 
regional trade or another proxy measure of the common market can be 
represented as o~e of various independent influences acting on Gnp (or another 
measure of welfare). The coefficients derived from ref!ression analysis of 
the data may enable us to calculate the separate influence of the preference 
variable. Though it is less useful in this context, X-section analysis is 
subject to less severe problems than time series analysis and it is worth 
recording the attempts to incorporate preference variables in global trade 
analysis, notably by Tinbergen, Poyhollnen and Pullainen, and Linnemann.(l) 
Moreover because of the dangers of extrapolating from x-section to time series, 
and because of the difficulties of applying general equations to a particular 
context we conclude that "the methods used nre ••• only useful in showing 
that changes in trade flows did occur 'and in measuring the extent of these 
changes in general terms. They do not permit the quantitative measurement 
-. 
of integration effects and of the relative importance of trade creation and 
trade diversion". (2) 
(1) J. Tinbergen: "Shaping and the World Economy" Centyry lUnd 1962, p. 
P. ·Poyh~Iti.nen: "Towards a t;eneral theory of internatioB trRde" and 
K. Pullainen: itA. world trade study: an .econorn.?trlc model of the pattern of 
.<?ommodi ty flows irt_ interna.tional trade 1948-60" both in Ekonomiska Samfundets 
Pidskaft 196; ... _:- :" .;'-!39.H,Linnemann: "An Econ,ometric study of, Intern~tiona.1 Tr:lde 
Flows" North Rolland 1966. Also see ",'l"'r3.rle Flows ('Ina Goop:raphic Diotanco" 
in H.G. Bas; "Tow:lrcls Balanced International Growth" Hotterdam 1965, pp.11l-128. 
Linnemann computed a relationship of the following kind from a x-section 
sample of 80 countries in the 1958-60 period: 
__ xij;: A Y i t Y j Ni N j Dij , P ij 
where xij is the trade flow between i & j 
Yi; Yj are the GDP of i & j 
Nt; llj are the populations of i & j 
Dij is a variable for "economic distance ll 
Pij is a preference variable 
are elasticities 
A is a constant. 
As a result of _~numerous tests (correcting for changes in commodity 
composition for example), it was established thqt the preference variable was 
very important; and it could also be sho\'iU that d,ue to the effect of the 
121. 
(2 cont.) 
"size" elasticity, there 10 a predicted reduction in extraregional imports 
from a multinational grouping through trade "diversion". 
( 2) II. Linnemann: l..Pl.!!. 
128. 
Attempts have been made to adapt multi-variate models of trade to 
time series. In a study specifically. on Central America, Nug-ent evolved 
a model in which the intra-regional and extra-regional exports and imports, 
of individual corr~on market countries were traced by means of equations 
which incorporated as independent variables; disposable income, credit 
conditions, a time trend factor, import and export taxes, a dummy variable 
covering transport costs and a 0-1 dummy variable to represent the 
absence of the common market.(l) As a result of analysis of a 16 years time 
series and various forms of its equation, he came up with the tentative 
con6lusion that the Common J!.arket Itexplained" about 1% p.a. to GDP after 
1962 (i.e. about 1/7 of the recorded growth). 
Even in a complex model of this kind there are many oversimplifications(2) 
, 
(1) R. Nugent. Discussion paper (unpublished) Yale University; seen in 
mimeograph form. 
(2) The limj.l.':.",':· ... ~:.m~er of variables, the exclusion of lags of over two years 
and of distributed lags, linear functions, the absence of any commodity 
disaggregation. Also the dun~y variables are crude; for transport a simple 
progression (0,1,2,3,4 ••••• n) and for the preference group a discontinuous 
series (0,0,0, •• to 1,1,1) with 1960 as the date of inception of the union. 
Relative price changes are dealt with very indirectly by means of a crude 
measurement of the external tariff (tax receipts over import VOlume) by major 
SITe· categories, which totally fails to measure the protectiv~ effects of the 
tariff as tax receipts are misleadingly deflated by the exemptions of intra-
regional trade from tariffs and of inputs for many industries. 
.~-
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and this model is in some ways too sophisticated bearing in mind data 
limitations. Also until the work is published one does not have any basis 
for seeing what evaluation the author put on his own results. 
A potentially more promising, because less complex, approach is 
sketched out by Nde~va in his study of the East African Common l!arket 
(for 1954-63). (1) He did a simple regression of income (for each of~ 
th~e countries) on inter-Common Market exports, extra-regional exports 
and gross capital formation, which three factors were aggregated into a 
single independent variable. As a result of this, regional exports 
"explained" 2/5 of Kenya's 6- 7% growth rate; and 1/20 of Tanz.ania's 5- 2% 
growth rate (Uganda's result was rejected because of a poor "fit"). 
However, the logic behind the model and selection of variables is not 
explained at all, and statistical significance of the resulto are sketched 
very superficially ~d it is, consequently, not possible to say more about 
methodology and the validity of the concluoions. 
One of the most difficult aspects of models such as that of Nugent 
. 
was the use of a satisfactory variable to represent the existence of a 
~.,. 
. t~~::: tt"'~"_~::;irl.,f 
preference arrangement. One way of avoiding thio difficulty is to look 
at pre-common market period and construct a projection model. This is 
then applied to the common market period and the difference between 
"predicted" and "actual" values for GDP as a residual, can with appropriate 
qualifications be attributed to the common market. This assumes basically 
(1) P. Ndegwa: liThe COrnrJon l',~arket and Develo ment j.n Foast A.fricn" East 
African Studies (Makerere -1965 pp.llO-lll. 
1;0. 
unchanged conditions but provided that the most likely changing influences 
are incorporated in the projection model this is a not entirely ~~reasonable 
assumption. (1) -There is also a considerable advantage in econometric 
terms since the existence of rnulticollinea£ity in time series (which is 
almost a1way~ present) does not prevent one making projections (assuming 
that the "fitll is satisfactory) even though it is not possible to separate 
out directly the influence of the different independent variables. 
One study of this kind has been made in Central America.(2) It does 
not use formal regression analysis but an approximation technique out of 
deference to the poor data available. The assumptions are clearly spelled 
out and seem feasible enough. The study.is thus described in some detail. 
The key ass~~ptions are as follows; 
(a) exports (outside the region) and to the "common market" are the 
only major autonomou~ influences on growth. The service, construction and 
domestic agricultural sectors are considered 'passive'; monetary and fiscal 
policy as unimportant and investment to be unrelated in nny direct way to 
b~owth (f~xed investment consis~~J1argely of imported capital goods). In 
the absence. of..,.Nt:{ .. e?c'port growth tho economies would crow at a. "minim1.Un 
...... .t-A_." .'. """' ..... Ul~ 
normal" or trend growth, determined by the "normal" growth of population 
(1)'- ,Similar assumptions have been made in various attempts to colcu1atc 
the effects of the BEC: E. Truman: "The BEe: tra.de creation and tra.de 
p.iver91on tl Yalo l!~conomic Essays, Spri'ng 19'69. E. 13alassa: "Trade dlv-ersion 
.?-nd trade creation in the HF.C" Economic Journal, Uarch 1967. Also 
E.P.T.A. "The Effects of EFTA on the Economie~ of r.~ember states" 1969. 
(2) D. McClelland: liThe Central American Common M::trket" OPe oi t. Ch.2 and 
Appendix B, and "The Common Market's con.:trib'lltion to Central America's economic 
£rowth: a first aupT.oximation" in R. Hilton (J<:d.) "The Movement IJ.1owards IJatin 
American Unit;t" pp.508-536. -
!), ).h -i~~.r 
'-' 
\'" 
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new techniques etc. (a concept similar to the "natural" rate of growth). 
I 
/ 
(b) The employment of additional resources in the export sector \ ,~ 
has no "opportunity cost". This is because of the existence of "labour 
slack" and because land has a specific use or is underutilised (chanf$os in 
export proceeds are often due to price rather than output changes too). 
The treatment of capital and skilled labour is less clear - except where 
it can be identified as a foreign exchange cost to be deducted alone with 
imported inputs. While acknowledging that these elements represent a 
resource cost he considers that "costs are of a different order from the 
gains". (1) 
(c) There is a very high supply elasticity due to the existence of 
uneMployed resources and this means that demand spillovers from tpe export 
sectors lead to an expansion of output, not of price; i.e. a multiplier 
effect. ~his is a very cavalier assumption and he deals very unsatisfact-
• 
orily with the argument that a budget deficit in these (un4<eynsian) cir-
cumstances would not simply generate a multiplier. McClelland made the somc-
What arbitrary a8s~~ption that import leakages cancel out the multiplier so 
there is a 1:1 relationship between export earnings ruld manufacturing output. 
" ... ~is is perha:~S. ~~':;~l2::teakeBt and most arbitrary assumption of the exercise. 
]y 100kine at the 1950-61 pre-common market period he is able to 
"exp~ainll the growth of that period (i.e. get a visually satisfactory fit) 
in terms of a minimum-normal growth of 4% (5% for manufacturine). This 
and th~ other coefficient were extrapolated over the 1962-68 period and the 
. "residual" GDP attributed to the Common 11~arket; which was about 1/10 of the 
. (1) Ik!i. p.208. 
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growth 1. e. about • 75% of GDP p. a. This conclusion is confirmed by 
separate calculations on the manufacturine sector, where about 50~~ of 
the, growth is "explained" by the common market. 
It woulc;i be easy to make criticisms of fluch crude assUlnptions but 
the findings have no cJ,aim to precision and the assumptiono made not: --b,h'/~ 
jMplausi ble. However, it should be noted that the procedure of using the 
"residual" aD a measure of the Common Market effect is open to very 
serious critism: the residuals in the McClelland study Vlere so small 
that they could easily have been swamped by da.ta errors and by the 
influence of other activities such as government investment. The 
coefficients chosen are very arbitrary and an attempt at regression 
analysis could have yielded figures that fitted the data more accurately. 
--
~~ '3-II,.Equations Relatinf, the Growth of S,.DP (Dependent Variable), the Growth of 
Bxtra-regional & Intra-ref{ional ·.rrade, Government Investment 
"'--
Guatemala: 
log y 
log t"\ 
and a Time 'J.1rend c..IHt"~1 
= 2.8936 _ .700410gXa + .1742log Xw _ .831210g G + .031~10g T 
(.2161) (.0674) (.0840) (.0802) (.0083) 
~ 
= 1.6408 
(. 2127) 
R~ .,. .9827 DIAl: "<J.? 
. . 
:81 Salvador: 
log y = 1.6432++ • 0198810[5 ~ + • 303~log Xw + .371fiog G + • 017~lO8' T 
(.2906) (.0548) (.0906) (.0997) (.0063) 
n2 .,. .9907 
DW ... 1.88 
log. ~ .'" -.3835 _ .12201og Xa.+ .5282105 Xw + .58121og G + .031410g T 
(.6416) (.1210) (.2000) (.2201) (.0139) 
Honduras: 
log '1' 
log .14 
Nicarnf.jUa: , 
log ~ 
log f'll 
n2 :: .9610 
DW .,. 2.22 
:: 2.068t + .028310g Xli + .197~10g Xw + .160910g G + .007910g T 
(.1146) (.0213) (.0255) (.0570) (.0024)' 
2 R = .9967 
DW .,. 2.35 
;., 1.317: _ .025810g ~ + .204910g XVI + .0384108' G + .030t10g T 
·(~_~6.~~~)4.·c~t .. f..(·0494) (.0590) 2 (.1341) (.6056) 
n :: .9941 
DW .,. 2.~3 
:: 2.730t + .005110g Xa + .193~10g XVI + .017110g G + .011,10g T 
(.1729) (.0119) (.0352) (.0033) (.0033) 
n2 '= .9968 
DW .,. 2.00 
.,. 2.318t + • 0028105 ~ + .006410g Xw _ .300010g G + • 039~10g T 
(.6041) (.0553) (.1637) (.3769) (.0153) 
R2 .,. .9621 
DW .... 85 
;::.;"-: 
Costa Rica.: 
log Y 
log ~ 
Nicaraeua.: 
... 2.9627~ + .002210g Xa + .0494103 Xw + .13141og r, + .018~loe T 
(.2020) (.0124) (.0644) (.1010) (.0031) 
2 R = .9949 
DW = 1.85 
= 1~874~ + .093~10g XU + .01141og Xw + .252310g G + .019~log T 
(.6665) (.0410) (.2123) (.3333) (.0103) 
. 2 I 
R = .9817 
DW :: 2.21 
. A. log Y ... 2.7207't + .282!f log X' + .0163! T 
(.08711) (.0521) (.0014) 
R2 ... .9800 DW... 2.308 
13. log M "" 1.7343~ + .2735~10g X + .0238 T 
(.0851) (.0518) . (.0014) 
R2 ... .9$87 DW'" 2.59 
Honduras: 
...... 
A. log Y ... 2.3579f(' + .132510g X + .014/T 
. (.0961) ( .0548) (.0009) 
II = .9633 DW "" 1.82 
1! . B. log 1.1 ... 1.3082... + .1171 log X + .0277 T (. " .. ~. ( .1031) (.0017) • • .LV~_I \. 
R2 
... .9612 mv ... 1.88 
Guatemala: 
A. log Y ... 2.8395*' + .0022 log X + .016~ T (.1386) ( .0163) (.0012) 
n2 
"" 
.9767 DW "" 1.22 
B. log M ... 2. 280~ 
-
.2012 log X + .022rT 
(. 0935) (.0016) 
n2 
'" .9751 DW ... 1.90 
El Salvador: 
. 
A. log Y = 2.8334 * + .0559 log X 
( .0492 ) 
+ ·0l71*T 
( .0010) 
. 2 
R :: .9834 DW :: 1.97 
B. log M :: 1.8118 * + .1200 log X 
(.1242) 
Costa Rica: 
A. log Y = 2.8920* + .1751*108' X 
(.0766) ( .0426) 
R2 :: 
.9935 DW 
log M :: 2.3482 + .0477 log X 
(.2146) ( .1194) 
R2 :: 
.873 DW 
Notes: XIV = world exports 
.,. 
+ .0227*T 
( .0027) 
+ .02l5~ ( .0008) 
1.08 
+ .0135 T ( .0022) 
:: 1.29 
XR = regional exports 1 = time variable 
S .,. ... = government investment \( ... 'lOP 
~ ,;'tJl(·~ q~t ~ef~~/i~~~~~ H~ M~~~<7{)f' 
Having surveyed the literature, how can it be i..:.;"used'l; Two applications 
were tried. First an attempt was made to do a time series analysis for tho 
1958-1969 period which embraced the whole of the common market and 
transitional period. Two alternative dependent variables wer~ used 
(~'DP at constant prices and manufacturing value added) and four independent 
variables, (extra-regional exports, government investment, intra-regional 
.~"" 
exports as a pro~ L":v~">!\c'he Common lI'Tarket effoct and a time trend variable~ i4 ...-....u1; 
• "./lcp.. ~~~Ol'i' Although the fits were generally good, a survey of standard :,; .. "1 errors 
of variables 
and substitution",showed that most regression coefficients were very unstable 
1~::: and it VIas found in almost all the equations after an investigation 
" " 
of partial correlation coefficients that "there was unacceptably high 
multicollinearity amongst the independent variables. No alternative 
transformations of tho equations (e.g. to log form: or taking least 
differences or introduction of other proxy variablesi ellininated multi-
134. 
collinearity to an extent that the equations could be used for evaluatin~ 
the influence of each variable separately under ceteris paribus 
assumptions. Also the short time period meant that the Durbin-Watson 
test for auto-correlation could not be a.pplied and the D-W statistics 
) 
seemed barely acceptqble in general. Nevertheless, the results are 
not entirely without interest. In nine out of ten equations the 
coefficient for regional trade is statistically insignificant. In Borne 
cases the coefficient is actually nesative, in most others very small 
indeed. The "common market" effect appears to, be 'swamped' by the time 
trend and the effect of extra-regional exports. 
Instead an attempt was made to apply the basic approach . "'6'I..L ..... bt"Ptn.~ 
by McClelland in an econometric form and to apply it to each country 
, ("l ... lIh) 
~ equations derivedAcan be used for projection separately. , • I\. 
purposes even thouzh Ir.ul ticollineari ty is present. The findine-s have to be 
c.o~ , 
treated Vl~th extreme caution'Abe~ring in nind the assumptions lyine; behind 
the projection, the poverty of data and the high standard errors of 
The conclusions are printed out in Diag. 3-l~ It appears that 
W 
predictedAaetual values are very close for HondUras, implying 
very limited gains from nevr influences in tho post-l962 period; bwt 
,-.:~ there is a large unexplained "residual II for Guatemala and El Salvador and 
to a lesser extent for Nica.ragua which appears to explain about tr of 
Guatemala's and E1 Salvado~'s growth in this period and 1/6 of Nicaragua's. 
For manufacturing there is a similar picture, The absolute figures are 
generally not very reliable as they depend on doubtful statistics and unchanged 
coefficients but relative magnitudes aro,intercsting.(l) 
, 
11) Changing the base of projection from 1950-62 to 1950-58 did not tl 
affect the results. graa y 
sis. Because of poor statistical series, Costa Rica was excluded from the cillaly-
Dia&-ra.."!l 3-12 "J2:.edict~d" v. Actual VAlues of GDP nncl ~.il)"P (mMuf;tcturin.e;) 
(i'rojection equation Loe; em' ::: a + b log X + e T )'lE-
1li.ca,ragua 
(in <;.Or..S""~(la at 
constant 1958 
prices 
1962 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
Honduras 
(constant 1948 
lempirRs) 
1962 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
Quatemala 
(constant 1958 
quatzales) 
1962 
1966 
196; 
1968 
1969 
El Salvador 
(constant 1962 
cofnes) 
1962 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1968 
., 'I 
. Actu8,J. Gnp. 
~999 
4033 
4245· 
4447 
4640 
629 
181 
8~4 
877 
905 
1143 
1394 
1453 
1566 
1619 
1603 
2063 
2116 
2246 
2324 
\I " 
"Predietedll GDP on Actual !f,anuf • 
assumption of pre.. Q."'Jp. ,_r •__ _ 
.cAm.! tr~~ ..... ____ _ 
,017 
3900 
4103 
4278 
4375 
620 
712 
807 
848 
813 
1114 
1293 
1344 
1395 
1441 
1489 
1753 
1826 
1095 
1914 
370 
541 
584 
671 
756 
76 
112 
'124 
135 
145 
151 
211 
·228 
247 
260 
241 
371 
402 
425 
401 
"Predicted" 
GJ)~uf..1-
375 
518 
554 
588 
612 
16 
106 
114 
123 
130 
148 
164 
182 
181 
192 
227 
283 
298 
313 
331 
. ;;-
Sources: El. Salvador. U.N. National Aceta. and the 1965/69 National Plan 
Guater.lala: U.N. National Acets. and Joint PlanninG' r.~ission. 
Honduras: Banco Centl.'al de Honduras and u.n. National Acets • 
11icarayoua: Central Bank; 1965/69 }Jational Plan and U.N. National Aeets. 
Notes c~r~ 
* ~ is exports to 'World markets in >, , prices 
T is a time trend variable 
. E~ ~ W ~ ;,.. 1-Llb. 
:.:.:.:......_--
n. Anal;y:si~ of Trade Flows 
Attempts to as'sess the :contribution of the common market to rel;ional 
GDP and manufacturing directly had mixed success. An attempt will now be 
made to look at. the growth of regional trade and, if possible, to deduce 
/ 
to what extent its growth.is due to the common market, and to infer from 
that what contribution regional trade makes to the GDP. The first step is 
to isolate that part of the trade flow', intra-regionally t which is due to 
the existence of a preferential group, 
Let us look first at some of the methods. that have been used to 
calculate the impact of integration on trade flowst 
(1) ,Tariffs and price effects: in as much as a customs unions 
arrangement involves the reduction of tariffs in one direction and their 
, 
consolidation in another, measurement or prediction of the effect of 
tariffs on demand could be made by a study of elasticities, Various 
ex-ante studies have been made, for example, of the effect of the EEC, 
EFTA and a possible North Atlant.ic F'ree Trade Area, using estimates of the 
prices elastiC~~!::.~~.:,.~j.f.land for imports. Knowing the extent of a proposed 
tariff cut and assuming an infinite elasticity of supply and an absence 
of income "feedback" from any tariff changes,. then chang'es in the trade 
'-
~3.~ •• 
flov~from a tariff~ be predicted.(l) This procedure has been used by 
Andic, l~dic and Dosser to predict the effect of a customs union in the 
west Indies.(2) In Central America one study was made adapting this 
approach:(3) it was based on the original work of Verdoorn who estimated 
(ex-ante) the gains from riestern European integration.(4) Verdoorn took 
an elasticity of substitution between in~ort demand and import substitutes 
(effectively the price elasticity of demand) of '5 and income elasticity of 
2·0. Tariffs are assumed constant for all products and countries; other 
changes influencing prices assumed away; factor supplies held constant; 
and the rest of the world .treated as a single country. The same 
assumptions and coefficients were used by May in predicting the effects 
of a Central American Common Market and he estimated that complete trade 
liberalisation in Central America should have added ¢e.6m over the 1959 
figure of ¢29'4m for regional trade. The wildly erroneous predictions 
of May's study should alert us to the limitations of this kind of approach. 
It may be of use for ex-ante calculations where nothing else is available 
but scarcely otherwise. At all event, the a.ccuracy of values for 
elastici ties is crucial to establish the magnitudes of trade flow changes. 
attributable to economic integration and those are hiehly elusive. Work 
done subsequent-1~~0:G~,9..~der to predict the effect of the San Jose Protocol 
(1) 1.1. Krause: "The E~C and US Balance of Payments" in W. Salant (ed.) 
liThe United states BalAnce of PaYpents in 196811 pp.95-ll8 and "European Economic 
InteP,Tation and the United States" Washington 1968. H.G.'"J~h~0nT~e~i;;r;o;7X:eer tra~th Europe: ttn estimate" 
Manchester School 1958, pp.47-55. 
(2) F. Andie, S. Andie & D. Dosser: "ilheory of ~:conornic Integration fo_~ 
. ...,;-.: Developine Countries" OPe cit. 
(3) P. May: "Pa.nama and the Central American Customs ~ni.Q.U" Ph.D. 
(unpublished) UCLA 1965. 
(4) P. Verdoorn: "A custom~ unJon for West~rn J.rurope - advanta.Q'es and 
feasibility;" World Politics, 1954, pp.482-500. 
on extra.-regional imports to Central America confirms fit.,'Ures of • 4 to 
.6 for the price ela.sticity of demand for imports. (1) Time series 
calculations of elasticities confirm the general orders of magnitude. (2) 
A more recent study in Brazil gave figures of ·4 for the import price 
Q) 
elasticity. However, the 
use of price elasticities is vulnerable to fa.mUiar criticism, notably 
the ceteris paribus assumption behind any calculation. Consequently, any 
numerical value must be subject to a wide range of error and to substantial 
change over time.(4) 
Some indication of the doubtful validity of using tariff changes and 
an assumption of constant elasticities to explain trade flows is 
obtained by looking at the experience of Weidmaar, who tried to calculate 
(expost) the experience of the Central American Common Market on Guatemala's 
trade with the rest of Central America.(5) He tries to prove several hypotheses: 
one is that intra-regtonal tra.de will tend to rise most rapidly where 
external tariffs are highest. He divides products into "high" and 
"low" tariff groups (nominal tariff - greater or less than 30%) 
and looked at a sample of products with over ¢50,OOO in regional trad~ 
. ' 
Despite testing at 3 
'(1) SlEC! ______ ~ ____ ~~--~~~~~~~--~~----~~a~o-s--o~n 
centroamerica". 
(2) 7,1.C. Chang, "Cyclical, movements in the ba.lance or' 'Payments" Cambridge 
University Press 1951. 
(3) P.G. Clark & n. Weisshoff: "Import DemAnds and Import Policies in Brazil" 
USUD 1961. Quoted in S1ECA/CEC-Cl..CA 111m2. 1968. Appendix 2 p.3. .-
(4) Problems involved in calculating import elasticities (and supply elasticities 
too) are given in a study concerned to tost the advantages of a multilateral 50;6 
tariff cut,\f\a l~ArTA arrangement. D. Balassa antl Associates: "Studi.es in 'rra.de 
LibeEIJ~tion amgn.tL)nd)lstrJ2-.t . .9oun,:!;],ielU... Objectlv.es And Al ternatives" r.~~ 
Hill, 1967J Ch. 1 and appendices by ]alassa and Kreinin. See E(l:S~ Orcutt: 
"!,easu:r.ell1pnt of price elasticities in international trade" Review of Economics 
and StatistiCS; ~/ay 1950. 
(5) D. Weidemaar: ",The impact of the CACl\t: on Guat.emala1 s trade flows" Purdue 
University 1969 (unpublished Pb.D.) Microfilm. ' 
\ 
and 7 digit level and getting partially successful results he was forced 
to conclude that "the import data. appears to demonstratE) that regional 
imports are being substituted for extra-regional imports, but in ~ll pre-
union tariff groups ••• hence, this seems to refute the claim that the 
height of the pre-union tariff has restrained trade in these items 
relatively more than in low tariff items" ••• and ••• "there is little 
evidence that tariff height has been an important factor in the stimulation 
of new investment!,(l) The direct calculation of prico effects by elasticities, 
is therefore rejected. 
" 
(2) ~ ... Market shares approach: another approach which does not deal 
explicitly with tariffs is to study the apparent effect of the common 
market on changes in import and export market shares looked at ex-post. 
In this way it is possible to contrast the va~ue of intra-trade which might 
have existed in the absence of tariff elimination, assuming that the 
structure of world trade~ould be othe~vise unchanged. Shares are calculated 
in terms of ageregate trade flow~ or disaggregated by cOll1r.lodity categories, 
or evaluated in terms of a matrix of trade flows representing trade 
. between individual . ~te>lu • The aggref,'ated approach was adopted in a 
study by If~ajor r~·.f~··~::t·~~"EC, who looked at changes in market shares over the 
1958-61 period,(2) and Lamfalusy who contrasted shares in the EEC market 
over the 1960-62 period, with what they would have been in the absence of 
th~~et. (3) Also a similar approach wag adopted by Pearson in a study 
(1) D. Weidemaar, ~. p.120. 
(2) R.L. Major: "Jhe Common 1.Tarket: producUon 
Institute Economic Review, August 1962. 
and trade"· 
--' 
National 
(3) A. Lamfalusy: "Intra-Eu;o-pean trade and the corrpetitive nosition of 
.the EgC" Manchester Statistical Society Transactions, Jf.arch 196,. 
, 
;, 
on LA:FTA, where he endeavours to calculate the "integra.tion-induced trade 
stirr:ulation" when cOr:1paring the rate of increase of IJA'l:<-v.rA inira.-regional 
exports to that ~£~~ rest of the world (with a cor:l'.'ectlon for demand 
. (1) . 
differences ir.. the two markets). Attempts have been made to build on this 
kind of analysis recognising that it does have certain advantages, IIthis is •• 
because there is some evidence to indicate that in the absence of pre-
ferential tariff changes, shares tend to display a useful degree of 
constancy and partly because the use of share performance automatically 
normalises for changes in charges in competitiveness and income ll .(2) 
However, this stabn-i ty is not based on anything more than inertia 
and it is not correct to say that preferential arrangements are the only 
or main influence on shares: shifts in tastes and preferences, political 
factors, reductions in "economic distance" on certain routes, and supply 
flexibility are other factors • These factors can be clearly seen in 
. 
share changes as they have affected Central America (Diag. 3-t3). The share 
of Central American regional tracl.e has been remarkably constant s.t 3/rA% 
in tho pre-:integ'ration period; but there are major chnnges outside of 
the preference facto'r - the growth of the Japanese share of import, and 
exports, and' tr:,:,::·":'~~,!ne of the US share, the latter due partly to the 
artificially hieh level of trade which was the outcome of the effective 
blockade of Latin America in the Second World War. To apply a constant 
shares approach would not be very useful in .this context ~s one of the 
(1) C. Pearson: "EvoluA.ting: intcg-r:1..tion nmong less develoPE~l:mtri.e.s: 
f',APTA as a CAse stu'dX". Journal of Common Market Studies, 1970 pp.262-275. 
(2) J. Williamson and I. BC'-u:n..tl "!"Cpe i[!!J?::lct of customs unions on trade jn 
~frl.ctures" Journal of International Economies 1972. pp.332-333. 
'. 
- ,:.;;-
Dial!Tam 3.::l3....showing chanr.!!s in market shares of, .9.~.ntral /\mer:i.can 
imports ~§ exports. 
~f share of 82,SQOz:,t,f3, ~ oh!J.z:e of imEort,s 
EEC & EEC & 
US LFTA Japan Latin America CACM US LFTA Japan Latin America 
1948 80 5 0 6 5 76 5 0 3 
9 79 5 0 4 4 75 7 0 5 
50 79 8 0 3 3 70 10 0 6 
51 79 7 1 4 3 68 11 1 5 
2 76 10 0 3 3 66 15 1 4 
; .. 71 15 1 3 :3 64 15 2 5 
4 66 21 2 2 3 63 18 2 4 
5 60 24 4 2 3 62 16 2 5 
6 55 28' 5 2 4 61 18 3 5 
7 52 33 2 3 4 58 22 ·4 4 
8 51 31 6 3 5 55 22 4 5 
9 46 30 9 3 ~ 6 51 23 5 5 bo 49 30 6 2 7 49 24 6 4 
1 50 26 9 1 8 47 24 1 4 
2 41 27 11 1 8 46 23 6 5 
3 43 26 14 1 12 46 22 1 6 
4 37 29 12 1 16 44 21 6 6 
5 37 23 14 1 18 41 21 8 6 
6 34 27 10 21 41 22 7 5 
7 34 26 10 23 41 22 8 5 
~ 
9 
Source: IMP Direction of Trade. 
, 
CACN. 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4-
3 
3 
3 
4 
6 
6 
.1 0 
9 
10 
14 
15 
19 
21 
l~(j. 
main effects of the Common Market trade has been to influence the overall 
level of imports or exports (relative to· GnP) by 'gross trade creation' 
~.~ netA~mport substitution; and the extent to which the 
Central American share has expan.ded may be attributable (in a way which is 
• ~IS' v.. 
difficult to quantify) to combination oflexpansion of trading in 
general and to diversion of supply. The retention of a 4% share in 
Central American exports and imports by regional trade would have led 
one to predict levels of regional trade of about ~35m by 1968 as against 
¢20m in 1958 before integ;ation treaties began to be sisned, and as against 
the actual figure of over $250m. Even if we allowed for so~e progress in 
reducing 'economic distance' outwith the framework of bilateral agreements 
it could not have affected the conclusion very greatly; especially when we 
note that the share of trade with other Latin American countries is declining 
(exports) or static (imports). 
(3) Projection Models. 
A sliehtly more systematic approach would be to derive a function 
wi th intra-regional .. trade as 
, .;; ~-. ~. ' ' -~t' 
project forward estimates of 
a dependent variable which could be used to 
troJA. 
intra-re.gional~ in the absence of a common 
,. 
market arrangement on the assumption that the independ~t variables 
continue to operate in the same way and that other factors are not 
operating. For several reasons, this is very difficult: data is 
extremely fragmentary on a disaggregated basis with separate and 
disconnected information for 1950-52 and after 1955. Also, while the 
choice of an introductory date of the common market was not critical in 
the direct calculation of GDP effects since the impact was small over 
14)), 
1958-62, the choicQ is crucial in this exercise since the series of 
trilateral and bilateral treaties preceding the COmD10n market proper 
was already beginning to have an impact on trade flows in tho 1958-62 
period when the rate of increase of regional'trade if not the absolute 
values l7ere very largo (over 2o;'~ p. a. ) • For example, tho income 
elasticities of demand for regional imports calculated for 1953-61 and 
1955-61 were 3.6 and 3.7; but for 1950-58 (or 1953-58) only 2.1. It io 
clear that any predicted values are greatly sensitive to the b~s~ 
date chasen. However, if vIe project using ooeffioients applicable to 
pre-1958 data)the "predicted" value in 1968 for regional trade would be 
of the order of ~5Om a figure substantially hieher than the other entimates 
above based on constant shares. It is extremely difficult to be preoise 
but it vlou1d appear that were Central America to return to a situation 
similar to that which preceded the Common Marke; 
somewhere between ;t35m and %5Om would still be traded. In fae.. CJ the 
figure would actually / be to the higher end as the situation Vlould 
not be reversible oompletely with regional roads now inotalled and 
, :'" ~ - ., . '",.1.' 
business connections firmly established. Still, a very considerable 
amount, probably 80-9~~ of regional trade in 1968)could be said to be 
"explained'! by the Common Market. 
- -- - -"- ---- - -- -
Di~~a~1~\~~OWing.the_C9mposition of regional trade in the pre-Co~on Market period 
..-----
SITe Categories I 
0-9 .: 1946-51 1950 195~ 1952 1955 1956 1957 1958 1960 1961 
.Agriculture & I Food 6.2 7·0 7.9 9.e 14.4 14·9 
Raw Materials . 4.8 1.3 8.2 9.0 Crude !,'!aterials 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.5' 1.6 1.6 
(0,1,2,A) ____ ,__ Veg. Oils , __ .J .5 .8 .5 .7 1.-6 
Drink & 
Ci-arette .8 .8 .8 I., 1.1 1.1 
:Manufactures Chemicals .6.8 1.2 1.2 1.9 2.4 
(5-9 incl.) .95 .95 1.15 1.25 Manuf. by 
roducts 1.2 1.2 1.9 2.4 ,.2 6.2 
Equi~ment .6.4.4 1.1 1.9 1. 
t Other manuf. .8 .8 1.1 2., 2.0 3.0 
Others inel. 
fuels (3-9) & ., .1 .2 .• 1 .1 .1 
oiscellaneous 
TOTAL 5.9 8.3 9.7 10.~ 12.7 13.4 16.1 20.2 27.5 32.4 
1955-60 Estudio Economico de Aoerb~ Latina, 1962 (Union Pa~ -~erica) 
Pre 1955 Analysi!L and Prospects of Intr_B:.-Cent:;,a~ Anl..erican Trade (mt BCtA) 195 .. ~ 
DiBgr~~ showing the source of regio~al trade in the pre-cc~~on ~arket period 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 /" '1958 1959 1960 '() Increase 
Guatemala. X '.26 .46 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.5 2.6 '3.0 4.2 5.0 31 
H __ 1_.13-- 1.0 1.1 .9 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 2., 3.1 7.6 150 
El SalvadorX 2.6 2.4 2.2 3.1 4.4 4.0 5.2 ' 6.3 8.1 10.5 12.5 27 
M 2.3. 5.6 5.0 6.7 7.8 6.8 8.0 10.7 10.5 12.5 13.5 22 
+--:H"-o-n""'dur-a.-s-~X----+--4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 '6.5 b.o 6.6 7.9 ·8.1 10.5 
H 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.6 1.6 _2.8 4_._6 __5. 2 503 9.2 
NicarC1gua X 1.2 3.0 1.8 1.8 2 • .3 1.1 .7 1.2 1.4 4.2 2.0 33 
J,! 
Costa Rica X 
M 
TOTAL 
Source: 
!5 .8 I., _ 1.3 2.2 1.5 1.5 2.8 2.7 4.0 2.8 42 
.4 .7 1 .. 0 .,.5_ 1.0 1.0 ..!9 __ --.J._·5 ____ J_.H ___ J. • .Q.. ___ 2_.4 25 
1.0 .4 .8 .4.5, .6 _.9__ .9 .... ,.9 ~--f.O-·H-3~9 13.5 
8,.5 10.6 10. 28.7 ,50:3 ,14.5 
SIECA Notes: different' methods ,.:.: OF 
calculation • 
JI¥2. 
The picture is very different when we look at tho experience of 
particular countries and pa.rticular product categories (see Ding. 3-141. 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica all had negligible trade prior to the 
common market. HOl'Jduras and El Sal vaclo!" had, however, been trad.ing with each 
other at a relatively hleh level since the ea.rly 1950's 'Yben Honduras' 
regional exports were half tho region's total. Clearly, therefore, these 
two countries had a good deal of economic ~ntercourse which owed nothing 
to the existence of a free trade area in industrial goods. At a product 
level the level of agricultural trade was relatively high and. it,s sloW' 
growth has not been greatly accelerated since trade was 1iberalised. 
The lED for regional trade in foodstuffs and raw materials pre-1959 is 
about 1, and on this basis the actual lovel of trade in these products in 
-
1968 was only double what would have been predicted in the absence of 
integration. This has considerable implications for Honduras where over O~ 
~ " of the regional exports were in the form of ra.w materials and food-
()Nl..~ 
stuffs in 1968; as opposed to . ~for regional trade as a whole and for 
the countries importso "this would imply that not only is Honduras' growth 
of reeional exports a good deal slower than its partners, bu·' that a 
greater proportion is also independent of common market effects. 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaraeua. 
Costa Rica 
regional exports of 
non-manufactures 
¢23m. 
¢16m. (inc. fuel) 
¢18m. 
¢11m. 
¢9m. 
overall regional 
exports (1968) 
¢78m. 
¢85m. 
¢31m. 
¢27·5m. 
¢38m. 
This can be seen more clearly if we look at tho particula.rs of 
individual products, and predict what would be likely to occur were the 
common market to cease operations. 
Some products would probably still be, traded in the absence of a 
common market: (i) goods subject to in'tra-rogionul tariffs such as 
petroleum p~oducts; cheese, coffee and coffee extracts and cotton, where, 
in overy case, free trade provision has not been agreed; 
. (ii) goods sufficiently competitive to be exported in 
substantial quantities on, the world market such as oil seed, vegetable 
oil, timber, unrefined sugar and leather. Some other products are 
exported competitivoly in small quantities on the Vlorld market (copper~ 
wi're, cotton~ yarn; machetes; certain types of cloth and insecticides) 
though the volumes were not significant e1/.ough to consider thu't these 
products do.'not depend on the preferenoe accorded to regional producers, 
(iii) there were several produots traded in substantial 
vplumcs before the bilateral and multilateral integration treaties; 
such as drinks and live cattle. An American survey reoently indicated 
that corn and beans (tUe main fresh vegetables) were traded independently 
of the 'conunon market.(l) In both ca~es intra-regional trade has risen 
slo~er tl1an extra-regional trade, and is not much higher now (1970) than 
at the end of 1966 whe~agreement O:Q.., free trade waS finally reached ft" 
\ 
(iv) thero are other producto where proximity io a good 
deal more important than tariffs (eggs and milk)'and these would probably 
be traded. 
(1) U.S. Department of Agriculture/Batelle Institute: "Pro,jeotions of 
sun 1 and denand for selected a ioultural roducts in Central America 
throu h 1 8011 op.cit. p.,7. 
Inclusion or exolusion is of necessity an arbitrary proceDa, but it 
was decided to assume t~~t the following produots would continue to be 
traded; petroleum produots, oilseed and vegetable oil, cotton, live, cattle, 
drirucs, corn and vegetables (mootly beans), timber, sugur and leather. 
Not only is product selection arbitrary but the quantities likely to be 
J..,'~F. ~c.J.e- . 
traded are to identify. Nevertheless the value of regional 
exports in ili968 accounted for in this way was Guatema1a)~7.5m; El 
Salvado~¢9.0m; Hondura~ ¢12.5m; Nicaragua/~6.3m; Costa Rica,~1,5m. 
Vlhat is significant, is that the largest ~ount of trade in products which 
do not appear to need the Common l~rket is Honduras, comprisina ovor 1/3 
of its regional exports, Anothor interesting detail is that Guatemala and 
El Salvador have;a, small quantity of trade in these categorios although 
their exports to the region of products in categories SITe 0-4 arc higher 
than those of Honduras,' This is because foodstuffs exports tend to havo 
enjoyed some manufacturing processing, e.g. Honduras exports unmilled 
maize to Salvador and buys it back milled (at a higher than would market 
price). ~3m of El Salvador's exports consist of rice which io protected 
by a substantial. tA.:'iff .• 
~ ....... ,,' •• 'I. ',"1";'" 
On the other hand almost all the trade in textilos, chemicals, 
machinery, tyres, paper products appears to be attributable to the Common 
:Ma.rke~, and would largely be lost if the Common Market were to ceaso 
operations, which would indicate that Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala 
~ 
, . .-..;- have~more to lose from termination than Honduras and to a lesser extent 
Uicaragua.,. 
To conclude, over 4/5 of regional trade could b~ "explained" by the 
Common Market and by related activities (e.g. the expansion of regi~nal 
infrastructure). . However, the effect is different by countrl and by main 
product category. In the extreme case, only 1/3 to "rUonduras I exports 
to the region appear to depend on the Common Il!arket. 
Hitherto, we have been largely concerned with analysing the effects of 
trade flows retrospectively with thc common market treated as, at best, 
a residual factor. However, we also need to confront the question as to 
whether, as of now, dissolution or continued membership would have the 
most beneficial result for the members collectively and individually, given 
What we know about the volume of trade which is dependent on (or independent 
of) the CACM. 
To get an answer to this question one needs to be able to quantify 
the foliowing; 
. -I~~ 
(i) the extent to Which~the value of goods traded represent, a 
~ ... commensurate1:'.'$~-;;;.7r:!.·in national income by way_ of local factor payments 
'together with payment for local inputs. 
(ii) "efficiencyll gains or losses from "trade creation" or ~trade 
. 
diversion". 'The·.: protection afforded by the common external tariff is 
clearly important here. 
'. 
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(iii) internal economics of scale, as manifested in new inclustries 
crossing the 'size threshold' and in reductions in cost for existing 
industries operating on a re~ional rather than a national market. 
However, very few major eC([l'inomies of scale industries have yet put in 
an appearance. 
(iv) income gains from extra output in the form of regional exports 
which involve the mobilisation of, unemployed resourc,' s in existing 
industries or new ones, provided the opportunity cost of using factors 
of production is less than the money paid to the factors. 
(v) income losses from the contraction of existing or potential 
industries in the fmporting regional partner resulting in uneMployment in 
that partner state. 
(Vi) the effects on the level of inyestment, and, specifically)foreign 
investment, 
(Vii) • indirect effects; multipliers, leakages into overseas imports 
and reeional imports (the latter being called "spreal" effccts)1 from any 
increased ~eal income, 
(viii) revenue gains and losse~' '. seen as an element in 
-
their own ri~~!~~~;~;(JJ.. 
Domestic Value Added of Regional Exports 
'" The value of intra-regional t'rade is not a value added concept and the 
value of trade includes imported inputs which clea.rly do not represent 
any gain to regional income. Secondly, the money value of regional -t('b..J.Q. 
does not take account of the opportUnity cost of the factors 
employed in producing regionally traded ~O~~. Both these costs, if 
calculable, need to be deducted from the value of regional exports to 
~--- ~- . '-. - ,. 
I 
I q 
,~ 
assess the" . contribution to regional income. 
The first poi?t is important since, "it is, nevertheless, worth 
pointinf; out that the process of import substitution which has been 
taking place in the Common Market is not as extensive as figures might 
appear to sU8gest, since the manufactured products traded within the 
area have a high import content in the majority of cases", (1) and "if, 
the domestic value added content of manufactures traded increasingly 
within the region is low, the expansion of intra-regional trade in 
relation to total trade may to a certain extent be a purely statistical 
phenomenon resulting from the fact that exports are valued eross rather 
than in terms of domestic value added ll .(2) The second point~is important 
since Central America is sca.rcely an efficiently functioning market 
economy in which opportunity costs will be mirrored in market prices. 
The question of material inputs is quite easily dealt with. In Diag. 
3-15 using industrial census d'ata, costs are broken down lnt, local and 
imported raVl material inputs, fuel and power, packaging, wages and salaries 
, '\ 
and 'others'. Various simpl·1fying assumptions are made in view of the lack 
t. :~:~ ~ ~,',;. ~: ~"'vf 
of data, and Appendix 6 explains these assumptions, as well as the tables which 
formed the basis for the DWfu~ary diagram. 
(1) Central Bank of Nicaragua (Annual Report) 1965 p. 124. 
(2) S. Dell: "Obstacles to I,attn American Integration" in R. Hilton OPe oi t. 
p. 63. 
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The question of opportunity costn is very much morc difficult. We 
aSSUJne that labour costA and payments for locM raw materin.1s a.re 
costless in resource terms: i.e. we assume lruld and. labour surplus. 
The rationale behind this assumption is 'as followo. Surplus labour on 
the land Dnd in the cities is assumed on the basis of evidence about 
endemic urban, unemployment and rural underemployment. 1"t vrould 
c;1-\ "tt.'i 
not bG~co~rect to assume .a zero opportunity cost because cert~in ~ypes 
of skilled and managerial labour are scarce, and there is to some extent 
a seasonal peaking problem. Unfortunately, information on shadow prices 
( 
and wages is unobtn.inable or meaning-les.s, and for simplification, no 
opportunity cost was allowed for labour. We are treating all labour as 
homogenous .here and this again understates the contribution which 
resources employed in common market exports would make elsewhere. 
However, what do we do with depreciation charges, interest and. profit? 
Depreciation charges represent the writing off. for future replacement, of the 
value of capital goods, imported in large part (though fixed investment includes 
buildings and land too).(l) ~orrowcd and invested capital can be 
raised either domestically or from overseas. nne would normally regard 
development cauitnl"as scarce in Central America, but it does not follow 
-.. "- --- .. : ...... ;.. . 
from this that capital has a high opportunity cost. In fact, there is 
consid ... rabl e evir once to sugg ,st that oS fIN("''' C\.6,"" oversea s ca.p! tal is t!()tWk"t'\.o$ 
'-
if any particular investment is blocked, capital will go ~t;"'t» 
~,~ outside the area altogether. ,~terest and repatriated profit 
(1) The "import 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
lUcaragua 
Costa Rica 
content" of investment can be specified: 
(1) .CapJ:.:t1!l.g.Qods imports (2) 
" total import'" 
.Ca]..i tal,.goods imports 
Fixed Capital .forma-
1960/62 19;)6169 
21'9 22,2 
17'5 20·2 
19'7 24'7 
19' 8 25' 2· 
21'5 23'3 
1960/62 
~ 28'1 • 
29·2 
29'1 
29,6 
27'9 
tion 
.l~4G9/6Q 
26·0 
32·1 
37'4 
40·8 
_S_our_c_e_:_\~_To_r_l_d_E....;"c;..;o.;;.;n.;;.,om;.;.;;i;;,.;c;...;:;;S.::::.urv~e::..L.Y.. 1968/69. 
31·1 
, 
.j 
I \ 
, .;~~.~ .. '" • .;,1,,,' ',,," •• , , .• J 
(which are overseas costs) are deducted anyway in arriving at National 
Income tCentral American value added) 
Local capi~al is more difficult to deal with, especially investment 
in infrastructure and circulating bank credit. ~1ere will be a low op-
portunity cost only if capital is brought out of hoards or unproductive invest-
ment, and though this is not improbable in some cases, it cannot be assumed 
in most. Infrastructure and revolving credit certainly could have had 
alternative uses. As it was irnpossible to be more specific, local payments 
to capital were treated as having made a zero contribution in local national \~~ 
terms i.e. the profits and interest coUld ,have been earned elsewhere, in 
agriculture or in non~common market based industries. Therefore in general 
capital payments were treated as contributing nothing to regional, income 
in as much as they consisted either of the rewards of scarce local factors 
or else payments to overseas factors. 
'The direct contribution of regional trade to local national incomes 
consists of wage and salary payment) and local raw material p~~nts. (1) 
TheSe-two items, 
state the gain, .",hile 
. ~~:::\,;.v.,~; ... :~. 
unutilised . 
entail some opportunity costs and)thereby, over-
the""""'" tfWuJ.~!; ~()..J.,14. rQ.:.l\ " otherwise 
and understate it. These errors are of opposite 
sign and while they will not cancel out completely" they offset each other. 
(1) 'l'he whole issue of analysing regional trade flows in this way is dis-
cussed in D. Segal: IlEast African Common llarket; inequities in the 1960's: 
an arbitration scheme". Yale Ph.D. 1969 (Unpublished) microfilm. 
The quanti tntive significance of these assu"llptions is set out below. 
% of "l~cal Value added" 
_ in mA.nllfacturing product 
% of "local value added" 
,In. regiona.l exp,ort.s, (1..9681 
Costa Rice--.(1963) 34% (approx) ¢12m of tho ¢36m "explained by 
the CACM.' 
+ most of tho remaining ¢1·5m 
Honduras (1966) 39'/0 . .' (approx) ¢7m of the ¢IO. Om "explained" 
+ almost all of the ¢12·5m 
'unexplained' 
El Salvador (1961) 40% (approx) ¢29·5m of the ¢75m "explained" 
+ almost all of the ¢9m 
'unexplained' 
Nicaragua (1965) (~pprox) ¢a·5m out of the ¢21m 
"exp1 ained" 
+ almoe.t all of the ¢6·5m 
'unexplained' 
Guatemala $28m of the ¢11m "exp1a.ined" 
+ almost all of the other 
¢1-5m. 
.~-
These figures are obviously very approximate and were applied to 
r-~ 
these three dugit (SITC) item~ of regional trade which seemed to be attri-
butable to the existence of the common market. The eenoral ratio of 
'local' to 'foreign' costs is close to 40% ill .these separate estimates, 
with Costa Rica not greatly different. This figure is substantially less 
than the figure used by McClelland for local costs· (2/3) though he does not 
deduct overseas value added. 
It is interesting to note that in many of the non-traditional 
industries, such as chemicals, paper products, olectrical and transport 
eqUipment, the local content is derisory. Many of the newer industries 
which figure extensively and increasingly in regional trade are little 
more .than assembly and packaging industries which reduce real income in 
extreme cases, Examples of this are given in Appendix 6. 
(iii) The cOAt .of iI.omestic production forB'Q]1!?: intra-regional exports 
",~.J.~ . 
contri bute to Aregiona1 income if local resources employed. have a low 
opportunity cost: Intra-regional imports may have tho two effects: first 
·there is the trade 'diversion' or import substitution ca.se where the 
• ~ '~ . ..,J;u ~~ ~ ~ ~CN' ~f .. 
importer would otherw.lse purchase abroad. " . _" ". 
. . ; gecond there is the case of trade 'creation' when the importer 
obtains p;oods at lower cost ·albeit at the expense of its own producers, 
who contract or go out of business. If we are consistent in OU"r a.ssumption 
of underemployed resources then this represents an income loss to the 
importer which is the corollary of the cain to the exporter. One can 
visualise a situation where trade 'creation' could lead to an all-bound 
income loss if a commercially inefficient producer using local raw 
materials and labour intensive techniques were driven out by more "efficient" 
i""p.,rbd. 
producer usine sophisticated ('__ ) machinery, 4mported) 
raw materials and little labour. (1) Clearly, an economy deciding whether or 
not to remain in a common market would like to know whether it could, with 
relatively small cost on resource terms, produce goods, presently imported 
//"-
from its ~eighbours and so add to its national income. It is, perhaps, the 
most serious ~~ .... ; ~:·:.r".i~m of UcClelland' s book that he nowhere touches on this 
k -...,., ." 10. .~ .. 
question of "shiftability" in assessing gains and' 10s8es;(2) although it was 
a major preoccupation of East African economists in the debate there. How- r 
eve~t it is one thing to conceptunlise "shiftability", another thing to measure 
it. 
l3rown carried out a study to identify "shiftable" industries and 
also potential conmlon marke,t based industries in East Africa which could 
(1) This is anal~lf;ous to the loss of welfare which can occur when mechanised 
production of goods replaces local handicra.fts and other small-scale 'traditional' 
prodUCers within the same economy. 
(2) tlShiftability" is employed here in a looser sense from that used by 
L. Mcnnes, J. TiJlbergen and S. Wardenberger in tiThe Filements of Space l1evc1opmen,i" 
North-Holland 1909. There) "shiftability" is defined as that property of an in- I 
dustry which can be carried out at. the same cost in all the space units considered.! 
CCc> •. ;t1~) ,l)? 
.""1 ~ ~" {~-' ,<~~}rp;~"~ri~l.~'l~~"''''':-'':'T.~~i'-:~~,~;'-
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not operate nationally.(l) lIe looked at firm sizes in Dritain(2) ~~d 
assuming that techniques of production were similar between countries 
and over time he identified "regional". and "shiftable" industries by 
deriving a figure for the East African market size as a proportion of that 
prevailing in the U.K. at the time of the Florence study, and relating it 
. 
to average firm size. 
Newlyn tried to avoid using overseas data by regard.ing as "shiftable" 
any industry, in an East African context, where the average output per 
plant (in Kenya) was less than the value of its exports to the region: 
in other words, regional importers could produce import substitutes, when 
their market size exceeded this average.(3) lie implied that if tariffs 
were imposed on regional trade, then by withdrawing from the un~on. Tanzania 
and Uganda could (and would) develop these industries on a national basis. 
Thus the present importation of these goods by member states represents a 
, 
'cost., which is measured in terms of the value added of the industry. l1ow-
ever, Newlyn's criterion and indeed the whole approach has ~~en severely 
attacked. (4) The following were the main criticisms: 
(i). an average firm size in country A is not the relevant measure 
of a shiftable industry in country B: what is relevant is the minimum firm 
size. possible, 
(ii) even if a switch to 'national' industries were technically 
possible it does not follow that it would be economically desirable. 
Considerable extra protection may be requi~ed because of diseconomies of 
.. 
small Bcale or because the new site has a comparative disadvantage, or 
because there are shortages of factors or raw materials in the new location. 
Connected with this point is another; that the extra cost of 'national' 
"production might reduce demand and BO the market size. 
(1) A.J. Brown: "CUstoms Unions v. Economic Sa aratism" Yorkshire Bulletin 
of Economic and Social Research, May 1961. 
, P.T.O. 
r . 
" 
, . 
(2) From S. Florence: "Investment, IJocation and Size of Plant" Cambridge 
+948. 
(3) W. Newlyn: "Gains end losses in the East Africa Common Market." 
Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Resea.rch, NoveMber 1965 and 
"Reply" to previous criticisms in November 1966. 
(4) A. Hazelwood: "§hiftabili ty; of industrr and t hp. me~.8urement of ~ains 
and losses in the E~st African Common MRrket" Bulletin of the Oxford 
Institute of Economics and Statistics May 1966. P. Robson: "F.conomic 
Intee;Tation in Africa" OPe cit. pp.138-l44. .. 
\ 
. , 
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(iii) the alternative possibility is not only that of l1~tiona1 anel 
autarchic policies; other preferential groupings need to be considered,(l) 
(iv) some industries are neither '''shif table", nor necessarily based 
on the common market; they may depend on a specific resource endowment in 
a particular country. 
(v) Newlyn's ovm analysis is weakened by the high level of 
aggregation of categories chosen and Hazelwood was able-,to show on the 
basis of more detailed. and accurate data that Newlyn's classification was 
either meaninGless or incorrect in most instances. 
(vi) Newlyn measured the income gain in terms of value added which 
assumes an absence of opportunity costs and that all factors are local. 
Though the concept of shiftability is clearly an important one, it 
so far evades satisfactory quantification. 
In the short-term one can safely a.ssume that were the CACM to 
terminate, most purchases would be deflected outside tho customs union 
i.e. litt~e of the present regional trade could be met by national 
"shiftable". p,.,ndii\")tiop. We have already outlined' the conceptual and 
... ' __ -. _ .... -"-',.o:~ 
practical problems involved in handling this phenomenon though it clearly 
cannot be ignored entirely, and the rupture of the common market would 
und~ubtedly be followed after a lag by import substitution on a national 
basia. By way of illustration a rou&l1 checklist of "shiftable" industries 
was drawn up, on the basis of El Salvadorian figures. If the regional 
imports to a country were greater in value thrul the average firm size in 
El Salvador in 1967 than w~ assumed that that country would be able to 
(1) In Central America precisely this kind of re-orientation has occurred 
after 1970. 
~~;r 
." ----------~---
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produce it nationally without encountering scale problems. (1) However, the 
list was undoubtedly a gross overstatement of the extent to which local 
production could replace regionally traded products in the short run: in 
some "shiftable"'industries there is a good deal of intra-product special-
isation which would make a switch to a national market difficult, especially 
with branded'products such as perfut:1es, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, but 
also with products such as clothing. In other cases the size of demand cri-
terion masks supply problems which would be entailed in p~oaucing local raW' 
material-based commodities,such as furniture, timber products, jam, and 
animal food. In yet other cases technically "non-shiftable" products 
could and probably would be produced locally if local establishments 
existed: soap, machetes, matches, margarine, paint, animal foods are all 
products which are actually produced in most of the five countries and 
whose production could be eA~anded. The results were so obviously in 
conflict with common sense that they were ignoredcf.,(' f~~ ~ ~ew ~~. 
1vidence from the experience of HonduraJone year of temporary with-
drawa.1 from the CACU is that very little regionally imported trade indeed 
has been ~'shifted" to' domestic firms. (2) "Shiftabili tylt, it would appear, 
is at most ak'~:_:~:-:-:l,:~.;m factor, probably on a modest scale. In order to 
apply a simple rule of thumb we assume in a secondary calculation that the 
countries importing clothes, shoes and cotton textiles could produce most 
of ~hese goods, if little eloe, nationally, at least within a period of 
several years. To these one could probably add Bome of the miscellaneous 
, -'l" . manufactures such as plastic goods, matches etc., some simple mixed 
chemicals (soaps, detergents etc.) anu some of the foodstuffs. However, 
(1) "Shiftable" products Vlere; clothes, perfumes and cosmetics; shoes, cotton 
textiles, cardboard boxes, furniture, wood products, printin~, fruit and vege-
tab1e"processing, leather, phamaceuticals. 
Those where there was a larr,e diAcrepancy between the size threshhold and the 
'market I indicatRS possible 1 regionally based 1 industries --. . • .. 
• o'~91ass bulbs, chemical products, machetes, tyres, jute sacks, rayon & synthetic' 
fibres, fertilisers, iron and steel products; soap,matches, margarine, paint and 
animal foods. 
(2) EConomist Intelligence Unit; Central Am . 
erlcan Report !Jo. 2 1971. p.15. 
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such a grossly· unscientific exercise is of its nature arbitr~ry and we 
shall simply assume that the three large categories of "traditional" 
manufactures are the object of domestic import substitution if the 
regional market was to break up. 'r'he "gain" from wi thdraw:u in respect 
of the sectors would be Guatemala ~4·5m, 1.1 Salvador ¢4·Sm, Honduras $5m, 
Bicaragua ¢3m and Costa Rica ¢2·75m. In the case of Honduras this goes 
a consi~rable way towards eliminating any income gain from the Common 
Market and to a lesser extent for Nicaragua, but the influence is relatively 
small in the other three cases. 
(iv) '.Comfllon Market' based industries 
We need also to consider industries which are completely dependent 
on the regional market, such that they would be forced to close if the 
Common Market were to break dovm. Technically, only the two integration 
industries (tyres and caustic soda/insecticides) and possibly one or two 
"special" industries (copper vTire, sulphuric acid, etc.) fall into this 
category, but it see~s not unreasonable to assume in practice that 
l!overnments would protect these plants in order to keep t}1em in existence, 
based on national markets or else on alternative trade outlets. Another 
possibility is that a country may see advantages from future membership 
if it can be gua.r"UItoed important 'regional' industry. It could be 
. ~;">-...... l4At' 
argued that Honduras might take into account the possible developm~nt of 
a pulp and paper complex which would necessitate access to the regional 
market. However, even if this factor wore quantifyable, which it is not, 
the fact is that a common market is neither a nece~sary nor a sufficient 
~, condition for the development of regionally based industry: a sectoral 
regional investment policy is more relevant and such a policy is not 
operational in central America. 
. 
157. 
(v) 'SeCOnc1~ry' or Spillover F1ffectA: So far only the d.irect 
contribution of regional trade only has been considered. However, the 
local factor payments are spent: some leaking into imports, others 
stimulatine demand for local products. It could be argued that some form 
of multiplier is at work here and the subsequent multiplication of inco~es 
should be allowed for. Attempts have been made to study the effect of 
'cornmon market' generated activity on the overall level of demand, for 
example Brovm, who tried to estimate "::;pread" or "spillover" effects in 
East Africa.(l)' His study is eooentially a Keynesian multiplier analysis 
with leakages into overseas imports and savings. Using plausible guesses 
as to the magnitives of parameters .. (e.g. for 'the mar()inal propensity to 
import from partner states) he calculated the effect of a cha~ge in 
income in country A or country B, and tried to show that Kenya and 
Tanzania would, in fact, benefit from the union because of "spread" effects. 
In an unpublishea thesis Charteris built up a demand model for East 
Africa which purported to show how the spread effect of demand from 
industrial incomes coupled with the effects (direct and indirect) of the 
redistributive pool resulted in losses to Kenya and gains to the other 
states. (2) '~::~.':,B~ll'!;w..' 
However, Keynesian multiplier analysis was not evolved in economic 
conditions where some factors of production are scarce as in East Africa or 
Central America: it assumes a high supply elasticity and that demand 
is the main constraint.(3) In practice, thin cannot be assumed and the 
(1) A.J. Brown: "Economic separA.tigm: ver1'lua a cu~toms union in developing 
countries". Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research, Nov. 1961 
(Part II) 
(2) R. Chat-kina: -of E~st 
Africa" PR&. 
(3) E.G. Rae: "Investment ~ntl the }~ultlpller in Rn Underdeveloped F.conomt' 
Indian Economic Review, ~eb. 1962 pp.55-67 • 
~~~-~, ~.~~~----~--~ 
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concept of 'multiplier' has to be used. with a go"od deal of care in this 
context. Moreover, it is possible to argue that tho multiplication of 
incomes deriving from increased exports is different in character from 
that which would flow from - say - a budget deficit, or a stimuluo to 
consumption and investment, in an underemployed advanced industrial economy.(l) 
an 
In advanced depressed industrial country, capital aD well 0,3 labour 
" . 
is underutj.lised and unless there is a serious crisis of confidence, an 
increase in aggregate demand would be followed nearly automatically by a 
rise in aggregate supply. In a 'developing' economy ca.pital may well not 
be underutilised or, if it is, this may be due as much to supply factors 
(management, skilled labour) as to demand factors and so Keynesian 
measures would in all probability not work, but result in inflation and 
foreign exchange problems. An expansion of exports, however, taking 
place autonomously has the effect of incre'asing output simultaneously with 
demand (and as production is in the form of tradeable goods, offsetting 
the increased expenditure on foreign exchange). Thus it is more lecitimate 
to talk about a multiplier in real incorr.e terms. Moot writers in this 
field have used the multiplier concept though few have acknowledged the 
, . ~ 
problems involved~a series of estimates is set out in Diag. ~-16. In 
most of the estim3.tes quoted, the multiplier effect is very large and 
, t" ':~~,,".'.' ~'_' 
swamps the other effects which Vie have been discuosing.(2) 
(1) -~ D. l~cClelland: "The Central AmeriCAn Common Ma.rket" OPt oi t. p.211. 
(2) Thtstmultiplier effects are primarily of importance in tho domestic 
economy of the regional exporter (or neg~tive to the importer where 
"shiftability" is beinff considered). Spillover effects to the other partner 
states are relatively minor by comparison. 
) 
59· 
Ding.1",]bshowtnlLvarious e8t.i~_IIlL'tde of the incp!ll5!. 
multiplier in de~c~o~ine countries 
(1) Miscello.neous estimates (1) 
from developing countries. 
Agriculture 
ManufacturinB 
.Tra.ditional 
Non-Traditional 
Others 
(2» National Plan of Guatema1a(2) 
Central Government Expenditure 
Consumption 
Inves'~ment 
Exports 
Arsentine 
1.3 
3.0 
(4.9) 
(2.0) 
. 1.2 
2·72 
1.28 
3.58 (plus 
.45 after a year log. 
(3) McClel1and(3) 
Central ~merica: overall f~re of .9 
(4) Central American Agricultural 
Supply and Demand Projections (4) 
(u.S. Dept. of Agriculture). 
Overall Figure: 
-.. o~:;;!.::~'. ~i,t emala. 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaraaua 
Costa Rica 
l2.60-70 
2.5 
3·5 
2·5 
2.0 
2.5 
1970-72 
2.8 
3.8 
2·7 
2.5 
2.8 
1972-78 
3.2 
4.3 
2·9 
3.0 
3.3 
(1) . Figures from Hector SOZEl Valderama "Planificacion del Desarrollo 
Ipdustrial" Mexico 1966, p.47. 
(2) He,tional Plan of GUAtemala: 1969-71: based on estimates of the University 
of Iowa (USA). 
(3) McClelland op.cit. 
~4) U.S. Department of Agricu1ture/Bntalle Institute: "r..r~jection!J of 
§.1!.pply and Demand for Selected Agricultural Products in Central Arner.ic .. A... 
through 1975" op.cit. 
H.B. In two East African studies already referred to Charkins assumes a 
mU:ltiplier of 3 in Uganda, 2 in Kenya. 
159. 
'l'he first step in this inevitably unsatisfactory calculation is to 
assess the common external tariffs which common market goods carry. TJet 
us assume for the moment tha.t all trade is "diverted" and thus that the 
tlcost" of protection by the customs union common tariff is quite simply 
the value, of intra-regional imports multiplied by tho 
difference in cost betwoen domostic production and imports. This is the 
cost paid by the importer for the cost of an infant industry establisllment 
in the exporting country. In calculating this cost it has been a.ssumed 
that the difference between domestic prices and import prices (oif) is 
measured by the nominal rate o~ oo~~on external tariff.(l) ~'hi~ assumption 
is obviously the only one compatible with conventional price theory where 
two identical goods cannot sell at different prices in the same market. 
If we applied this type'of analysis to Central America we could 
• 
establish the "cost" of the tariff protection. If 
we assume that all regionaJ trade would be "diverted" outside the region 
if the market broke up, which it would be in the short run, w?_can get a 
I 
maximum figure for the cost of the tariff. A recent EeL A study showed 
. -.", 
• &.""-f".~J.."'_ "r..t'" 
that the av'eraee "neight of nominal tariffs was substantial: consumeX' 
goods, 82.5~; raw materials and intermediate coods, 34·5%· building 
materials, 3216 and capital goods, 1;~6, (2) and changing the basis of 
we,iehting did not seem to grea.tly a.ffect these gen3ral averages. 
Bearing in mind the assumptions made so far, if we multiply the 
value of trade in each category by the nominal tariff rate then this 
(1) It is very important to point out tha.t we are using the national tariff 
as a proxy for the cost of protection. Nominal rates may of course have other 
more direct uses, as measures of the restrictive effects on trade flows OX' 
fiscal effects. 
(2) U.N. (E.C.t.A.): "~-eneral situa.tion and future outlook of the' Central ------~~~--~~~~~~~~-=~~~ 
____ Am_e_r-i_can __ In-t_~ ....... ~"""'. f.l._t_!-:-9B:-:--:_r-:-qr02~a~mrn_e_"_E~:/12/CC~2~~~~ •. ~.~~~_~ ...• ",~ .. ,f] 
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Diagram from the Common l'rarket Countries by EconOI:lic_Grou!,s __ in~;n. 
1966 1968 
Volume of Imports 
from the regio~ Guate~~la E1 Salvador Honduras Uicara-aua C. Rica Guat. E1.Sa1. Hond. 
Consumer goods 16.35 
Raw l,':aterials + 
Intermediate goods 15.09 
Building Materials .86 
Capital Goods 1.08 
TarAt ~ 33.84 
lb.tio of ioport volume 
to t~~t of the country 1.40 
with the lowest vol~e 
of inports 
Cost of Tariff Protection 
of Regional Import (i.e. 
average tariff x volume of 
imports) -
TarAL ~ 20.26 
Ratio of tariff cost to 
that of the country with 1.33 
the lowest cost. 
31.1 
14.73 
5.08 
.91 
52.03 
2.16 
33.1 
2.12 
22.11 18.74 
8.42 1.98 
1.63 2.51 
1.25 1.83 
32·41 31·49 
1·35 1.31 
. 
22·7 20.1 
1.49 1.32 
--- -_._-
14.15 16.85 34.12 
1·41 21·5 22.1 
.61 3.52 6.23 
.89 1.32 1.53 
24·09 43.14:lf 65.16 
• C,,1'r.a~o 
1'''1._ ~ 
1 /49.4/ 1.41 
1.07 
~J 15.18 
f "-
28.1 40.8 
. 
to,'" 
-N 
tJ 1 .98 1.41 
Na.0~S 1. The average nominal tariff rates are taken from the EeLA stu~ referred to 
in the text. 
26·45 
11·8 
2·71 
1·11 
48.67 
1.05 
30.16 
1.04 
I" 1, -~ ~" ~ 
V ,cC ~--, r -~,' ,,~' 
L 
I' 
Nic. C. Rica. ,,: 
t: 
25.86 
~~ " 
25-14 
r " ,'" 
15·0 19.0 
3.11 2.61 
1.66 1.27 
46.17 48.85 ,-
,--
1 1.06 
i. ;Ct 
28·95 30.0 
1 1.04 
\. 
! 
~;" - , . ~'J'M "f. 
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could f.·ive us the "cost" ill incooe terms of paying the tariff: it amounts 
to about 60% of the value of reGional trade (imports) in 1966 and 1968 
for the five countries separately and collectively. There is not only a 
globally large economic cost of protection but represents a 'terms of trade f 
movement against Honduras and particularly in favour of G~atema1a, i.o. Guatemala 
imported from ~he region disproportionately large quantities of low 
tariff raw materials and intermediate products from its partners while 
Honduras imports a disproportionately large volume of high tariff consumer 
goods. An attempt is made to demonstrate this in Diag. 3-17, where on the 
assumption of 100% trade diversion:' and 10(J'!u tariff utilisation, it Cf'..n be 
shown that the cost of the tariff is higher (proportionatoly) for Honduras. 
The conclusions of this study are, on the surface, extremely disturbing. 
If we ignore second-round effects, the 'costs' of external tariff protection 
are considerably lligher than the benefits of integration as they have been 
calculated so far. ane explanation could be that some trade would not be 
"diverted": however, even those industries which historically appear to have 
experienced "competitive" trade creation mie;ht take a considerable time to 
adjust to national production of former imports after the dissolution of the 
regional BTouJl. <'JrtQ' AS we have already indicated the potential "shifting" of 
'. --- .. : ;';..",,:,' 
industry does not seem a quantitatively large factor at 1ea.st in the short 
run. Imposition of tariffs might also have consumption offects, ill reducing 
demand. 
However, tllere is another much more important factor, and this lies in 
the fact that nominal tariffs are a technically unsatisfactory measure of 
protection. Viner has. ar~ed "that th~re is no way in which the 'height' 
of a tariff as an index of its restrictive effect can even be apprOXimately 
, measured, or for that matter, even defined with any degree of precisioJ'. (1) 
(1) J. Viner: "Customs Unions Issue" op~ cit. pp.66-67. 
(~~ ~ ~'~'.J~~ ~'r" ~\ 
'l. ' C 
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The nominal measure sirr.ply takes the tariff (in ad valorum terms) as a % of 
cif import values. This measure assumes that nominal tnriffs are indeed a 
fair measure of the difference between local ru1d import prices. However, 
there is a good reason to suspect "water" in the t~lriff, i.e. part of the 
tariff is redundant in as much as local producers are able to sell at prices 
significantly below the price of imports (cif) plus tariff. Various writers 
on tariff matters have drawn attention to this phenomenon(l) and a recent study 
on Mexican tariff rates indicated that more often than not the t~riff was not 
used (in other cases, though, the tariff understated protection because of the 
existence of quotas).(2) 
East African evidence confirms the existence of disparities of this kind. 
One important study which assumed "no water", was that of Ghai~lIthere are 
reasons to believe that thisjis a close approximation to the effective 
protection enjoyed by E~st African produco and manufactures ••.. A cursory 
examination of prices (excluding import duty) of a few imported agricultural 
and manufactured products with the prices of similar domestic ~roducts shows 
that import duties are a reasonably good measure of the actual protection 
by local products. _ Also with the exception of products in which there are 
. ' .. 
. t£~": :<l'''v __ :..~. 
quantity restrictions, East African imports: most of the products entering 
inter-territorial trade. In a situation like this,· it is reasonable to 
assume that imported goods act as 'pace-setters' and that local producex's 
will be faced with given prices for their products. It would, therefore, 
appear we are justified in using import duties as a measure of the cost of 
import substitution stimulated by the coynrr.on market It • (3) .. 
, 
\ . In Hazelwood's critique of Ghai's article he identifies categories of 
, 
goods, regionally traded, which do not use their protective tariff: 
(i) goods where there can be no effective competition from outside because 
transport costs or perishability are so important( as with fresh milk. 
'. 
t 
t 
t 
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(if) goods which are sold at prices belo'w "import parity" (o.g. beer 
& cigarettes) or s~ccessfully exported outside East Africa.(4) He was, 
in turn attacked when he used this information to argue that substantial 
elements of Ifprotected" East African regional trade was, in ~act, 
independent of the external tariff and to such an extent that Kenya's 
I advantage I in regional trade disappeared. Wood has argued that this is 
too much of an 'all or nothing' approach and that tariffs do approximate 
to the need for protection if only partially: also that increases in 
tariffs on entry to a regional group may be significant oven if the 
(1) B. Balassa: "Trad,e Liberalisa.tion in Industrialised Countries" John 
Hopkins 1967. pp. 60-62, 
and "The structure of, Protection in DevelopinlS Countries" OPe cit. pp.ll-14. 
(2) T. King: "Mexico:, Industrialis::l.tion ,and Trade Policies since 19~0" 
OECD, 1970, especially the Appendix in which G. Bueno's estimates are discussed. 
Also considerable disparities were observed by S. Lewis & S. Guisinger of 
"!teasuring Protection in a develo inR countr:,y:: the case of PakiRt.!m." Journ~ 
of Political Economy Nov Dec. 1968 pp.l670-98. 
(3) D. Ghai: ",~erri torial dist:...'ibution of benefits and costs of the E~f3t 
African COlllJlfon Market" East African Economic Review June 1964. Ghai's study 
is primarily concerned with establishing the cost of tra.de "diversion", and the 
extent to which the imports of one country in intra-regional trade tend to be 
more heavily protected than those of the partner states. He showed that Kenya's 
intraregional e.':".1:":">' ·~..;'.,:!~ed to be more highly protected as well as being greater in 
quanti ty than those of Uganda and Tanzania. 
(4) A. Hazelwood: "The Eaf3t African Common l,;arket;- importance and effects" 
Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economica. and Statistics, Feb. 1966. 
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absolute level is less 80. (1) IIowever, a recent study of Roels appeared 
to indicate that underutilisation of tariffs is very substantial across 
the board: "the weighted average of effective protection on the 34 products 
for which comparison was possible worked out at only 7' 2% •••• or about 
1/10 of the nominal protectionll .(2) In Appendix 4, this is illustrated 
for Central ,America and Diagram 3-18 shows the major discrepancy between 
nominal and 'implicit' tariffs. 
However, such a conclusion seems to conflict directly with price 
theory under which the same goods cannot sell at different prices in the 
same market. There may be divergences where statutory marketing boards 
fix prices, but otherwise apart from temporary disequilibria, this anomaly 
could be explained in several ways. 
In some cases, as with perishable goods or traditional export goods 
there may be only a'trickle,of imports from outside the area, and the 
tariff is merely redundant remaining, perhaps, as an anti-dwnping device. 
There are other industries where infant industries have "grown-up" and 
have developed a highly price-competitive industrial structure. Imports 
no longer enter',qnd the tariff remains performing no function. The 
• oi :',~. '~"'~' 
market structure .of domestic production will determine the price whether 
it is a competitive equilibrium or a monopolist/oligopolist profit 
maximising price. Where tariffs are prohibitive the nominal rate of 
(1) R. Wood: "The East Afric:tn COll1fTlon U.3rket: a reassessmcnt1f l3ulletin of 
the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics, November 1966. 
(2) A. Roe: "Terms of trade a.ml transfer effects in the El1.st Africl1.n 
COmrrlon J.~arketn Bulletin of the Oxford lnsti tute of Economics and Statistics, 
AUGUst, 1969, pp.160-l61.· ~e sense in which 'effective' protection is 
used by him is quite different from that used by Ealassa, Corden etc. and 
is equivalent to the term -implicit· protection used elsewhere. ' 
- -",~-----.. ---...... -....... -
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Diagram showing various aspects of no~inal and implicit protection PERCENTAGES 
A 
Norunal 
Tariff 
(1966) 
B C 
Rank or~er I~nlicit 
of A Tarirr (12m 
A Finished Hanufactures for consumption 
Clothes (all) 90 
90 
150 
70 
87i 
105 
15 
15 
3 
3 
15 
-40 
B 
Perfunes, household soap, cosmetics 
Shoes 
Cotton Cloth 
V~sc. manufactures 
Blankets, Rugs, Towels 
Payon goods 
i.:edicines 
Furniture 
Printing naterial 
Granophone records 
Weighted average by importance in 
inter-regional trade 
Arit~etic average 
100 
10 
160 
100 
75 
83 
85 
9 
10 
39 
10 
10 
20 
-30 
-40 
-12 
-20 
+11 
-3 
-50 
-25 
7 
-45 
-20 
~hnufactures (finished and unfinished) for industrial consumntion'(including agric~~ture) 
Ind'.lstrial soaps , 82 -2~ '. 
Electrical apparatus 30 32 l~i 
Chemicals products (a) insecticides 20 37 -l~ 
(b) plastic material, cellophane 55 23 32 
Paper product (cardboard, wrapping paper) 45 27 '-33 
1'1etal manufactures (machets, nails, etc.) 37.5 30 10 
Tyre s 30-40 29 33 
Ju te bags 50 24 20 
Steel pieces 28 33 33 
Copper wire 20 35 1.5 
Cotton yarn and thread 17.5 36 -40 
Fertilisers 5 40 25 
Paints 42.5 28 -2.5 
Tanned leather 45 27 -15 
Pa er-kraft 50 1-:iEing end construction mchinez:y 24 40 
fIb Mtt!t)dt't M\ ............ ~"".......,,.,,"_. ....... ¥--.....-- .. -4- _. _ ~-A~ 2 .A..~ .. .,. o. _ . £0 _ ... .~.5(J _ ... 
D E 
Rank order Implicit 
of B Tarifr 
34 
28 
34 
18 
23 
10 
16 
37 
25 
12 
19 
9 
17 
5 
30 
11 
3 8 j 
3 
13 
34 
6 
15 
1~ 
, . .I? 
(rr.odiried) 
+1 
+15 
4-5 
30 
55 
15 
-35 
140 
o 
-30 
20 
85 
-10 
110 
o 
65 
100 
60 
75 
30 
-50 
50 
" 35 
\-l~ 
,,......._ .... ,,"".1'; .... , '_ ,~, 
F 
Price ChanR'e 
since 1962" 
-8 
+5 
-8 
-26 
-20 
15 
-10 
25 
o 
-10 
-8 
50 
75 
-15 
-15 
-10 
30 
20 
-25 
o 
-3 
27 
-5 
8 
_4J/;" ,~_ ~L",_._,~ .. 
'l.Q.SG bottles 
,l.Qminium products, zinc 
~eighted average 
Arithmetic average 
i' :t-~sh vegetables 
r~ ~. Oils 
] ~llcd maize 
~~sh Fruit 
,t ~:t>garine 
~, ''l~ets 
'1.:t~c. food 
~it preserves 
t\t) . l.mal food 
Q ~~eals 
t1~~ 
,ze 
Weighted average 
Arithmetic average 
A 
22 
35 
34 
28 0 5 
100 
56 
110 
110 
117 
100 
87 
120 
11.5 
35 
75 
92 
81 
D 
24 
31 
10 
22 
7 
7 
5 
10 
19 
6 
38 
31 
20 
c 
60 
-20 
+3 
-65 
-25 
0 
-50 
-39 
-50 
-35 
-30 
-40 
-25 
-15 
-33 
D 
1 
23 
42 
25 
14 
37 
33 
37 
31 
28 
36 
25 
9 
E 
70 
-30 
-25 
15 
-80 
-3 
-10 
.-25 
-30 
-10 
-25 
10 
F 
50 
-20 
+7 
-4 
0 
3 
-20 
-8 
+8 
-45 
-10 
-8 
10 
-4 
"--------------------------------------------------------------
, 
i t) 
!'~T 
f .. • 
Rank. order of nominal tariffs for \IDole sample 
Ave. price (cif), of inputs from Central American countries rc1~Y~ to 
ave o price (cif) frora outoide "lOrld. This was done by giving the Central 
American prices the index number 100 and relnting world prices to this 
index. ~ 
Rank order of price relationship 
~.-
= As C but taking price from lO'.!Cst ylOrld source. 
Ave. priue of Centrr.l !.mericnn intraregional imports (cif) in 1966 
relative to ave. price in 1962. , 
AVE. refers to products ,·rhore thera is no COl'l'L'r.on tariff - on nrithmQtic 
ave. is taken. 
~ ~urces See Appendix 4. 
protection indicates the "potential" protection, which eives a "cushlon" 
to the producer. In thllJ case, one must make direct price comparisons in 
order to assess the importance of the tariff for questions of resource 
allocation. 
There are cases of substantial "water" in a tariff even when a 
considerable proportion of imports comes from outside the reGion. This 
can be due to quality differGnces; and to 'import preference' amonrrst local 
consumers even when there is no objective quality difference, caused in 
part, by major social and income in eC].ual 1 ties which are reflected in 
different tastes; or due to expatriate ownership of retailing and 
wholesaling outlets. (1) There is evidence that even in making applications 
in Central America, producers ask for a 30-40% 'safety margin' between 
their o~~ prices and competing import prices.(2) 
. 
This raises difficult questions of principle and practice. It is 
usually not possible to use the trade classification to separate high/low 
quality ~oods and it would be easy to reg~rd (for non-prohibitive tariffs) 
any loss,of quality as equivalent to monetary loss as measured by 
tariff diffe::,::;:::~~ .. 1.\J,.' However, this 'would be inappropriate in the context 
in which we are dealine.' What appears to be happenine is that import 
substitution tends to take place in lower priced lines because the local 
ma:;-ket is deeper and because the effects of a "specifictl import duty on a 
broad catesory of goods is to make the protection on the cheapest goods 
higher. As a result the ava'!J.a'hil,ity of cheaper go9ds is increased, 
(1) United lJ~tions E.C.L.A. ",Evaluacion de In intcarClcion econ,omica. ,en 
Centt'oB-merica" li:exico, 1966, pp.38-40. 
(2) S.I.E.C.A.: "Solicitudes de lOA GobieTnos 'Otlra. renoP'ocirt( 
a la importa.cion egui}),ar"ld<m," SI1CA/CB-XXIII OTS, 1966. 
perhaps giving access to categories of the population which previously 
were able to consume only small quantities; while the higher quality 
goods are in more restricted supply. The process is well described by 
the management of one of central America's paint firms: "when 'INCEP-
(a Californian (US) subsidiary) started to manufacture it ,concentrated on 
the same line of premium products as previously sold in the area on an 
import basis ••• However, these premium quality paints were still out 
of reach for the great majority of Central Americans. This v;as broug..'1t 
home by the success of locaJ. firms with cheap liquid and powdered paints ••• 
Thus nJCEP broadened its line ••• and as the Californian Paint Co. sold 
only high quality paints, the formulae for the new lines was provided by 
the company's Cuban affiliate." (1) 
We are wandering into the more elusive realms of welfare economiCs, 
. , 
but it is far from obvious that an enforced switch (at the expense of 
elite groups largely) from high to low cost lines of consumer goods, or 
to penaJ.ise an "irrational" import preference, should be considered a 
cost to ,be equaled witll the direct cost of trade 'diversion' as 
. 
conventiona) 1 v',"'I:n1e.:rstood. 
' .... '- ...... j,. -~"' ..... 
It is clear that for most consumer goods, 
prior to import substitution, the importers buy overseas products in a 
manner which reflects not only the inegaliterian social structure but ,'" ',',,\ 
the branding and product differentiation strategies of tho metropolitan 
exporters. However, when local production commences, it becomes a 
commercial imperative for the company and an economic boon to the country 
(1) Harvard Business School: "Industria Centro-ameriCAna de pinctllras -
INCEP" Industry Case study, Boston U.S.A. 1966. 
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if producers adapt their output to a 'mass production' basis aimed at 
the larger untapped home m~rket. 
in this context~(l) 
The "loss of quality" is unimportant 
It would appear then that there is not a great deal 'of significance in 
the levels of the nominal tariff. ~at about changes in the level? It is 
not too difficult to show that the effect of tariff harmonisation was to 
revise tariffs upward (2) ~d this would appear to have adverse consequences 
for the previous low tariff countries, Honduras and El Salvador.(;) 
A World Bank study of external tariffs (4) showed that out of a sample 
of 87 items of products, which bulked large in intra-regional trade, the 
external tariff was greater than the pre-integration national tariff 
,.....-,,-
in 82 items (Honduras), 79 (El Salvador), 76 (Nicaragua), 73 (Costa Rica); 
(1) However this kind of beneficial structural change is not universal. 
Many import substitution industries incorporate the quality and product 
differen~iation patterns of the metropolitan manufacturer (assembler) and 
use a protective tariff to do so. 
~. ' 
• &'7:. -: " '.~~::~.t:.' 
(2) See Appendix 4. 
-';) J. Nugent: "!Ja structura aftancelaria y e1 -costo de protection en America 
Central" El Trimestre Economico No. 140 Oct.-Dec. 1968, pp.75l-766. 
Note that the discriminatory nature of customs unions can result in significant ' 
changes within the average. For example, if Honduras had a tariff of 10/6 and. 
Guatemala of 30%, a new (higher) aVeraf.,c tariff of 25j{ were imposed the tariff 
would be decrea.sing for Guatemala. J. Flanders: "M.easurine protection and 
nred,ictintj trA.de diversion" Journal of Political Economy, 1965. pp.165-l69. 
(4) World Bank Report Opt cit. Vol. II (Statistical Appendix) Table 35. 
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a very crude indicator but one which indicatc@ that not only has Honduras 
suffered proportionately more trade divcrAion, as it was hitherto n 
relatively low tariff country.(l) 
However,. the appendix exercises also show that while attempts have 
been made to raise the rates upwards, the actual tariff has fallen in 
many cases because of the effect of rising import prices (due to inflation 
in developed countries and a shift to higher quality lines in extra-
regional purchases) on specific tariffs. If we look at actual prices 
(implicit rates) rather than nominal rates the irrelevance of the upward 
movement of tariff rates is even more apparent. wi own and McClelland's 
"'"<>~ Cltl~t" ~ 
data indicate that" . " of negligible importance. In both cases 
a direct comparison was made of cif prices of goods traded intra-reeionally 
in 1962, and at a later period 1966 (or 1968). ~~e comparison was made 
at a seven dieit or mOre level of disaggregation and so only a small 
amount of any change in prices could be attributable to changes in 
commodity composition within the categories, though the categories are 
still far from homogeneous. McClelland found that between 1962-66, 44% 
of the items ~ad.:lower prices, 179'0 were the same, l~% had prices less than 
. iiV:,._~~<~~.i.~' 
10% hi6her and the remaining 26% had substantial increases. A correction 
for product mix differences made little difference:(2) The author made 
a similar comparison and the results are summarised in column F of 
Diagram 3-18, where the figures are gi~en in large product cateeories 
(1) S.I.E.C.A.: ".l!lxposicion de Hond,Eras Rohre los rroblem~s Actualel'J del. 
ltercado Cornun Centro-americano Y Propuesta. de un Plp!l de Accion Irr.med i at a" , 
GUatenala, 1969. 
(2) D. UcClellalld: liThe C,entral Amerlcan Common Market" OPe cit. pp.59-62. 
, 
Ii 
1 
i~ 
, . 
.-::~ 
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representing a weighted average of sub-products. My own Hgures show 
that (for a weighted average) consumer go~ds fall in price over 1962-66 
(and 1962-68) by 80;6 and so did foodstuffs (by 47'0): intermediate eoods 
rose slightly (by 7'/). Such price increases as did occur were in a 
few products only, but nevertheless, of important items; elatrionl 
equipment su.ch as wires, cables, batteries, bulbs: cardboard boxeD, 
steel sheets and metal containers and tanks of various kinds, machetes, 
blankets, rugs and jute sacks, fertiliser, medicines and plastic domestic 
goods. 
This is not to say that all participants benefitted equally from thiD 
tendency to have lower prices under tIle influence of greater competition. 
Not only is there the evidence which indicates that Honduras has had adverse 
"terms of trade lt in intra-regional trade, as an exporter of agricultUral 
produce and an importer of regional manufactures, but it is alleged by 
Honduras that whereas "trade creating" competition has lowered prices in 
many' of the more traditional manufactures, Salvadorian and Guatemalan 
suppliers have taken advantage of the protected Hohduras market, where there 
.is little competition from domestic producers, to raise prices. The folloVl-' 
iug price iudicc~ appear to bear that out: 
. ~)::4~ ,~;~:~U'l 
1960 1968 (1963 = 100) 
~All good. 101 105 
San Salvador Food 97 109 Housing 128 110 
Clothes & Shoes 95 86 
~A11 good. 94·5 112 
Food 92 112 
Tegucigalpa Clothes t, Shoes 93 155 (Honduras) 95 .134 (Housing 98 108 
Source: Date from "Iuclices d.e 'Orecios de 1a. consumidor de la.s Nationes 
.Ameri canas II Bul1et!nNo. 43, Union Panamericana., i969. 
Though one cannot generalise, it is fairly clear that in the major 
category of manufactures in which El Salvador and ilonduras deal, (i.e. 
clothes and shoes)' Honduras, as a portial consequence of sVlitching from 
non-Central American to Central American sources, haD experienced some 
considerable p~ice inflation in these goods. El Salvadorian consumers en 
the contrary hove experienced a fall in prices. This phenomenon can only 
be explained either by price discrimination caused by different degrees 
ofcompetition in different markets, or else by the fact that market 
enlargement has caused a considerable fall in El Salvadorian prices from 
world 
well above",rnarlwt level: the former explanation appears to fit the facts 
better. 
The general' effect, therefore, of high nominal tariff levels and of 
increases in the rates does not seem significant when we look at prices 
directly. It certainly does not seem meaningful to talk about the cost 
of the external tariff "in terms of a substantial 5~ of GNP. (1) Nevertheless, 
there are SOme products \vhich in terms of "implicit" protection are 
clearly enjoying most or all of the benefits of the tariff, and there is 
clearly a cost in terms 'of economic resources. This is measured better 
by 'effective I. t~·'::':-·~~/j~j.l1a.l I protection I. (2) 
(1) E.g. tho Nugent tariff study referred to earlier argued that the common 
tariff "cost" Central America 'C/.. of its GllP. R. Nugent: liLa estr1.lotura 
arrencelaria et.c." op.ci t. This figure is similar to that estimated by a 
similar method by Harberger for Chile. This is the IIstatic" cost of 
protect'ion. Attempts have been made to calculate "dynamic" costs as well 
which \'Totl1d embrace the effect of free trade on inducing greater 
coopetitiveness, and the efficiency gains from the closure of inefficient 
firms: i. e. the compet it iva "shock" or \I cold showor" sometimes referred to 
in a European context. However this whole exercise presumes mobile resources 
and it is very doubtful if the Central American economies have that kind or 
flexibility, or indeed, if it is enjoyed by other Latin American economies 
(Ba~assa considered the total' cost of protection woe 6.Z~ of G1W in Chile and 
9. ~~ in Brazil). A. Harbevger: !lUning- th~ ~ur.ces nt hand m,oro effectivcl;z" 
American Econor.lic Revi~w, Papers and Proceedings, lllay, 1958, pp.134 .. l55. 
B. Balassa: "The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries" Jolm Hopkins 
Press, 1971, Ch. 4. 
(2) See Appendix 4. 
;:;;-
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This io not a thesis about protection measures. However the basic 
COInmon sen~e behind the idea of effectiv:e, protection is that it measures 
protection of the manufacturing process not of ex-factory values.(l) 
Using the values of nominal tariffs already calculated, it should 
be possible .to make come kind of estimate of t effective' protection. To 
carry out measurement in practice, howover, is complicated by the fact 
that measurement of effective like nominal protection is dependent on 
what assumption one makes regarding the , extent to which the tariff is used. 
Also, there is no input/output data in Ce.ntral America worthy of the name 
at a satisfactory level of disaggregation to establish the value added. and 
raw material coefficieniy one has the choice of using input-output co-
efficients derived elsewhere or the very partial data available from census 
information. (2) Another problem is that on many imported inputs, but not 
all, duty is exempted under industrial incentive legislation. One study 
shows that in many sectors, tariff exemption is almost complete (cardboard 
", 
and paper products, basis chemicals and miscellaneous chemicals, basic iron 
and steel, metal products, electrical equipment, miscellaneous manufactures 
~~ (})lastics)1 synthetic textiles, clothes, jute bags). . In these cases effect-
ive protect~on'~a~d~ simply to the protection of value added • 
............ -"" ... ,~. ,,.~ 
Diagram ~-19 shows Borne restuts for a sample of products for which 
tariff protection appeared to be important. One can see that in some 
cases effective protection, even if considered in terms of "implicit" 
protection, is close to or greater than lOQ?6. This is extremely costly. 
It implies that despite lower labour costs, the cost of processing is 
twice as great as at inte~ationallY competitive prices. In some cases, 
also, there is actually a net loss in foreign exchange (where domentic 
(1) If tariffs on raw materials are zero then the measure of effective pro-
tection quite simply measures the extent to which processing costs (wages, 
profits, rents and by somo measures, local raw material costs) can exceed the 
trocessing costs of foreign competitors. If raw material importa are taxed 
owever, then part of the nominal tariff is performing no protective functibn 
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(1 cont.) 
other than covering the tariff on the input and this reduces the effective 
protection. Takintr these two factors together, the effective protection is 
a function of the differential between the tariffs on raw m8.teri ala and 
ta.riffs on the final product, combined with the extent to which the CODt of 
the finished product is accounted for by these raw m~terials. 
(2) This was used in fact. 
R t, 
I, 
)Eo'l 
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-4.-09-00 
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" S)9 .. 63-02 
(5~5"01_02 
Nominf~l ~nd Effp.ctive Protection fot' Gooch; ,·,hieh fu?'p..?ar to unA tho C.E.T. 
Product 
Value of 
Regional 
Tradc o 
(1966) 
Nominal ImpUoit 
Hate Rate (1966) 
A B 
Fertilisers %300m 5% 25% 
Celophane . % 042m 29% 60% 
Plastio (ost070%) 
r1aterial 
Textile ~4.7m 100% 
Fabrics 
(rayon goods) 
Baltenes 
:Bulbo 
Cables & 
Copper "!ire 
Paper & 
\Jritin6 Paper 
Kraft 
Tyres 
Glass :Bottles 
Steel pieoes 
Steel sheets 
1'fachetes 
Hetal Tanks . 
Umbrella Parts· 
Jute sacks 
(inoreased to 7r:t;0) 
~2.35m 30-40% 
~ .35m 130% 
¢ .3m 
~ .35m 
~4.8m • 
¢ .27m 
~1.33m 
~1.83m 
¢ .8m 
¢ .3m 
E1 Salvador 
approx. 
25% 
15% 
66% 
70% 33% 
22% 66% 
17% 8% 
40% 60% 
8% 100% 
16%. 10% (~nco 
31% io 9Cf';S) 80% 
Ciroa 100% 20% 
in El Salvador 
Value lidded. 
Ratio {fl.D1Jroxl Effective Prot. 
El Salvador 
(1968) 
04 
.5 
.3 
.3 
.5 
.5 
.4 
.4 
.5 
05 
.7 
.33 
A B 
----_.-
66% 
(117)~) 
(125%) 
17Cf'fi, 
6~~ 23% 
(130%circa) 33% 
105% 
83%, 
35~ 
34% 
70% 
15% 
25%. 
35% 
(10~~) 
43% 
130% 
50% 
00% 
19% 
94% 
(100%) 
10% 
(00%) 
58% 
\ole assume that ~).a ij. is zero since imports are ecnerally duty free 
•• I , 
~ ~urccs .. : Value added ratios from El Salvador "lMuatio, Eotndietico" 1968; tariffs 
from \·/orksheets in the appendix or fron'!' Special industry" studies of sle~. 
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value added at world prices is zero). 
This tendency of some industries to become very hiGhly protected 
may not have quantitatively significrult consequences overall, though 
many of these industries are of strategic importance in the econo~1 as 
producers of intermediate goods to other industries and agriculture. 
steel products and electrical apparatus impose additional costs on the 
construction industry, while agricultural exporters suffer particularly 
badly from high cost jute bags, fertilisers, kraft packing papers, machetes, 
tractors and abTicultural implements. Insecticides, have, undoubtedly, 
become more expensive since the Nicaraguan toxaphene plant started 
production. 
To come to general conclusion. it would appear that there are so~e 
products where "static" costs.of protection are significant but relatively 
few. Trade diversion does not appear to involve quantifyable cost 'that 
can be set alongside the gains from stimulated activity and, indeed, there 
are offs~tting gains from industries where genuine competitive trade creation 
is involved. We feel, therefore, entitled to ignore these costs when cal-
culating ga':!'::':'{~lailosses, while noting that in as much ns there are costs 
involved, they appear to bear down more heavily on Honduras • 
. Summ:trislng National Gains and TJOSS0S 
If we take the various elements ·already isolated and try to combine 
them, one could produce some kind of global estimate for gains and losses 
of remaining or withdrawing as of now (1968). 
It has been argued that the cost of protection is sufficiently small 
to be ignored. Therefore, there are only a few steps in the calculation.(l) 
(1) A similar type of balance sheet is dravm up in R. Green: "EcQDamj Q Uniou 
in East Africa: Principles, Prices & Proceeds" East Africa Institut. f S ...... ~ ... ~ 
Research Conference Papers, Jan. 1966, Paper Ho. 553. e 0 ~ h_O._ 
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,Cost in i,m. Q. ;n.- Sal. ll. lll.9.. C.B. 
(1) Total regional exports in 
1968: 18 85 }l 28 38 
(2) Total "explained" by 
COI"lJTlon Market: 70 74 19 22 36 
( 3) After disallowance of tnon-
locaJ.' costs: 28 29 7 9 12 
(4) "Shiftable" regional im-
ports ••• after dis-
allowance of 'non-local' 
costs: 
-5 -5 -6 -3 -} 
Net gain: 23 24 1 6 9 
(5) Multiplier ••• (a) if 1 
(minimum) 46 48 2 12 18 
(b) if 2 
(maximum) 69 72 3 18 27 
F 3%Jf 4rJ As a 96 of GNP this works out at to ,,0 4% 6% rd:~to ~~~o ~ 4t 
• 
If one were to assume that the marginal increments to regional 
trade had the sa.me structure and "import content" as the remainder, 
it would appear that, over the 1961-9 period, El Salvador's trade was 
.", 
adding 1 to'''':;:: ;~J·t-~· its GNP every year or about t of its annual average 
growth; for Honduras very little indeed; for th~ reeion as a whole about 
1/7 of the growth rate or • 7'Jt to .196 p. a. This approximation is close to 
the conclusion of N'ueent and McClelland though arrived at quite diffel'elltly. 
The figures for "shiftable" losses and for a multiplier nre complete guess 
work and the existence of positiv'e gain from membership for Honduras is, 
thus, questionable. 
One should not forget that there is also the factor of gains and 
losses from the break-up of regional institutions. The only one with 
major distributive implications is the Integration ~ank. The average 
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disbursement per country has been the 1961-68 period - Guatemala ~3'4m; 
El Salvador ¢3·6m; Honduras ~4'4m; Nicarab~a ¢4'3m and Costa Rica ¢3m. 
'Were this sum to have been allocated on a basis of Gl-lP the figures would 
have been, (if one asswnes that in the absence of the Bank, foreign capital 
aid of these volumes would still have come in, and in proportion to recipient 
G1T) Guatemala ¢6.25m; El Salvador ¢4-75m; Honduras ¢2'53m; Nicaragua ¢209m; 
Costa Rica ¢3·28m. 
of: 
There is an effective (apparent) annual redistribution with dissolution 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
Costa Rica 
... ¢2.S5m 
t ¢ o15m 
.,. ¢ ·28m 
Honduras ~- ¢1'77m 
Nicaragua 4-- $1. 4m 
However, some of the capital aid to CABEl would probably not have materialised 
othen7ise and the cost to Guatemala and the benefit to Honduras of 
. 
,.,.. the CACM is overstated. 
(vii) .Q.ther Costs te Bener! ts: So far the analysis ha.s been entirely in terms 
of gains and losses in income terms. However, tllat is .not the only criteria. 
For example, in their study of likely gains in the West Indies) Andic, Andie 
and Dosser. ~"'''~~.'!:.elY calculate the effect of integration on employment 
"'_ ..... ",4,~ • ........,~ 
creation, capital investment, foreign exchange earnings, as well as income 
effects. (1) The employment effect is of great importance but is unquanti-
fyable given the data, and we cannot meaningfully separate out the consider-
able indirect effects ,vhich are a great deal more important than direct 
effects (derived 
demand for agricultural imports, multiplier effects, the effect of competi-
tion between new industry,and the artisan sector). As far as foreign ex-
change ie concerned, it seems to tho author to be inherently dangerous to 
talk about 'saving imports' without reference to costs, especially as the 
countries do not evidently suffer from chronic balance of trade and 'trade 
i1 ) r· AnddicC I St· i Andic l-c D. Dosser: ",A Theory of };conomic Integration for less i jrev~ ~P\ ~Ul'l r esllUniversity of York 1971, navievled in Journal of Corrunon' - .~ 
•• ar e S udl.es 1972 by P. Robson pp.363-368. r 
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gap' pro bl ems. However, as far a.s it was possible to establish tt fiBure, 
about one half of intra-rcc:ional trA-de represented inport sUbntitution 
(i.e. gross I-S.:net I-S is very much less) and the rest was explained by 
competition between existing producers or 'consumption effects' due to 
lower prices. 
Two particular areas of concern have been the effect on customs 
duties and foreign investment, and these will be looked at separately. 
Tax Revenue 
Even though the loss of tariff revenue on regional trade is essentially 
a transfer problem, as tax loss is turned into hieher value added, one of 
the most serious problems of economic integration amongst developing 
countries concerns this loss of revenue. (\') It is related to the question 
of 'balance' in th~ sense that the country which loses revenue does 
not· necessarily acquire the compensating benefit if manifested in higher 
factor payments in the producer country. "The greatly diminished im-
portance of tariffs as a source of revenue in advanced countries can be 
counted as one_.of the most important factors that has accelerated the 
. C.:~'_:'; .': ~ ":::Z4... 
formation of customs unions and free trade area.s among advanced countries,"(-=':.) 
and "the feat' that customs unions would result fn a loss of revenue has 
sometimes operated for prospective members as a factor against proceeding 
with customs unions negotiations. It is of course a probable result, where 
prospective members have a larr,e volume of dutiable trade with each other 
before the customs union and also where a customs union will divert a large 
amount of import trade from outside countries to member countrles.,,(3) 
(I) There remains, however, gains or losses from shifting to a more or less 
efficient method of tax collection. 
('2) 
C.S. 
Hirofumi Shibata: "!{leo of Economic Unions in COr.l.~on Market.A" in 
Shoup: "Fjscal H:n"1T1onj::~ation in Corrrnon Trarket" Part II, 19 'I, p.224. 
J. Viner: "The Customs Unions 1131'1. ueil 0 it 66 
- p. c • P. • 
. -,.;:.-
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The pattern of taxation in Central America is one 6f extrema 
d~pendence on imports, in all Central 
American countries: 
,P-iagram Sh.2!.!Ef\ Ap;grep;ate CUIT.ent Revenu~ of Piv!? Centra.1 
American Governmen.ts, 122(;-65lC,urrent i')rl.,ces) -
l2.5.§. 12~8 ,19GO 1965 
Direct Taxes, 
tax) (mainly income 27'7 33'3 34-5 
Import Duties 104-4 114'9 120·3 
Other Indirect 103·0 97-2 95'5 
266·9 275' 3 200°, 
~urce: World Bank Report statistical Appendix Table 4. 
Notes; The "total" includes other sources of revenue. 
71· 9 
132,2 
156·1 
401- 5 
Import duties accounted for over 40% of revenue at the inception 
of the Common It.:arket. In several cases this figure was substantially 
higher (55% in Nicaragua' and Costa Rica) and the lowest (Guatemala 35%) 
is still very high by international standards. One might also say that 
this is due, in part, to a refusal to find other bases for taxation. 
Revenues are abQ~t 9-10t of GNP in the five countries, and only Haiti has 
. mt:·.:...;~:: :,:.~'":~!-.t;t.' 
a weaker record of domestic public saving. To rectify this more general 
problem, the OAS/IDn have prepared detailed reforms, largely ignored. (1) 
~~e main feature of the structure of duties (aee Appendix 4) is that 
many rates on "competing" imports are so high as to be prohibi tiv'e • 
Duties on non-competitive imports, generally required as inputs for 
domestic production, are near-zero, thus generating negligible revenue. 
Non-competitive imports for final consumption are moderato to high 
providing substantial revenue. The form~tion of ~ common tariff did not 
greatly affect the structure of the tariff though it was raised in respect 
of several previously relatively low revenue tariffs which were raised to 
"prohibitive" levels for protective purposes. 
~ r>f:"'~t~~:.J)_~_~____ 
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The effect of the CO!J'l.mon Market would induce 10flses in the following 
ways, assuming for the momel1t that, in each case, cuotoms duties are not 
replaced by other forms of taxation on consurr.ption and that there is no 
income or profit tax: 
(1) in respect of trade that wa.s "divertedtl to existing reeional 
producers froq outside supplier3, there would be a straight loss of revenue 
to the ioporting country,which could be measured by the quantity imported 
from the region, multiplied by the level of the tariff. 
(ii) in the longer run, regionally based "common market industries" 
will be developed which vl111 involve a structural change amongst imports or 
as intermediate end capital goods are produced locally which were previously 
imported or,embodied in imported final products. In this caoe there will 
be a revenue loss to both regional expo~ters and importers as both would have 
previously imported the good. 
(iii) for products involved in tl:'ade "creation" (where there is 
Itshiftability", for example) then there is no loss of customs duty as this 
was already forgone in the course of import-substitution nationally. If 
however, consumption taxes could be introduced to replace import duties then 
there is no reason, theoretically, why all import duties could not be replaced 
by taxes at the point of co~'\sumption. 
If we consider the additional effect of incom~. and profits tax then in 
cases (i) and (ii) there are no losses, but the exporter gains additional 
reven~e in (i) in proportion to the value of his regional exports and in case 
(ii) in proportion to the value of total production. (Note, however, the 
income and profits taxes are exempt.~ on many nevI industries). 
the regional importer will lose income and profit tax. 
In case (iii) 
(1) Pan American Union: ",Report on the Central Aplericnn Development Plans 
1968-69" oPe cit. pp.145-157. 
,"" 
~-.---~-, ------
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One of the basic difHculties in quantifying gains and losses in 
revenue terms is that one is again tryine to contrast the present with 
the hypothetical situation of common market break-up. What would be the 
. 
structure of imports and production after the break-up? What would be 
the relative importance of (1), (ii) and (iii) above? To what extent 
can the countries concerned shift the tax base? One can only make 
hypothetical assumptions. 
It is fairly clear that although tax ~~ have been adjusted upwards 
in many cases (in specific if not ad valorum terms), the ratio between -
duties collected and imports has fallen, partly due to the Conrrnon Ma.rket 
and partly due to various exemptions.. Between 1962 and 1966, import duties 
as a % of impor~from g.~tside Central America fell as follows: 
Overall 
Guatemala 
E1 Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Costa Rica 
~~ in 1962 
l.l 
21 
23 
25 
18 
27 
% in 196.6. 
II 
16 
15 
18 
15 
20 
Various attempts hav~ been made by worried governments and other 
~. 
• r.;"\>.\ ~ '\".~ ... ~ "~:!.' 
bodies to calCUlate the loss of revenue attributable to the CAmJ, and to 
compare this with the implications of other major revenue policies such 
as tax remissions to investors.(l) In the 1969-72 Plan the Costa Rica~ 
(1) UU(ECLA): "Re ercuslones Flscales de la • ui aracion de Imnuestos 
a la Importacion y del Libre Comerci.Q ... en C.A." E CN.12 CCE/lID. 
SIECA: "Anal sis de nerdi(l.~s de in- re:;,~ fiscal.es atrib.ulliles al proceso 
de integracion economica". SIECA CEN/3-68). Guatemala 1968. 
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government gives the following figures for exoner~tions of import duty 
on intermediate goods and on intrn-regional trad~ (in %m).(l) 
Integratio~ Agreements Law of Development & 
Industr,ial Protection 
TotD..l Actual 
Incoma from Irnnorts $ • 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
. 1·5 
2.0 
7·7 
13·4 
19.0 
34·6 
43.2 
1.3 
2.1 
5.6 
10.0 
11.9 
15·0 
27.7 
30.0 
32.0 
32.0 
2600 
25.0 
It can be seen that as a proportion of revenue collected (and therefore, 
of the total budget to a large extent), ''losses'' from intra-reeional trade 
are substantial. Howover, as the Costa Rican planners themselveo 
acknowledge this in an unfair comparison as some of the "losses" are over-
stated:-
(i) some trade is genuinely IItrade creating", whose production 
• 
yielded no revenue anyway, 
(ii) the calculation igno~es offsctting direct and indirect tax 
receipts, 
(iii)" some trade is agricultural; on which im~ort duties are often 
.J. .... , ... 
. I:;"':'ttl..." .~""~. 
exempted anyway:-- '.-" 
They redid the calculation on the assumption that there 'would remain 
a fixed relationship between extra-regional imports and import revonue, 
and projected forward an estimate of revenue for the import volume of 
later years, based on a simple regrassion from the pro-Common Markot 
period. They come up with tho following fiaures: 
(1) Costa Rica: "Previsiones del Desarollo Bconomic,Y Soci,!ll 1969-12 X 
Planes del Sector Publico" Tomo 1 pp.241-245. 
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Import Duty Estimated Duty Difference 
Collected Without 
Impott on IJoca11y* "Net" IJoss 
Produced 
• Inter,ration Commodj.tioB 
- , 
1964-68 145'4 215 69·6 40·9 
1964-67 120.0 163 43·0 17·3 
1964 30·0 33·0 3·0 
1965 32· 0- 42·1 10·1 2'7 
1966 32·0 42·2 10'3 3·a 
1967 26·4 45·a 19·5 10·6 
1968 25·0 51'0 26·6 25·0 
* This fif,Ure includes duties on ga.soline anel sales tax. 
It can be seen that if these two offsetting factors are taken into 
account, the "loss" is much less. However, even this estimate is not 
reliable: 
(i) loss from membership may be overstated because proceeds from 
income and profits tax on additional exports are ignored, 
(ii) losses are understated in that the figures for "offsetting" 
28'7 
25' 7 
3·0 
7· 4 
6'5 
8'9 
1·6 
excise duty are too l~rGe. Some of the revenue (e.g. on gasoline) would 
be obtained from a national refining of oil in the absence of the Common 
}~arket, and the same is true of several items subject to sales tax, in 
non-tradeable services for example, 
(iii)" the import structure and the propensity to import are assumed 
-... ~~"r::'.J5:;~f 
unchanged. 
There have been various other estimates for Costa Rica:(l) one 
in J;articular ohould be mentioned. A group in the Costa Rican central 
~ank tried to isolate the effects of the co~~on market, of the industrial 
incentive laws, changes in tariff rates, import structure and "residua1 l1 
factor; in explaining any shortfall in revenue from yields predicted on 
the basis of a const~~t import and tariff structure over the 1962-68 period~(2) 
(1) e.g. Ad. Hoc Committee on Central America: (CIAP/272): "~lu~tion of 
.Costa Rica' A Economic and Social Devolonment Plan, 1965-68" • 
(2) The calculations were made in an unpublished paper by Central Bank 
officials; made availablo to the author by Prof. Robson of St. Andrews. 
. ...:::. 
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The effects were analysed as follows: 
12,6
k
2 12.23. 12M. 119.2- 19(,6 12.U 19[,8 
Estimated revenue on the basis 
of 1962 performance 28'9 31·6 35·4 45·5 45' 5 48'5 54·8 
Shift to CACM cornnodities from 
extra-reGional co~~odities 
- ·3 -1·6 -3,8 -5,0 -8·0 -12·0 
Exemption policies -1·0 
-4'3 -10'7 -11·2 -13·7 -15'5 
Import of tariff chances • 3 
·1 - '4 2· 3 ··2 3'3 
Residual ·5 ·1 1 • 3 2·1 - ·8 - .6 
Actual duty collected 28·9 31.1 29·1 31· 8 31'7 26., 23·4 
It can be seen that there are losses due to CA(mf trade which rise to half 
the revenue collected in 1968. If consumption, income, and profits tax yields 
were to be considered, there would be a small offsetting factor, which would go 
a considerable way to cancelling the loss. 
A Guatemalan calculation did try to eliminate exaggerated estimation 
of fiscal costo, while noting that import duties had fallen dramatically 
from 40% to 20;6 as a proportion of fiscal incomes. This was attributed to 
causes other than the Cornman Harket. Two hypotheses were 'Put fOI"ivard; (1) 
(i) ...... ,d :'It,..,. aSSUlJlq'" ... J.u1'ly "trade divertine" pattern of trade, the "cost" 
will be tho volume of regional imports (less those itemo that would have been 
traded anyway) times the external tariff, minus the national income gain from 
the un~on multiplied by the proportion of tax (excluding import duties) in 
the national income • 
(ii) assuming a fully "trade creating" pattern, then revenue Bains 
or losses are solely income and profit tax yields from the net trade 
(1) Guatemala: ~'Pla.n de Des~rrollo .191l:-7:iu Secretarin. General de 
Congejo l!acional de P1anificacion .c:conomica, pp.263-275. 
~ .... ,"" .... - . ..-,.----.------------~",..--
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balance, (ignorine consumption effects). 
T'.ney produce 0.1 ternative guesses of ~13m gain o..."ld ¢16m loss in 
fiscal terms to Gp.atemala from membership of the Cornmon ~i;a.rket (1969). 
The assumptions represent reasonable outside estimates but the spread is 
too wide to be meanineful. 
The most vulnerable to fiscal loss is Honduras which has a large bnlance 
of payments deficit with its partners and has experienced very little gain 
in income terms from membership. Using the Guatemalan methodo, if we were 
to assume lOOI~ trade diversion, then Honduras would lose approximately ¢14m. 
This is an inflated figure as the CET is higher than the previous national 
tariff. If there were lOO~{ trade "creation", then there would be a revenue 
loss of ¢3m. However, anywhere in the middle of this range still represents 
substantial revenue loss. 
Finally, Nicaragua estimated that the folloViing amounts of revenue 
were IIlost", and tried to identify the source (in ~m). (1) 
Duty exemptions on regional trade 
• .;..'t11" ',,) "~""'" { ... 
Indus triar 1-'roi'ection Laws 
Others 
12.§j 
, 20' 5 
7·1 
3',6 
31·2 -31·0 
The Nicaraguan goverriment ma.de much of these "losses" which amount 
to lO~X or more of import duties actually collected. However, for 
reasons already indicated, the picture is distorted, the calculations 
are non-rigorous and ieno"re important potential gains. If the Guatemalan 
calculation were re-done for Nicaragua, one might predict revenue losses 
(1) Nicaragua:, Banco Central: "Informe Annual:"1966, 1'.246. 
, 
1 
in 1968, of sliehtly smaller magnitudes ~those estimated for Honduras 
(~3m to ~lOm) though the situl1.tion improved considerably when Nicaraguuls 
regionu1 trade balance moved into surplus in 1969-70. 
To conclude, the superficial picture of large revenuo lonces, which 
are shovm by direct calculation of looseo, arc greatly exagGorated. 
lIevertheless, Honduras, .in particular, has experienced considerable loss 
of revenue. }:Ioreover, concern over the losses caused by regionul trade 
should not obocure the fact that a much more serious loss of revenue 
~rioes from a luck of willingness to realise the full taxable capacity 
of the regional economy for political reasons. There is no doubt that 
many more times the present tax yield could be obtained by switching 
the tax buse from imports to income, ~;OfitS, propcrt~ifiad!~gg~~mpti,on. (~ 
Or the revenue situation could be improved by joint and selective increase 
of the external tariff aEl occurred in 1968. (2) 
Overseas CaEital Flows 
One effect of the CAOl'.'! has undoubtedly been to stimulat~ an inflo\7 
of private capital into the region. This is because of the nature of 
the industrial development which is to substitute overseas imports, 
'" ..... 
. f~- ,,-"~" 
providing an incentive to pr~"ious importers to "jump tho tariff" in 
order not to lose their murket share. The largor and expandine regional 
market is a further attraction to overseas investors. 
(1) M. Best: "Determinant::; of Ta...", Performanco in nevolo I inl'!' Countries: 
,the Case of GUllternalR" Ph.D. Oresa.n, 1970 unpublished,lfJ.crofilm. 
Clark Joel: 1I1!'x J,ncentivos :i.n CentrA-I Americnn dcvelo;pment" Economic 
Development and Cultl.lral Chanae, Vol. 19, Ho. 2, 197J. •.... 
S.I.E.C.A. . (2) .. ,\II~,~edidas do omerge:;.n,c.i,a p'ara 18 defellsn dc, ,In ,h,r.!} ,9.llza cle ... p]Jg'os en 
Centro-Am""rjc~" .', '"I. I', .' ... " .... ) " ,." "',.", r'-, :,"".~~f'\." ., ...... t-I;>CA/A/ 
J • J ~ L •• ' ~ ' ... _ M J .' "~..,I.~' .-v,_" '-.' '., .............. ; ... ,,\.J'" ~ ,.:\ 
JJrjC-Cl;GA-II D'L'2, 1960, (The Protoool of San Jose). 
;~ 
~~ j 
··",,'"'V'1 ~.~"." •.• ~rd~·~ 
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Diag. 3-10 shows the main trends in private overocas invcotment 
(por). P~ITregate flows arc unfortunately not broken down sectora11y and 
it is also difficult to separate out ':pure' equity investment fro:n 
suppliers credit and other forms of long term financine_ \1hat tho gross 
figures show is that there has been a discornable increaso in direot 
investment in the Common }[arket period. This is less obvious in the 
case of Guatemala, where the largo inflow of investment commenced in 
1955/6, but the contrast. is particularly sharp with El Salvador and 
Honduras where the nineteen fifties were characterised by a large scale 
export of oapital (by local residents transferring liquid assets to 
safer hoards in the U.S.A.), 
Some of this reoent investment is surely due to the 
Common Mar:ket, though there were other influences at work notably the 
national import substitution policies and the investment incentives. 
Most now investment has been in"manufacturing. This oan be olearly seen 
. 
. from Diag.3-2t.\;vhich shows the state of Amerioan investment in Central 
Amerioa. However, one should ~0t exaggerate this: tho massive increase 
in investment by the oil companies was almost entirely in the six oil 
refineries and this is twioeas great as investment in the Vlhole of the ,.-' 
• ~.~ .. "~!' ,,: .. ~_ 'f: ["'~~' 
rest of the manufacturing sector tosether. In Guatemala (Diag.3-2~b) the 
'~2Om foreign investment in two refineries (now nearer ~30m) io substantially 
greater than in the rest of manufacturing- Mc~olland has estimated 
that-over the period to 196o, only 5 to lq:, of gross fixed investment in 
manufacturing was from overseas.(l) F;om Di~g.3-20h it can also be seen 
that the total U.S. investment in pub1io sorvices and aericu1ture, which 
in 1965 still acoounted for half the total, have not inoreased at all in 
, 
reoent years, though certain other sectors (e.g. ootton) have benefited 
from an infloYl of oapital. 
(1) D. Mclelland: "The Central Amerioan COq!l1on Market" op.cit. p.94. 
~ 
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Guate:nala 
A Direct 
Investment 
B Investment 
Income 
C (net) 
. Undistributed 
Profits in A & B 
E1 Salvador 
A 
:a 
C 
Undistributed 
Profits in A &; B 
Costa Rica 
A 
:B 
C 
Undistributed 
Profits in A &; B 
Private Invest~ent PIous and Profit Remittances 1948-68 
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~ long term private capital asset increases 
large p~ents for a telephone installation made by government 
corupensation for Govt. take over of power company included here. 
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~ Private Investment Flo~s and Profit Remittances 1940-68 
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Honduras A 
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Profit in A & B 
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P 4·9 9. 2 14.5 15.3 16.3 I.' 
-, ~- .- ~ ----.-~-. - ----- ~-- -- ---- --- -
.. 
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-3.8 -5.2 -3.2 -4.7 -3.6-5.7 -2.0 +1.9 -.9 -.2 +.5 +3.8 +3.2+2.9 +4.8 -4.0- 2.7 -1.2 -2.5 
17 6.0 7.1 7.6 7.7 
Source: TIP Balance of Payments Yearbooks 1960-1970 
B all long term private capital asset increases. 
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D,iag. A .. S.t.rycturc of Forcirrn Investment in GuatE'T:l<\la: 1265 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Petrol Hefining 
Construction 
Electricity 
Trade (esp. Banking) 
Transport (esp. Railways) 
Services 
Total 
% 16.6 m (of which United fruit is ~11m) 
1.6 m 
15·95m 
19·34m 
'.36m 
13.5 m 
20.4 m 
29.0 m 
l41fJ 
1. tti-' 
13. (55J 
16. :-;;~ 
2. 9;~' 
11.6~a 
11·4~~ 
22.0i'; 
.6;£ 
~ y 
Source: Ballco de Guatemala; Sector Exte'.fno; 'Ssto:t1istico 1966. 
Diaa.3-~ObAmericRn Investment in Central America (1262) 
,l.92.5. li?.2. 1960 
Mining rt 35m 15m 20m 
Petroleum {mainly 
refin.ing - also 14Qn 40m 50m 
exploration 
, . 
Manufactures ;.:..":,~,~~~::~~. 56m 2m 15m 
Public Services 121m 95m 126m} 
Trade 21m ··lOm 16m 
Others (csp. Agriculture) 151m 145m 149m 
-
.~ Total %S36m 301m 316m 
-
Source: (1965) Lederer & Cutler: "Intornational Invostment of 
the USA in 19~6" as reproduced in Conllne~cio Thc:terilw. 
(lJcxico) Au~. 1968, p.680 and ::';. "1 tho U.S. Survey of 
Current Business. 
'------------ .. _ .. ~~ 
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The pros and cons of overseas investment and the balance of gain and 
loss to investing countries and investors has been dealt with elsewhore.(l) 
The most important contribution of F.O.~. is that in its abncnce, much 
of the industrial .development that has occurred within the CACM VlotU<1 not 
have done so, because of the absence of local capital and entrepreneurship. 
However, concern has been expressed about three points: 
(i) first, that profits repatria,ted from investments are an 
extremely high proportion of investment, especially when local capital 
is used to provide supplementary fixed ,interest capital. 'l~ Diagram 19 shows 
total profit remittances are greater than, or at least a high proportion of 
new capital invested, such that Aot investment wns negative in Honduras 
and Nicaragua even in '~period of hieh investment. The contrast is a 
little unfair, in as much as the remittances are from previous investment: 
in agriculture and utilities, as well as from the new manufacturing invest-
ment'.~a recent study on overseas private investment in manufacturing in 
Latin Anlerica and Afr~ca suggested that three or four year payback periods 
are ve'ry cornmon, (224 ~ere are important cnses in Central America of over 
lJO% (largely tax free) returns on capital.(3) Indeed, these figures 
understate the profit repatriated as much of this is undoubtedly concealed 
in inflated price5~for i~ported raw materials and equipment from the horne 
company which .J.~:~;~~~ to the project. (4) . 
(1) T. Balogh & P. Streeten: "Domestic v. F,oreim invest~ent" Bulletin of 
i 
i 
I, 
the Oxford Institute of Statistics, Aug. 1960, p.220. G. McDougal: "The 
,b,enefito and .costs of 1?r:!vate ll')'y.e,stment from A.broad: a theoretical AJ?Fo~.ch" 
Economic Record, Uarch 1960, pp.13-l5. C. Kindlebcrger (Bd.): ":~e Mul t:i.-
pational Corpor3,t~". R. Vernon: nUt S. enterpriAe in the less developed countrill 
,evalua,tion of cost and benefi til and 1. 1i ttle: "The vnlue of .. .n.r.ivate overse.r-t.t-'. 
inv,estment" both in G. Ranis (Ed.): "'1'he Gan between Rich :::llld Poor Countries" 
lEA 1971 pp.210-228. E. Penrose: liThe state and mult.i-nn.tion<l.l enterprisen'in 
,less developed countries'.' in J. Dunning: (l:;d.) "'l'he i:ul tinrtti..olli'l;l :i~t~J1?rir-1e" 
Allen & Unwin 1971. P. Ady, (Ed.): "~te Foreifill Investment nnd the Develon-
inS' World" Praeger 1971. 
(2) C.S. Gray: "~osourceFlows to 1'$80 Develo:r..c[l Countr~", Praeger 1970 pp. 
27-;6. 
(3) D. McClelland: "Xhe central ,American Common"Mar~et" OPt cit. p.217~ 
(4) c.s. Gray, ~ p.36. 
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How~yar 
~ indicate that profit remittances may be very hieh does not in 
itself indicate that there is a real income loss relative to other feasible 
alt'ernatives (whi~h may simply be non-investment); it may merely indicate 
that a proportionately large share of the proceeds are appropriated by the 
investor. 
(ii) it is argued that overseas foreign investment has tended to be 
badly allocated, distorting the manufacturing sector in favour of "easy" 
import substitution industries incorporating a small technological component, 
limited local raw materials and labour, operating inefficiently behind 
tariffs and duplicating wasteful product differentiation and marketing 
methods in the narrow Central American markets. However, we have to 
separate out cause and effect. These inefficiencies are not a product of 
foreign investment per set 
~~e low usage of local raw-materials owes something to the system of 
. 
tax incentives which apply to new firms, indieenous or overseas.(l) Also 
much foreign investment in man~·.facturing has tended to be in sectors where 
markets ana competition are weak, and the less attractive features of 
monopoly and oligopoly are to be anticipated as a consequence of private 
..... ~ ;::. ... P\ ...... -':·, .. r~. 
investment, overse~s or indigenous. Indeed, to embark on a strateGY of 
protected import substitution without planning or controls will inevitably 
(1) However, tax incentives are more generous for industries which help 
.- the balance of payments, and have a high value a.dded (cateeory B rather 
than C under the Agreement on Uniform Central American Fiscal Incentives 
to Industrial Development). 
,:t87. 
lead to distortions whatever the origin of the capital and this willlcad 
to a loss of welfare. (1) And as far as production techniques are concerned 
the degree of capital intensity is probably only a very indireot function 
of who owns the capital: much more of the product. The tecl'Ulique of 
production is .incorporated not in the system of financing, but in the 
capital goods which, in Central America, would be imported whoever owned 
the capital, as there is no indigenous capital goods industry. 
Nevertheless, the use of POI rather tl~n indigenous enterprise 
inevitably creates problems of its own. This is partly because the fcost' 
of any inefficiency in industrial structure is shipped overseas in foreign 
factor payments. Also, the cost of protection which we Imve shovm in 
seyaral key sectors "could have been minimised by selecting one or tV10 
firms in each activity •••• but the pressures of international oligopolistic 
warfare led to a multiplication of uneconomic plants in infant activities •••• 
Governments have been~too weak or shortSighted to resist the pressures of 
oligo;Olistic strategists who favour keeping a toe held in every market". (2) 
The evidence of very 10Vi usc of local raw materials is a.ga.in in part a 
conseCJ.uenc,e of tho desire of the overseas investor to maximise the use of 
components an~L~::?,?1.13s and managemerit from the rest of the company> •. , 
. which, through the operation of 'transfer' pricina may incorporate much 
of the profit earned by the subsidiary, • 
------------------------------------------------------------------._.-----------
(1) H. Johnson: "The :possibil,ity of income losses from increa,s.'!.d erficien.c:~ 
or factor accu~aulotion in the presence of tnrift:s" Economic Journal 1967 
pp.15l:54. 
(2) C. Diaz Al§jandro: "Diroct Forei. :1 investmt3nt in JJatin America" in 
C. Kindleberger: "The International Corporation" op.cit. 'Pd2 -;---
'. 
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It should be said that there are a few showpiece cases where overseas 
cOJnpanies have cOl',lsciously built up very strone backward linkages locally, 
especially in food processing,(l) but it is still conspicuous that those 
basic industrial projects which were planned to be at the centre of the 
common market's industrial activity, pulp paper, pig iron, glass, which 
would use local raw materials and require some technological in~enuity, 
have, so far, failed to attract investors, by contrast with the numerous 
assembly and packagine operations.(2) For a profit making enterprise, only 
seeking to maintain a market share there is clearly very little incentive 
to make costly adaptations to its range of products,(3) to use local 
suppliers, or to transfer technology and to change"its production techniques, 
certainly not for a peripheral market like Central America. 
(iii) it is further felt that the process by which US concerns buy 
out local medium size ,enterprises, thereby discottrag~local entrepreneurship, 
reduces competition and promoteJ.capi tal export: II it is argued that 
while the common market was de-,eloped, partially to discourage capital flight 
from Central America to U.S. and European money markets, pressure from 
..... . ,;~~~I .. :::~:.:~. 
(1) Examples of this are the efforts of Ralston Purina (Guatemala) to develop 
.chicken farming amongst peasants; the Philip 1Jorris cigarette plant which uses, 
after encouragement. local tobacco growers; AdanS chewing gum (Guatemala and 
El Salvador) which is believed to buy 95% of its requirements for processing 
foods locally (cheese, jams and jellies, mayonaisc and salad dressing); and 
United fruit which makes banana puree for baby foods in Honduras. Business 
International Corporation: ",The Central Amorican Common M,A.rkct: profits fmS 
prospects in an integrat.i.n~ economy". OPt cit. 
(2) The Integration Industries Scheme has embraced very few of these industries 
as yet. One of the two approved plants (caustic soda and toxaphene) incorporates 
. a highly advanced tcchn ,logy: this is only tho second toxaphene production in 
the world usinG this advanced method. 
(3) The paint industry is an exception but tha.t WC.s in :r:-esponse to 
experimentation with cheaper lines by a local company - Kativo Chemicals. 
foreign corporations now moving into the Central American Common Market 
may by undermining indiGenous investment and enterprise actually 
intensify the flow of Central American American capital abroad". (1) One of 
the results of t!1ese complaints has boen greater interest in the idea of 
"joint partnership" to avoid a situation "wherein in the absence of 
deliberate action to stimulate indigenous enterprise it can happen that 
the main effect of regional tariff reduction may be to encourage foreign 
enterprises to set up subsidiaries in the Common Market ••• and this 
causes the lines of integration to run from parent to subsidiary rather 
than between countries". (2) In fact, the whole system of tax incentives 
(biased to "new" enterprises) and commercial bank operations (biased to 
"safe ll borrowers) disfavours the loccl enterprise. In a sense this is 
a 'nationalistic' rather than an economic point, but nevertheless the 
adverse effects on local entrepreneurship does have long term economic 
significance: "the displacement of. local facto:r.S of production and the 
) 
I 
stunting of local ab,ilities which can occur in the wake of overseas private I 
I investment is sometimes absoluten• (3) Nonetheless, the skills acquired 
and the technological sophistication of the processing metl".'Jds are likely 
to be more useful than those of local producers in most cases. 
-------------------&~'.~.' . " '~~, 
(1) R. Hansen: "Central America: Rep-ional Inte}$'rat.ion and. Economic 
~lopment" OPe cit. pp.54:':55. 
(2) S. Dell in R. Hilton: "The Movement ~'owards L,ntin American Un! txn 
OPe cit. pp.68-69. 
(3) , A. Hirschnlann (quoted by Economist Intelligence Unit): ",Invest,ment 
In, Latin Americll" QER Special No.6. 
" 
! 
! 
! 
! 
(iv) the main reason underlying tho fOar of take-overa and o.n 
expansion of·overseas investment is that as small countrieo, the Central 
American states are vulnerable to an additional 10s8 of t~r already 
heav~ly circumscribed economic and political sovereignty. Only in 1954, 
Guatemala had ~he experience of being invuded und its government over-
thrO\T.n when action was taken by the government to acquire , surplus 
land from the United Fruit Company. Loss of control is fear~d in more 
subtle ways: the sacrifice of local intereots to global corporate strategy 
as, for example, in not developing third country exportsr or in USing 
"arms-lengthlt transfer pricing to avoid local exchancre restrictions and 
taxation (though in practice exchange restrictions are very ljmited and 
tax: is exempted any\vay from most of tho new companies). But CentrOll 
American attitudes are often li·~tle more than an emotional rejection of 
American influence, of IIporto ... ricarisation" and other visible manifestations 
of the evident politict:l.l and economic dominance of their northern neighbour. (1) 
For this reason 'foreign' investment, by Mexicans, Colombians, Italians and 
others is welcomed even though its conduct is objectively no differont 
) 
than that of U;',S. subsidiaries. 
To surnmax:ise"V1e.yannot make any meanins-ful estimation of the costs 
, -...... ,-"'" 
of benofits of the large volume of POI which has attendod the integration 
process. ABood doal depends on what would have happened in the absence 
of POI. If POI is the only investment that would have b~en forthcoming 
then its total effect must be oonsidere~ including its effect on the volume 
(1) To mtmy Latin Americans this dependency is accelerating ,("rau6uralis'atiollttf) 
as American producers develop their existina assets (nooumine that they do 
not repatr~ate the profit). ,0. Sunkol: ItNa,tional Dove~o.pmen.t Policy in 
Latin A~er~c~' Journal of Development Studies, Oct. 1969, pp.;3-j4. 
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of eXports and import subntitutes that it creates. 1:f POI replaces 
domestic investment then i!ffercn~j.al effects need to be cO!lsidcred. 
Vernon has shown tha.t on reasonable assumptions the latter kind of 
defensive investment is much more likely to result in a net loss to the 
recipient: (1) in Central &~erica most foreign investment is of the 
other kind and it is fair to sny that without it, the rains would not 
have materialised to the same extent. 
There is no evidence that the floVi of publ ic capital (II aid") has 
been affected either in volume or distribution by the CACM except in as 
much as it has affected regional institutions like CABEI. (2) 
Unequal Gains 
!Ieavily qualifieJ though our results have been, it is, nevertheless, 
clear that whatever measure is employed Honduras appears to have derived 
, 
less benefit, and Guatemala and El Salvador more benefit, from the 
union and that dissolution of the union would lead to less loss for 
Honduras' (and perhaps even gain). '£his should be linked to the debate 
which has raged ever since the CACM Vias started and which centred around 
~ . 
. ~., ,,"' I\f'.!: .... ~ .... , 
whether the dist'rlBution of beneri ts (which WQ,.J2. expected to be unequal) 
should be affected by a conscious policy of intervention in the free 
market and what the objectives of intervention should be. 
~------------------
(1) R. Vernon; "l!..t§.. •• ,Ent,c,I'.Prise in the less developed countries etc." 
OPt cit. 
(2) J. McCammant: ",Development Assistance in Central Americ~" Praeger, 
1968, Chi 10. 
, i 
t<~'" ~~~ 
,~,~:~~~ , ' 
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Comparative experience of groupings elsewhere leaus us to CA~ect 
that disequaling tendencies will be set up. "If BTowth from low income 
levels is anticipated, m~c elimination of restrictions on the flow of 
intra-Union trade and concomitant establishment of a common internal 
tariff will, in general promote imbalnnce in opatial development"; (1) 
and given that the rationale for integration was based in part on the 
disequ~\~Jibrating consequences of free trade in a world context, one 
might expect that trade liberalisation would have the same effect on a 
regional level: "free trade will bring unequal rates of development in 
whatever area or region it appears". (2) 
The Integration Industries Scheme incorporates the principle of 
reciprocitYi (lilt shall be effected on a reciprocal and equitable basis 
in order to ensure that each and every Central American state may 
progressive~y derive economic advantaee:"(~») and there is a specific 
clause which states that no country should have more than one IntegraUon 
Industry before the others have one each. This idea dates back to the 
original inception of the Conunon lI!arket: "the concept of integration 
in Centra1;~!!~?J~peems adequate as a point of departure ••• to be 
limited integration accompanied by a policy of reciprocity." (4) 
(1) R. Birmingham: "International imbalance in customs untonf! amon!" de-
velopinr, countries: rliju'strnent mechanismp." Ph.D (Iift"tsbu'rgY 1967, MicrofHm. 
(2) S. Dell: "A Latin American Common Ji~n.:r.ket" New York 1966, p.146. 
This statement and the argument behind it is in complete contrast to the 
conventional trade theory which would predict factor price equalisa.tion 
tendencies. 
(~) Article I, Treaty o~ Central American Integration Industries, 1958. 
(4) United 17ations (ECLA) ",;tp.ter,Tation ..:L...E.£9iprocidad, J~conomios en 
Centrorunerica" E/CN/12/AC. 17/3 (Committee for E~onomic Cooperation) 1952. 
Criticised in paper by P. Vire1li, r.~. ~f..1osco, and !(~. Hermann; Central 
Bank of Honduras 1952. 
. ' 
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Nevertheless, definitions are difficult: ono might also mention that 
EeLA have tended to use a definition which is whether or not integration 
gives accelerated development over what would havo occurred within tho 
national market 'alone. However, a much stricter principle is hinted at 
elSEwhere, the principle of "balanced growth" ('desa,rollo economico 
equilibrado'.) which implies positive discrimination in favour of the less 
devoloped regional partners.(l) The Regional Bank, the Convention on 
Industrial Incentives, and the semi-formal Textile Agreement all have ru1 
implied or explicit commitment to direct proportionately more resources 
to the weaker states, notably Honduras. 
The question of unbalanced development_has worried three of the 
countries. Costa Rica was a reluctant joiner initially, being concerned 
that its high wages and more expensive social services (financed in an 
inflationary way) Vlould cause the country's competitive position to be 
eroded: (2) its enthusiasm has also waned in recent years as the regional 
balance of payments situation has;deteriorated, leading to wlth-drawal, 
temporar~lY, in 1,972. Nicaragua had a period of disillusion~ent when 
it left ~he Common Uarket, but that appears to have been a temporary 
aberration. ,':" _~,~~~,J.is, however, recognition that its industrial base is 
vleak. (;) Honduras has always been acknowledeed to have the greatest initial 
handicaps: a lower income per capita, a wenk industrial sector, poor 
(1), I. Roocnthal: "Consid.cracion£!s ncorca del tde~arroll0 eguilibr<!9s.'tt 
Universidad de San Carlo~·'LY.xI Jul.-Sopt. 1967, Guatemala, pp.95-101. 
(2) E. Staley: "Costa Rica and the Centra.l American Common l:arkot" 
Economica Internaz"ionale 1962, No.1. 'lhe reason"; given "far-Costa Rican Re-
Ditancy were given by Snr. Borbon, her forei[,'U minister, as (a) the absence of 
a "complementary" role for Costa Rica's industry in Central America: ,', (b) fear 
of the low wage countries ,attracting all new investment, (c) loss of customs 
duty, (d) loss of economic sovereignty. Costa Rica was eventually persu~ded 
that only limited loss of soverei{;nty v/;:j,S involved and that her skilled labour 
and politic;:j,l stability were a major attr~,ction for foreien investors: s. 
Borbon: ".§£D.e..J:r.9blerr.£l'~_1~'?-.91p!1§1}jl!!" No. 12 Costa Uica, 1962. 
(3) United nations (EeLA): "m. des~rono de 1~, economia Nicara.r-;u'1 X. 
s1 tuacion cOl'TlT)arati vo '1.9,l\e occupn. r'l ic~ .,pais en ti r1crccdo controameric:mo lt (C.I'..PAL!!,:CX!lOjand "AnR, sb LC?.Y.9Scioll.ep. del .?f.<!!!3_rrol1oeconornico de-"'~icaraN'''a" (" ICN 1'27'/42 F xi 197'"1"" --.----!.:..-~. ,;;'"' .t:.t,... .,.c co, '00. 
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industrial sector, poor communications, and at no staf;e, subsequently, 
has it showed any evidence of narrowing the gap which divided it from 
its neiehbours •. (1) 
The evidence which was presented in the earlier part of the chapter 
indicated that Honduras appeared to have realised small eains in the past 
and could possibly gain from dissolution. Costa Rica has not, evidently, 
gained to any significant extent, but there is less obvious source of loss 
either. The other three partners appear in various degrees to have ha~ 
past gains and have future expectation of eain. 
A more widely used convention for establishing gain has been the 
balance of trade, regionally, either in total or for manufacturing products. 
This is by no meano a statemen~ of gain and loss (it assumes implicitly 
a zero sum solution5 but it is true that the eains are a function of 
regional exports and the losses a function of regional imports. Balance 
of payments trends are for statistical reasons very easy to demonstrate, 
and sho~ developments over time. 
As far as Central American trade is concerned, Diae. 3-21 summarises the 
1960-70 period. 
"-
(i) Guatemala has persistently run a surplus about ha~f or more 
which has been contributed by manufacturers, the rest by raw materials 
and foodstuffs. 
(ii) E1 Salvador ha.s consistently run very largo surpluses of 
manufactures and deficits,of non-manufactures, these latter becoming 
(1) SIBCA: "Eco..!:£.J!lic rITOwth of ~rontlur::ts !'!nd the balanced develonment of 
Central American Integration" Sn~CA eel:!: IX/OTl: Foro Honduras odi tiona 
NO. 3 and 4; Banco Central de Honduras: ".!!9.n,n.,uras y lA. Tntcfi'r~cion 
CenJroamericana" T(l.~~galpa, Jan. 1967. 
- -517 ;;;::w;;;·6=:;-"¢ ":~--:., :~;: --'p- O:--'.L-- ';'arqGrut-Uf'~IQ%.'I::iw;i4dSfs.a- -r $ r ... ·~ri 
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p~p.w'\.j-l./ BALANCE OF TRADE AHONGST CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES (im.) 
~. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1' 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
0 +1.8 +1.4 +l.B +1.65 +3.3 +7.0 
Guatemala ../ 
"'-M - .25 - .25 +1.9 +6.8 +4.1 +6.2 
.Q + .B 
- .2 -3.B -4.0 -4.2 +3.3 
E1 SalVac.or< 
'1 +3.8 +3.B +3.2 +2.6# +2.5 +13.2 
0 2.1 2.0 4.8 -0.1 TO.3 -3.1 
Hondu.ras ~~}1 
- 2.0 -2.6 -3.8 -6.B -B.B -12.1 
b .65 -1.1 -1.3 -2.9 -6.2 -11.4 
N"icaragua < 
-1.2 -1.1 -1.3 -3.5 -5.3 ·-10.5 M 
Costa Rica c: 0 -1.65 -201 -1.5 . + .5 +6.B +4.2 
1966 1967 1968 
+21.2 +23.6 +2B.O 
+15.5 +16.6 ++14.8 
+ 5.5 +20.6 +19.6 
+13.4 +22.7 +29.1 
-12.5 ;U7.2 -17.4 
~14.5 -16.2 
-18·9 
-16.7 -23.8 -19.9 
-16.4 -21.9 -19.S) 
+ 2.5 
- 3.2 -10.3 
1969 
+35.0 
+19.0 
+11.5 
+21.1 
-20.1 
-15.7 
-11.6 
-15.1 
-14.8 
1970 
+41.5 
+25.3 
+14.5 
:?23.8 
-35.8 
-25.8 
+ .2 
-10.0 
-20.0 
) 
r 
L 
• . ' 
~ 
,t 
I • 
. , 
·f 
t ~ 
f 
t. 
~l 
r' 
l 
,I 
--------:..------------:------______ L 
1<1 +2055 + .15 + .9 +7.5 +3.2 +2.0 
- 1.2 
- 5.1 - 8.3 -13.3 
;\ 
o .. Overall 
M = Manufacturing (i.e. '5-9 cate~ories in the standard trade classification) 
C;:O~: ~ .~c.A c.~_..c~~~',/(vo-:-) 
~~ulative figures 0 _ + 171.0 
/:;:: 6<11 _ + 110.0 
'1 J' 
lJ 0 _ + 65.5 
·El Sa1~ _ ~138.0 
o - - 97.0 Hond<M ___ 127.0 
o - - 92.5 Nic~M __ 107.5 
o 40.8 
C. Rica<N _ _ 13 .. 6" 
~.-
) 
)' 
I ,I", ., i./.:fYi.~ 
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relatively, less important since 1965, prior to which importa.tions led 
to an overall deficit. 
(iii) Honduras has run persistant and growing deficits on manufactures 
which were initially more than offset by exports of non-m,mufactures; but 
in recent years Honduras has even been a net regional importer of food-stuffs. 
(iv) Prior to a remarkable improvement in 1968-70, the Honduran 
pattern was repeated in Nicaragua; in this case also agricultural exports, 
previously neglected, have helped to offset manufacturing deficits in the 
last two years. Since 1968, Hicaragua has replnced 1"'1 Salvador as a. 
supplier of manufa.ctures to Honduras - shoes, furniture, pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics etc. 
(v) Taking the period as a whole, Costa Rica has been a slight 
loser in overall B. of P. terms, with a smaller deficit in manufactures. 
However, the Costa Rican relative position has deteriorated precipitately 
since 1965 and is causing considerable strain on the association at the 
present moment. 
At a more disaegreeated level we have. isolated the following ways in 
which a 1aiE'·::~_?,.:~~~-i:ke grouping can lead to unequal benef! ts: 
(i) losses of welfare as a result of "trade diversionl1 a.ffectine 
disproportionately the net deficit partner in reeional trade. This 
cost will not affect the cons~~ers in the exporting country who would 
in most cases be bearing the hieh cost (or higher cost) an~vay. There is, 
in Central America, not only the direct cost of the tariff, but a 'terms 
of trade' effect as the main regional trade deficit partner (Hondura.s) has 
a. higher tR.r!!f profile fqr its reeional imports than its regional exports. 
In as much as tariffs are effective nnd contain no "water", "the less fa.voured 
'" -;.::;~ -
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region can be said to be financing the industrial development of the more 
advanced counterparts by payinG hi&her than world prices for industrial 
products in intra-area trade." (1) However, this factor is diminiched 
in significance by the fact that implicit tariffo are very much less 
than nominal rates. 7lhere loss of quality is involved it is not.eworthy 
that since the Honduran authorities placed restrictions on common market 
trade, "Honduras greatly prefers the industrial goods it now gets from 
the USA and Europe 
partners." (2) 
to those it used to get from its com~on market 
(ii) the effect of liberalising free trade with one partner has a 
small and inefficient industrial sector, can be to inflict loss of activity 
and err.ployment on the weaker partner; "in most cases free trade vrould 
strip all protection from the least developed of the countries and expose 
them to the unhampered exports of the semi-industrialised nations of the 
region permanently consigning the former to the status of a primary 
producing exporter. \I 0) In other words, the rationale for integration 
based on r infant industry' industrialisation across t he board must be 
satisfied in the partner states individually as well as collectively. 
~.., 
IZ;I"::,~::,'~:;~, 
In central America, dissatisfaction as expressed by Nicaragua, and 
Honduras, has been precisely over this question. l.~any of their intra-
regional imports are Itshiftable": textiles and:'clothes and simple 
(1) A. J. Brown: "Customs Unions versu§.. Economi,P neparation in deve1opi!.l.!i 
countries" Yorkshire Bulletin of Economics & Social Statistics, Vol. XIII 
1961, p.58. 
(2) E.I.U. Quarterly Economic Bulletin (Central America) No.2. 1971. 
(3) R.L. Al1~n: "Integr.qtion in ler.s developed areas" Kyk10s XIV t 1961 
pp.329-})O. 
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manufactures which could probably be produced domestically. V,11en Honduras 
erected tariffs against the ConnnonU;'arket in 1971 it was quickly announced 
that several products were being substituted d.omcstically; textiles, 
barbed wire, plastic and cardboard, brassieres, tiles, animal feed, 
bicycles, p~astic shoes, button8, toothpaste ~nd fruit juices. (1) And 
in Nicaragua, one of the ea.rlier bones of contention had been the effect 
of competition on existing Nicaraguan industry: it was reported in 1968 
that all seven clothing factories h1d or were beine forced to close under 
the impact of Central American competition. (2) If the processes of 
displaced production are more labour intensive than those of the more 
efficient firms, then competition ~ay result in net unemployment in the 
region. " 
However J we have argued previously that "shiftability" is a lon::; term 
and not a short tem factor and not without costs of its ovm. 
(iii) In fiscal terms the deficit partner suffers for two reasons; 
first from the revenue which is lost on "divertedlt trade 'and the revenue 
forgone from taxation of income and profits on production (especially in 
manufacturinf:) l'i':hj,ch accrueo proportionately more to the producers count:t'Y 
. ~ -'H';"'~ <:.~, 
of origin. As Brown puts it, "if we assume that the non-industrial 
terri tories pay prices for manufacturers of their partners which are eq1.J.al 
to the prices of competing imports including import duty, thon by being in 
tho'union they lose revenue equal to the duty on the manufactures which they 
F buy from their union partners instead of from the outside world. Probably . 
this loss of revenue brings about a reduction in real income". (3) lIoVlcver, 
we have seen that the re.v~nue loso factor is ~~ exaggorated.,\~ tk~s '-O",'tQ;(.-e. 
(1) E.I.U. (Central J~crican Report) No.2, 1971, p.13. 
(2) E.I.U. (Central American P.cIlort) no. 2, 1968, p. 15. 
(3) A.J. Brown: "Cmltoms Unions versus economic senllratinm in dev.cloning: 
countries" Yorkshire Eulletin of }~cono~ics and Statistic::.::, Vol.XIII, 1961, 
p.88. 
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(iv) PlPoIT.ic Rffects: one of the main products of largely 
unrestricted co~petition is likely to be the concentration of new 
investment and new industry in already industrialised locations. 
The phenomenon of 01 ustering has been partly eXplained by Myrdal in 
terms of tlba;ckwash" and "spread" effects. (1) The fonner is the move-
ment of ca.pi tal and skilled labour towards the advanced centres. or 
in areas where there is minimal factor mobility there will be a differ-
ential attraction for overse~s foreign capital, Offsetting this 
is the "spread effect"; the effect of increased demand for the products 
of the less developed periphery as a result of higher incomes in the 
rest of the area; and the diffusion of skills. One would expect that 
ultimately "spread effects" Vlould tend to exert some influence if only 
because the "deve1oped" areas will eventually be raising money wage costs 
(and congestion: costs) to price themselves into an uncompetitive 
position (providea. that labour productivity, and external economies do 
not increase even more rapidly). But one would expect spread effects 
to be small in the Central American area because of obstacles to diffusion: 
"with an imperfect price oystem, primitive transportation. facilities and 
an uneven distri~~tion of social overhead capital in these areas 
.. ,"" "''''''''1~,.~:.:-..&.\y/j,. 
agglomerative tendencies assume greater importance." (2) Backwash 
effects do not operate through the mechanics of labour mobility and, in fact, 
Honduras is a major importer of migrate labour. What happens in Central 
(1) S. Myrdal: "Rich Countries ?J1d Poor" OPe c1 t. pp.30-55, or 
"Economic Theory: and Underdeveloped Countries" London, 1957, Ch3. 
(2) B. EalasDa: "1h.e~9.f..1lQ.Qnomi~ Inter,ration" op. oi t. 
~--------~------~---
,~ 
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i~ that, "capital and industry cluster around areas which are already 
developed and industrially advanced and slip away from thoce areas which 
are insufficiently developedll.(l) Widespread underemploym~nt menns that 
, 
this agglomerative process can proceed without meetine a labour bottleneck 
even in the absence of labour mobility. 
, It 
The reasen for these "backwash effects boine predominant is partly 
due to the "market-orientated" nature of modern production methods and the 
resul ting fact of market expruwion feeding on i taelf. (2) But even with 
"footloose ll industries, (3) there is the advantage of externalities as lithe 
availability of economic overhead facilities (transport, gas, electricity, 
water supply, waste disposal, etc.) the availability of skilled labour 
force, ease of exchange of tochnical information and the existence of 
linked proceocos;,,(4) and "the presence of some firms in an area wil~ 
enhance an areals attractiveness to newcomers".(5) The latter point 
indicates that there is more than merely cost advantages to a favoured 
location: psychologidal factors are, if anything, more important and these 
have been powerful contributory factors to the "growth pole" concept of 
Perroux and others.(6) 
(1) Barzc'-.&.~': >," "TJndercleveloped areas within the Corn.rnon lSarket" 
Princeton 1965, pp.33~(or Italy). 
(2) B. Balassa: "Theory of J!Jconomic, Intef,'ration" ·op.cit. p.126. 
(3) The distinction between "market oricntatedll nnd footloose" industrieo 
and ~heir relative importunce is discussed in S. Florence: ":rhe. ~ogic of 
British or American Industry" London, 195" p.40 • 
.. 
(4) B. Balassa. - ibid pp.201-2 and 225-236; A. Hirschmann: "The S,t.ratem~ 
of J<Jcononic Develo;;-;;t" ' Yale Univ. Press, 195~, Ch.lO. 
(5) B. Massell: "East African Economic Union: an Tt.,valuation and Some 
ImElicatio..!!.~_...f0r Policy" Rand Corpo:cation jComoran~lul'!l HO· 3880 ftC, Sept. 
1963, p.39. 
(6) P. Perrou.,,<:: "Eultinational Investment f.tnd th<:l Annlys:ts of'Dove1on:rl8nt 
!lnd Inte;;ration Poleo" i; lAUB: "I::ultinational Invc~tm~nt :i.n Lntin 11.T:l;i::r;;" 
op.cit. pp.89-126. - •. 
• 1 
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However, ·the essence of tho "growth polo" and "backwash" arB'llment is 
that inequalities develop not fro;.} economic integration per so, but from 
the framowork of laissez faire capitalicm: "in a laissez faire 
environment in which unguided market forces detor::Jine resource nlloc.!",tion, 
cu."1l.ulative movements in income inequulity are likely to bo· set up. This 
will Occur not only between nations, but also with a. customs union as well 
. (1) and 
as between the reGions of a nation"; I "to leave the allocation of 
productive resources exclu~ivcly to the free interp~ay of market fources 
would be equivalent to concen~rating develo~~ent on the more advanced 
countries amon~ the union members.,,(2) Develppmont must be expected 
inevitably to have this unbalanced pattern and a rough rule of thum~ is 
that "the smaller and poorer the country is, the more reason it has to 
fear that if it is merged in a larger markat unit the major growth poles 
would arise outside its territory and this might adversely affect its 
development prospects 'oven more adversely than do the limitations of small 
size." (3) 
But it is not even necessary to have initinl discrepancies in the 
level of development. If countries merge in order to industriuliDe, 
comparative advant9t'ro in industry is not initially apparent and "growth 
• Iri ..... _ ... __ •• ,"t~' 
poles" mny emerge acoidentally in locations in countries where pOI' capita 
(1) K. Griffin: "Reflectionn on TJotin Amerioan developr.1cnt" cr..cford 
EconQmic Papers, 1966, p.l and 4. S"\.. 
(2) H. Wionczek.: "Reguisites for ViA.blo In·~ecrrr:ltion" in "!.!,atin American, 
Eoonomic Integratioll" pp.3 and 9. 
(3) w. :81kan: "How to beat 'backl'lanht'lthe-::".Cnsc::f6I'":~'";lcustoms drawbrtck ul}Jonsll 
~¢llCmic Journal Udrch 1965 p.44. 
20"t: 
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income is either higher or lower than tho initial average. 
It can plausibly be arc;ued that thoro is no solf-corl!'::lction for this 
process as the market mccb.anism fans to reflec!; tho diseconomies of 
agglor.teration: lithe external economics due to the (growth) poles are, 
though, real, consistently overestimated by economic opcrat~~" (1) 
Also lusinessmen may have a verJ short tc~n horizon 
and be unreasonably concerned with "risk-avoidance" in the more backward 
areas.(~) All these factors produce a diver~ence betwoen social and private 
costs and a bias against investment in the already "lagging" areas. The 
explanation for tbis tendency to polarioation in Central America is in 
fact, in terms of externD..li ties. In Appendix 7· a look is taken at various 
posoible exploratory factors; taxation, \'Tage rates, "m:),rket potential" etc. 
None satiofactorily explain the Vleakness of Honduras, though EI Salvador 
,-
benefits from its hig1'\ market IIpotentialll and central location and Costa 
Rica's- vleak performance in rec ent years COllld be duo to poor market 
r.')tential as well as high labour costs. The only satisfactory explanation 
for the basic weakness of Honduras as a centra for new inveotment is in 
terms of the existing weakness in manufacturing and communications, as 
• "~,,, ... J' "',,",,: ;\'Iif~' 
brought out i~"tl;~.Jdiagra~l~elow. (3) 
(1) "Strategy for Economic Development" A. Hirschmnnn,~ op.cit. p.185. 
"'~ ""Capital gI'm'1th in connection with indivisibilitics, and rent lag, 
causes ag,zlom9ration of economic activities" .H. Giersch: I~Economic unton 
betYreen nation~4nd the loca,tion of inclnstq" Review of Econonic StudiefJ, 
1950, pp.87-89. 
(~ This problem is cov.;red in a more l-"('maral way in Yair Aharoni: 
E9reir,n Inv93tmcnt Decision Process" 196,6,. -:.: .:~. 
"The 
-
(g) This \'lould not ba valid', howovor, if -tho greatrc)r manufacturing 
contribution in one country hnd been produced by protection of relatively 
high cost entcrprioeo •. 
l 
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DI~ 3-23 :r.....c\~'M ".r: WU;fk.'.cJ ~ .Irtr.-...sl-ru~ ~.,~ • L4'" -----_._--t'--
(1968) GUAt,emala El Sal va..2£! !Io.ndnras Nicnramla. Costa l1ic.~ 
Manufacturing Value ¢250m ¢186m (1969) 0101'Sm ¢99m ¢149m 
Added (1960) 
Improved Roads, 
miles per 1,000 sq. 
miles 169 339 33 34 178 
Telephones per 
1,000 population 7 10 4 7 16 
~:Li teracy Rate 38% 48~b 45% 50% 84% 
% of Labour Force 
with Primary educt 1)~ 6nt /0 11% 7% 22~~ 
Electrical Power for 
Industrial Use 
(1968) million kwm. 211 164 43 129 155 
Source: Infolwation obtained from: U.N. Year book of National Accounts; 
Inter-American Development Bank Annual Report of 196B - "Sooio-Bconomic 
Progress in Latin America". 
,Cha,pter 3 
Conclusion: this chapter has tried to demonstrate some of i:le problems 
involved in calculating gains and loss from membership of the CACM, and 
to produce estimates. Tho figures do seem to corroborate the other source 
. r:' ~~ \ ',,:/'l~;-.)jJ,,' 
data and indicate significant benefit to the region, somewhat unevenly 
distributed to disadvantage Honduras. - ,I') However, it should be stressed 
that limitations of data are a major handicap to makin6 firm predictions 
and limitations of methodology present are undertaking other than retro-
spective or comparative static analysis; either of which may be a mislead-
ing guide to future policy. 
~~~~~~ 
~~~p'~~ 
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Chapter IV A Regional Investment Policy 
The rationale for a reeional. investment policy has been set out in 
the followinG terms: 
rea) such a policy is needed if maximum benefits are to be derived 
from inter-industry specialisation and from economics of scale, if 
duplication of effort is to be avoided and if it is considered that 
competition and private investment decisions are insufficient to provide 
these benefits: 
and (b) a regional investment policy is at tlie same time needed to 
counteract the clustering effects of industrialisation and can be used to 
reduce the need for financial compensation agreements by eneurine a more 
equitable distribution of the employment and income generated by integrationu(l) 
or by UNCTAD: "the fbllo'wine •••• deserve special attention when the question 
of an investment policy for the reeion as a whole is examined •••• a) 
equitable distribution of benefits; b) establishing priorities; c) 
aV9idanc~ of duplication. II (2) Such a policy might also be of benefit 
in establis~,~n5.:5;:~!1tange bargaining power with multinational investors. 
v"' ! 
(1) P. Kahne~t, P. Richards, E. stoutjesdijk, P. Thomopoulos: "kWQ!!!.ic 
Integration aJljon~ DevelopinJ:; Countries" OPt cit. p.42. A "regional 
investment policy" means jOint planninG in this context. 
(2) U.l:.C.'l'.A.D.: II,Trade E':mlmsion !'!,n.,ti J<;conomic Int.esra.tion Amonest 
Developinp; Countries Report by the ~ecretariat" OPt cit. p.32. 
, 
,. 
~~,-.-
204. 
Unfortunately, this is a subject that can easily bocolne infused with 
doe;matism. V[t-,ether one chooses to deal with inefficient industrial 
structures, on one hand, by reducing , protection to stimulate 
competition, or, on the other hand, with a ro~iona1 investment policy 
using licensing and other 'dirigiste' techniques, can become a matter of 
political prejudice rather thBAfconomic analysis. The author's view is 
that both approaches are important but that a regional investment policy 
is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for dealing with the 
problems described. This is a position which enjoys respectable patronage 
if not uni~ersal support.(l) 
The rationale is based on separate arguments and they should be dealt 
with independently. 
I Economies of Scal'e~' J.' Market structure 0.,...$ t~ ~Clsh. cj ~ ff\~12. Ort-',~.J:;~ 
.'In ChI I, we discussed, in very general terms, the importance of plant 
, 
economies of scale and the magnitudes of some of the actual benefits 
manifested in the 1areer market were suggested. Here we shall try to 
consider economi~~ of scale in the context of market structure. !'lore formn.1 
..... ___ ~;,.,,~Ii 
V-, 
(1) The case for inter-government agreement on industrial location is argued 
in (inter alia) A. Ewing: "Indtwtr;x: in Afri.c~tI Oxford University Press 1969 
pp. 126-7: 
Unit,ed Nations (mum). Jnd.u~trir-tl Dev(llo'Ome[lt Su!'vex pp.140-51: R.B. 
sutcliffe: "Industry and Under-development" OPt cit. pp.230-31: G. Dell: itA 
Latin American Common Market ll Oxford U.P. 1966, PPt120-141:,: J. Tinber/;'cn: 
"Heay;y IndustrY: in the JJ~.tin American Com:non 1,':llrket" Economic 13ulletin for 
Latin America, !v!arch 1960, pp.1-8; K. Kojima; '''rowards. A. Theory of Afl'reed 
Specialisation: the Economics of Integration" in ' E.'l~~s, l.1. Scott, 
J. r.'olffe. (Ed.) "In<iuct.~on Tr3.§...e •• and Growth" Oxford 1970 pp. 305-~24: 
M. Wionczek: "Reaui,sites for V'inble Intogrl'l.tion" and H. Kitamura: "F.conomic 
Integration of Under-developed 11er:ions" in t. \\ioneczek (Ed.): 1tJ.,atin AmerT.~~l1 
,Bconorrdc Interrr:J,tionll OPt cit. pp. 3-21, 42-67. 
'. 
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detini tions and analYDis of economies of scsIc will be renerved for Chi 5, 
but a good deal can be 'learnt from the attempts made initially by naill, ::md 
more recently by. Pratten to construct long run cost curv(~s for a sct of in-
dustries ba.sed on engineers' and economists' informed estimates. (1) '1'he 
studies shoy.". first, the "minimum efficient seHle ti (or "minimum optimur.l scale") 
of production, which is the lowest scale cJ: wh:t:cR minimum cost is realised 
(i.e. the lowest point in the averaee'curve). Second, they show the sen5i-
tivity of production cost to plant size. The cost curve for each ind.ustry 
incorporates a great many simplifying assumptions which cannot all be spelt 
out here. The genera.l picture is conveyed in Diag. 4-1. Alongside are set 
out details of the Central American market and the production of Central 
American firmo, for the few cases where indigenous data is available. Com-
parisons may be misleading, as we may be dealing with different levels of 
technical development. However, the technology of W. Europe/USA is directly 
applicable, in as much as there is no local capital goOdo jn(luotry and the 
capi tal equipment used is imported from .' O~ and incorporates 
g~ technology and scale functions~ (2) ror interest separate estimates 
made by an Ee;yptian researcher are recorded too, but the "optimal" scale is 
rarely ve-q .:cd:i.f.~:r:l:. 0) In Chi I also, reference was made to the f&;.c;'G;M~ 
for adopting existing technology - to 'minaturisation techniques' for 
exa~le - but these were not considered important. 
(I) J. S. Eain: "13_~r.~iers to New Competitio..n." Ha.rvard, 1956, esp. Appendix :B. 
C.P :C. Pratt en: "EconoMies of SC:3.1e in ~/Anufacturin?i Tndust!:{." Ca'rflbridae 
Dept. of Applied Ecol1omics, Occaoional Papers, No.28, 1971. 
(2) M. Kerhav: "Technolorrica1 Dependence, lV-ononol:! Md C:rQ.~" New york, 
1961, p.6. 
(3) U. Uetawal1y: "The, Effect of 1'!l'l.l'ket r,imi tr-dions, on the IndustrialiM.tion 
of F:B'Ypt" Yorkshire :Bulletin of l<;conomic and Social ncsearch, l.:ay, 1967, pp. 
37-49. 
"',' ~~,i~;; "" f " 
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Diagrnm 4-1 
Industry 
Flour 
Ebonomies of Scale of Optimally Sized Units 
M.E.S. Cl'r\II\i~ E"ffr~ c.;~ 
f' 
. 16,500 M.t. p.a. (:6) 
Scope of Central America 
A.C.curve " Production 
(increase in costs as ~ 
output falls by 50'/0 ~ '4lt!\3·
Q5· 000 Tp ( 
l5%(P) , . .a. exc. 
5-lO%(B) C~sta Rica and 
Nlcaragua) 
in El Salvador 2 mills 
Consumption 
~ ~ produce 44,000 tons p.a. 
*" ' : • J ~o trJT> ~ 1": ;'l:.. Sugar Re-rining 350,000MT p.a ' (M) 9%(p) 172.5 million litres  
.Beer 1 million bar: ~ls (P) in El Salvadorone 
20 million litJ~s (M) brewery produces 1m. ~ barrels plus 14m. 
litres 
Cotton Yarn 6-11,000 MT p.a~ (M) ) 50,000 MT in El Salvador 
60,000 spindles (p) ) (19 66) 
-very - ---
Cotton Weaving ~O-75 million metres (M) ~small 3q nillion metres in 
c 1,000 looms (p») El_Salvador (1966) 
P.aYon Yarn 
-Viscose Yarn 
50-75 million pounds (:e) 
25-65 (M) 
11 million pounds (M) 
/ 
8% None 
None 
Soap/Detergents 70,000 MT p.a. detergent (p) 
10,000 !1T p.a. soap 2.5% (p) In 1966 7. Central Anerican plants in market of 5,000 M.Tp~. 
Fertiliser 
Ethylene 
Nylon Fibre - polymer 
I::anufacture 
- ex {:<:tdc;[- fibres 
Sulphuric Acid 
, 
45,000 to 300,000 MT p.a. 
of Anhnonia (If 
300,000 l-1T p.a. 
80,000 MT p.a. (P) 40.000 HT p.a. 
1 million T p.a. (p) 
I 
capacity fr_o:n900_to _ :s.oomrr -o.a. ____ _ 
None 
9% {p} None 30,oooMr 
5% (p) None 1,GOO 11T 
7% None 
1% 13,000 T p.a. 
i 
! 
(:;:";;;;7'~' 
'" __ ';'10.:/ 
• I' "',', I ','/"1,' "/ I I" // ,-" ~. 
" 
N\ . ..Q. .S 
¥.atches 20-4~11ion sticks (M) 
Petrol Refining .200,000 bel (p) (b . .l.~ <" 
65-165,000 Qd (M) b~ F"~) 
____________________ ~1~20=,~00P_~d ___ {B) 
Leather shoes 600 - 1,000,000 pairs p.a.(~) 
Factory <300,000 pairs p.a~(P) 
Other <. 20, )00 pairs p.aJ 
A-.c..~ 
5% (p) 
2% (B) 
2% 
Pruf~ 
E1 Salvador - 1 factory 
producing 2~,000 m. sticks 
Six refineries from 
8,000 bd.to 22,000 bd. 
. 
El ~alvador.l.~5 million pairs 
p.~~5 facuor2es 
~ 
600 - 2,500,( :~o pairs p.a. (B) insignificant 
----------------------------~~~- , 
Cement 425,000 !1T p.:!.. (B) 10% (B) 
Tyre s and t~bes 
Steel production 
L"ltegTa ted 1-tl.11 
Rolled Sheet 
Rods, Bars and Pieces 
Fridges and Washing 
Hachines 
Car Assembly 
Cigarettes 
Uotes and Sources: 
~ 
2,000,000 MTp.a. (p) 9% (p) 
335 - 660,000 MT pa. (M) 
1.5 to 3.0 mi11i~n units (B) 
4 million units (M) 
9 ' !1T Pia. (p) 
1.3 HT p.a. (UN) 
1-2.5 million MT p.a. (B) 
4 mi11ion}~ p.a. (p) 
5-6 million (p) 
20~~o.5PO,000 unit~ p.a. (M) 
500,000 units (p) 
20 billion (B) 
4-35 billion (M) 
(1-0 !{etat.)~ . 
(B) 13ain (references in textj 
(p) Pratten 
Cu.~ ~ rJo:t.:....... 
2-3% (B) 
5-10% 
18% (UN) 
5% (~) 
S% (p) 
n.a. 
&to (p) 
1,(13) 
5 plants varying from 
120,000 }~ p.a. to 
600,000 MT p.a. 
2 plants ........r.v S'oo,CUO~' poo . 
None 
None 
None 
Th~~e mills produce 
32,000 HT p.a. in 
400,000 
150,000 NT b~~w 
40,000 HT 
El Sal\Tado,J;:r~ ________________ _ 
450 p.a~ E1 Sa1vad.or 
Four s~zll plants 
5 factoriQ ra.'1ging from 
.5 billion to 1.2 billion 
,OOop.a. of 
20 I:!akes 
" 
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The tables show that there area.. few indust.ries where the Central American 
market, nationally or reBionally, would be able to sustain a substantial 
number of producero of optimal 6i7.e ouch a.s flour milling, cotton yarn an(l 
I 
weaving, shoes. (1) For a second category, the reeional m;trkct could support 
one or two plants of optimal size: oil refininc, soap, beer, matches, cement, 
H.wG~ s~lft?.,~ 
cigarettes. . in' _ cases there are one or more plants of sub-optimal size 
in each country~1ilis appears to have contributed to substantial loss of 
economies of scale in oil refinine and detergents, particularly. ~~ I 
there is production at capacities well below the optimum in industries for 
which Central America could not, anyway, sustain an optionally sized w1it: 
,sulphuric acid, steel pieces, assembly of COnStll1er durables and ca.rs. Finally 
in most intermediate and capital goods industry, the limited market size has 
prevented any production at all in Central America:~~ethYlene, rayon and 
viscose yarn, fertiliser/ammonia, nylon fibre, pulp and paper, iron and steel. 
-'"'I 
. However, there are major qualifications that one m~~t make to such a 
superficial analysis. The statistics are derived from engineering 
~~ 
approximations and are only approximate. ~e product categories are far 
less homoeenous in practice than appears to be the case: steel, paper, etc. 
~~ .... ,.. 
. ~ ~:. ... ,,:~!,~~~....t"" f 
consist of many quite separate sub-products. A consequence of this is 
that "in most manufacturing industries as distinguished by official statistics 
the first plant of minimum efficient size cannot hope to survive with-
.~ 
out -export outlets unless the size of the market for the products of the 
industry as a whole, has reached, say, three to ten times the value of the 
(1) The finishing of textiles requires larger units of production than 
the Vleaving/spinnine' stages. Economies of scale are quite important in 
flour milling too. 
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output of the first plant. On thE) other hand, once this 'threshold' has 
been passed, it need not take f), very long' time before a number of add! tional 
plants can be established in the same industry, each ~ith a different 
production pattern. One interesting'implication of this is that if, for 
example, three countries are individually too small to support a :pharmaceutical 
industry, th~ integration of their markets for pharmaceutl cal productS' may 
well make possible the ,establishJnent wi thin n rela'Uvely short period of not 
only one pharmaceutical factor! of minimum efficient size between them, but 
of three or more such factories". (1)' Secondly, transport costs can havo the 
effect of reducing the 'optimum' size considerably. Thirdly, there may 
be changes over time: -mimiaturisation" may be a factor of importance in 
steel, cement or oil refining, (2) even tho~gh, in general. the tendency 
, 
appears to be for technical optima to increase over time. 
Economies of scale have, so far, been consideret disembodied from market 
structure. For an industry with declining costs over the whole ranee of 
output required to satisfy the rCGional market, any plant which was not in a 
monopoly position would be technologically sub-optimal. :But monopoly is 
generally associated with the misallocation of resources and "excess profit". 
There appears to-,.be an inevitable conflict of objectives here: "the beneUts 
" i~~r~.2~ J::: .. :U' 
from competition in a lareer market may often be incompatible with one of the 
main arguments put forward in favour of inteeration: this is that larger 
markets would open up investment opportunities for plants that would not 
otherwise be buil tit. (3) ,Or more str~dently "if any size of the ,indivisibility 
(1) . P. Elkan: "How to beat. backwash: the clls'e for 'cuntoms drR,wbflck ,mions" 
Economic Journal. 1965, p.65. 
(2) This is discussed in H. Sutcliffe: "Industry ~md llmk!::,clevelopme,nt" OPe cit., 
pp.240-241. However, he concludes: "these dovclopments have not succeeded in 
making small scale output cheaper than larljo scale output; they have only servel' 
to reduce the cost disadvantaser of producine; on a smr.tller scale." 1t.!.1. p.24l. 
( ~) F. r=n.l-mc:rtt, P. Richards, 1';. stoutj csdijk, P. T'lo!'lopoulos: "Economic 
InteP.'ration Amonrr Dcvelopinr" ,t:ountries" OPe clt. p.19. 
- .. ;.:."~ .. 
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is greater than the size of the market, perfect competition with free 
enterpriso is doomed". (1) 
The coexistence of several producing units is impossible in perfect 
competition theory under conditions of decreasing costs, when the ar;gresive 
encroachment' on other markets must lead to monopoly. ' • 
Expandine; the market size in theso circumstnnccs would involve 
reducing a few pure monopolies to oligopolies; small ~roup oligopolies 
to slightly larger group ologopoliesj while in other cases the larB'er 
market would enable new monopolies to be created. The likelihood of 
a high concentration will thus be very great; for in very few 'scale' 
industries will regionalisation advance the size of the market to the 
point where the cost curve has flattened out. Merhav has argued 
that countries Vlhich are industriolising but which have a backward 
indigenous technoloe:r mu~t inevitably import "alien" capi tal-
intensive, large scale techniques vin. imported capital equipment even 
though the level of aggregate demand is low p.nd lithe disparity between the 
scale of Oll.;+:r:'~.~::+S)...r;.which it is geared and tho extent of the markets, 
produces, at an early stage of growtl} an industrial structure in which 
technically inevitable monopolies are dominant".- (2) 
(i) A. Lerner: tiThe j';conomier> o,f Control It New York 1944 p.180; also 
see T. Ski tovsky: "l.:conomic rrhcol:'Y anit W. l·inropctiI.n Inte;i'ration1t Stanford, 
1958, p.124. 
• 
(2) M. If.erhav: t1~.£'echnoloe;ical DeI2onclcnce, !!onop,o.lJ': Rnn. Growth" OPe cit. p.6. 
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The question then arises a.s to whether we should recarcl "monopoly" or 
oomewhat more "competitive" if technically inefficiEmt industrhl structures, 
as more acceptable. The former has traditionally been rc£;ardcd as tho 
greatcr evil. In Central America tho U.8. government eave ve.nt to such 
anxieties, when crlticisine; the Integration Industries scheme: "tho US 
Government opposes 'integration industries' and considers that they will 
tend to limit competition and ultimately benefit neither the economy of 
the region nor the consumer". (1) Hov;ever, the extent to which a 
monopolist can e:>"1lloi this posl tion will depend on the level of tariff 
(i.e. goven1ment policy) and on the willingnoss of government by 
taxation to appropriate all or part of the monopolist's profit. For 
these reasons, monopoly should not be regarded as posine an insoluble 
policy problem. Indeed the Integration Industries Scheme has a 
considerable array of controls to ensure that any regional monopoly 
is adequately policlcd. (2) 
~~ 
The more serious problenA is over-invcotmcnt leadine; to a wastRge of 
capita1~ Most recent Vlri tines on the Central A..'llerican Common 1~arket 
have referrt;>n c:i·~tj.pally to "the problem of duplication •• ". or, more 
... ~~ -. ~-~.00Q~ 
preCisely, the establishment of excess capacity for providine any product 
as a. result of investment in two or more competing plants in two or more 
(1) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Interna.tional Commerce: 
"~.System of Regional Industries of TnteG'rn.t:l.on t:1nd United st.::ttes 
Policy" Washing-ton DC, 1968, p.l. 
(2) See p.l1~ (of this chapter). 
~ .. 
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of the Central American countries". (1) To tl very large extent, the 
whole process of import substitution behind t1=l,riffs, r:tthcr. than 
specifically in: a comrnon market context, is rt:sponsible f()r this 
tendency to a wa,steful proliferation of capacity: "the growth of 
several small-scale plants in a number of industrial activities, with 
consequent loss of economies of scale has been noted in both Latin 
America and Asia. In Latin Anerica the growth of such inefficient 
enterprises has been both induced and maintained by hieh tariff 
walls which make profitable production at almost any scale possible. 
Besides, this phenomenon appears to have occurred in Latin America 
(in the automobile industry, for example) despite free entry, suggesting 
that most firms got into the act simUltaneously and are consequently 
in an inefficient but stable equilibrium where none wishes to expand 
. . (2) 
at the expense of the other since each can pla,y at the same earne". 
-.J 
Several case studi~ have been carried out of the extreme lengths of . 
"duplication" in the Latin American car industry, especially in Chile. (;) 
Tavares writes of the seventeen firms in the Brazilian car industry that 
. . 
"their joint action on the market is actually para-monopolistic in terms 
of prices without any of the advantages of a monopoly in.terms of 
, '. • -r-' ""'v·'~ ~ •. l,~, 
costs." (4 r ,-~.:..:..' 
(1) World Bank Report on Central Am0rica, Part IV, 1967, p.3; • 
. (2) J .B. Ebagwati: "~.(~o;t.icip.s for devolo:pmel1t" in P. ]'oi and G. T\3-nis: 
"J'he Gap between Rich and Poor Countries", p. 257. 
(3) L. Johnson: "F,!oblerrgJ of import"l.l.!Ps.titution in th'e ChHean autO!T1obile 
.!.!19-.ll.fl.t~ Economic .Development rmd. Cultural ChRnrjes,". Jan. 1969, pp. ~02-2l6. 
(4) U.C. Tavares: "The ero .... rth and decline of. imnort st~tittltion in ]raz:l.1" 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, No.1, 1966, March, pp.9-10. 
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This ha.ppens beca.use import oubstitution involves importers tryine 
to jUJT'lP the tariff by producing locally in ore10r to defend a market share 
threatened by other local producers. (1) Johnnton argueo tha.t, character-
istica1ly, investors "duplicate" the market structure and marketing 
methods of the advanced countries; high distribution margins, hea.vy ad-
vertising, extensive product differentiation, rapid product changes, which 
are made even more expensive in this context by the narrow markets and 
special tastes in luxury goods of the elite groups.(2) Furthermore, 
"the special deficiency of the competitive system makes it possible for 
enterprises with greatly differing productivity to coexist owing to tacit 
market sharing arrangements and to the fact that prices of the least 
efficient producers are supported by the high protective tariffll. (3) Any 
"oligopolytt formed in this way will tend to be stable in the long term 
as the overseas subsidiaries accomodate each other, while maintaining 
formidable "barriers to entry" for any indigenous producer who wiDhes to 
enter the market. (4). And the -~ttempt to explain this persistent tendency 
to proliferate small uneconomic producing units (especially in light 
industry) vms made by Griffin. He suggests that it is due, in part, to 
the inability of the entrepreneuxial class "to crea.te inveatment opportunities •• 
(1) 
.... , 
------._--\-'.~:" 
Open 
This process is deElcribed in deta5.1 in P. Kilby: "]:ndustrialisn-tion in ap 
Econo:n;y:: Nip;eria, 1945-1966" Clllilbridge, 196~, Ch.; and 11. 
(2) H. Johnson: IITa.riffs And Economic DEwclonment" Journal of Development 
Studies, 1964, p.24. 
0)- .U.N.C.T.A.D.: "Trqd(~ Expansio,n flnd Econo'Tli.c Integ!·a.,ti,on ,a-nong Devol,o'Pin,f! 
.Countries" OPt cit. p.33. 
(4) M. Merhav: "Technological nepende~cp., l.~onopol;z ~;:Qwth" 01'. c~t. Ch.2. 
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but instead is inclined to respond to obvioun profit situat:i.ono." (1) He 
a1[)o sUGcests that in the absence of adequate plc:umine;, industrial investment 
does not naturally gravitate to the more "difficult projects with important 
"linkage effectsll and long term profits, but to superficia.lly eRsier pro-
jects that protection is adequate to sufficient to ensure adequate profit. 
There is, thus, an implicit assll."l1ption of "satisficinc;" behaviour among 
local businessmen which toeether with the pressures of international 
business strategy amonest overseas investors, explains the inefficient 
industrial structure developing. However, there arc optir.lists too, 
l.!ikesell sketches a scenario in which lithe introduction of a new and, 
perhaps, more efficient plant may force down the price of the product. 
If the demand for the cornmodi ty is fairly elastic, the market might be 
able to absorb the output of several plants; or conceivably the less 
efficient firms might be forced out of business or at any rate, obliGed 
to take steps to reduce their costs". (2) 
We are faced. with a persistent "identification problem". Are 
the inefficiencies identified the p~oduct of a reeional common market, 
or of import-substituting industrialisation which would produce even 
• .;.¥.rf~,-Jf ,.:~, 'It\ .. f 
6reater inefl~l.:~eriCies if pursued nationally? Indeed, it could be are~ed 
that "there is no contradiction between the posoibilities of reaping 
economies of scale and enjoyina the advantaso of intensified competition 
in .an intebrrated area ••• in sectors characterised by national monopolies, 
oligopoly will become the dominant market structure~ while in oligopolistic 
industries the size of the group will increase". (2) 
(1) K. Criffin: "pndervelonment in Spanish America" London, 1969, pp.251-252. 
(2) R. !.:ikescll: "The th.eo;rx of common markets AS anpli£:d to region::..1 
.§.;rranceJr;.ents ~:2E£..devel:£Pln.tr.~;n.trien" OPe cit. p.220. (This ifl pn.:-·t of an 
arcu.'"!lent. questionine the V~l,lue of a 'p12.nning' ap:9rot'l.ch in this context). 
(3) :B. Balassa: "The 'l'heory of Economic Inter;;rl3.tion" OPe cit. p.164. 
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Nevertheless, thin is a phenomenon that mere m~.rket enlnrg'0mcnt is 
unlikely to solve and may make worse: "it should be kept in mind that the 
(higher) cor.nnon tariff •••• may work in the opposite d.irection (Le. 
encourage a less rrlonopolistic otructuro) by offering greater opportunity 
for lucrative operation oven thoueh part of the installod capacity is not 
put to use. Thus, there is a danger that Anti-economic forms of growth in 
industry will be transferred from the national to the (regional) Central 
America.'1 plane with the resultant waste of resources". (I) And by extending 
the degree of import substitution, the ComJ'Tion Market will extend the 
distortions associated with it. 
It is clear from what has been said earlier that many of the examples 
of wasteful duplication do occur in industries which enjoy high effective 
protection, especially those in Central America promoted under the "Special 
Industries" Scheme. (2) Under the scheme, which guarnntees tariff 
protection and a common market to industries which are "new" and "of 
particular interest", there is no attempt to control location, impose 
legal b~rriers to entry and there is no limit to the number of firms 
wi thin an industry provided that each plant's capacity is half the size of 
the regional m~rkets. 
. .::~'.:.. .. -.:),: .. !~' Thoueh the latter is an attempt to realise economics 
of scale, the clause is so permissive a,s to permit laree scale duplication. 
The other factor which has aggravated the situation has been the policy of 
national governrnents who, It in their ea.c;emess to at tract foreign capital, 
have been vying with each other, each strivint; to offer tax benefits 
.. 
greater than its neighbours ll .(3) The existence of separate regimes of 
incentives interferes with the choice of loca.tion and timing of investment 
by creatine a patronage. relationship between eovernment and 'client' 
investors: in Honduras, for exa~ple, loc~l enterprises ca.n obtain 
additional benefits if it could be shown that a similar enterprise in 
another Central &~erican country is receivinG larger exemptions. (4) If 
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governments are prepared to subsidise inefficient duplica.tion in this way, 
investors are likely to take advantage of it. The recently agreed 
Investment Incentives protocol has tried to curb this aspect of incentives 
by a provision that when an industry hfl.S been given ta."{ exemption status, 
competing investments in the same country may receiVe similar benefits 
only during the u.ywxpired portion of the original incenU ve perio'd.: after 
1976, there will be limits 011 the ability to compote with deoignated 
prOjects in other countries. ( 5) 
(1) J. l.:oscarella: ".hl2.9..t:lpmic Integration in Central America" in J\~. \l1onczek: 
"1.Jatin, ""tunerican Economic Inteeratlon" OPe cit. p.278. . 
(2) The special e~J) SystCT1 for the promotion of production was intro-
duced in Jan. 1963 in the first Protocol (San Salvador) to the Convention of 
Integration Industries, and became effective in Feb, 1965, except in lIonduras. 
Due to the speed of operation of the System and of the simple pro ced.ure s , 14 
industries were approved in the first four years of operation. 
(3) C. Joel: "Tax Incentives in Central American Development" Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 1971, p.233. 
(4) . World Bank Survey of Central American Economies (Industry) OPe cit. 
p. 28. 
(5) C. Joel: iJlid p.248. 
• 
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We have shown in Chapter ;, ,that in mnny industries, the Central 
American COr.' ..rrlOll 1.;arket had led to (presumably heal thy) price competition 
ma~ing the tnriff irrelevant. However, what evidence is there of the kind 
of wasteful competition described above, usinc tariffs and incentives 
(i.e. effective protection) to disguise inefficiency? 
This problem of duplication varies in cause and effect depending on 
what type of industry we are discussing. 
Consumer Goods. If we concern ourselves firstly with 
consumer goods, especially consumer durables, the problem of duplication 
arises partly because of the nature of competition between the major 
international companies as well as the existence of restrictive practices 
between local operators. The former in particular are willing to 
accept inefficiency as the prices of retaining a ma.rket share and pre-
venting the expansi~n of rivals, and both may well be enabled by generous 
protection to make substantial profits. 
Th~re is considerable evidence to suggest that waste of capital has 
After the estalllishment of a small 
factory mrucing laundry detergent in Guatemala in 1956 (usine.one third of 
the Guatemalan Il'larket) there was in the early nineteen-sixties "a. flurry 
of.. new activities which ul timatcly resulted ip the introduction of several 
new brands and the construction of six additional detergent factories" - later 
• 
in 1966, two mo~e were added. (1) AccordinB" to inq.ustry executives,U the 
major impetus to thiD new development came from tha formation of the 
Central American COmrlon ~;rarket coupled with the offer of attractive investment 
incentiveo by the eevernments of c01ch of the countl'ies compri~inf:' the CAel.;". (2) 
(1) Harvard Business School (cases): "ll,Qj.e on the CentraJ._A"Lerican De,terp;cmt 
Industrx", 1965, "QQ).Late-Pal,moli va Intern-~"':-t~:i.;';'on-::t~J~_ ,;;." "':;A~-:':':B~-~C-;;!',;,::"1966, and 
"Kativo Chemicals DeterGent! U. S.," c. 1963. -
(2) ",N.ete on the r.entral AMerican Detereent Industry" op cit p ~ 
. - -:.I. • ".1' 
--
Once established, these seven plants competed but avoided overt price 
competition, "feeling that once started it might lend to a price war which 
would be disastrous to everyone involved. InsteUll, they prefElrred to rely on 
indirect cO'1lpetitive pricing tactics such as offering retailers both credit 
facilities, larger cash discounts, freo promotional merchnndioe, or changing 
the size of the detergent cont~iners.lI(l) As II result of brand competition, 
advertising wn.s adding 10-13;.(, to net sales value. 
The :effect of non-price competition was to duplicate the costs of 
of 
"spray tower" installations which do enjoy som9 economja:s,tcalo (,3200,000 
fixed investment for a 1,200,000 kg annual capacity unit: ¢300,000 for 0. 
3,000,000 ke unit) and to produce considerable waste ca~~city as production 
of the prepnckaeed spray towers is standardised and not offered at less than 
the 1,200,000 kg capacity. Therofore, for the Central American lJarket of 
4,350,000 kg in 1964 ( circa 5 million Kg in 1966) there were the following 
plants:, 
J3rnnd 
Date 
Openeq, Compllnv 
. , 
One shift 
capacH;y. 
Superdct 
Prim 
Fab 
Prim 
Tide/Ace 
!linso 
1956 Industia Quimica (local) 
1961 Ki!lg Hermanos (local) 
Guatemala 
Guatemala 
1.2 m kg 
1.2 m kg 
(also corit;r:ac ~"l;i~Jplier to regional 
Colgate-Palmolive) 
market except Costa Rica. for 
1962 Kativo S A (local) 
(destroyed by Volcano 1963) 
Costa Rica .' 1.2 m ke 
1963 Colgate-Palmolive (US) Costo. Rica • 9 m kg 
'~ 
1963 Renisa (l:utivo-local) Nicn.ragua. 1.0 m 'kg 
Hondura.s ,. 3.0 m kg 
Gable) 
1963 Quimicas Dinart (local)' 
(also contract supplier for Proctor and 
1964 Uni8013, (50)~ Unilevor) '£1 Salvador 2.6 m kg 
!lote': '~.~ .. ~::."~O' tha .. io.tal ,sales; 25;'~ VIere of 10c:11 brnna~ and 7510 
of th'~ throe big int(;rna. tion"ll cO:::lpanieo (Unilever, Col.::;nt-l'nlmolivo, 
Proctor' and Gamble. 
.. 
. , 
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As a result, only 4o;/~ of capacity \'las used in 1964 and about the same 
in 1966: while the grana investment cost is very much-greater than it 
could have been, with fewer plants. The causes and effects of this wastage 
are explained by n local area-manager: "it is relatively easy for anyone 
with about %200,000 to buy a prepackaged detergent plant and the technology 
necessary to operate it. That's one of the reasons why eight detergent 
plants have already beon constructed in the CAill.i when one or two could 
easily produce enough detergent to supply the needs of the whole arOa. With 
so much over capacity it is easy to see that what really counts is no'~ the 
ability to make detergent but rather the ability to market them effectivelyo,,(l) 
Another facet of corporate strategy in this area is for ench firm or plant to 
diversify output into a general product line; Colgate into soap and tooth-
pastes; Unisola into mar~arine and dried soups, dissipating even further 
possible gains from volume production and specialisation. 
A ?lightly less spectacular case but, nevertheless, a significant one 
is the case of the gIns,S b.ulb~._l'lnq flu,oroccent tube industry Vlhere two plElnts 
have been estnbliched both having Special Industries status. Both Sylvania 
(the Costa Rican subsidiary of General Telephones and Eleotronico) and 
~':, ..,., 
INPELCA (£1 Salvaitu~;'l!iit' subsidiary of Phillips) are assembling fluorescent 
tubes in the region, and both are producina substitutable lines with the 
reservation that Sylvan in have an increasing output of ~he. more luminouo bulbs.(2) 
In thiS: industry tho 1969 capacity was three .. ti.r~ofl greater .than a mrocimmn. 
estimate of the regional market 1Il9aoured by irnporto and assUrnirlJ lOOl'j import 
(1) Caoe Study of Colgate-Palmolive, op.cit,. p.9. 
(2) SIZeA: "!~otima,:te,.of dCt:1and in. ,;rolat.ion to. inotnlled cfl.'O,noit;z of Sylvania 
ppd I1{Pj!LCAII SIECA7.3EPAP/D.l 3-69. ~~atemii1a. 
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substitution; total capacity wao six t~ greater than tho ~nlmnm estimate 
of the market;. Th~ fact that the tariff required for tho in<lu~try is over 
lOOl~ is at least partially due to the enermous excess capacity in the 
industry. 
Another industry with three producers (in 1966; now four) is the 
dry-cell battery industry, the production and assembly of which normally 
requires considerable fixed costs expenditure. (1) Over t2m. had been 
invested in the industry by 1967, in three plants (with anothor to follow) 
of which Duralux (Guatemala) - an ESE subsidiary~was dominant and Union 
Carbide (Costa Rica) was subste,ntial. The Duralux subsidiary with 225 
million units capacity was operating at 33;'~ capacity, the other two at 
substantially less than lq; of capacity. There was also very little scope 
for further import substitution and not unsurprisingly, the situation has 
led to requests for subst~ntial tariff increases.(2) 
The paint industry is generally recrarded in Cen'~ral America as n heal thy 
competitive industry workin6 re~sonably closo to capacity,(3) but in 1965 
J> . 
there were 9dlO plants each producing a full quality range, mostly in 
competition for th~,. 3 million gallon market and for the most part, established 
. £: ... ,,( t1>'~~. 
post - 1960 by -i~t~~ational companios to proteot their markets previously 
fed t~ough imports (e.g. California raints Co; Hathaway Pain'~ Co; Standard 
Paint Co; Excello Co. and Regent). Paint production does enjoy economies of 
scale in the lower ran go of sizes and the number may well be in excess of 
• 
that required to supply the region offioiently and at tho least investment cost. 
(1) SIECA Document SIECA/CE - XXX/nT.18 (1967) - A requeot for "special 
industries" status. 
(2) SI£CA Document SI3CA/C3 - Vl/DT3 (1965) - A request for a higher tariff. 
(3) Harvard Business School (cases): "Note on tho Contra.l Am>'3ricnn Paint 
Industry" 1965,lCH 13G 2GB. 
- .. ;.;:-
219. 
, 
There are other cases too. As indicated earlier, an obvious solution would 
be to reduce the ra.te of effective protection, and this can be expected 
to happen when incentives expire in several years time for many industries. 
This would result in bankruptcy for the marginal enterprises and perhaps 
rationalisation of intramargina.l firms. However, in some cases some 
form of industrial licensing would be preferred (or added) and for 
rationalisation to be supervised by an official Common fI';arket body. To 
lower protection to existing enterprises could well lead merely to an increase 
in imports, with marginel firms becomine bankrupt ana intra-mo;f'ginal F~rms 
being forced by the new competition to operate at even lower rdtes of capacity 
use and lower efficiency, at least in the short run, 
," 
1. In the last few years five gramophone record plants have been set up 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Ric~ and lacdragua, all competing and all 
operating at low rates of capacity ltSage.* There arc several other 
industries in which economies of scale ma.y be of some ir.1portance and which 
-~ 
• ~f!t:fIr"#-'~~'''' ~ ~'t ,.. have attractecCJ.ac"t~o'rieo from the major U.S. brand nrunes, e.g. Cosmetics 
(Revlon, Helena Rubenstein, 4711, Old Spice) mostly in Gua.temala; pharma-
ceuticals CiVilly, Y.K. Hoffner, II a, Roche, Abbot, Dohme and Pfizer, Merck Sharp); 
ladies stockings and underwear t "LoveableH , f."aiden Form, Form-fit, Kayser}. 
In all these CAses one cannot be doema,tic about th'e cost "from "over-investment·· 
but it is clear that investment is largely motivated "by the desire of foreicn 
(mostly u.S.) suppliers to prot(~ct their pnrt of the narrow Central JUnericnn 
Market, and has resulted in a very inefficient use of capacity. 
* Banco Central de Costa Rica (Dept. de: Estudios Economicos): "AnalYsis de 
~rinciJ?¥es l'ubros" del-S.2E!l2!2i9 •• cc.ntl'oa,:,e.x:j.c~~1t 1968, p.3. --
It \ras factors of this kind which guided the Central American 
eovernments when they r~achcd a joint a.:.,rrreement on the phmning of the 
textile industry. 'The inherited situation at tho inception of tho Cornmon 
ltarket was highly unsatisfactory. Only 60,},: of the Oentral Amerioan demand 
was satisfied locally, but yet existing supply was seriously under-utilised. 
Tho mnin'problcm was th.~t "there exists no coordination whatever in the 
textile industry" •••• "new factories and expansions of old onas are planned 
in several countries. This will not solve the problems of those now 
operating at less than full capacity or with a low productivity. Lack of 
integration is one of the reacons for the duplication of investment and 
inadequate utilisation of investment, but the prospect of vast over-investment 
is likely to become a burden rather than an asset to 'the companies of the 
Central American countriesll.(l) 
Faced with this situation, a report on the rogional industry was 
, 
commissioned, (2) and this was followed up by a series of regional conferences. (3) 
The main conclusions which emerged from the report and c('nferences was 
, 
" that some restriction was required on new investment in spinning and weavi1lZ 
capacitY,.~~.~ ~". 
. c~'·:/'·, ~::,::\.~. 
(1) B.P. Hoselitz: "Economic Development in central. America" Vlelt .... wirt-
ochaftlichesarchiv, 1956, p.208. ._--
(2) Mission Conjunta de PrograUV3.cion parn Cnetroamericana t "?r,or-r,r,l'I.ma de, 
desarrollo de In i.nduGtrin textil de hillldoG lanoo de al';!.'oc1on" 
Guatemala, 19 4. • 
(3) SIECA (Report No. 1-324-A): "Informe de la reunion de 10. 'Orimera confel'~ncia textil Centronmericnnoll and SE~CAZCE XX;( wn:i, Gua't~mD.la 1966. 
,-' !'./. 
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As far as csn be scon, this approach to the problom of the textile 
industry has been relatively succ00sful and despite the high (nnd increa.soV 
.P~_~ ~~o~~, i,..J.:..tfo--J:~~· \ 
tariff there is. . The same ttlt.Mi~ 
approach would be, in all probability, more productive than merely to reduco 
protection in most industries with comparable problems. 
(ii) Intermediate and Capital Goo~s 
Different considerations a.pply here since economies of scale through 
indivisibilities are very considerable, such that for many chemical and 
basic metal projects the regional market could only support one efficient 
project, and also, because lead-times are long and uncertainty in tho 
pre-investment period can lead to postponement and delay in investment • 
• 
Thus the absence of a regional investment policy is important because, 
first, unrestricted ~ornpetition could lead (and haoS led. in Central America) 
to a situation where uncertainty over the intentions or", other governments 
And pote~tial investors causes the shelving of major investments: 
Second, if 'competitive' investments are undertaken ~separate locations, 
then the cosi~~~~e4TInS of under-utilised scarce resources. or unused 
economies of scale. could be very considerable. 
'", Thore are several examples of duplication having taken place. The case 
of oil refining is suffiCiently important to merit a speoial case study 
(Appendix ) as it ia one of the few industries yet est~blished where there 
were really major gains to be obtained from economies of scale, and was one 
(1) 
of those which were used in the 1950's to justify the "rationale" for inteGTation. 
(1) United Nations (EeLA): "Possibilic:!ci~es de Del3f\rrol,do Industrial Intee;ra,fu>, 
,en Centroamerica" New York, Y965, pp.33-48. 
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In actual fact, the industry ha.s developed on the basis of nlltiona.l 
refineries 811d the corporate strateeY of the ma,jor mul tinR.tionaJ.s com-
bined with the reluctance of local eovc~~ents to co-operate, has led 
to six refineries being establishcd~IIVlhile the desire of each of the 
five governments to have a refinery located within its botu!daries has 
played a fundemental role in the development, it must be recognised that 
the different foreign oil companies undertook the investment involved 
with a view to insure their continuing presence ond operations in the 
area". 
(1) 
Another case which merits a special case study is cement. 
IINational lt production units have been maintained under freo trade 
-despite the significant economies of scale in the production process; 
Transportation costs- aro normally used to explain this but the 
considerable excess capacity in the industry can be explained in 
6 
good part by lack of coordinatio~~~ ~ S~~) · 
(1) World Bank Report (Industry) op~ cit. p.35. 
• 
~ ... 
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The first induGt~r, to be considered for Integrated Industries status 
was t;;rre production. and more particulQrly, tho GINSA tyre factory in 
Guatemala'. This had been in o'08ration since 1957 and obtained full I-I 
status in all lMjor countries in 1965, whereupon, it doubled its sales in ti':o 
years. One of the more persistent problems has been the fact that while in 
some respects the company is expected to operate as a regional supplier, to 
maintain stocks in all five countries, and to base its capacity on the 
regional market, it has had been unable to use its capacity to the maximum 
possible. (1) The regional market was believed to be 480,000 tyres in 1970 
and 335,000 in 1966. (2) But in 1966 capacity usage was about 60p with 
production of 188,000 tyres and oapacity'of 300,000 tyrcs.(3) Part of the 
problem has been due to competition from another plant (FIREST0l8) in Costa' 
Rica which operates outwith the I-I scheme but nevertheless, has taken the 
Costa nican market and as the I-I protectj.on falls annually, Firestone is 
taking a greater proportion of the Nicaraguan and other markets. 
Soldered steel tubes is another industry in which it was felt nt the 
beginning of the ninoteeen sixties, one region~l producer would be adequate 
for the sma~l diameter range as part of an integrated stoal industry.(4) In 
. I~~'J, _ . ,' .. ',I'>:.,&" 
practice, three plants have been established: M..!1rASA (US Steel) in Nicaragua 
and IlflUP3RSE in Guatemala were set up first of all ~nd recently a Costa Rican 
plant has started substituting the products of the other two plants. There is 
• (1) :: •• : D. Ramsett: tlRe6ion~1 Inclustrial Developmen~ .. " op.cit. 
() . 00. ( 2 F1restonelEstimate interview in Costa Ricn). 
(3) It is bound by protocol to produco 225,000 tyros (Article XXII of 1st 
Protocol) and ext0nsions fro~ a 120,000 capacity wore carried ~lt in 1966, 
followed by further extensions. 
(4) United Hetiono (EeLA): "Possibili1ndcs e1a desarrollo i,ndustri.3.l, interr::.~ 
en Centroamer1.ca" :: .. - :- ":-9P~¢ih pp.9-·1,. 
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serious undcr-utilioation of capacity in the industry (}/J!:'l'ASA. 30% in 1965-6 
of its 11000VT capacity for making -?i" to 4" tubes). 'l'he entry of an 
I1""TUPERSE (capacity 7 ,000 J~T) removed 10-157( of !~~ASA' s oaJ.es in the 
Guatemalan market. Fixed costs are heavy in this industry (¢2m. in }.:B'l'ASA) 
and the under-utilisation of capacity has given rise to financial problems 
and a demand- for tariff incroases. (1) In the flat ga.l vanised sheet business 
there are eight serious projects being considered for a 40,000 rf.T market, 
four already under construction, a.nd as a consequence nec0r;sary effective 
protection is very high. 
There are several other industries where governments have planned 
competitive installations which have not yet been established. Fearl'l of 
excessive investment in production facilities were largely derived from the 
1964-69 Development Plans. "If all the projects consid~red in the plans and 
by the development institutions were fulfilled, by 1969-74 there would be 
considerable excess capacity for certain products and a lack of capacity for 
others ••• many of the installations aro relatively small and in all 
countries there are plans to establish or to expand factories-in the samo 
types of'inclustry." (2) For this reason the l)lnns we:r::) heavily criticised; 
~. 
• ''', .... ,.t"~<,~, .. ~~'-.. ~, 
"it is ovident- ~nat·'the national plans that have been prepa:red so far do not 
contain specific elements directly designed to drive the process of 
specialisation of the productive facilities, nor for the same do they lead to 
a systematic use of the potentialitieo of the Corrunon Farket." (3) In order 
• 
(1) SIBCA: "So11c.i.tudE's de J.on rrobiernos pn.rn. rene,rocial" gravamenes a la 
,importa,cion e-g';;;"u';;;'ip;;;'a;;';_ ·ro;.,_n.;;";d"O;';;8-II---";;'S-L;;;'~C--A-/""'C""1;";;-' ;'::-";;XX';;;v';';;I';;'l;:;'I/-:'DT~'-S.:.;.;o..-G-u';';a';;'t""c"m-(-al;:';a;;;';.-"o.;;;.;.;:,.;..;.;==;;;....,; ...... ;,:;;: 
(2) Pan A.lJlerican Unlon: tlReno,rt on the C_~Etra.l Americ'\ N.ation,al. neveloJlMent 
Plans Rna the Process of E.£2n.s>1!'2:s. I,!1te{l'l'atJon" August 1966, p.27 (also 
pp.87-EJ8). - . 
(3) .I!21i! p.26. 
I 
t 
r 
I 
to demonstrate the potential effects of this lack of co-ordination, Diae.4-2 
sets out the situa~ion as regards those products where the effects are potentially 
most serious. 
Two significant pOints emerge. The first is that in the absence of 
adequate co-ordination there are many cases where, had planni~g targets been 
adhered to there would have been gross excess capacity and many plants of 
small size in industries that are very scale sensitive. The second is that 
the extreme inadequacy of the national planning exercise was such that it 
lUU1ped together projects totally failing to take into account the stage of 
development of the projects contained; many of them being little more than 
hopeful ideas unsupported by technical, "financial or economic data. The 
"lead-time" in many industrial projects, especially where local raw materials 
are involved, and technical obstacles have to be overcome, is very considerable. 
The effect of national.compatition for the ultimate siting of these major and 
valuable projects is to hinder them, ao prospective investors are unsure as 
to the ultim.:l.tc size of the regional market: "one is led to 7he conclusion that 
uncertainty resulting from existence of national compatltion in the granting 
of incentives has ,.~ended more to hinder neW' investment than to encourae;e 
duplication" ~ (L'j:':'T~~~~~ajor issue, therefore, is the adoption of' policies 
which would provide tho necessary elements of control over the inevitable 
monopolistic situation which results from the establishment of large plant, 
'~ 
and to· ensure that there is a sufficient degree of joint planning to prevent 
competing industrial promotion with its conl'lCQ,uence of creating uncertainty, 
as Vlell as the waste of time and resources in the pre-investment phase. 
(1) World Bank Report (Industry) pp.35-36. 
currently 8st~blished 'r0eional' entl)rprises 
others) convinced the author thnt this was a 
both now plr.n'cs and expansion;' .... 
Interviews with mana(3'ers of 
(caustio soda, PVC, tyres and 
real fear and hnd retarded 
.. _-
: 
Product 
Ircn at:d Steel 
Plate glass and 
ccntainers 
~\Irl!loni9. 
Caustic Soda 
~'~~~_4--1:-~ __ PL~ !A$W2~ p~ 
Demand - Projected 
Por billet steel (for shapes) 
1969: 140,000 tons 
1974: 235,000 tons 
1969: 
1974: 
1969: 
1974: 
1969: 
. 1974: 
1969: 
197.4: 
21,000 l!T containers 
33,000 It II 
10,800 plate glass 
16,000 11' " 
110,000 MT 
220,000 ruT 
13,700 MT 
19,000 UT 
Projects Planned Nationally (1964-69) 
Honduras: minimun of 100,000 tons of 
billet steel fro~ oagnatite 
Costa Rica: oinimum of 100,000 tons of 
billet steel froo titani-
ferous sands. 
Honduras: 6,100 ~T plate glass (2-6~) 
(possibly 9,200 MT) 
El Salvador: 9,000 l:T containers 
(16,000 lTT in 1970-74) 
Costa Rica: s,em l1IT plate glass 
(2-4=m) and 
6,000 M:T containers 
Already exists VIC.~A - Guate~ala in 
1964: 12,000 T of ~ontainers 
El Salvador: 100,000 ~~ 
Guatemala 100,000 lilT 
Costa Rica: 18,000 UT 
(IGAITI report subse~uently recoTmended) 
a 180,000 MT plant :ft1r Honduras 
Nicaragua : (12,0~' ,'l.IT planned) 
f- , 
. 
" 
Guatemala: 5,000 ~:T {as a 1974 possible 
extension to a viscose rayon 
plant) 
El Slavador: ~, 000 M:r (as part of Pvc 
compl$) 
Costa Rica: l2,OJO ~ (and insecticides) 
(subseq,ucnt idea of a 50,000 12r plc.nt 
to accompany alumina plant) 
1\ 
Pres·:mt Situation 
Ve~J long term. Eodified 
proposals for 60,COO tons 
Not recently discussed 
Serious proble~s due to 
excess of iron in glass. 
Long tero if at all. 
Plant closed 
Only coloured glass 
possible. 
IncraaseA.to 
B-"1c! then to 
. 
22,000 liT 
30,000 tiT. 
No action taken in any 
countrJ. 
Established 1968/69 
at 10,000 1'~ 
No £lction 
Being considered 
Insurmountable problems 
of chlorine disposal. 
",'-P' •. '::! 1
i 
"'I 
,b', 1":,, ,/I/M 
Polyethylene - PVC 
Viscose Rayon 
Pulp and Paper 
1974: 
1974: 
1969: 
. 1974: 
MT (PVC) 
18,300 1~(Polyethy1ene) 
3,000 lIT 
3,800 I.iT 
(Pulp of all kinds) 
1969: 1, 000 1.~ 
1974: 120,000 lIT 
(alternative estimates 
163, 000 J,IT 
220,000 MT) 
El Salvador: 3,400 ~~ PVC 
Nicaragua: (PYC, Po1yethy1eno) 
Costa Rica: 5,000/7,000 llT PVC 
7,000/9,000 llT Polyethylene 
lIicaragua ) 
Costa Rica ) : 
.. 
8,Oeo (lrr in total 
Gua te:na1a ) 
Guatemala.: 100,000 }.1T (.60, COO Linefu.oard 30~orrugated oedi~ 
10,000 Kraft) 
E1 Salvador: 11,000 k"T (Yxaft and corrugated 
nedium) 
Nicaragua: 
and 
Costa Rica: 
and 
Honduras: 
40,000 MT (for writing &; toilet 
paper) 
100,000 l~ (for export from 
Atlantic coast) 
18,000 lilT (Kraft and corrugated 
medilm) . 
50,000 1!r (Kraft liner and 
corrugated medium) 
«Linerboard) 
j 
170,OCQ'.\1T 
. '. 
',2 ~ 
~ 
\\ 
ITo project 
7,000 liT PVC resin 
No project 
Uo action 
Ho action 
Imple~entation phase 
No action 
No action 
Project due to start 
1972; then postponed 
indefinitely_ 
) 
,""I,' 2//;':,/,;, 
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Tinbergen has argued, "assuming that an optimum pattern of heavy industry 
can be more or less estimated ••• can'1 t bo expected that this pa.ttern 
will automatically come into existence ••• ? It would seem doubtful. 
The first re~.son for doubting the effectiveness of a regime of free 
entrance to these industries is the relatively long construction period 
of the industrial projects. This invalidates the accuracy of the market 
mechanism ••• (since prices are artificially high in the construction 
period and other firms enter to duplicate the production). The second 
reason to doubt the effectiveness of a regime of free investment is the 
existence of indivisibilities ••• The third reason ••• concerns the 
important question of location (due to externalities in certain places.)" (1) 
1m. attempt has been made to justify in principle, a regional investment 
policy in order to prevent the wasteful use of scarce c~pital. The 
mea.sUres to be applied could cover a whole range of policies from strict 
mul tinational licensing to incentives and voluxltary aercemeJlts; and aloo 
require parallel measures to prevent any abuse of monopoly power. But in 
any circumstanccfl !'the real choice ••• lies between spontaneous monopolies 
• 0/,"--- ••. \ ' . •. :."t.' 
and oligopolies on one hand and monopolies and olieopolies controlled by 
Union authorities on the other." (2) 
(1) J. Tinbergen: IIHenyy Inclus.t!:Y. ip the LR.ti~ricml Common M"'rket" 
Economic Bulletin.for Latin America, March, 1960, pp.1-8. 
(2) J.l. Wionczek: "Regula! tea for Viable InteE~rl'1.ti0A." ill Wionczek (Ed.) 
"J)atin American Economic Intep:ration" 01'. cit. p.IO 
'. 
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In eh. 3 it was shc/wn that \71 thin Central .America the distribution of 
gains Vias such as to offer least benefit to the initia.11y poorest partner, 
• ()(.(;iAol'"$ 
Honduras. This process: in all geographical are(l,S whare there is 
industrialisation under largely laissez-faira conditions: "historical and 
recent experience both within countries (for instance l3razil and Italy) and 
wi thin integrated groups of countries (for instance E~ast Africa) strongly 
indicates that in the absence of measures to counteract the natural trend of 
market forces, the disparities between the more advanced and the less advanced 
developing countries within a unified re~iona1 market would, in all probnbility, 
become more prono1.IDced." (1) There is a good deal of'evidence to suggest that 
industrialisation in Latin American has led to spatial polarisation within 
and between countries; (2) and that this is a characteristic feature of 
~(\\~~ 0) 
developing , of mature economies • 
• As far as common markets are concerned, several have produced evidence 
of unequally distributed benefits apart from Central America. In East Africa, 
for example, the Cornmon Market was disrupted in 1965 by disputes over benefits 
despite the existence of R distributive pool for customs duty and an industry 
sharing arra~;::::,··~:""',::+,.,.!., (4) Authori ties are divided as to whether Tanzania '. and 
Uganda.~the least industrialised partners,lost in .. absolute or merely relative 
(1) ID!CTP.D: "Trade }~am:don and F.col1om1c .Inteeration Am(')n~ DevcloI?ing, 
,Countries" 01'. cit. p.20. 
II 
(2) P. Odell: "Economic rntee;r~tion, .and the Spa.tIal Problems .of. ,Economic 
~.Ql2!'1rent ill Latin Americ.~" Journal of Common ][n.rket Studies, Vol. 6, 1967/8 
pp. 262-286. 
(3) J .G. \'lilliamson: "ReHional ineg'.!!1l!..t;y: And the P.:!:'Oc~I'IS of ll::lt.!Q.l.lal 
developmE;nt" Economic Development & Cul tura.1 Change, 1965. 
(4) Sec (inter alia) P.'Robson: lIl£.onomic Inten;r~.tion in Africp.," oPe cit. Ch.4. 
Earlier signs of strain were evident: rl'. Kennedy: "'.Ph€) :S:U'lt Afric~,n Economic 
Union: some features of ito history ftnd oper.A.t:i.:.2!ltt 1.:'a,.l)ol.'ere Journ'al 1959~ 
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(to KettjJa) terms from membership. (1) ~be 1967 Treaty for East 
African Corporation incorporated (Article 2) an explicit commitment to 
"harmonious and' balanced development and sustained expansion of economic 
activities, the benefit whereof shall be equitably shared". The Central 
African Customs Ul1ion(UDEAC) there was a considerable disparity in initial 
levels of industrialisation and income per head (~abon and Congo (Dr.) 
being much better placed than Cbad or the CAR; with Cameroon being both 
larger and poorer than the rest): again, despite an element of fiscal' re-
distribution Dnd industrial co-ordination there has been continuing tension 
between members with threats of withdrawal from the 'interior' 'end less 
developed members. (2) The West Africen 'customs Union was never able 
( 
to overcome the suspicion of the 'interior' and more backward states 
(like Upper Volta) have, that industrial development woul~ polarise towards 
the coastal and more advanced cities in Senegal and Ivory Coast. (3) ~be 
Central African Feaeration disintegrated, at lea.st in part, due to the effect 
which it had on the economic performance of Nyasaland. '(4) While the 
other groupings have not existed lona enough for cumulative disequilibrilm 
effects, to become apparent, they have been very careful to specify some 
The rationale, then, for soma 
(1) The former view, (gain from withdrawal) is' taken by D. Ghai: H:J11r:rit.2£12J.. 
distribution of the benefi ts ~m:l conte of the En.st African Common l,1arket" 01'. 
'ci't. ;i/. N'ewlym IIGaj.np· ~n,drJ;9,spefl ~~n-t..hE..Y.dl§i...A!...ri~E....9.2..ll)!!lorr r/arkE?.~1I OPe cit. 
A more qualified view is taken in the works of Hazelwood, Robson, Brovm and 
others, quotccl elsewhere. • 
(2) B. Mutharika: ",Tow,2.rd 1,:ul ti-l},a.t,i.£..nal Econp'plic C.o·:.oDcr:.~tion in ,.:\fr5.,c,~" 
Praeeer, 1972, pp.279-286. 
(3) B. Mutharika: lli£. pp.286-294. 
(4) A. Hazelwood: ".African Intef,'ration and Dinin.tf-er:ation" OPt cit. ChI 
(5) E.g. t.he ,Andean Group are c01'l1T'litted to roduce differer.ces between member 
countries C Acuardo de Integrac10n Subrecrio'naJ: Andino (l9691.and the CJ\JUFTA 
group is committed to an "equal" distribution of the benefits of free trade 
(Article 2 of the Agreement 1968). A major obstacle to the continuing develop-
ment of LA~"rA were differences in income levels betw.een members and the 
possibility of these widening. W. Krauss &: J. rt .... '1.this: tr,IJatin America r-!P...c! 
.Economic Intef;ration" ':l:bwo., 1970. 
- , 
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form of intGrvontion to ensure an acceptable distribution of proceeds 
is quite simply that "the tendency for an llutOinil:,.tiC process of income 
equalisation is very weak." (1) 
How is this problem to be solved? It is probably more difficult thro1 
amonest developed economies oinco the scope for transferring resources and 
making sacrifices is less; and as the disparitie~ in income between regions 
and social classes is likely to be so much greater than that between partner 
states, that political priority may be lacking for tho will to mruce 
concessions. It can also be ar~led that unequal development must be 
tolerated to enable the accumulation of inevitable surpluses. We shall, 
however, review the various methods that can and have been applied to 
maintain a satisfactory equilibrium, (2) 
(a) a regional investment policy, i.e. control over industrial location, 
by licensin~ and restr~ction, either on a piecemeal basis or part of a 
comprehensive planning effort. 
(b) ii$(o.;L compensation for the disadvantaged partners. 
(0) export subsidies. 
(c;lJ" ~~~r~ ~"~~ ~~ 
It is not.~elf evident that a regional investment policy is either 
. e::: . .:'of:' y.~. ~!J,,' 
necessary or sufficient given other policy options. To what extent call tho 
other policies be seen as alternatives? 
(1)' M.e.Bos: '''rhe Spatial Dispersion of Economic Activity" Rotterdam, 
1964, p.3. 
(2) This io an oversimplification. No mention is.to be made, for example, 
of the use of complex exchange rate regimes. In general see UnCTAD: "T~ade 
Exollnnion fmc'! ;·~conomi~ Integration A.monr Develorin~ Count.ries" New York, 
1967. 
---- -- ------------------------_._-------
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(i) Fiscal ComQon.sation: the attraction of fiscal compensation io 
that "it is possible to avoid the difficultic!Js of an investment policy 
II 
along the compensation principle of welfare economies ••• lithe creation 
of a compensation fund with all its difficulties should be far simpler 
than the cr9ation of an efficient p1anninf, machinery". (1) The use of 
fiscal compensation has been detailed elsewhere and requires only a short 
precis. The standard function of fiscal compensation is explained by 
Newlyn: "viGorous industrialisation policy will only be achieved on an area 
basis if there is complete fiscal integration ••• nle area government must 
control the fiscal machinery to the extent of being able to effect inter-
unit transfers ••• The industrialisation unit should compensate the other 
units by a direct fiscal payment for the loss of import duty resulting from 
import substitution". (2) This is economically justified in as much a.s tho 
" loss represents the "excess cost" in real income terms of the partners' 
imports (assuming away "water in the tariff ll ) rather than direct revenue 
loss. Such a criteria was applied in tho Cen~ral African ]'ederation, (3) 
and was a large component of tho national loss deemed to be compensated by 
the "distributable pool f! in East Africa, though in the latter ca,se, 
the "redistr~~_:'_t:~-~: from Kenya (variously calculated at L· 5m tof1'lm 
p.a. in 1964/5) was widely regarded as inadequate, and not commensurate with 
the revenue losses of Tanzania and Uganda. (4) I 
(1)- A. 2.d.dAfi'\ "Economic Intep.:rntion in IJ<tt.ir America. its 'Bener! tA 8.nt\ 
Obstacles" in R. Hilton; "FlCODooic InteC'r~tion ••• " OPe cit. p.89. 
(2) W. Newlyn: ",The rO].e of monet.ary And flecp.l polic;y:tI in U. Hicks: 
"Federation -and I:;conomic Gorwth in Dnc1erlleveloJ'?ed Coul'1trief!." Few York t 1967 t 
pp.90_ and 100. 
(3) The Federation involved, however, distribution mainly from Zamb~~ not 
Rhodesia. 
(4) The "pool If consist.e(l of 6~" of all comrr.only collected customs duty and 
4CY;' of com:r:only collected. company income tAX. One half of the fund Wo.s 
allocated to common oerviccs and the other half to distribution. 
" 
The UDEAC scheme incorpora.ted two clements of fiscal compensation. 
One Vla.S a Solidarity Fund which comprised 20~\6 of cornmon duties and vm.E! c,-iven 
almost entirely.to Chad and. CAR, though sums were not lare:e even after 1966 
when the new Treaty wan effective. (1) A. second instrument was the "tax 
unique" which was an excise tax on products sold in the ree-ional market and 
credited to the consuming country. However, it has been A.r{jUed that the 
device is "primarily to be considered as a means of restoring the domestic 
tax base, rather than as a means of providing fiscal compensation for the 
cost of intee;ration." (2) 
There are other arrrulgements which involve some de&rce of financial 
compensation as a subsidiary aspect o'f their operations, for example, in 
regional investment banks. In East ~frin~, fo~ exa~le, the contribution 
and receipt patterns of the Dank enable some redistribution to occur: loan 
allocations are mad~ on a 38~yf; 38~%: 22-~% basis, (Reyna havina; the 22~~), 
'While contributions are equal. (3) 'l.'he Central American Integration Bank 
operates on similar if less formal critoria. However, t.h_~ s form of oa1-
culation does not conpensate for income losses, particularly in respect 
of the loss for "shiftable" industries; and, indeed, it would be very 
-.... .c;:'C::~~£':':\:'~' 
difficult to do so since !B1l compensation for this might involve the 
exporter nation paying more in compensation than·' it derives in benefits. 
Also the imnorter may well regard economic activity loss as not measurably 
~ 
solely in finrulcial terms. • 
(1) m~crm ".Q.grrent nrobJ.erns of economic intetrA.tion" (Peter Robson) 1971 ,p. 34. 
(2) Ibid. p.32. 
(;) After 1967, there was also Central collection of revenue (20% of income 
tax and 3?:' of import duty) for a central fund to finance common services which 
were redistributed more equally. 
~ 
..... 
1J.1hus it is difficult to see how fiscal redistribution could be used 
for any other. purpose than offsetting import duty losses and it must 
necessarily be, therefore, only a subsidiary element in any settlement. 
It has, however; a useful part to play and is blessed with the virtue of 
simplicity once magnitudes have been agreed, assuming that a common customD 
collection q.n.d tax policy is in existence (which it is not, in Central 
America) • 
The inability of fiscal compensation to deal with "backwash" effects has 
led to suggestions that restrictions of regional trade be permitted. 
(ii) 1rade re~triction~ are one way of protecting the interests of 
the weaker partners, by permitting quotas and tariffs on intra-regional 
trade. This cuts right against the traditional case for customs unions which 
is to maximise the degree of free trade and equally is inconsistent with 
the GA'IT terms of admissability of customs unions which is only when there 
is complete internat free trade. However, if the argument is accepted that 
integration is a mechanism for reducing the cost o~ new industry, given 
, 
"industry-preference" in all countries, then free trade is irrelevant in those 
industries in which the "industry preference" of all countries ia not satisfied. 
Thus the v;i.~:?'...:..e~:'~.~~,in East African that "shiftable" industries which did not 
need any more than national markets, should be produced in national markets, 
protected if necessary: and in East Africa tariffs (or "transfer taxes") are 
pe:mitted up to 50% of the external ta!.'iff, - for revenue as well'ns 
protective reasons - on those products in which Tanzania and Uganda run a 
deficit with Kenya, as long ns these countries are n~ less than 20% out of 
overall trade balance and provided that the product arc not of "regional" 
industries (in East Africa the ..\:'p..)' could be seon, in a sense. as trade 
li~eralising a.s it replaced restrictive quotas). (1) Something analngoua 
(1) Prior to the "transfer tax", quotas were permitted on regional trade 
under the Kampala Agreement. 
A "liberal" pl'incip1e behind the tax is also implied in the explicit 
'infant industry' test. '11he tax ia tb 'disappear after eiGht yefJ.rs. 
occurred in the west African Customs Union, where tariffs up to 50jG of tl1e 
external tariff were allowed on intra-regional trade. However, in this 
case there was no special bias to the tess developed partners. 'l'he same 
principle applies somewhat morc positively in LAl"TA and the Andean group 
where trade restrictions are reduced proportionately more slowly in the 
transitional phase for those countries in South America, like Bolivia and 
Ecuad,or which would be unable to sustain competition with ArgentiOl). or Brazil, 
(though in both cases," a. rigorous "infant-industry" approa.ch is adopted and 
protection is strictly temporary). 
One idea for ensuring full reciprocity is that of Elkan, who produced a 
""blue-print· for an area of quantitatively and structurally balanced free 
tradel! in which restrictions would be permitted when trade failed to balance 
(i.e. deviate from a balnnce·by 2~:') in sectors for which specialisation' 
(1) 
had. not been planned. This would operate through a failure to "drawback" 
customs duties on unbalanced intra-regional trade. However, excessive 
pedantry over the precise balancing of trade in the short term can be 
seriously misleading: industries induced by the common ~arket may have an 
import-substituting or trade promoting role outwith the group (even for a 
deficit ·partner) and trade within the region may have marked differences in 
~ 
• ft,"""">l' .""'~,.,~, ,. 
value added' cc>u\;eni;' and multiplier effects as well as beinff unpredictable. 
In practive also, little progress will be made towards integration when each 
partner is concerned only with narroW' interpretations of reciprocity at each 
• 
neg~tiating stage: Arab and LAFTA experience bears this out. 
(1) P. Elkan: ItBlue-prlnt for an area of quantitatively Met atructura.11x 
balanced free trade": Journal of Common Market Studies, Sept. 1966, ~----. ,. 
see also, 
P. Elkan: "How to bc'!at bA.ckwash: the C"lse for customs-drA.wback unions" 
EconOmic Jo~al, If.arch, 1965. 
However, more fundamentally, such measures are entirely negative and . 
probably irrelevant since the individual states may well do better by 
total withdrawal, unl ess the restraintn on trade nre pn.rt of a total 
packa.ge involving agreement on the location of industries based on the 
regional market. Only if measures are talcen to help the weaker partner 
expand its r,.egional exports will the source of friction be removed. (1) 
Also as in East Africa, the definition of a. "ree-iona.l industry" must 
necessarily be vague and industries enjoying economies of scale could 
easily be inhibited or precluded by "transfer ta.."tes". (2) 
(iii) Subsi4~: fiscal compensation cannot effectively deal 
with "backwash": trade restrictions dan, but only by constricting the 
integration process. Neither mechanism greatly helps to promote regional 
exports, especially of firms using the regional market, indeed, they raise 
both fiscal and tariff disincentives to the more successful partners to 
expand regional sales. 
This has led to the su{Sgestion that the exports of the less advanced 
partners be subsidised to the extent that is necessary to displace some 
potentia~ production from other partners (or preferably attract additional 
activity froV! ()·Hl"!id~). (3) This would be most likely to be lin~:ed to fiscal 
1..~ 0 _, ,,~ ....... ~,,'l'" 
compensation in as much as the fiscal transfers were used for subsidisinB 
regional exports. 
• 
While the use of export subsidies is more trade-expansionary then 
restrictions on regional tr8de, it does face serious practical questions. 
(1) R. J3hambri: "CustOlTl!'1 unions And 1(1S8 -developer, countries" Economia 
Internazionale, lI:ay 1962, pp.235-58. 
(2) G.K. Helleiner: "Trnnsfer ta.xes", trt.r.Urs and tho j'~ast Afric:tn Common !:.arket" 
East d'rican }t~conomic r,ev'ie;~, 1967, pp.53-61. An· eXaT:'lple of a failure to 
develop A. proper reGionfll c'lne for industrico d~le in part to "transfer ta.."tes" 
is tyros. 
,R. Ehambri: i M,d,. 
-
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l"irst, is the subsidy arrD.ngement to be financed by fiscal compensation 
or by the exporter country (as, for example, in the Central American Fiscal 
Incentives System)? The latter would' have very limited attractions for 
the backward country. Second, is the subsidy e.pplied to regional exports 
only or to ~l the production of designated plants? The la.tter would 
lend to heavy costs and possibly abuse, the former to price discrimination. 
Third, we know from experiences elsewhere that it is not possible to 
influence investment decisions by small differences in tax rates and that 
as many of the advantages enjoyed by the favoured locations are -external' to 
the firm it would be extremely diffic~t to quantify precisely tlle cost 
disadvantage of the less favoured locations. (1) 
If this is the case then another way of making investment in the" lagging 
areas more' attractive is by improving the infrastructure (transport by road or 
rail, telecommunications energy supply, industrial training) in these areas 
weakest, such as Honduras in CentrallilAmerica, 'l'anzania in East Africa, Chad/ 
C.A.R. in UDBAC and Paraguay/Bolivia in LAPTA, and for the better placed 
partners 'to help finance this. (2) Also, if the volume of intra-regionol 
trade Vlere. gre,at,:a~ a proportion of the totnl then currency devaluation 
""" .... , . ..;,..... ... \,~d.' 
would have the same effect as an export subsidy combined with a tariff (in 
intra-regional trade). This may be directly relevant for those casos where 
high labour costs are ono of the main obstacles to succes3ful tra~e as 
possibly with Costa Rica, which did in fa.ct try a policy of multiple 
exchanee rates, but which was prevented from devaluing against its pa~tnerB 
(1) Clark Joel: "~pcentivco in Central American develonment lt OPe cit. 
(2) One might also ment'ion that in EOost Africa the dissntisfaction of Tanzania 
and Ueanda with the East African group was partly met by decentralising corr~on 
service institutions from Hairobi; and in Central America efforts were Made to 
ensure that Honduras had some share in the administrative structure of the 
Cornmon 1.Iarket (in fact, the Regional Bank headquarters). However, there ar'e 
certain economies of centralised (locision making which might be lo'st in this 
w~. . 
in 1968/69 on the grounds tha.t this would be an obstacle to moneOtary 
integration as well as an unfair trading practice. The East African 
Economic Community almost disinteerated in 1971 when Tanzania and Kenya 
temporarily allowed their exchange rates to diverge (though this was 
quickly remedied). 
The conclusions one would draw from a survey of alternative methods of 
dealing with the question of imbalance is thao~ both fiscal compensation and 
restrictions on trade deal at best only with one aspect of gains ru1d losses. 
Collectively financed export subsidies present serious praotical problems. 
Furthermore, none of these approaches do anything very specific to induce the 
establishment of enterprises based on the regional market in the backward 
economies or indeed anywhere else. For these reasons attempts have 'been 
made to operate regional investment policies of various kinds. One researcher 
has gone further and tried too_prove that in termo of 'industryrreference' 
theory an investment policy is superior to the other alternatives,(l) but 
in practl('.:3 a combination ° of regional investment pC'licy and f,iscal com-
pensation (and possibly trade restrictions) is perhaps the best solution. 
III Other Arggments for RegionRl Investment Policy 
One argument for the regional planning of industrial development is 
quite simply the conventional argument for planninff transplanted onto the 
regional plane; that in the absence of guidance or control, tho wrong 
o~ 
priorities will be established; "obviously there is a. danger under a. 
relative laissez-faire system of free trade ••• (that proje .. cts) ••• Vlould 
be selected on rather a haphazard basis from the pOint of view of developmen'~ 
• ••• • There is even a possibility that the industries established could 
conflict with the immediate priority needs of ah area for industrial 
development." (2) And it is precisely industries of this type which Central 
, 
~ 
\ 
I 
I 
f 
\< 
r 
I (1) ° R. Birmingham: "Inter-territorial Imbalance in Customs Unions and, j'. 
Developing Economies: 'Adjustment I.!echanisms" PPv>, 1967 (Pi ttsburC). 0 • 
( 2) S. Dell: in R. Hilton: (F..d.) "The ~.~ovement Tovr'" d 1 tl A i t:I i ~--~~~~~~,~r~o~s~~_a~,j~n~J~~<~a£r~c~~~n~r~"c~o~n~o~m~o Intep;ation" on. ci..\. p. 63. 
--,,--
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America has tended to attract - "finishing touch" plants involving the 
assembly of cars, bottling of cosmetics, packing of fertilisers and 
insecticides. ,Of the effects of the~lO industries Ha.nson has said: "it 
is ironic that a policy of import-substitution adopted in order to free 
underdeveloped countries from chronic balance of payments difficulties 
should exacerbate that very problem". (1) With no licensing of new 
investment, high tariffs and genercua tax concessions on raw materials 
and imported machinery there is no incentive to develop industries based 
on local raw materials and importing technical know-how to the area. 
Instead, luxury goods are manufactured in small assembly units attracted ) 
by the regional markets, while "it would be bettor from the standpoint 
of development for the region to continue importing such luxury goods in 
the relatively linuted quantities that would result from the imposition 
of a high tariff on finished goods instead of going into production it-
self" and dissipating valuable -exchange and capital resources". (2) 
It might ve~~ well be a=gued that such distortions occur because of 
. 
excessive and wrongly orientated systems of protection, which, for example, 
through duty drl),wbacks, offer no inducement to use local raw materials. If 
. ~~,<'"¥"":' J~:Jla,a!· 
this is the case then tariff adjustments are required rather than bove~~ent 
., 
(1)' R. Ha.'1sen: nCentralJEl~a: Re:~iona.Llntegration tmd }<~conomi.q, 
lJ.cvelopmcnt" OPe cit. pp.48-49. 
(2) S. Dell: ~. 
, 
" 
:. ~~ ~.,. ....... -~ 
~
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controls. It could be argued more positively, that this would not do 
any thine to promote the formation of "growth pointst! or industries with the 
potentiality for developins linkages, forward and backward; (1) This is 
a problem outsid~ of this thesis: suffice it to say that Italian and 
other experience raises questions as to the succeSR of government sponsored 
(or any other) growth complex developments. (2) It is also crucial. and 
frequently for{;otten that the failure of regional markets such as Central 
America to develop in practice major 'building block' intermediate 
"industries using local raw materials sl1ch as paper, iron and steel and 
glass, is more, due to technical difficulties ra.ther thpI market size 
restrictions. However, it is still probable that private initiative 
in pursuit of short term profit, may tend to lead to investment being over-
looked in "high priority sectors" as defined by local plans and here a 
reB'ional investment policy may become important in both an entrepreneurial 
sense and a promotional sense. 
A reB'ional investment policy might also be a rr:~ans of ensuring that a 
proper balance between domestic and overseas capital is maintained, through 
regional .supervision of investment, which, because of its character, is most 
unlikely to ~nm~',~~o~taneously from domestic sources. 
~_,-"""",.j}o...t"''1' __ '" 
Regional Investment PolicY~Previous Experience 
'-
A case for a regional investment policy has been made in qual~ficd tezms 
and as one part of a packa.ge as far as problems of 'duplication' and 
polarisation are concerned. This, in turn, implies ,a committmemt to 
• planning' in the indsutrial sector. Ski tovsky a.rgucs that whereas it 
(1) K. Griffin: Il.!.&derdeveloument in Suanieh America" OPt cit. 
(2) E. g. K. Allen: S. Holland (Ed.) in ";''he stA.te n,o l!i'ttren,rcme'}:£" Wei~l enfold 
& Nicolson, 1972 1'1'.165-182. 
(3) H. Brewster & C. Thomas: ",rJ'he J?ynamics of 'Jest Indian Economic Inte~ration I' 
University of the West Indies, OPt cit. Part I. 
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may not be permissible in the more "clevelopcd" economiel'J it is here: 
"I feel that the case for the coordination of inter-relatet1 investment 
decisions is larl;ely confined. to the uncleru.eveloped countries." (1) This 
"planned" formed of industrialisation can, alternatively, be contro1,.led by 
mandatory aBl'ligment or inducement by incentive, or a combination of the two. 
(a) the most direct way of dealine w.i.th the problem would be to abolish 
national licensing powers in those industries in which a regional market is of 
particular importance, and restricting free entry into the regional market. 
An example of this was the East African Industrial Lice~sin8' Ordnance. 
However, only )2 licences were allocated to regional industries in ten years 
(mostly in textiles but also stee1drums, glassware, metal windows) before 
Tanzania and Uganda refused to co-operate further because the system "became 
a means for preventing competition with plants already established in Kenya. 
In other words licensing beca~e a means of arresting development in Tanzania 
and Uganda r~ther than promotinG' it." (2) The subsequent (1965) Krunpala 
agreement tried to combine both licensing and restrictive functions. 
Agreement was reached an the allocation of certain industries to Uganda, 
nitrogenous fortilisers and bicycle assembly; to Kenya, e1ass bulbs and 
£1 uorescent :b~"'Q'~ t" to Tanzania, 1androver assembly, tyres and tubes, 
.... -. .~ "" j~l~ 
radio assembly, and aluminium foil sheets; while several "regional It 
firms were instructed to dele~ate production of shoes, cigarettes and beer 
to a national level. However, the allocation agreement was part of a 
"package" invol vin·g trade quotas and methods to help Ugf'.nda and Tanganyika 
which ultimately proved unsatisfactory to all partners and the Kampala 
agreement was no~ implemented. 
(1) '1'. SkitovsKjl "Papers on "'ielfa.re ani..Grow.:thlt London, 1964, p.83. 
(2) s. Del1~ "~e Blocks ann Cornmo,!l.;':~rketsll OPe cit. p.283. 
\ 
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One could also possibly classify under this head a1eo the agreements 
reached between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey of the H..C.D. group, under which 
a substnntial number of joint projects were beinG pl[U1ncd, and come are 
being implementod. (1) The advantaGe of multi-national licensing in this Vl!ly 
is simplicity and directness: by ailocating specific projects to specific 
locations the regional authority can attain the objectives of optimum ccale 
and optimum location at the same time. ~~e major defect of this approach 
is rigidity: it is clained that negative controls would inhibit private 
investment which was not prepared to accept prescribed sites while giving 
no guarantee that projects' would go ahead vlhere alloca;ed. (2) Another major 
problem is that by completely excluding market choice and replacing it with 
administrative control one needs some allocative framework within which to 
operate: "Channelling industry to an area where economic resources bring 
a lower return, results in inefficiency of resource use •• ~ subsidising 
IIlaggingtt sectors is a luxury underdeveloped countries ca..."lnot afford ••• It • 
MaRsell's view is somewhat ~xtreme and private operators probably ignore the 
diseconomies of aselomeration and lonG term fact9rs, and eXRffcerate risk. 
However, there will be some ~nefficiency and if this is to be minimised, it 
fellows that there should be a framework of planning, "this measure, if 
short of a sophisticated plruming discipline could prevent the displace-
• 1lt:'-7' ... t." . ".!.:~~, 
ment of the union towards it production possibility and utility frontiers • 
. 
In the absence of careful planning there is no guarantee that such acr.ceemcnts 
would permit an efficient use of internal and external economies... Tho 
earmarking of industries would freeze the degree of monopoly, creatinG an (4) 
atmosphere less favourable to undertake costiy research to increase efficiency." 
(1) See (,'11."l.. Thes-; projects which are being implemented are; 
aluminium, banknote paper, jute mill, loco~otives, wires and cables and ball 
bearings. 
(2) £.t7. B. ?<7assoll: "K'lst Afric?.n Eco.nor'dc 
Imnlicat}pns for po15 cY"S~;ta Ji,onic8.; HlGm, 
(3) Ibid, pp.58-59. 
(4) A. Rolclo.n: "Economic Development in Latin AmOdeo.: its Benefits and 
Obstacles" in H. nH7i ;"'l t~o:-:~~l~(T·~'d~)";;'='~~~-=::""'=~.:!:.!!~~~~.2~~~~~~lli1 
OPt cit. .ti • : "The 1!.ovcment Towards Lati Am i 
-.. n Cr can Uni t;z:" 
'.,~ "'-~-
241. 
J3ut, the weR1.11ess of previol.ls national (let alone ro[';ional) planllinc h~,s been 
clearly enough shown already and it may be that this is somethinG for which 
"Latin P.merica is ill-prepared either. technically or poli ticaJ.1y ••• 11 
This dilemna is difficult to resolve, b'ut has yet to be seriously confronted 
in Central .~erica • 
. 
(b) The most permissive form of joint industrial policy would involve 
some fOrI:l of joint consultation without cOJTll'Tlitment or control. Most of 
the regional arrangements a&Teed so far have a vague commitment to joint 
consultation: in East Africa and UDEAC there is an explIcit commitment to 
discuss regional projects. (1) A very &~od exronp1e of this looser form of 
control is the use of regional development banks which are give~ guidelines 
but are otherwise left to opera.te on commercial or near-commercial criteria. 
In the East Africa case, red.istributive bias was made explicit in the lending 
criteria but the Bank has only hacl a chart history as yet • 
. The central American Dank has been described in outline in GIl. 2. 
One of its main purposes has been. to sl~~t its investments towards Honduras 
1 
I 
and also· to Nica.ragua. In Diag. 4-; an attempt is made to set out the i 
status of l::",~,~~;' by CAllE! fro .. its inception in 1961 up to 1970, both I 
in aggreffate 'ruld by sector! It ap~ears that in disbursements Honduras particul1 
arly, but also Nicaragua, has benefited slightly from such a process of I 
active diversion, especially in respect of loans for roads and infrastructure. 
How~ver, such a contrast is superficial and the actual 'diversion' of 
resources can only be estimated by contrasting flows of lending from the 
floVls which have existed had they been proportional to GNP or to the actual 
flows of aid to the five countries which gives an indication of where external 
finance might have flowed' in the absc>nce of a Comrnon l.~t3.rket. In Ch. 3 it 
(1) :B. l.!utharika: ",TowRrds 1\~1l1 t,lnat:.f.,<,m.:,;l Bconomic Co-oporn.tion in ~frica" 
OPe cit. p.275 and p.262. 
! 
I 
Dia.<~. 4-3 Loans l~u'~horisod Annaa,lll to r-entral Americiln Countries from 
the .Cenp},;31 Amoric8.:.,l!..1.t:ttcarfl,tion ~3ank 19~1-7~ :G{'1lI 
Costa Ricn. El Sal:.rador Guntemla Honduras ill£..~1!. Central America ""-'* ... --.... 
1961 6.1 9·7 5.3 3·7 2.0 26.8 
1962 8.5 6.1 8.8 9.5 7.7 40.6 
1963 1.1 5.7 3·7 0.2 10·7 
1964 9·0 4·4 3.3 0.6 16.7 34·0 
1965 10.7 12.0 10·5 15·5 48.7 
1966 0.4 16.3 9.7 8.3 34.7 
1967 1.4 
-
6.0 7·5 14.9 
1968 3.0 2.0 'r .2 13.0 
1969 10.0 10.3 34·5 7·7 7.4 69.9 
1970 15.6 3.8 12.4 31.8 
,'-
52.8 49.3 79.9 55·7 77·4 325.1 
~s_disbursed and anprove~ uE to end 1968 (apd by sector) 
fl.vproved Diobursed p'~s~Ul'~ed to Industry I,rfrastT)l.9tnro Houoim , . 
Costa Rica 37.2 23.9 7·1 14·8 2.0 
31 Salvador 35.2 28.3 12.6 13·7 2.0 
Guatemala 45·4 27.5 8.8 16.4 2.25 
Honduras 48.0 34.5 9.3 23.5 1. '75 
Nica.ragua. 57.6 33.6 14.7 16.9 2.0 
223.4 141·8 52.8 85·; 10.0 
Industrial Loan~ Disbursed b:t:: Industrial GrouE uI! to_en.<! 1260 (IDol. 
Nu.mber, ~~ 
Food etc. 22 7.28 
Drink 
Tobacco 
Textiles 25 16.76 
Clc·:;hes 6 1.8 
Timber 3 .33 
Furniture 4 .97 
,Printing 4 .6 
"Others" 13 ~.6 
IJeather 2 .16 
Paper 2 1.33 
Rubber 
Chemicals * 14 4.93 
Hon-tll~tal 
min. 12 6.75 
*'~ Basic 1:!eta1s 8 4.27 Me t al f}o-l. 9 .97 
Tranoport £~. 1 .2 
Elect.E~. 4· .2 
Others: two to mining\% .2m) 
ten to personnel services(%2.77~) 
(~1.35m) two to induotria1 llrornotlon bodieo 
S011rces: SI~CA, Indies-teres ?:!conornieos Ccntroamori-::ane Aue. 1969, 
Nos. 6 &77-'also r,A:rtA'lnformativl1. Ho'. 116, June 1971. 
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was shown th:lt, on average, Honduras was receiving ¢2m p.a. 1':10re than if 
the same aid had gone in proportion to recipient GNP, end Nicaragua $l'5m. 
However, it is ,doubtful if anyone "loses" in absolute terms as the Banl( is 
financed by specific and probably irreplaceable aid. The transfer of re-
sources through the Bank is thus quite considerable £U1d Hondura.s also 
probably derives some benefit from havine the headqu9.rtera. 
The Bank is also expected to promote "reg'!onal" projects as well a.s 
balanced grov/th. The ch'al.-ter st.ates that tho Bank is to ass:f.st tlinfra-
structure projects for completion of existinG' regional systems or which 
compensate for disparities in basic sectors which hinder the balanced 
developments of Central America '0' and shall not finance infrastructural 
projects of purely local or national scope". (1) , The J3ank ,also lends to 
m~~y industrial projects which rely mainly on the regional market ~ Phelps 
Dodge (copper and aluminium electrical conductors), CAVISA (glass), and 
the agreement specifically prohibited the Dank from lending to "essentially 
local enterprises". (2) 
CABEI has. also tried to promote one or two projects with Latin American 
. ,z~~~:'_~~:1<~"'~' 
capi tal (\I Cavisa" and the Colombian owned "Fabri te" toxtil e plant in 
Nicaragua) and prefers to lend to joint venturos, e.g. Hercules-P.ennsalt 
Vii th substantial INWNAC equity t Phelps-Dodge (50;,6 government o\,med: ~r044~R 
IlJSAFI) I Sherwin Williams. However, much of the credit goes to projects 
whooe equity is o~~ed by American enterprises; o.g. Bemis & Standard Fruit 
(textiles and edible oils in Honduras) and W. Grace in foodstuffs. Its 
main, and very considerable achiovement, has beon to multiply its Central 
American investment (¢40m) by over oir-ht-times by means of loans from U, S.-
AID, 
., }f.exico, Spain, France, Netherlands, belgium, Switzerland, the 
o~r 
countries. (3) Some of this finance would have U.K. and 
-I. 
come to the region . proj ectr and to national "financieras" t but a good 
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deal, especially from the smaller European countries, may be irreplaceable. 
V,p'N"~1" 
The Bank has\been criticised for inefficiency and confused oper~ting 
criteria, (2) arid while CABEl would appear to be a.~useful supplement to 
other regional institutions, it is Dcarcely capable by itself of remedying 
the problems of imbalance and certainly of duplication. "There is no 
conclusive evidence that its loans have stimulated the establishment of 
regional industries 
••• 
Few of its projects have been f,"cnuinely multi-
national 
••• 
It has not provided an alternative balancing mechanism to 
the integration industries scheme. It has not avoided the usual problems 
of international lending agencies: lack of trained personnel, inadequ~tely 
designed projects, reluctance to assume exchrulge risks, debt service 
difficulties, disputes over the national distribution of benefits ••• and 
of course, the usual lengi.hy delays ruld cumbersome administ'rative ree."Ulati~At" 
(1) Constitutive Charter of the 'Centra.l American Jank for Economic Integration 
(r,~anagua, Dec. 1" 1960) Article 1. 
(2) Ibid. Article 2. 
(3) Th~ Bank i_s treated here as incorporating the Central American Fund for 
Economic In~:~:::5~,,(l)l (est. 1963) which is to finance infrastructm::e_ 
(4) P. Schmitter: ",central A~..§:'1 In;tegrr-ttion: Spillover, SE,nl-::I,round. 
or Encapsulation" Journal of Cornmon Market Studies, 1970, OPt cit. ppt9-10. 
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(c) A third intermedia.te possibility is to have acr<:f!ments whereby 
regional free trade or incentives or protective tariffs, are conditional 
upon Diting a plant in an agreed location but where th$rc is no legal 
l)arrier to entry. An example of thi's is the Integration Industries Scheme 
which repres~nts' per''iaps the nearest thing to a full Hog-ional Invcstmen·t 
Policy in Central America. This schene tries to eliminate all the d.efects 
of an uncontrolled market situation sinultaneously. First, it tries to deal 
wi th the "imbalance" problem by operating so that it "shall be effected on 
a reciprocal and equitable basis in order to ensure that each and every 
Central American state. may progressively derive economic advantage. 1t (1) This 
principle is enforced by a clause which states that no country should have 
more than one integration industry before the others have one each. (2) Second, 
it tries to prevent duplication and is largely concerned 'with attracting 
firms "the minimum capacity of which requires access to the CAC;y'" in order to 
operate under reasonably economic and competitive conditions". (3) These 
firms are offered what is intended to be regional monopoly status, by meOO1S 
of a free trade area in countries which accept Integretatio.l.l Industry and by 
a ten year, reQllarly declining (llinfant industrylt) tariff a.gainst any country 
which establishes,Jts own industry in competition. 
. t:,. ~.\..::,. ~ =l;?4J.td,.' 
In order to qualify as 
in Integration Industry a minimum capaCity has to be established. Any 
--
monopoly established is then supervised by prices and quality control, by 
ensuring competition in the retail sector and by powers to permit imports and 
to d'esignate other plants. ~'hird, t~e question of ownership is dealt with 
by insistence on a certain percentage (usually 40j() of local equity capital. (4) 
The nature of the scheme ensures that its benefits, which inclu:lc free trade 
and a comon tariff, controls over dumpinG and duty raVl materials and inter-
mediato products, arc conditional upon strict stnndardo being met. In these 
ways the SC:lerne seems ideally suited for policine the major industrial 
projects of the region. 
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(1) Article I, Treaty on Central American Integration Industries, 1958. 
(2) l..ll£ (Temporary Arti 01 e) 
(3) ibid, Article II. 
(4) GINSA had 50/50 o'l'mership composition; the caustic soda-insecticide 
industry hp~ 40/60 (lOCal/overseas) and the plate class industry w~s to 
have 60/40. 
i' 
t 
) 
~- --- -------
HO\'leVer, the reality is very different. Althoueh it could be claimed 
th3t a great advance ~as made in merely gettin3 nccepted tho idea of joint 
deciSions, in the tnelve Y8aro since tho introduction of the scheme, only 
two distinct industries have been established (t~1es and caustic sodn) and 
the former existed before 1958 without regional statu8; while one other has 
been app!'oved "(slass plnte) 'and several others are being discussed. (1) It is 
necessary, therefcre, to loot: at tho reasons for the failure of the scheme in 
practice: 
(i) the designation procedure waS enormously complex and involved the 
need for ratification by national legislatives of each industry. The stages 
through which it WaS necessary to pass were; preliminary application; SIBCA 
Executive Council approval in principle;' ICAlTI feasibility study; ~~ecutive 
Council approval and drafting of protocol ~tself very complex, specifying 
location, oc,nership, quality, capacity, prices, customs duty, etc},;siglUlture 
by Economic Council; ratification by at least three legislatures. Even if 
all ,\YaS agreed in principle, the delay of several years in ratification would 
kill the interest of most entrepreneurs if they could gain en-:..ry (ll'l any other 
basis. Furthermore, the scope for delaying tactics was dcmo.nstrated abundantly 
with the original .~reaty which took threo years 'to ratify and the delays in 
• I:'''t.::,':~t. ",',~.J:~1d-' 
Signing the tyro and tube protocol. 
(ii) a related point is that tho nature o~ tho -·designa.tion procedure 
requires the continuous positive political support of all the partner states 
(though technically, only three ratifications are required to make a protocol 
effccti ve). Honduras waS able to use this p03i tion of "blackmail" to express 
its dissatiofaction with benefits received from the regional integration by 
refUSing to ratif,y either Treaty or protocols until 1967. The lack of 
• I 
(I) SI3CA: ",;;;I;.;n:,;;f-:;.o:;rm?o~::-::-~:;-:l~o~s~a::.;.v,;;;.a;.;.;n~c.;;c;:;s......-;;,d;;.e l~"O~r:.;o;;;.;r-~. r:.:.n:;;m::;;;a::...;:d:.:.e:...::i:.::n~t:.::e~r;.:.a.:::.c.:-.io::.n::.-e:::..:c:::.;o:::.:n:.:;;o~r.l::.:i:-..::c::.:;:,s. 
centroamericano Guatemala, p.e. 
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cooperation from Honduras may o.lso be attributed to dilJcatisfaction with the 
Ilr eciprocal" rather than "redistribution" na.tul'e of the scheme. However, 
in 1969-70 Honduras was fightinG to strengthen the scheme against opposition 
from El Salvador. 
(iii) the US government strongly opposed the Scheme and as a region aid 
donor this was posoibly decisive. (1) "It is hoped that the.ReCime of Central 
American industries does not become a lasting feature of the regional economic 
integration programme". (2) 'l'he Americans thought the scheme was an 
Unnecessary addition to CADEl, industrinl incentives and market forces :i.n 
genernl;- was conducive to monopoly and arbitrary decision making, encourc~ing 
corruption and favouritism; and permitted tariffs in intra-regional trade. 
However, the dislike of the scheme felt by US investors because of its re-
strictions was probably a more likely source of motivation. 
(iv) there was a general failure of direction with no attempt made 
to draw up a coherent priority list for "trading-off" one project against 
another, and in a context of regional planning, Projects have been considered 
on an entirely ad hoc basis with ereat divergencies in the levels of projects 
preparation. This defect was recognised in 1966 by subsequent reviews of 
proB'ress. 
(v) in practi"ce, the scheme has not proved to be a necessary condition 
for eDtablishment of regionally based plants. Plants have been established 
in .fertilisers, oil refining, insecticides, which ideo.1ly should have developed 
under the scheme. Generous treatment by fiscal incentives, tariff protection 
for example, under the Special System, enoure the benefit of the scheme 
without its problems. The one real asset of I-I status, a guaranteed regional 
monopoly, was shown to be hollow by the activities of Firestone in establishing 
(1) Explained in J.D. Cochrane: "US l3.ttH.11(ies to Centr~l A,-nel.'icrm b~conomi.c, 
inte{~·r."t.tion" Inter-.American Econo';ic Affairn, IJov. ' 1963'. 
(2) Letter from R. E. Simpson, Director of Office of International Regional 
Economics; Dept. of state, Washington, DC, published by USA I D as IlComrr.enia on 
~he~eration Industries Sche:pe" (nOCAP, .Gu.'ltema.1a). (Uni ted Natiol~s ECLA~ 
(3), "Economic Committee for .scon. cooper::J.,tion in the Central American IsthMus'W 
I • 
1966 Mexi co. 
in Costa Rica. 
(vii) the exnerience of GINSA rold Hercules-Pennsalt (Caustic soda and 
insecticides) has been unhappy and hal:? probably discouraeed other potential 
applicants. Although the GINSA plant was already in existence the firm had 
considerable difficulties both in getting Integration Industries status and 
subsequently. 1J.1he company had to compete over tariffs in Honduras which did 
not ratify, and against Firestone which started operations in Costa Rica. 
Second, there was interference by SIECA in group marketing policy with 
distributors referring to handle more profitable imported tyres and reluctant 
to hold in store the volume of GINS! inventories required by SIECA. Third, 
the tariff has proved inadequate and there has been evasion of the tariff by 
prior stockpiling and importing cars complete with tyres. The plant had an 
agreement siened in 1963, ratified in 1965, and only operative in 1966. Thus 
"integration industry" status has not conferred on the industry the security 
and advanta~es that it anticipated. (1) 
. 
The Integration Industries system suffered its most ser.ious blow, when 
a competitive system was introduced that was a groat deal more permissive, 
while retaining the essential ingredient of giving a reeional market (and 
~ .... 
. Ilif.,.:.'t .... ,,":.::~~, 
special protection) to "regional" enterprises. This programme '\V~s intro-
duced in Jan. 196;, in the 1st Protocol (San Salvador) to the Convention 
on Integration Industries, and became effective in Febru~ry 1965, except in 
Honduras. Under it, the Economic Council of SIECA can eive concessions -
free trade and a common tariff - to industries which are "new" and "of 
. particular interest" and planning to operate on more than a. national 
(1) , SIECA: "Problems of the 'lYre Industry" SIECA/CE - XXX/TJr2, leth Oct. 1967. 
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Ind.t{st.cy 
Light Bulbs 
Glass Bottles 
1':etal Cyli.'1.clers (i) 
(ii) 
Su) phuric Acid 
J~icultural Im~le~ents 
FlC 
Fluorescent tuces' (i) 
(ii) 
Soft Paper 
~ . 
P\""}"~ q...-q..i Special Industries 
Designated Location 
1965 San Salvador 
(Il~ELCA) 
I 
1967 Guatemala 
(VICASA) 
GuO. t e!Il.ala 
(CILCASA) 
Costa Rica 
( m • , .j.rop~gasl 
El Salvador 
(F3RTICA) 
El Salvador 
.lm!lual 
Capacity 
6,200,000 units 
(tvlO shifts)-
bul bs /:.; la.'!lps 
78,000 units 
150,000 units 
135,000 units 
23,000 (1970) 
(Sta. fna.) 100,000 units 
(also plants in 
Guata-:p.al<~& Nica-
ragua 
Nicaragua 
(:'.ii tsui Shin- 6,600 !,1T to 
.~tsu) 8,000 • 
1969 El Salvador 
(I~ELCA) 
1,920,000 units 
Costa Rica 
(PHILLIPS) 1,730,000 to 
2,034, 000 ...... :~s 
Costa Rica 5,230 !.IT 
(Scott) 
ROoj.a..,.cl.· 
~ket for particular product 
(1968) 
(1970) 
(1969) 
(1969) 
(1969) 
ra."1-ge 
10,300,000 bulbs & lamps 
~1 
47,Ceo units 
15,000 units 
15,000 units 
13,000 fi:T 
estimates var,y fro~ 
500,000 to 
825,000 ,,-,,,tr 
est. 6,300 MT to 
7,150 NT 
."4 I~~': 1,130,000 units 
\-f {j 
7,600 MT' 
-- ) 
'/ 
lIot!inal Tariff"-
1968 prices (approx) 
40j j 
40;; 
251~ (approx) 
15;';' 
35J~ 
100i~ 
100i~ 
40i~ 
.. ;to' 
market. Like IlIntegration Industries", "Spccin.l Industries" hav(~ to be 
embodied in a Protocol and endorsed by national legislatures. But the 
differences are gr?ater: 
(a) there is not attempt to control or even indicate optimum locations, 
(b) there axe no IIbarriers to entryl' and no limj.t to the number of firms 
within an induotl~ enjoying the same status provided that each plant's 
capacity is half that size of the regionnl market. 
(c) there is no close or systematic control over prices and quality 
though tlle Executive reserveo the right to l~aer duties to previous rates nO 
a counter to excessive profits in the industry; and if local supplies are 
deficient to allow, quotas of imports a.t previous p:t'iCGs. 
(d) Status is easier to obtain because extensive preparatory study iR 
not required - though in 1965, SIECA, on the insistenco of Hond,urns, decided 
that in some cases studies could be ordered. 
The attraction of. the scheme is obvious to potential entrepreneurs who 
want a'protected status without the controls and procedural problems of 
Integration Industries status. From tho governments' point of vieVl, too, there 
is no serious constraint on the numbor of plants established. Hm-lever, the 
scheme fails to dq,al with any of the basic problems of the reg-lonal arrangement. 
~ ,""" f-'t 
. .e'~. ;. ';' .. 'I'III'~· 
There is no provision for 'balanced development'; the combination of tariff 
protection and minimuni tariff capacity rcquirements"encouraee duplication by 
permitting plants to run at low rates of ca?(3.city utilisation; and the policing 
of prices io vasue to 'n hiBh degree. Ono way of demonstrating the inadequacy 
is to show diagramatically the location of 'spacial industries' tho relation-
ship between their c'lpacity and the market; and the tariff (Diag.4-4 ).(1) 
l' 
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L""ldustry 
Light :Bulbs .' 
Glass :Bottles 
~etal Cy-linders (i) 
(ii) 
Sulphurio Acid 
~~icu1tura1 Imple~ents 
PVC 
Fluorescent tubes (i) 
(ii) 
Soft Paper 
\ lAo..,,,,,,",,, 4.-4; Spe~il11 Industries , 
Designated 
~ 
/ 1965 . 
. 
1961 
I, 
1969 
Location 
San Sa.lvador 
(nlPELCA) 
Guate~a 
(VICASA) 
Guatem8.1a 
(CILCASA) 
Costa Rica 
(Tropigas) 
E1 Salvador 
Annual 
Capa-::ity-
6,200,000 units 
(t'.'lO shifts)-
bulbs &'la1'!lps 
78,000 units 
150,000 units 
1~5,OOO units 
.. 
(F3RT!CA) 23,000 (1910) 
El Salvador 
(Sta. Ana.) 700,OOOiunits 
(also plants in 
Gua tamak & Nica-
ragua 
Uicaragua 
(··'t . C"h" .oll. sUJ. oj J..ll-
·~tsu) 
E1 Salvador 
(TIiPELCA.) 
Costa. Rica 
(PHILLIPS) 
costa Rica 
(Scott) 
6,600 MT to 
8,000 
1,920,000 units 
1,130,000 to 
2,034,000 c.... .. ~s 
5,230 lIT 
R",,),a...a.1· 
!~ket for particular product 
range 
(1968) 10,300,000 bulbs & lamps 
(1970) 47,OCO ~""lits 
(1969) 
(1969) 
(1969) 
75,000 units . 
75,000 units 
13,000 it.'T 
estimates vary from 
500,000 to 
825,ooOo"",tr 
est. 6,300 L"1' to 
7,150 MT 
1,130,000 units 
7,600 MT 
.,...-' 
l1om.nal Tariff-
1968 pricc~ (upprox) 
40;<1 
40,.7 
25)~ (approx) 
i 15,,: 
35'f 
100i~ 
lOCi.: 
40i~ 
, 
I.; 
,,-: 
" , 
. ' 
'I 
t 
~1 
• 
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The conclusions which emerge are: 
(a) the IIlaissez-faire" approach hfts led to a, polarisation of investment 
with the "underdevelopedll arel.'\.S being neglected. Of the plants mentioned, 
E1 Salvador has attracted the largest number of industries (sulphuric acid; 
fluorescent tpbes and bulbs; aericu.lturRl instruments and machetes) and 
Guatemala does quite well (bottles, machetes and metal cylinders). Honduras 
has none. 
(b) the deBTee of control over capacity is low. In some cases there 
has already been duplication (fluorescent tubes, macheteB Rnd metal 
cyclinders) and in other cases (PVC, sulphuric acid and Glass bottles) capacity 
has been installed well above the total regional market without Cor.fI4"'f"Q..bol\ 
of competing projects that are currently being planned. 
(c) J~any of the industries scarcely deserve the tag tlof particular 
\ 
interest to the region". There are several industries (fluorescent tubes, 
light bulbs, agTicultural instruments), which are little more than assembly 
industries with low net foreign exchange saving. The chemical industries 
(PVC and sulphuric acid) both use imported. raw materials. The cost of this 
type of processing is reflected in the high external tariff, and even hieher 
, . 
i 
effective p.rotection. 
The scheme has, in fact, evolved as little more than a mechanism for 
,,' giving protection, though the minimum capacity constraint is some incentive 
'~ 
to establishing regionally based plants. 
Also within Central America has been the common textile policy described 
earlieri a voluntary a&Tee~ent on the location of future or, eipanded, textile 
installations within the 'framework of a COmMon t~riff. This policy incorpor-
ated redistributive measures to strengthen the textile industry in Honduras 
and Nicaragua. 
\ 
or" 
. '-, .... 
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The programme that was finally agreed was lncorporated in the second 
(1) 
protocol of Uanagua to the Agreement on an External Tariff. It involved a 
substantial increase in tariff protection on finished textiles, a restructur-
ing of the tariff to prevent cotton thread and crude textiles being imported 
duty free, and there VIas agreement on the installation of additional ca.pacity 
in the region to 1970, unless any additional capacity was for extra-regional 
exports. Enforcement was left rather vague, but it was implicit that 
continued free trade and maintenance of the common tariff was conditional 
upon mutual respect for the agreement. 
Three exa~ples, of varying degrees of permissiveness, have been Diven of 
approaches to a regional investment policy in Central America which 
go beyond mere consultation yet stop short of mandatory control. In other 
areas similar techniques.have been employed. In the central African group 
(UDEAC), for example; the various governments have a commitment to plan the 
9110cation of industry; and projects which require the regional marke~ in 
which to ~perate have to be approved by ali the partner countries.(2) 
(1) (i) to place restrictions on the expansion of spinnin~ and weaving capacity, 
(ii) that as Guatemala and E1 Salvador had an overwhelming dominance in the 0 
textile industry, especially in spinning, new capacity should be steered towards 
Honduras and Nicarague especially. " 
(iii) that there was serious excess capacity in the painting and finishing 
departments, and for this reason, restraint in building cornpletely inter,rated 
plants and the idea of pooling finishing sections was urged, 
(iv) ·the part of the market so far not locally satisfied "m.e that requiring 
long fibre cotton for fine cotton thread which is produced satisfactorily 
only in Guatemala, eo that there was a supply constraint on further expansion 
of output. 
(2) This is in addition to the terms of the "tax unique" where no account of 
location was involved in granting status to regional enterprises. Within 
UDEAC there are also bilateral agreements over the location of cement, match 
and battery factories • 
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The L.A.FTA group encompassed a scheme for, intrasectora1 IIcomplement~rity 
agrecmento" and sectoral agreements or "little common marketsll.(l) 
"ComplementaritY'8.,.<:?;rcementstt are free trade areas in specific products 
or groups of products between any group of LAFTA countries. The basic 
philosophy behind these agreements is "coordination ••• with a view to 
establishing complementarity agreements which would avoid the duplica-
tion of projectsll .(2) The complementarity agreements started out as 
designated-product free trade area agreements incorporating the principles 
of the GAT".P "most favou:red nation" agreement. This aroused little interest 
and only two agreements (calculating machines and electronic tubes) went 
ahead. (3) There was then a series of agreements which built in discrima-
tion against other LAFTA countries but only two were finally ratified. Then 
came some more significant agreements; a major project covering the whole 
chemical industry (115 product~), signed in 1968~ and a petrochemical agree-
ment between the Andean countries which incorporated special treatment for the 
less developed partners, a joint approach to foreign investment and specifica-
tion of locations for new enterprises. In the last few years several 
agreements of all kinds have been signed (office machinery, electrical 
equipment, ,pha~aceuticals etc.). 
The complementarity agreements have run into severe criticism and not 
only for the slow rate at which they have developed: "they can cause costly 
deviation from optimum resource allocation ••• To avoid unemployment in 
the higll cost countries, coop1ementarity agreements might be entered into 
(1) N. mari tano: fI,A Latin Al'IlericM }~conoMic Communi tl" Notre Dame Press, 1970 I 
pp.118-120. UNlOO: "Industrial Develooment Survey II" p.119. 
(2) S. Dell: "Obstacles to LFltin American Integxatiol}," OPt cit. 
(3) The progress of complementar.y agreements to data is sct out in J. Sloan: 
"JJafta in tho 1960's: Obstacles to pro~c~s" International Development Review, 
]Jo. L. 191,2, pp.16-26, and H. };e11: "Jariff Profiles in L~tin Americ:\." I'raeger, 
1971, pp.135-136. ..,' , 
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which would allow the high cost countries to continue production ••• Thus 
complementarity agreements can freeze a trade pattern which could represent 
high social costs to the integTation c,~ea". (1) 
The LA}l~A Countries also, unsuccessfully, h~ve tried to la~~ch sectoral 
probTanming of particular industries involving periodic conferences of 
. . cl:r,,~n""'l d lti t· It· . . bus~nessmen and c~vil serv~~ts, propose mu na ~ona en erpr~ses~h~l~ 
exclusive allocations of plants ,mder complementarity agreemento and a 
regional development fund. (2) Despite considerable discussion of steel, 
il\rl4\~ 
automobiles, and othe~ , nothing has, so far, been accomplished. Indeed tlall 
in all, the record of industrial location policy within tAFTA makes depressing 
readin6 and gives scant encouragement for the near future". 
To conclude this section, what we have done is to summarise some of 
the approaches so far"made to a."regional investment policy", starting with 
rigorous controls, then the _ "laxer" al ternati ve of 'consultation f and the 
use of regional banks; finally arrangements which try to incorporate clements 
of both flexibility and -rig-our such asthe "complementarity agreements" and 
the tIntegr~tion Industries' scheme. Generally, ~~d understandably. the laxer 
arrangements are more popular; and there is no really successful precedent 
of truly multinational,planned, allocation of industry. 
Regional Investment Policy;: Operation~l Questions 
A review has been attempted of the rationale for a regional investment 
policy and of the various attempts to realise one. However, merely to 
(1) D. Baerrasen, lfl. Carnoy .~ J. Grunwald: ",Latin American Tr~de Patterns" 
BrooJdngs (Washington) 1965, p.38. 
(2) H. Bell: p.137. 
(3) ~, p.139. 
"k-Jo ~his approach,\ from t.u"'TA Resolutions 100 (IV) 1965. 
\ 
--.,. 
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discuss m8.tters at this level of generalfty ignores some of the basic 
questions of implementation that such a policy would have to face. Should 
the policy operate at a project level, sectorally, or as pa.rt of an 
integrated plan? What form of inter-government barGaininp: is opti(\lal? 
. 
How are potential projects evaluated for joint promotion? Who ovms the 
multinational enterprises? How are monopolies created by conscious policy 
to be controlled? ~bat should be the optimum size of the region served? 
(1) Project, sectoral or Comprehensively Planned Investment: One can 
visualise a whole hierarchy of possibilities in terms of ind.ividual joint 
projects, to sector agreements, to fully integrated plantu~Eecauee 
a 
governments are extremely reluctant to tolerate/large scale infrineement 
on their national sovereignty) one would probablY have to concede that 
a complementary structure could be engineered only for a few sectors. 
The major advantage of this 'partial' approach to planning is its 
. 
simpliCity. Its major disadvantage is the danger of a completely ad hoc 
system in which regional projects are chosen in an entirely unsystematic 
and unplanned manner; as one of the earliest advocates of comprehensiVe 
industrial planning put it: "a policy must be. completed by formal agreements 
reached after negotiation, concerning what industries should be located in 
what countries. This implies the need for joint.common planning." (1) 
This planning would involve a confrontation of plans to identify incon-
sist~ncies with mutual readjustments to take account of discrepancies. 
The absence of a framework of planning is serious from two additional points 
of view. First the question of gains and losses will be obscured if the 
regional market is simply parcelled out to dominant suppliers without regard 
either to comparative costs or to the interests of weaker countries. 
(1) s. tl"rdal quoted in II. La"""'. "ImTlort." of U f t f I d d 
.." ... " _Ok ., j".,a.nu no ures rom ,ess- evelope 
Countries" OPe cit. p.12. 
• 
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Second it could lead. to the promotion of the wrong types of industry 
with high effective protection of emall value added dissipating much of 
the 'gains' from economies of scale: "the danger of an unplanned industrial 
investment policy'is that it may increase external vulnerability without 
adding very much to the underlying erowth potential". (1) The exarnpl e 
of the Special Industries System in Central America (and of some com-
plementarity agreements) is clear enough evidence of this type of development. 
On the other hand it has already been shown, that "comprehensive planning" 
is beyond the capacity of Central American countries even at a national level. 
National planning bodies were only established in '1963 and governments have 
delegated very little authority to them. (2) In Central America there has 
hot been even a minimum of real supranational planning. The "confrontation" 
of plans by the Pan American Union resulted in no action to eliminate in-
consistencies;. nor has there been any prepublication coordination of plans; 
and there is no supr~ational authority with planning powers. (3) 
This pas led to the view that the best" form of regional investment 
policy is one which avoids an excessively ambitious comprehensive planning 
exercise, yet also avoids the distortions that would result from parcelling 
out individual projects. This could be done by l~~ited 'sectoral' planning 
(1) S. Dell: "",A VOl,tin .t1m~rican pOl'll}!1on Market" OPt cit. p.64. 
-~ 
(2) A. Fuentes ~!ohr: "0bservaciones sobre e1 Des~rro1lo de la Planifica,cion 
en Centro-america" CIAP/11G, 1964. 
(;) Pan American Union (O.A.S.): "lleport on the Central Am~Fi.9an Development 
Plans. and the Process of .Economic Intecr~tion" OPe cit. This is not a problem 
unique to "common ma,rket" supranational planning. It has been also a difficulty 
in rulY nation~\ plans where federal authorities have a good deal of autonomy, 
e.g. Nigeria (see A. Hazelwood: "Africnn Integration &, Disintegration" OPt cit. 
pp.18-19). . , 
" It is fair to mention the existence of ;:ruPLAN (a joint advising regional 
planning,body) incorporated into SIZCA in 1965. 
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of key industries; the model for which would be the LA1?TA/Andean a.greements 
on chemical products, (1) and which are also sugeested by ECA. (2) However, 
even in these limited terms relatively little ha.s been done in Central 
. 
America, de sr. ~ te efforts by SIECA officials to draw up a list of 
priority areas and to plan them. (3) 
n' 
Gruc~al question is',obviousl), one of sovereient)'. Any attempt 
to &1 ve pOVlers of alloca.tion to a supranational planning body ra.ises the 
question of loss of control over decision making. A major element in 
the concern is that the "procedure for allocation of investment may result 
in an inadequate sharen : "opposition ••• (to joint planning) ••• is based 
uncertainties of the indefinite maintenance of the political atmosphere 
during which the supranational planning effor~ has been initiated; the 
opposition of government groups jealous of their pre-regotives and fearful 
. 
of a fall in prestige and power in the case of far reaching integration and 
ide~ocica1 arguments involving national sovereignty. At very least ••• 
any country joining such a supranational planning effort ,:.will attempt to 
make very·sure that it is receiving its proper share of the benefits of 
••• 
economic integration". This leads on to the question of the bargaining 
procedure •. 
(1) The basis of the agreement was a complex, programming solution sugsested 
originally in T. Victor-ltz & Z. Szabo: "La Inn.ust~ia 0.Uimica en AT:lerica Latill~n 
Uni~ed Nations (Economic Commission for Latin America) 1963. 
(2) United Nations (Economic CO!lLT!lission for Africa): "Report of the MiRsi.,2!l 
on Industrial Coordination in East and Cen,tral Africa" E1CN.14/247, 1964. 
(3) United lJations (}~C1A): 
americana" Economic Bulletin 
"T,,'3 problern3s de politica industrial Centro: 
Latin America, rtarch, 1964, pp.l20-l23. 
(4) United rrations (mITro): "Technioues of Sector~.l Planninp:Jr The Chemical 
Industries" UN. 66, II B 17, p.48. 
\ 
, 
,~-. 
(2) The Basj.s of Allocatil'1fI Uultinational Activit,~: The OSDenca of a 
regional investment policy involves nations foreoine, even if temporarily, 
their right to(.p.n.ilatorallmproCeed~Vfith certain investments. Even if VIe 
confine ourselves to the limited form of sectoral planning outlined abovo, 
and were to draw up a list of industries which should be operated in the 
. 
multinational market, there would still be difficultiec in allocating them. 
The main question is one of reconciling equity and efficiency criteria; but 
one also needs to decide whether allocation should be on a sectoral produot 
or subproduct baSis. and how the allocation is to be realised in fact. The 
essence must be that each country feels it is deriving some benefit without 
insisting upon narr0i7 reciprocity conditions. 
Examples of schemes have been quoted which try to allocate specific 
plants to specific countries to achieve 'balance', for example the Kampala 
agreement or the R.C.D. arrangement. Suohagreements would tend to be 
arbitrary, the product of horse-trading, so dissipating the gains of scale 
from operating in a regional market. As Balassa hus put it "should 
covernments enter into bargaining regarding. tlle establis~.ent of new 
. 
industries? I think we can hardly expect government bargaining to lead to a 
desirable locational structure ___ ".(1) This could be avoided if there were 
a broadly based allocation system under which "after all the industries which 
are tied to specific locations have been allocated to their most desirable 
geographical zones, the footloose industries can be utilised for working out 
'.. . ' (2) 
a pattern of mutually satisfactory regional compensations". This requires 
a substantial list of potential industries to use for compensation purposes. 
However, "the difficulty with this solution is that allooation of a long 
list of industries is likely to be an exeroise of some futility. Any list is 
(1) B. Balassn: "30onomi,C DGv1310pment And Inteeration" C:!:!!J1A, 1965, p.119. 
(2) uni~e~ Nati?n~t¥il~cch:niques of Sector:3.1 Econopic Planning : the Chemical 
Industry" ',~ .. -"-'op:;-c3.±.p.49. 
an expression of hope that the industries can be attracted at all, and 
that they can be attracted to the countries to which they have been 
alloca~ed".(l) Partly, for this reason, the Central .Amorjcan Integration 
Industries Scheme tried to limit itself to specifying that no more than one 
industry should be allocated to anyone country simultaneously without 
. 
specifying ex ante what they should be. 
Enforcement is also a problem, especially where equity considerations 
have over-ridden efficiency considerations. If onc prohibits the establish-
mont of enterprises in certain locations there is a real possibility that cer!;ain 
enterprises could be ,discouraged from investing in the region altogether. 
'l"'nis could only in p:lrt be controlled by trying to ensure that cases wherE: 
resotlrce endowments or cost differences are important, are allocated by 
efficiency criteria. :;~r.~EVen:·:then't- as long as investment was largely 
undertaken fro:'J private. sources, mainly from overseas; preferences basccl on 
unquantifyable factors such as the 'political climate' are likely to be 
. 
very important. It arso follo~s that tax and exchange control (and for 
that matter all controls on overseas investment) should have first been 
harmonised to prevent any conflict between goals of the regional policy and 
of national interests. 
. , 
The comprehensiveness of the policy is also important ill trying to 
reach an agreed bargaining situation. The gre~ter-the number of sectors or 
projects beinB considered including possibly agriculture or infrastructure 
then- :the greater the possibility for a satisfaotory t package dea.l' boing 
agreed, but tho greater, in turn, the probleoo of preventing 'ad hoot, 
unplanned development.(2) ~e Eastern European countries have found that 
(1) A. Hazelwood: "African Inte6'Tation and Di::dntegration" op.cit. p.l9. 
(2) It is also possible that there might be vertical as well as horizontal 
.. specialisation as part of a regional policy, with component or subsidicy 
activities dispersed to designa.tod areaS. 
~ .. 
~ ~~--. ~. 
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intra··induotry specialisation has been more acceptable amongst the plp..nncd 
economies, since few countries are prepared to forego completely the 
establishment of basic industries like steel or petroleum, though they will 
accept hor~zontar subproduct and vertical specialisation. (1) In a Central 
American situation where basic ca.pital intermediate industries are almost 
completely nonexistent this problem is likely to be less serious but even 
so it is doubtful if any Central American country would trade off industry 
against agriculture, or accept the loss of any basic industry already 
established, such as cement and petroleum, in the interests of economies of 
scale. Ue have to start from the assumption that an industrial investment 
policy would incorporate an 'industry preference' and apply to new industries 
only. (2) 
(3) Evaluatin5 and Quantifyin& the Results of a Reeional Investment Polic~: 
The original assumption underlying a regional investment policy is t~at 
there were net gains to the region in the form of capital savings and new 
enterprises that would otherwise not be established. However, it has 
been sho~ how a policy, especially if carelessly applied, could lead to 
the capital savings being dissipated from investment in sub-optimal loca-
tions and from jhe loss of external economies as an inevitable consequence 
. of decentralisation, (3) and to prospective inves~ment being lost to the 
region altogether. Por this reason it is important that MY regional 
inv~5tment policy should be subject to finer quantification than a crude 
barter of projects. 
(1) United Uations: "Economic Integration and Industrial Sp,ecialisn.tion amon£! 
·the llember Countries of. the Council for !,~utual t!:copomic Assi.st::m.92." 1966, pp. 
21-27. 
(2) The basis of a satisfactory package deal is discussed in United Nations; 
"Trade Exp?IlSion ~md Bcono!"\ic Intp.P;!'~.tion among neveloniny countries" 01'. cit. 
(3) In Borne industries, external economies from central industri~ locations, 
may outweieh internal economies. On tho pther hand there are external 
diseconomies of a~6lom~ra~ion; p~d excessive discounting of risk by private 
investors in unpopular locations. 
,~~cc~~ t. 
-- ;;J 
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Attempts have been made to SUGGest a framework for this by 8ChYdloWSky.(l) 
First, agreement is reached on which industries are to be subject to regional 
. 
policy. Second ,o.'programmine , analysis is done to assess the discounted 
net benefit at world prices (2) of establiohment of different sized plants 
at different"locations. The gains and losses to pnrtner states can easily 
be calculated: the "losses" to the importer being the additional foreign 
exchange payed above world market cif prices, for local products. Third, 
when a set of gains and losses has been assigned for each product and each 
set of locations, tho overall optimum can be calculated by linear progr~TLming. 
If a Itdistributional" constraint is required (e.e. equal per ca.pita benefits) 
then this can be accommodated by a distributional constraint in the model or 
(more efficiently) by side payments. The question or projects at different 
states of preparedness could be accommodated by havinc a sequential assign-
IDemt procedure which would be taken into account that cumulative effects over 
• 
time, using appropriate discounting. Within this general framework, there 
have been refinements in terms of the optimising calculation using eeometic(3) 
and algeqrafc models (4) and one of these models will, in fact, form the basis 
of subsequent case studies. 
(1) D. Sc.hydlowsky: ".MA.lYj:.lcal basifl for a )\.'ltionnl folicy on ree;ion~ .. 
{).;conomic InteexFttion in Latin AmericA,1I Journal of Common IEarket Studies 
Dec. 1967, pp.79-96. 
(2). This is done by taking the net foreicn exchange saved (gros3 value -
foreign imports) and deducting the opportunity coat (in foreign exchange 
terms) of local factor use; all discounted to present value. This form of 
calculation is virtually identical to the tLi ttle method' (I. Little: "A 
Manual of Project fNFtluation" OECD, 1966). 
(3) E • .!3'. D. ]aerrensen: ".A Ye.thod for rIa-nnln!! ~onomic intermti9n fo_"1!. 
~pecifierl Industries" Journal of Common :l~arket Studies, Vol.6, 196876-9: pp.1-23. 
(4) See Ch. 5. 
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A very different approach has r)een suggested as a basis for rational-
ising the bargaining procedure. It has been arBued that the s1 tuation 
is comparable to ~hat of a 'gaITle' and its solution can be resolved using 
game theory. A hypothetical scheme was sketched out by Isard and Smith 
, , 
for a multi-country regional investment policy involving the trading off of~ 
. petrochemicals works and a steel complex. (1) Segal has tried 
to show how 'game theory' could be used to resolve a bargaining conflict 
between East African states over ga.ins' and losses though the approach is 
suggestive rather than operational. (2) A recent study of strate6ies for 
allocating electricity generating installations amongst Indian states uses 
a similar method. (3) However, it does appear that this approach is adding 
another dimension of sophistication (by explicitly incorpor,ting uncertainty) 
into a quantification exercise which is already, perhaps, excessively refined; 
an~ it is not yet clear that the 'game theory' approach can be made 
operational to cover a large ~TOUp of products and countries. 
(4) OwnershiE: The requiremer::.t that agree~ plans be enforced would be 
easier if industrial investment was made from public funds but in the 
circumstances of Central America it is very unlikely that local entre-
preneurs or state bureaucracies could pioneer difficult industrial projects. 
On the other hand, there are, for reasons already indicated, strong local 
objections to total external equity ownership. The insistence of the 
Inte~ation Industries Scheme on a minimum local equity participation was 
indicative of local priorities. One way of reconciling these conflicting 
(1) w. Isard & T. Smith: "Game theory, 10ml.tion theory And industriR.l 
.aef,lomeration" Papers of the Regional Science Association (18), 1967, also 
Nos. 19 and 20. 
(2) D. Segal: "E1.st African Common N:",rket: inequities in tho 1960's: an 
,Arbitration Scheme" (Ph.n.) OPe cit. 
(3) F. Gately: "Inter-stato pl::lnninp' of the urb:m electricit au 
a mixed inte,,~er proyra"JrlinR: appro~.ch" Ph.D. (University of North 
1971- ... ,to">'ll",_ 
: 
"-
-. 
" 
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pressures while also enabling the distribution of gains from a regional invest-
ment policy to be precisely quantified, Was set out by Little. (1) lIe 
proposed regional.internationa1 companies partly owned by local 60vernments or 
their nationals. Shares are available in proportion to COnS'ltJIlption by non-host 
countries and as there would be a conwitment to a low retention ratio: the 
"dividend" would be a form of compensation both for non-production and for 
higher prices paid. The proposal was formulated 'in precise terms and has 
been criticised on that basis, (2) but the critical aosumption behind tho idea 
is that the non-host country shareholding should be aid financed removing the 
cost of compensation from the host country. This is a somewhat heroic 
assumption when one recalls the hostility of the United states government to 
the "regional monopolies" created by the Central American Inte~;ration Industries 
system. 
The whole notio~ of multinational cooperation in industrial enterprise 
is as' yet underdeveloped - the Latin America Adela Investment Company (of 
~rivate Latin American shareholders) (3)and the small stake of UDEAC 
governments in the Gabon oil refinery being about the only cases so far 
(though one,ROD project is also on these lines). 
., r 1 -
" . 
" 
One very indirect 
(1) I.M.D. Little: "~ee;!onel InternA.tionnl Companies as an ATlproach to 
gonomic Integra.tion" Journal of Common ];;arket Studies, Dec. 1966. 
(2) Uni~ed l:ations (UnCTAD): "Curr~nt Prq'blem.R_,o.f. 'EconoMic I.ntef,l'ntion" OPt c1 t; 
pp.27-28. R. Robson: "Project ev"llJ~tion of mul tinR.tion::tl plMts in Afric~" 
. Journal of Industrial ~conomics, pp.105-l11. 
(3) Inter-American Development Bank: "~ti-nation::tl Inv9r.::tment, Public & 
. ?rivate in the Economic l)evelo'Oment nnd InteF'r:-1.tion of IJatin AmeriCA." 1968, 
pp.311-325. 
, . 
" I 
way of retaining local participation is t~ use reeional development banks ~D in 
Centr~l America, the Andean Group, or E3st Afric~, to promote region~l 
ventures: though- we have seen, with the Central American bank, how thJ2J ~f-J.. 
~b~d.~ easily becomes lost sight of. 
One implication of private ownership is that abuse of private monopoly 
power would have to be prevented, possibly by declining protection or 
b'Tadually requiring exclusive access along the line of the Integration 
Industries. Actual direct control of monopoly Vlould be more difficult as'it 
presumes a central authority with expert knowledge. 
, . 
"" 
'. 
(~) Choice of Industry: One of the basic reasons for developing a more 
planned approach to i~dustrial development was to develop an industrial 
structure based rationally on cheap local raw materials, local power supplies 
or other ~actor endowment)whlch offered the prospect of comparative 
advantaee. In a West Indian study it was a.rgued , integration that 
lithe produc.tion of. a sma1l range of materials can lead to a hieh degree of 
economic maturity (e.g. paper, glass, plastiCS, rubber, cement textiles, 
iron and steel, fuels and chemicals notably alkalis and sulphuric acid)" 
... and~ "in the production of foodstuffs with high lED and the mrulufacture of 
base materials of iron and steel, pl~tics, paper, rubber, natural and 
synthetic fibres •• is the basis for prosperity. It seems to us that success 
in economic development and transformation is crucially dependent on the ability 
to produce these commoditi?s which are heavily used in the production of othor 
com:nodities". (1) E.C.A. have adopted a similar approach: "real 
(1) II. Bre\vster and C. Thomas: 
OPt cit. p.11 and p. 35~. 
."The n,-m::..mics of ':!est IndiAn IntePTation" 
\, 
. { 
~--, ~~. - -"', 
industrial growth dependfl on stimulating activity at a number of key growth 
points. This means the installing now of modern industries strategic for 
economic development". (1) However, the need for industries with high 
multiplier and linkase effects should not blind one to the danger of dis-
economies arisine from its establishment of plnnts in previously non-industrial 
locations. 
While most arguments in favour of regional investment policies tend to 
stress the role of these strategic manufacturing sectors (2)it must be 
stressed that other criteria could equally well be employed to give different 
priorities. 
(6) SuprCl.-national Institutions: It has already been made very clear 
the determination of the central American governments to control the 
Integration Industries scheme even in its minor details • In all integration 
• 
schemes so far established there has, in practice, been virtually no 
delegation to suprana.tional boriies.. In LAFTA, CACM, UDEAC, the ~~ahgrebt 
RCD (also "CARIPJlA and Andean group) the chief decision making body is a body 
of Heads of state or ministers, assisted by a permanent Secretariat with 
limited power • 
(1) '", Jleport of the West African Industrial Coordination Mission: E/CN.14/24G 
1964. 1'.14. Also, R. Green & A. Seidman: "'pnity or Povel.·tylt Penl,,'Uin, 1968. 
(2) J. rardenas: "Latin American Activity U:Lthe Kul tjn~tionA.l Investnent 
}'iel.dtl in Inter-American Developmont Dank: ";.~ul tinA-tional InveRtmE!nts in the 
}]conomic Development ~,nd IntE'p-ration of I,E1.tin ArI)erica" OPt cit. p.359. 
\ 
" 
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However, "an equalising mechrulism is di.fficult to cst(1b1ish without 
the creation of a supranational authority with discretionary powers and 
independent means." (1) and lithe continuous renU11ciation of national 
sovereignty is the price that countries must pay to nchieve successful 
integration". (2) This, in its extreme form," must involve the right of 
a supranational body to write or vet national plans, to levy rElvenuc nnd 
control industrial location. In the absence of such deleg~tion to a 
higher authority there is need for continuous and positive bargainine. 
In either case the prob1er.l is political: lithe building of the Comrr.on 
:!r.arkct is an exercise in politics and it is a ques~ion 
of the most delicate kind involving, as it does, the ultimate question of 
national sovereignty". (3) 
(1) C. Franck: "E'1st Afric8n Unity Throur,h the IJ:tw" llcwhaven, 1964, pp.69-70. 
(2) F. Kahnert: et a1 "Economic Inte.zr8,tion_alT'onp: nevelopin",. Countr1.2!l" 
01'. cit. p.42 • 
. 0) R. Hansen: "Centr~.l Americn.: Rer;;ion::t1 Inte.9:ration ::l.nd SconoJll1.£ 
pevelon:nent" OPt cit. p.62. 
,{ 
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,Concl usions 
A review has been mane of the rntionale for a regional investment 
policy. Other methods of rectifying 'the tendencies to wasteful duplicr-ttion 
of capacity and disequilising tendencjes have been discussed and all had 
inherent li~tations. So however, did the regional investment policy 
approach, but even its critics have been prepared to concede "that industrial 
allocation is not a device which should be dismissed as a possible 
ingredient of a regulated customs union , •• (even though) ••• it would be 
wrong to think of (it) as the simple and complete answer ••• ". (1) 
A more commonly agreed position is that lJan effective regional 
. investment policy is both an essential condition for a regionnl integration 
scheme among developine countries and t he sure sign of the scheme's success". (2) 
A,reviewof attempts at regional investme~t policy, showed the dang0rs 
of excessive rigidity, complexity and unrealistic eA~ectations of planning 
on one hand, and permissiveness on the other. Consideration of previous 
experience and eeneral operational questions indicated th3t a regional 
investment policy was most likely to succeed if: 
(a) 'industry preference' was recognised as a.starting premise for 
all countries, 
''''(b) if it could be confined to a few sectors which would otherwise 
probably not be developed; preferably key sectors of strategic importance. 
(1) A. Hazelwood (Ed.): "Africl1.n Integration and nisintet<;T~tion" OPt cit. p.21. 
'(2) F. Kahnort et al OPt cit. p.46. 
" 
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(c) if aid finance could be available to cushion losses to non-host 
countries, 
(d) while recognising the "partial" approach - as in (b) - the range 
of the policy should be as comprehensive as possible to eive bargaining 
flexibility which means that it is necessary tor some kind of planning 
. 
exercise to ensure consistency, 
(e) the policy should be properly costed an~ programmed co that 
\ 
diseconomies from misallocation of resources could be estimated and the 
costs and benefits to individual partner states made clear. 
The latter point seems a particularly crucial factor and so the rest 
of the thesis will be devoted to showing how a regional investment policy 
in several key sectors might be costed and prograrr~ed. 
The relevance of such a policy should nat be underestimated even if 
the history of previous efforts in Central America has not been very 
successful. For example, periodically, proposals have been put fo~vard 
for reviving the Integration Industries Scheme in a more flexible and 
potent form; (1) and with the benefit of hind-sight one says that: "many 
of the difficufties prior to the 1"'l Salvador - Honduras war were due 
largely to an over-emphasis on regional trade liberalisation on one hand, and, 
on the other, to a neglect of joint industrial policies ••• ft. (2) 
(1) SIECA Carta Information Uo. 52 and 61, 1966. 
(2) W. Vlionczek: "I.atin A!'l'erican Economic Cooper::l.tion" Journal of Common 
Market Studies, sept. 1970, p.64. 
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We start from the assumpt:l.on justified ill Ch. 4~ that a r(~gional 
. } , 
investment policy on a product or sector basis is the basic policy 
I.,)I~il\# ... c-.-~ 
instrument required~to realise econoMies of scale, and also 'avoid the 
problems of 'duplication'. But this, in turn, raises locational problems 
in as much as markets are geographically dispersed and economies of scale 
consequently limited by transportation costs. 
-In this Chapter an attempt will be made to be more precise about 
what we mean by 'economies of scale' in this context, and to quantify 
its significance and that of limiting factors such as transport costs. 
A model is described which can be applied to particular industries and 
the limitations of the model are analysed prior to its use in several 
case studies. 
~conomies of sC81e: It is not intended to describe in detail much of the 
existing secondary source material on economies of scale but some attention 
must be paid to the meaning and sources of economies of scale first, and 
then to problems of measurement. 
We should start with a definition; that economies of scale occur when 
~ 
average coots fall with increased output (of a plant usuaily, but possibly 
of a firm). Distinctions are normally made between "shorl-runu economies 
of Dcale - the relationship between output and average cost for a given 
capacity - and "long-run" economies of scale - the r.elationship between 
output and average cost with variable capacity. (1) This in itself a 
(1) Confusions also arise: "Economies of scale" referring only to "short 
run" economies are described in D. Ransett: "Recionnl Induntrh.l Develonment 
in Central America" Praeger, 1969, Appen~ix A. 
\. 
.I 
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(iii) "stochasti(} " ' economies or "economies of massed resources" 
because of the need to stock less by wa~ of raw materials ann spare parts.(l) 
(iv) specialisation of labour, mana,gement, maintenance staff and 
equipment (and overheads generally) becomes practicable at lareer sc~es 
of operation. One could include here econonies in research. 
(v) "learning behaviour" is believed to have a considerable effect 
in lowering the cost of production as production runs are lengthened.(2) 
There is now ~ good deal of "micro" and "macro" economic evidence which 
puts quantitative flesh on the theoretical bones. (5) There are th~ "macro-
economic" studies of Chenery and others, dealt with in some detail in eh. 1 
and Appendix 2 which "explain" the advantages of large countries in 
developing manufactures and indicate that certain sectors notably petroleum 
products, metals and chemicals are particularly' 'scale oensitive l '. We have 
already discussed the limitations of this approach and the findines are too 
• 
ageregated anyway. Of the various "micro" methods of calculation - uSinG 
engineering, accounting and 'survivor test' methods - the engineering method 
is genera~ly regarded as the least unsatisfactor,y though there are considerable 
difficulties in as much as plants at different sizes may be of different 
vintage and function and there may also be non-technical economies in respect 
of labour and ~ana.gement input. 
(1) T. Ski toV!;3ky:. ItEgonorr.ics of scale in spare parlan American gconornic 
,,. Reviev/, 1956. 
(2)~ 'Learning behaviour is best described in the classic text of K. Arro~: 
"The economic implications of learning by doing" Review of Economic Studies, 
1962'. 
(~) J.J. Johnston: "StatisticAl Cost Determinr.Jtion"; F.T. Moore: "gconomio9 
pf sCA-le: some statistical evidence" Qua.rterly Journal of Econo:nic;,-1959 
J. Baldi & D. ''-ihi tcombe, OPe cit.; Unl ted }]at'ions: "Seminar on Innm'ltrir'll 
proer A-mTninPa'1I Sao Paulo, 19?4. ' 
(4) The "engineering method" is preferred by C. Pratten: "EconoT!'1ie~ of SCA.le 
'. in l.;;muf::tcturinE Industg" OPe cit. pp.20-20, and by J .S. fuin:-'"il~:Te;~~ 
rew Corypeti tiQ!l" OPe cit. in tw." classic works on the subject. The"""difrercnt 
methods are critically reviewed in D. Gold: "New r.eY'spe~tives on cO,s.t. theory 
and empiric::tl fincUnr;~" Journal of Industrial Economics, April, 1.?t:6. 
'. 
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Economies of scale have been shovm errJpirically to Vt:l,ry in importance 
at different parts of the cost curve. Eventually, diseconomies of scale can 
be manifested: efficiency of factor use declines as the quantity of the 
factor applied increases. There may be technical re8sons why large sizes 
~ become uneconomi~;lm~~~erial difficulties and problems of alienation 
amongst the labour force. (1) (however, there is a considerable difference 
between diseconomies to the firm and to the plant). Most empirical research 
has tended to indicate that long run average cost curves have an L-shaped 
Ci1'<V\e~ $)) 
rather than U-shaped with a minim~~ economic size 
which represents the lowest size for the realisation of full plant economies~2) 
The actual size of any plant will not solely by guided by the minimum economic 
size as technically defined. It is also necessary to take into 
account the factor mix of different processes the size of the market and 
~ , . ) 
growth of demandi the cost of competing imports. Even in industries where 
economies of scale are important small plant sizes may be encouraged by 
small markets, by a desire to avoid the risk of obsolescence from technical 
progress, by the local availability of (bulky) raw materials and water 
supply, ~y the abund.ance of cheap labour encouraging labour-intensive 
techniques, and in some industries (e.g. cotton spinning and weaving) by 
technical factors. 
The particular diseconomy which we are immediately concerned with is 
that ot:: transport costs. 1.s the scale 
of a, plant increases, the geographic spread '.of markets is increased (unl ess 
(1) C. Pratten: op. cit. pp.14-16; E.A.G. Robinson: ItThe strl1.ctur£.....2! 
ComPetitive Industr:l" Cambridge, 1953, pp.182-l83. 
(2) J. l3a.in: "Ba.rriers to New Comoeti tion" op. cit. V.K. Gupta: "Qwi 
FunctionR of Industrx in India" Journal of "IndustriAl Economieo, 1968-69, 
pp.57-73. J.Johnson: op. Cit.. Ch. 5. J. Blair: "Rel~tion between size fI.nd 
efficiency of busineflo" Review of Economics & Statistics, 1942. 
'. 
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increased sales can be accomplished by greater sales to existing customers) 
and the avera&e IDlit costs of transport ~jl1 rise. If transport coots are 
heavy, then optimum sizes will be 'smaller. There are a &reat many possibilities 
depending upon the, weight of the finru. product, the weight of raw materials, 
the geographical distribution (and growth) of demand, distribution services, 
economies of scale ~~d transport costs. Generally, it \'lil1 be possible to 
achieve a determinate optimum spread of production points which m.inimises 
production and transport costs. (1) There will be points where transport 
costs of either raw materials or final products are veri hie~ relative to 
the value of a product and economics of scale and conversely where 
economies of scale are subst~~tial relative to transport costs. The 
relationship between raw nk~teria1 and final product transport costs is 
important in determining the extent to which production is 'market-orientated' 
or 'footloose' or 'rooted'. The case where trrulsport costs are sufficiently 
large to affect the optimum capacity is to some degree a special case but 
nevertheless one whidh embraces most goods transported in LDC's including 
fuels, minerals, building materials, fertilisers and ~ricu1tural products. 
Clearly there is a need to relate trade theory to transport costs. (2) 
(1) E.ti. for a. theoretical discussion L. Lefeber: "1,ocl1.tion nnd Regional.. 
Plannine" north Holland, 1966 • 
. (2) W. Isatl'd &. M. Peck: "IJocation Theory; .and Intcmationa.l and Inter-
regional Tra.de Theory" QUarterly Journal of Economics, 1954, pp.97-1l4. 
'. 
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Evidence of }t~conomics of Sc.n.l~. 
In order to demonstrate the role which economies of scale might play 
in quanti tati va terms, a review is made of some of the main quanti tat! ve 
surveys of economies of scale in manufacturing. Before discussing the 
fiGUres, a brief review of tl\e studies will be made: 
(i) Numerous attempts have been made to apply the results of Bain's 
work in the U.S. based on engineering and economists' estimates, and already 
described in Ch. 4.(1) The drawback is that estimates of cants made by 
engineers are for 19vels of output which have never been experienced and 
are hypothetical. Another particular disadvantage of working directly with 
Bain'n twenty industrial cost curves is that they are now somewhat dated and 
also open to the criticism that data obtainEld from rich inclustrialised 
;~tl!.J 
countries are of~relevance to .underdeveloped countries. 
(ii) Efforts have been made to update and extend tho results in 
Western countries and an import~t study by Pratten of twenty-five industrial 
• 
categories in the last few years provides a good deal of additional 
information. (2) For steel and cement, estimates diverge greatly from 
~ain's estfmates, but the rest are compatible. 
(iii) The tn1. and other organisations have tri~d to adapt these figures 
to the costs and techniques of developing countries. Attention will also be 
:given to studies such as that of ~r,etaw,ally using feyptian data. (3) 
(1) J .S. Bain: "B;:rriers, to New Competltion" Harvard, 1956, esp. Appendix B. 
(2) C. F. Pratten: "Economies of Scale in Ma.nufa~turin~· Indust:rx" on. cit. 
(3) M. M.Meta,.wally: "The Effect of M:lrket Ilimi tations on Industri!!tlis~tion 
in Egypt" Yorkshire Bulletin of Economics & Social Research, May, 1961, 
pp. 37-49. 
\ 
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What we get from this datA. is first of all some measure of the "minimum 
efficient scale" (or "minimum optiJnlal scale") which is the lowest scale 
where minimum cost .is realised. /'II.U.pI. .. "S ~.lII!YA. To Bain, this 'lt0ii'> 'average plant size in 
the largest size group. Second we can obta.in some measure of the sensitiv-
ity of changes in unit cost to chanees in scale. Third we can obtain some 
measure of the sensitivity of investment costs in particular to changes in 
scale (Diag. 5-1). (1) _ Inferences have been ma.de, on the basis of medium 
or average sizes in richer countries to suggest (in an analogous way to 
the survivor technique), what is a suitable size for beginning production. (2) 
(1) E. g. T. Vie-oritz: "Prograrr.ming Data Summa.ry for the Chemical Indust;;x": 
(United Nations) Industrialistic and Productivity Bulletin 10, 1966. '1'he 
relationship between investment costs and scale of production is presented in 
~he following formula: 
= 
,.:bere K and K stand for the capital requirements of plants 1 + 2, and 
X] ahd!2 are ~he correspondine output levels. ~ is an empirical coefficient 
wTIich varies from one industry to another and Wl1ich would hold true only 
within a certain range beyond which it would tend to vaxy. 
(2) A. J. Brovm; "Economic separl'!.t.ion versus A. coprrnon mr-l.rket' in developing 
Countrie~tI Part 1, Yorkshire 13ulletin',of Economio and Social Research, !~ay, 
1961. 
\. 
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Diag. 5-1 CoeffiQ,ients o.f Economies of Scale in Investment 
Product 
Chemicals: 
PVC 
Ethylene 
Urea 
Acetylene (from natural 
gas) 
Polyethylene 
Caustic Soda 
Methanol 
\ Ammonia 
Sulphuric Acid 
Butadiene 
Iso-propanol 
Aluminium 
Petroleum Refinery 
Cement 
Coefficient 
. • 55 
• 54 
.67 
.67 
·87 
. • 76 - • 80 
·78 
·81 (Mo) 
·73 
• 8 (Mo) 
·80 
• 59 
• 50 
• 9 (Mo) 
'75 (Mo) 
'77 (Mo) 
Notes: See footnote ·on p.~~ 
Ranp,;e in wh:f.ch ecopomies of 
Acale are important 
2,500 - 40,000 Tpa 
10,000 - 60,000 Tpa 
16,000 -165,000 Tpa 
10,000 - 45,000 Tpa 
6,000 - 12,000 Tpa 
6,000 - 35,000 Tpa 
5,000 - 60,000 Tpa 
.. 11;3;000 ~180,OOO:'~pa 
10,000- 100,000 Tpa 
5,000- 60,000 Tpa 
2,000- 30,000 Tpa 
Sources: (Mo), 'F. Moore: "Bconomies of Scale: some statistical evidence" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1959. 
'Uni ted Nations: ''Programming Data for the Chemical InduAtl"Y" 
Industrialisation and Productivity, Bulletin No. 10, 1966, pp.7-57 • 
'-
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One must also qualify any report on specific economics of scale 
relationship in various ways:(l) 
(i) where production processes embrace a heteroGenous range of outputs 
as with a steel mill or a petroleum rei'inery" "'Chere is a problem of deciding 
at what level of aggregation to d031 t 
(ii) economies of scale looked at here arc entirely ','internal" and 
exclude externalities which may be an important element in the sa.vings. A 
related point is that only one process is considered at a time - in practice 
certain industries such as chemicals as developed on a 'complex' basis taking 
advantage of input-output relationships, 
(iii) products can be made in several cases by different processes 
which will have different scale coefficients: steel and acetylene are 
examples. 
(iv) the use of monetary measures of investments and other factor inputs 
is-open to the obvious objectio~ that price levels vary considerablY over 
time and between couniries and prices may not reflecttteltative costs. 
(v) the relationships do not necessarily hold over time d'le to 
technical progress influencing optimal scales. However, notwithstanding 
these qualifications, the figures in Diag. 4-2 and 5-1, if treated with 
caution, do ,give a rough idea of the importance of scale effects in different 
industries. 
{o _~ One might also point out other aspects of economies of scale (in the 
short run) by illustrating the degree of underutilisation of capacity. 
'~: Unfortunately, Central American data is poor but for many industries the 
utilisation rate is on average well below a "goodlt ra.te (over 7(J)~ roughly) 
It should be stated however, that there are serious questions of definitions 
where capacity utilisation is concerned - depending upon whether capacity 
(1) The problems of usine technical coefficients in specific contexts is 
discussed in T •• Vietorib: "Pro.ttarnr.tin Data f3um.'11ta for the Chemical InduHt " 
Industrialiscdlc>l\.~ Productivity Bulletin 10, United llations • 1966, pp.7-57 • 
.. -..... - .... ~ 
., 
~-"" 
211. 
is defined in terms of one shift or more; a concept which, in turn, 
is not very meaningful in process industries or in very nmal1 units. 
Also, the effect of increased capacity use will vary according to 
whether it resul t·s from better use of equipment or a creater number 
of shifts. The high levels of capac! ty undcr-utilioation in Central 
America can ~e explained in many cases by the small si7.e of market 
relative to the minimum size of plant. 
Diseconomies of Scale: Transport Cost~. 
It is even more difficult to be preciso about transportation costs for 
which comparative data cannot be used, only direct information. The 
rate structure is enormously complex depending on the route, the road 
surface, the mode of travel t and the extent of discounts for laree and 
regular and long distance consignments and for return journeys. ~ail 
fxeights are relatively straightforward and advertised by the con~anies. 
Road freights arc a. great deal more complex and unpredictable. Rail 
. "' .olo· nft 
services '" .. " . '., however, service intra-regional trade, which is 
carried - 800A by road and 20?~ by coastal shipping. (1) 
An example of the diDpersion of average transportation costs was 
given in a recent transport study (for goods). (2) 
(1) SIECA: ".1ncidencia del COlltO del trnnl'3Jlorte en los nrecios de lOA 
pro§.uctos I1.PTicolas<f!;, indu~trialc8 de intercambio dentro del f1'1orc?do comnn" 
SI.8CA!68/VII-5728, uatemala, 1968, p.2. 
(2) Central American Bnnk for Economic Integration: ",Contr(!.J. American 
Transportation Btudy:. 1964-65," p.229. 
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Terra.in 
TYPe of_Road Mountai,n Rolllng Plain 
Trails 20'0 15'0 10·0 
Good-weather (Passable) 
dirt roads 10·0 a,s 7·0 
Poor 7·0 6'1 S· 3 
Average (all weather 
and paved) 6·1 5' 3 4'4 
Good 5' 3 4' 4 3·6 
Excellent 4'4 3·6 2·a 
Notes: cost is given in cents per 1~-Xilometer. 
An ECLA Study also indicated the degree of dispersion of road costs 
on the basis of information from hauliers, on main regional routes. (1) 
The range was roughly 2'5 c to 7'5 c per ton-kilometer: return journeys 
gave approximately a 25% discount, and smaller loads were, naturally, 
somewhat more,heavily charged. Generally, for trade of more than 100 km, 
for busy routes in both directions and for-good loads, rates of 2·0 c to 
3·0 c per ton kilometer are generally levied where straightforward bulk 
goods are c~ncerned, Border crossing procedures (even without tariffs) add 
to costs and risks. It has been estimated that even on the single-leg 
journey from Guatemala to t'1 Salvador, border - checking and delay can add 
about l~/o to the cif price for bulky products like cement, timber and ferti-
-~ 
lisers, and may account for low region~ trade in these products. (2) This 
(1) Economic Commission for Latin America, E/Cn-12/CCE/~25; (TAO/LAT 48), 
1966, pp.50-55. 
(2) K. Huber: "Central lunsricRn Ro~d-U::;er Chnrf'es studl," World :Bank 1969. 
(Unpublished),' 
\ 
\ 
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problem can be eliminated by bonding but this is costly. 
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Gemn:ally J the role 
of transport costs as a. limiting factor has been widely recognisecl in the 
realisation of economies of scale in the Centra.l Americ:m re{;ion and .in 
Latin America. generally, (1) especially for those industries where the upper 
limi t of economies of Beale is greater than the constraints of national 
markets. 
\ ~ Tr d' ff~ ., , f S 1 't T t c t a ln~-o i!Jconoml.es 0 ,ca e RP:a.lns r,8nspor os s: We have isolated two 
main non-proportional costs which influence in contrasting ways the deliv€red 
cost of products. Perhaps the best way of introducing a theoretical frame-
work is .to look at what location theory· . can contribute. (2) The first 
point of reference is t he work of Weber who tried to establish optimal 
minimum-cost industrial location with reference to labour costs in different 
locations and transport costs, of raw materials and products, 
Weber'.s work has been bull t upon in many ways to 
• 
predict the market area boundaries for complex patterns by deriving points 
of minimum transport (and total) cost in a plane. liodificd models have 
included :r;-ealistic transport costs structures including terminal 
(1) E.S. C~rpep.ter: ItProbelrn~.A rrenerales del trammortes en America. IJatina" 
Inte:r:'-ATTlerican Review of Economics, Vol. It No.1 & 2, 1963. J. De Kock: 
ullos Transportes y las Comrnunicaciones lA. 1n+,e rr;).cion Economica de Centro-
america" ESAPAC; Co~ta Rica 1961 Seminar Papers on the Organisation and 
Administration of Roads). R. Brown: tlJrMsport R.nd Economic Intee1"~.tion 0"£ 
South America" Brookings, 1966. H. Snell: ",Transportation integration: a 
.. va1"iety of prob1ems" in R. lIil ton (Ed.): ",The !tovement Toward Latin American 
,Uni ty" OPt cit. 
(2) In this the author has drawn heavily on the main works of W. leard, 
notably "!{ethods of Regional Analxsia" !h.I.T. Press, 1960, and D. Smith: 
"Industrial Location - an economic geographical analysis" IllinOis, 1970. 
'. 
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charges. (1) 
The major weakness with the Weberian "least-average cost" approach is 
partly that it ignored the interdependence of firms which d.erives from 
imperfect competition of which economies of scale may be an ingredient; 
also, that it ignoreS variations of demand in space, as will inevitably 
occur·with population concontrations: "as soon 8,S demand is allowed to vary 
in space the least (average) cost l~cation does not necess~,rily· yield 
maximu:n profits ••• a new location may have higher unit costs but greater 
sales will increase total profits ••• also a low total cost may simply 
indicate a low volume of output in a badly situated location relative to 
the market." (2)' 
Dealing with interdependenc~ between a small number of producers is a 
, 
difficult problem and Isa1d and Smith have shovm how it may be necessary to 
." I,' invoke g~e theory to reconcile the conflicting interests of producers in 
an optimal manner. (3) However, like so many other locational theories it 
has been st~gestive of a possible approach rather than explicitly directed 
to the foundation of an operational model. 
It is perhaps easiest to show diaeramatically the nature of the problem • 
One~could start by showing what would be the effect if there were no economies 
of scale. 
costa. 
AB represents a linear market, the vortical axis represents unit 
./ 
(1) R. }.~orril1: "The Spi=l.t1a1 Organisn.tion of Societx" Duxbury Press, 
Washington, 1970, p.90. The only cost of distance is not only the direct 
transport coat; there is the use of time involved in journeys, and the indirect 
, social or psychological effect of distance. Transport cost i teelf m~ _ be a 
complex function of distance usually decreasing exponentially if terminal costs 
are included; and pther factors will influence the cost such as the route, the 
characteristics of the carrier, and non-competitive rate fixing, c.a. C. Clark: 
"IndustriRl I,oc~.tion ~mn economj c potentiAl" Lloyds Eank Review, Oct. 1966, also 
on the motion of If~conomic d:j.stance" is W, Beckerman: lI1)isb_ncc ~n~ tha 'O~t,tern 
.of intra-b.'uropean trade!! nev~ew or Econom~cs &: Stq.tisti·cs, ) eb. 19)6. -
P.T.O. 
·' 
. (2) r,li. Smith: "Industria.l location: an economic p;eo~raJ?hicRI analysis" 
OPe cit. p.137. 
(3) W. Isard &. T. Smith: "!,oca.tion p,'R.mes: with anplic::tti~ms to clrU'10ic 
location problems" Papers of Regional Science Association, 19, 1967, pp.45-80. 
VI. Isard: "trams theory. location theorx and industriRl :I.C"r,'lomerRUon" Papera 
of the Regional Science Association, 18, 1967. pp.l-ll. W. Isard &. T. Smith: 
"Coalition e:runes: Pa.ner 3" Papers etc. 20, 1968, pp.95-107. M. Greenhut: 
"Games, capitalism and general location theory" Manchester School of Economics 
and Social studies, Jan. 1957. 
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(:'~~Ilproduction cost 
~::.~ransport cost 
In this very simple case there are two producers whose unit costs are 
EF and CD. With a linear tr~nsport cost function, (BJ, AI)oI'(AK, BL) 
represent delivered costs for the two locations. An optimal least-cost 
solution is where HG represent~ the market boundary served by the two plants. 
~b.is is of course, absurdly over-simplified (the linear demand, constant 
costs etc.). An equally simple set of circumstances based on constant 
costs can be repre:'\ented in a linear program.1'lling "transportation problem" 
when complex problems involvinff large numbers of production and consumption 
points (with d~mand assumed to be represented at a point) can be solved to 
minimise transportation costs and (constant) variable costs. Theoretical 
models of this kind have been evolved by Lefeber and others. (1) Practical 
ap~lication has also been sought~ Ghosh, for example, used this linear pro-
granuning approach to compute the optimum inter-reaional flows for the entire 
Indian cement industry based on a matrix of nine states,. (2l A similar approach 
has been used for the East African sugar industry (minimisin~ the cost of 
transport from fields to r~finery;(3) and for a very much larger numb~r of 
(1) };~.C. Eos: ",8TH"til'tl Di?nersion of Economic Acti vityl1 Rot.terdam, 1965. 
L. Lefeber: ",Allocation in Sp~ce" North Holland, 1958. 
(2) A. Ghosh:· "Efficiency in rJoc~tion and Inter-redonal Flows: The IndiA.n 
Cement Indust:r:r 'DurinG the l"ivp, Year Pl::tn.~_J9~O-22" North Holland, 1965. 
(3) G. Frank: "The Sugar Industry in East Africa" East African Institute of 
Social Research, 1965, Ch. 4. 
• r' 
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potential locations as in the nussian cement industry. (1) 
If economies of scale are considered then there are two conflicting 
influences on pl,ant loca.tion; (2) a. larger scale of production is tending 
to reduce average costs and trrolsportation cost are rising with increased 
distance from the point of production. 
--
- ...... 
--
..-
XI 
~ ____________ ~ ____ ·_"w __ , ______ ~ 
Distance 
---~ 
X" 
TO' and TOil are 
tra.nsport costs 
AC' and AC" are averaGe 
production costs 
TAC' and TAC" are total 
costs per unit 
(delivered) 
·In the case sho\vn above the combination of average cost and transport 
cost 1s such that in all caSC'3 a plant at.X II; operating as a monopoly, would 
be preferable to two plants. In other cases, rising total costs may make a 
split market more economic. / 
The question then arises of how it is possiole to operationalise a 
model which enables us to trade off economies of scale against transport 
,", . . 
costs. Linear programming is precluded since by definition the formal 
requirement of conventional opti~ising techniques from a mathematical point 
of view is that there should be no non-convesities and indivisibilities, i.e. 
variables should be continuous. \Vhere non-convesities occur it is difficult 
to approach an optimal solution and impossible in tho case of indivisibilities~3) 
(1) !llints and Finkelstein: ",URes of r,iathematical ?rodel::! in 1'\01 vine 'OroblemR of 
Inter-industrylInter-redonal Planninp; in f,he USSH" UN Seminar in Planning 
Techniques at U.nDk, 1964, pp.l67. 
(2) 'We are, of course, concerned here solely with internal economies of scale. 
If externalities are important then big undertrucings in areas of hieh BTowth 
p.rr.O. 
may have additional advantages. However, there are probably insoluble 
problems of measurement here unless we try to deal with the problem by 
'complex analysis'. 
(3) T. Vw6ritz:'''Industrial Develonment Plannin!~Models with Economies of 
Scale ani1 Indivisibili ties" Journal of Regional Science Assoc'iation, 196;, 
Papers of Lund Conference, p.l. 
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It is possible to circumvent the problem of convex production functions 
by a variety of methods none of which are entirely satisfactory.' (1) 
(i) one is the 'comparative costl method i.e. to compare tho ~~ 
cost~ of various locations assuming that all plants have equal scale.(2) 
This approach is just too simple and does not help us to answer the 
question ?f how Jo1an:,! plants should opE-rate and at what scale. 
(li) a second and more realistic approach is to compare absolute costs 
for a specified number of realistic programmes, or combinations of factory 
"0 
sizes. Vietori~ & Szabo this in a study of tho Latin Amoricm) 
chemical industry involving sites in five countries, twelve market areas 
and sixty production activities. Formal optimisation was avoided and a 
series of alternative programmes which looked attractive a priori were 
explored by means of detailed computations. (~) 
Detailed industrial complexes in which economies of scale inhere, have 
also been dealt with in this manner, by contrastine the cost of one or two 
likely industrial complexes. In this way, 5nput-output 1inka.ges can be 
aCCOMmodated to some extent. In the classic study of this kind a refinery -
~c.o 
fertiliser - synthetic fibre complex on Puerto~was favourably contrasted 
. .,' ('1-) 
to anoth.er hypothetical project in the US by comparing absolute costs. 
(iii) a useful simplification employed by Vietof\"li7e and :Manne was to 
approximate non-proportional cost items by a fixed cost and a linear variable 
cost. The particular problem which they investigated was the optimum 
'" 
(1) There is a good review in T. Vi'etori~: "Pron-D..'"1Mincr natR. SUr.tmFl.ry for the 
Chemical Ind.ust;ryll in Industrialisation & Producti vi ty, Bylletin 10, United 
Nations, 1966. . 
(2) E. (;. i'l. IsaJf'U &. J. Cumberland (FAs.): "TIeR'ionA.l F:conoMic Pla.nninr-=: 
,Technigues and Analy.s.is for !/es~ Developed Aret'lsll OBeD, Paris, 1961. -:1. Isa(d: 
"Method!) of Becion:)} Ana.lysis" !.:.I.'r. Press, 1960, ChI 9. 
(~) United nations: " ].a. Indu:qtri~ ~uir.lica. en America. La.tinf!:" 1963. 
(4) w. Isand, E. Schooler & T. Victorisz: "~stria.l Complex Analysis & 
Rep;ional Development" New York, 1959. 
P.T.O. 
t , 
I 
I 
t 
I 
\ 
(5) T. VietorlL--z &: A. Manne: "Chemical Processes, l Jlant IJocation & Economie.;.~ 
of Scale" in A. Manne &: H. Ma.rkowi tz: "Studies in Process Analysis·· Cowles 
Foundations, 1961. 'J.'. Vietori-h: "Industrial neve]opment Pl~inG l~~s vlith 
.Economies of Scale & Indivisjbilitiesn Regional Science Associa.tion: Papers 
of the Lund Congress, OPe c~t. 
\, 
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location, ata given point of time, of an ammonia/nitric acid/s\uphuric aCid/ 
~~:...-.. 
arr~onium sulphate . nitrate complex. They simplified the complex process to 
two stages; an~onia at one stage and fertiliser at the second, by making a 
series of approximating assumptions. ''l'he computer run a complete enumeration 
of 1024 combinations of ammonia and fertiliser locations to find the lowest 
production cost/transport cost solution, each locational alternative being 
represented by a zer%ne variable to indicate whether the fixed charge be 
incurred at that point. This approach has been referred to as a tlfixed 
charge transport problem", as it could be treated as a linea.r programming 
problem once the convex function had been linearised. 
This fixed-charge (or mixed integer) programming approach has specific-
ally been used for problems of plant location within common markets. The 
Brookines Institute has endeavoured to show how joint supra-national planning 
W9u1d produce a. more efficient distribution of plant than has occurred with 
" (1) 
national decisions. • Other studies have incorporated several staces of 
production; multiple and joint products, imports and exports. (2) 
Eastern European plannine exercises have independently evolved to 
similar ap~roach to the problem; one of the more famous usine non-linear 
progr~~ing techniques without the approximation techniques referred to above~3) -
(1) J. Grunwald: "Un proj ecto conjunto de investip;;A.cion sobre In integ-racion 
industrial en AmericA. IJatina" El Trimestre Economico, 1966, pp.435-449. ' 
M. Carno,!l "A Welfare flnalysis of TJatin Ameri,can }~conomic Un:l.on: nix in~l~st!"Y 
studies" Journal of Pol! tical Economy, 1970, pp.626-654, and ",;r.ng)l~.!'. .. i.Fl.1i.s~.1;,i0!l 
ip a~ JJatin American Common fJ:arket"(E.C.I.E.t. Studies) ,q)}. 
(2) E. P.'. D. Kendrick: "Investment plannin.o; a,nd economic intep;-ration" Economics 
of Planning, 1967 t or "Proeramminp;; Investment in the Process Industry" t.UT, 1970. 
Ana •. M. Martirena de Martel: ".Int.ep,'r~cion :x de economicoR de cSM.1 all El 'l'rimestre 
Economico, Vol. 123, (1964) pp.412-422 and IIInte,QTac,ion y de8~.rrollo economicol! 
Trimestre Economico Vol. 142 (1969) pp.169-l85. 
(3) J. \Co~ et al.: "r,{A.'thernA,ticp..l ProP'rp..mmin~ of the Develonment of 
FJunl"'Ftrian. nthetin Ji1ibr~: Production" 3ucl~pest, 1963 (extracts only, seen by 
author • G. Jandy: '';Problems of Location in Oner}'J.tions Research" Regional 
Science Association Papers (Budapest Conference) 1968. 1. Knessic: "'l'echnigues 
of Inc1uDtrial Location Pros:rramMing": V. iieducdeur & V. Kagan: "Economl.c-
]{athematicQl mQr!elf ~ methods QK locfltinp' 5.mlust:rlI11 entemri~e'an: 
W. Endicher, I. Klebanov & V. Komlik: "Po~nibil:i.tf.es of nsinf" electronic 
comuuters & methods of m:1them:1tical nro£:rCl.mminp' for nolvinR: prool'"ems of" 
production location" ~ll mimeo~atlhed in "Papers of the mrrro Inter-resdon~l 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~.~--
P.T.O. 
t-.,,".!<",,-
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(iv) Finally, attempts have also been mfl.de to lift the above model 
from the static or comparative static confines and to generalise it to 
So 
cover the best pattern of capacity expansion which is fea,sible, th(:l,t 
advantar,e mie,'ht be derived from staggering investment in such a vmy that 
when a deficit occurs at one point there is a surplus at the.other. Such 
an application of mixed-integer programming hFl.s been in operation in India. (1) 
It was felt that application of methods (iii) and (iv) to the situation 
of the Central American Common MRrket could give sufficient flexibility and 
choice of alternatives to enable us to arrive at something approaching an 
optimal size/location decision in several industries; ruld to contrast 
aut:archic with more decentralised solutions. 
We are thus able to determine, under certain assumptions, which 
country in the Common Market has an absolute advantage in producing the 
pr04ucts studied. The cost to each partner country of buying from the 
optimum (or minimum cost) alternative is compared with the cost of importing 
from thi-rd countries or producing the good domestically and the gain 
or loss to each country from purchasing from ,the customs unions can be 
estimated; 
An attempt will be made to set out a model using an integer programming 
app~oach which is basically the acme as that used by Vietorisz & Manne, and 
Carrt>y, referred to earlier. There is a series of consumption points, j, 
(1, 2 ••• n) into which a given (price inela.stic) demand R." is assumed to 
J 
be concentrated, and production points i {It 2 ••• m} at which a uniformly 
produced homogenous good are manufactured. The cost of transporting 
the finished product from i to j is Cij. The number of units produced 
(and thus transported) for market is xij. The costs of 'production 
(1) A. r,~anne: "Investments for Capacity }]Xpl:m~ion: Si7.e, loc~t:ton anrl Til'lle 
Planninr," Allen &. Unwin, 1967. D • .a.'rkenlotter: "Pre-investment Plrumin~ for 
,vapacity: a Multi-location T.l;@amic t~odel" USAID, New Dolhi, 1969. 
nr(J divided into those elements which erc proportional ond nonproportional 
to output. 'The proportional costs can sinply be added to cij. ~~hc non-
::>roportional costp are important vrith'economies of Deale, where there io 
a fractional e:,ponent: 
Capital or labour input (K or L) :::: a. ~~; 
This function can be lineariscd; 
If 
If 
tl..:::: 0, 
0<.", ° 
K or L :::: 0 
K or L :::: a +(x 
o ? ~ '1 (f)(.= Dcale 
coeff:i.c icmt) 
x~ '-rw.~ 
Vfuat this implies is that the non-linear function can be broken down to 
two components. OnG is a fixed charge in which is incurred wherever a 
the other is ( ) 
plant is built at i and/a proportional cost which can be added to cij. 1 
VIi is the fraction of the fixed co~t incurred (0 or 1). 
The model can be set out as folloY/s: 
. Minimise ~ o.i wi + -~cij x Xij • •••••• (1) i - l. J 
subject to ~Xij :::: ~Rj (all j) • •••••• (2) J 
If 171 [:~J then Sxij to] l. 0 • •••••• (3) 
Wi "" 0 or 1 • •••••• (4) 
xij~O • •••••• (5) 
Zquation (1) represents th3 objective function: it_defines the sum of costs 
to be minimised. While the mo:lel is implicitly assumed to be closed it would 
be quite easy to introduce imports by assuming anothor source which supplies 
the good at 0. Biven price (tho region beins a 9rice taker for the world's 
goods): there would be no fixed charge for imports. Equation (2) i~plies 
capacity 
that demand in m~t by out1:mt, leavine no surplus/or shortfall. Sqy .. ation (3) 
is of an either /Jr typo. 'If a plant is eoto.blished nt i then wi is set to 
(1) In other vlords, marginal cost io constant while average costs fo.ll 
with increased scale. 
\ 
.; 
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unity and a fixed charge is incurred: if it is not established thon wi 
is zero and there is no fixed charge (equation 4): Equation (5) is 
formal, eliminating the theoretical possibility of negative output. The 
~~~ . 
model is solved by.. . zero and ones to the zero-one variables, 
the remaining variables being related in a linear programming trru16-
shipment p;r:oblem. For each combination of zeros and ones (or local 
optima)0l ) a Bp.parate trans-shipment problem has to be solved. 
Hitherto, we have detailed the treatment to be eiven to one homogenous 
good involving only one production stage. In fact, many of the more useful 
studies, of Vietoritz and Urume, Cn~y and the Brookings team, and Kcndricl{ 
operated with two stage production processes, or multiple products. This 
does not alter the fundamental nature of the problem but involves considera-
tion of interplant shipment costs to final markets; and requires a lineariscd 
.production cost estimate for each stage of production. 
The minimisation of cost model is, therefore, more complex but similar 
to that indicated before. The model can be set out 8.S follows: 
xik is the number of units of x (an intermediate good) produced 
.at i (a first stage production point) and shipped to k (a 
"second stage" production point) 
Yik is the number of 'units of y (a final product) produced at k 
and shipped to j (the product market) 
Wi is the fraction·of fixed charge incurred for an x plant at i 
where w1 a 0 or 1. 
~ is the fraction of a fixed charge consumed for a y plant at K 
where 2k = 0 or 1 
~ is the fixed annual charge for the construction and operation of 
an x plant at i 
(1)' The "local optimum" is tho minimum v~riable cost for a given combina.tion 
of plant locations. 
280 .• 
bk is the fixed annual. chargo for the construction and operation of 
a y plant at k 
cik is the variable construction,'operating and transport costs per 
unit of x at iplus transpor.t costs from i to k 
~j is ~he variable construction, operating and transport costs per 
unit of y at k plus transport costs from k to j 
Rj is the market at j 
Minimise: 
+.~ ~ k ~ c:; ik ik ~ ~ dkj • ykj +j:'k c .x~+kj •••• (1) 
subject to ~xik 
~ 
If 
~yjk 
WI ~: ~~ then 
2k 
.. 
, (= 1) then (=.0) 
= ~ yjk (all k) 
::: l' Rj (all j) 
~ xik 
~yik 
j --
where' 
xij yjk ~ 0 
w. 
~ 
:zk ::: 0 or 1 
• ••• 
• ••• 
(all i) 
• ••• 
(all k) • ••• 
" i 
This modifiqation is an important one in denlinB' with any industry where 
production may be vertically disintegrated; steel, fertilisers, car 
production, etc. 
(2) 
(3) 
(5) 
The numbers of possible permutations is likely to be very great and 
~. complete enumeration may not be possible to find the optimum 201ution and 
the distribution of costs of alternative solutions. For this reason, 
alogarithms specially writt~n for the computer incorporate approximations 
to the exact optimum solution. (1) 
" 
(1) This subject was beyond the author's mathematical ability but attempts were 
made to follow the logic behind attempts to develop R~c. methods which 
could give approximate answers to complex 'problems. In his own examples the 
author was able to confine the scope of the exercise to complete enumeration 
problema. 
At this stage it is necessary to review [lome of' the amlUmptions Md 
simplifications that have been introduced. ~) whole exercise is of partial 
equilibrium analysis and rests on ceteris paribus nsst~ptions. 
(1) We mad.e. several sweepine assumptions about the n~ture of §em~md .• 
We have assumed it to be given for a fixed time, ~rice inelastic and 
concentrated at a point.., and projected. on tho basis of uncertain income 
levels. These assumptions are obviously open to question. Heavy trans-
port costs will have a considerable effect on delivered costs in peripheral 
locations and, consequently, reduce the demand 1n those locations for products 
which have a positive price elasticity of demand. Also, even with the high 
degree of urbanisation into Latin American cities the scattered rural 
POPulati'6n1 hNe. to be served, incurring transport costs. 
In addition, there is the basic problem of lack of data Dnd the 
difficulties of making projections. Demand estimates, therefore, would 
. ~~ 
have to be subject to.sensitivity,t0lsdme kind. 
(2) Economies of scale are subject to even greater simplifications. 
~a are dependent on hypothetical engineering estimates for long run 
average cost curves, which are applicable primarily to .' developed 
economies an embody more advanced and recent technology than will 
are also having to assume, statically, that tech-
nology is unchanged e foreseeable future. 
The linearisation procedure is subject to errors, possibly of 
considerfl.bl e magnitude. The Vietoritz and Manne study involved draViing 
. 
a segment which cut the curve at the points representing "minimum" and 
"maximum" scale, which data is separately obtained from empirical data. (1) 
Another possibility is to dr~w a t~ngent to the curve nt the technical 
.pptimum if such data is available. 1ven ass~~ing that one of these 
procedures is feasible, more likely the first,the linearisation proceduro 
'. 
29n. 
does incorporate errors especially at extreme ends of the rang'e of scales. 
At zero scale there is a fixed investment charge when there should be no 
charce and so the cost is ~estim8,ted. at low scales: similarly nt very 
high scales. At scales between the minimum and maximUcll the linear 
approximation unde-rc:3timatea the true seal e. 
~--::--7-
I 
\ 
';t;"';;" --~:-b-><<'f..tl) 
For these reasons, some form of sensitivity analysis is ~[;'ain impe~ative. 
(3) Jransport Costs: these must be estimated empiricall on the 
,-
basis of locally avaiJ-able informa.tion. This becomes complex where port 
c~sts'are involved as well as land journeys and in practice it was found 
advisable to calculate with "h':,6h" and Itlow" eotima.tes. 
(4) Prices in general,: the whole price structure is assumed to be 
static and constant but the process of transformation may drastically effect 
-
the level of wages end, import costs over time. 
(5) Uniform objective function: it is implic£tly assumed that all, 
countries have the same goal (cost minimisation, growth maximisa.tion etc.) 
-... 
though, in fact, some may ascribe greater importance to employment per se, 
stability etc. 
.. 
(6) }In "Open" Economy: imports and exports from outside the region 
can be introduced without a great deal of difricul ty. Imports solve the 
function in the model of supplying final product requirements or intermediate 
products requirements thereby e,~sing the capacity constraint. Exports 
\ 
'. it-! 
1 
, 
1 
1 
" 
"  
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remove the limitations of a specified market. In practice it mru{cs the 
problem more manageable to assume that 'the rest of the World' is a 
homogenous market or source which taJ<:cs products at a given price, or 
supplies at a siv7n price, . 
(7) static or Dynamic Assumption.§.: the basic framework of the models 
described so far has been to look at the spatial aspect by excludin~ the 
time factor. We have been concerned to' minimise the cost of serving a 
market given at a point in time. The dynamic problem in a closed economic 
system (as defined above) is simply described: to what extent is it 
desirable to select a capacity for a proposed plant above present require-
ments in anticipation of the Growth of the market1 (1) A large plant, 
~ larg~tt~ present demand, will enjoy economies of scale, but will operate 
below full capacity initially, when heavy fixed charges will ~.o:;::.be=-~ 
carried. Conversely a plant which is relatively small will have better 
capacity utilisation b~t less economies of scale, and will require earlier 
supplementation. Time phasing thus presents a problem with or without the 
pr.ssibility of trade between regions of a country or with the outside world. 
Trade has the effect of permitting imports' from neighbouring plants when 
domestic plants have reached full capacity; and, by exports, of allowing better 
,-
utilisation of capacity in large plants which is in excess of domestic needs. 
In this way better economies of scale and plrUlt utilioation can be achieved 
(with' a trnnsport penalty) if investment is staggered to accommodate the 
intentions of neighbours as well as the domestic producer. 
.. 
The object of this study is to develop a cnpacity plannin~ model which 
encompasses three factors: dynamic chQnges, spatial patterns and the structure 
of costs, coordinated simultaneously. There have boen various atte~pts to 
(1) A., :Manne: "InveRtment for Capllci,ty Exprmdon" .... op-.;.. • ..;c;.:;i .... t  Ch. 1 & 2. 
., 
2$12, .• 
relate these different uinensionf3. (1) Non-linear models Ylith a dynamic 
aspect present several problemB which do not r::dst for static problems: 
(i) it is necessary to compare future streams of expenditure and 
receipts to prcocnt values (or terminal values if /rixcd po:i.nt of comparison 
is envisaged).' For this purpose time discounting has considerable aclvantage~:-> 
H0'I10Ver, there is likely to be .. ; .. 
uncertainty over the rate of discount to be used. 
(ii) cost and demand estimates need to be projected under conditions 
of uncertainty in demand and of technical change in supply. Uncertainty is 
of necessity assumed aTIay and this limitation can only be partially rectified 
by sensitivity analysis. 
(iii) time periods need to be sp~asiS for comparison. 
It io necessary, within these time periods, to specify diocrete intervals, 
witbin which all activities are.assumed to remain constant. Time being 
. 
infinitely divisible, this assumption is inescapable and we would normally 
t~ a year as the minimum indivisible time ~criod. The maxim~~ time horizon 
needs to b~ sufficiently large to allow consideration of a reasonable array 
of different plant sizes but not too large to make projections totally 
meaningless. 
Vietoritz and 1~nne showed how, of tho various attempts to deal with 
these probletls, a comparative static. approach could be employed., using essent-
ially the s~mc static model described above but analysing the effects of 
increases of demand for. given future points in tioe.(3) Another relev~t 
study was that by Ghosh of tho IndiOl cement industry. (4\3y e;<cludincr 
£1) n~Vie\7ed in D. EnkeIllotter: "!X.e:-inves~men..t Planning for CO-;.lRcitZ 
_!.xpans~on: a 1~ulti-locnti.on. Jrftnmic ~.:o(l.el," op.cit. eh. 1 • 
. (2) -n.g. 
.?avinO'~" 
s. l.:"'.rb'lin: "~Socinl 1"1'Ite of discol~nt and tho optima.l rate of 
Q.uc:.rtcrly Journal or J.!conomics, :b'~b. 1963, 
(;) T. Victoritz and A. '!I,ranns·. "eh i 1 P PI I. - --2E... ca rccespes,: : IIp,t Looation and:. 
Economies Of. Scale" op.cit. 
(4) A. Ghosh: ".8ff~ci,ency. in Location, .nnd !.n,ter-rocional flo'CTs; 
Cement Industry :Dur~nf th':l Fiv~ Ycqr 1?lnns 1950-52:' oP.cit. ' the Indian . 
,,. 
economies of scale, Ghoch uas able to employ a conventional linear 
programming approD.ch ,duh demand rininr, throuG'h time to obtain a solution 
which l::inirr<ised tl!e present value (discounted) of proportional mant.1facturing 
and transport costs. 
Kendrick, studying the Brazilian oteel j.ndustry, incorporated non-
convexities into a model which was concerned with the output and investment 
decisions needing to be faced by three steel mills, with seven L1ajor 
production units:, each making four steel products. (1) He tried, first of 
all, a linear prograIT~inB model run over time (similar to that of Ghosh) 
and assumed away indivisible capital investment as a sunk cost. He then 
used an inteBer programminB approach to compare the casts of meeting a 
given derland, using different cornbinatio s af twenty-three "investment 
opportunitiesll each referring ta a speciic size, location, time period of 
1 initiation and completion, considering a total time horizon of 7~ years 
divided into three discreet periods. 
~'he basic problem we encounter in these various models is what 
Erkenlotter'calls the IIcurs~ a:': dimensionality,,;(2) that it is impossible 
to deal with the multiple aspacts of a model which approaches the real 
Vlorld situation without making solutiono computationally impossible even \"lith 
an electronic conputer. With each additional producer location, for exa:nplo, 
the number of possibilities increases exponentially. 
One is forced back, therefore, on oimplifications and approxioation 
techniques. One of the most relevant appeared to bo that of Manne. He 
mo.de the simpl:f.fication that there was a oonstant cycle longth between 
investments in a given location. with an arithmetically growing demand in 
a single location modal th~~ fact the optimal solution. ':lhere 
(1) D. Kendrick: 
, , .~ "Pro~nmr:li.?'5 Inve,stpt-cnt in the. !';rocess Indu.stry" ?"P~ ,clt. 
~... I· 
(2) D. Erkenlottor: 'rpre· ... lnv:estment PlanninG for Cap~:tcity Expansion~ a. 
rul ti.:...rJacatian nyn~ic !.foclel" p. 9. 
,,' 
~. 
mulb pIe production points arc con:.::idGl~od, cycle lengthD vary IlS bGtl1CCl1 
locations. !:anne m'lde the further simplification of takirl{; 0. tYlenty-follr 
year "major" cycle within whj.ch the minor cycles v/cre contained, each 
multiples of one year._ The model called SLOT was solved by zero-one integer 
proBTarnming, by assigning zero-one varinbles to each corabination of nlinor 
cycle lcn{Sths o.nc1 initial starting times, and finclin3 the combina.tion "'hioh 
gnve the minimum discounted costs over a "major cycle ll • The solution was 
Reur.istic, not guaranteed to eive optimal results but suf·::iciently close 
to optimal solutions, otherwise arrived at, to be regarded as a reasonable 
approximation. Manne considered that errors of simplification and 
nethodo1ogy were small compared with the degree of error in the data. 
The model can be summarised as possible: 
(i) We take a producing area in which there are several producing 
sites (il i2 i3 ••• in) and several consuning areas (jl j2 ••• jn)' 
(ii) the disco~t rate is r, a constant. 
(iii) as in the static model, proportional (including transport) unit 
costs can ~e represented as cij and the number of units transported is xij. 
(iv) the investment costs at any plant. are characte~iscd by economies 
of scale such that Ii = K (Ait< 
or 
, where-Ai is the plant cRpacitX 
(not necessarily equal to output), and where I >"'- > O. Note that it 
~ 
is no~ necessary to lincarise the economies of scale funotion. 
(1) This meant that tho following possible cyole lengths eouid be 
evaluated; 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 years l each of which is divisible into 24. 
.; 
(v) plant life can be assumed to have constant or infinite lifo. 
Replacement ccmplicates lnatters slieht1y but not fundamentnlly. Similarly 
-extensions;" fror.! additions to exi:::ltinr, pl,mt rather than ercenfield sito 
development arc excluded but present no fundamental difficulty. 
(vi) demand in tho conmlming area j grows by equal annual increments 
of Dj en" D~ in th3 case where the market at the producing location is 
beinc considered. 
(vii) there is no excess capacity at title (t) = 0 or i'There t = T, 
wh"lre T is the leneth of the major cycle. T = 24 years in the Manne study. 
24 Years was considered long enough to consider a variety of cycle lengths, 
but not too longo, such that the oonstants (r, cij and Dj ) should become 
unrealistic. 
(viii) each producing region hns a constant time cyole for the phasing 
in .of nev! plantsJ '.q. ~ and the fi::.st construction is started after year p. 
Pi and qi are integer~ representing discreet time periods: one year or a 
multiple thereof. The number of plants existing at any point in time at i 
is \'Ii; such that 
'\ = 0 from t = 0 to t == q 
VTi ... 1 from t I: q to t == q + P 
Wi ... 2 from t .,. q + p to t = q + 2p • •••• 
Wi ... T vrhGre 24 == T 
-p 
(ix) it is also necessary to introduce an integer variable 
where k is an index representing ever~' combination of cycle lengths and on 
strean datcas. 
The objective function to minimise then is 
G r ( ~ wI Ii ·/ik) 
where xij ~ 0 
+ ~..:?: cij. xij 
J. J ••••• 
••••• 
(1) 
(2) 
and where capacity is alrmys adequnte to meet peak demand at 
:E; W A 
J. i i 1ik and w 
r and cij 
:> t of' Dj "-
nre inteccr variables 
a.re constant 
.... (3) 
••••. (4) 
• • •• (5) 
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,CAST!: STUDIES 
Choice of c~ses:' 
It was decided to concentrate on tYro already established' industries, 
cement and-l2.,.p.,trol refining, which receive a detailed case study trcatment 
in special appenuices. What follows is an abbreviated summary of the 
studies. The reasons for choosing the two countries are the following: 
(a) they are well establiohed industries 'vith a good body of data 
to draw upon both in terms of production costs and from the regional 
experience of intraregional trade. 
It could be, argued that the issue is academic as each of the five 
countries have now 'gone it alone' in developing their own refining and 
cement production capacity. However it is necessary to isolate two 
quite different questions. First, there is the "static" ,question of 
v/hether, given the existence of high fixed capital costa in cement pro-
duction, there should be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ••• 0. or producers. Second, there 
is the "dynamic" question of whether, given a group of 'national' producers, 
any expans~on of capacity can be phased to give a better deeree of 
utilisation taking into account the possibilities for regional trade and 
a planned staggerine of investment. 
(b) both industries are key 'building block' industries. The cement 
industry has a high 'local content' and refining has important 'fo~vard 
linkages' to petrochemicals; while both have a significant rple in import 
substitution. 
(c) both manifest imp~rtant economies of scale but in both cases 
also the centrifueal forces of high transport costs are sufficiently sub-
stantial to balance the centripetal forces of scale econonies in labour 
and c,api tal costs. So, centralisation ~s not a. self evident solution 
\ 
as it would be with hieh unit value products. ' 
~-- . 
,r 
HYpothesis 
The specific hypothesis to be tested by the model is that 'na.tional' 
rather thnn 'regional' development hR.s produced a11 inefficient :?lnd costly 
distribution of excessively small sized and underutilised plant. There 
is a priori evidence of several kinds. 
First, there are five cement plants in Centr£l.l America with a combined 
capacity of about 1· 2 m tons p.a. (1972) for a market of about 800,000 tons. 
There are about 15 kilns in total. Yet most modern plants in industrialised 
countries would now install single kilns of 500,000 tons capacity or more. 
I 
The oil refineries are even more glaringly suboptimal in Bcale. There are 
1'." ? , 
six, with a total capacity of 80,000 barrels a day, while the most popular , I 
range for single refineries is 40,000 to 60,000 bs. in most developing 
countries and the best economies if scaUe are obtained over 100,000 bS.(tea. MAf-) 
Second, capacity utilisation is very low. For cement, utilisation 
./ f' ~ates rarely exceed 70';~ taken year by year and are usually below.- "'Plis is 
for a continuous process industry where there is little p~~~ing problem. 
9~X utilisation of capacity is considered normal in industrialised countries. 
For the oil refineries, the average use of the six refineries since their 
start-up has been about 50~[, as compared with the 959f: use of overall refining 
capacity by a major company (Shell). This is not merely a transitional 
phenomenon: estimates made in the appendix indicate that if present plans 
are carried through, the situation will deteriorate rather than improve, 
.. 
especially in oil refining. 3 , 
I 
! 
" 
, 
Third, prices are high by international standards althOUGh labour wld 
., 
many other costs are lower. The aver?ee market price per bar, of cement 
was until recently around ~l' 50 as compared with },~exico City (circa 90c), 
.. 
ru iI.,,,,.,y 
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in India (circa 65c in the main cities) and much lower levels :I.n induotr:i.nl-
ised cOtmtries (circa 65c in the U.K.). Cement is protncted by a nominal 
tariff of 50/( which is exceedingly large considering that imported cement 
carries a high transport cost penalty. The 'protection' of petroleum 
products is more difficult to prove because of the transfer pricinG' pracUces 
of the multipational oil companies. As we show in the appendix'part of the 
'cost' of duplication is carried in reduced local refining profit margins 
( 'profit continuing to be made on the crude oil), and partly in lower 
government tax revenues. There are however tariffs OIl gasoline of up to 
lOYr, losses of discotmts on fuel oil and quantity controls. !;h~ hypothesis 
was then tested, using the model described above, with the intention of 
establishing whether some or all of the observed inefficiency of the industry, 
was due to a serious duplication of plant. 
Data Used 
The special appendices spell out in considerable detail the methods 
used in compiling usa~le data. The following data simplifications had to 
be made: 
(1) Demand: we had to assume that markets Vlere concentrated in a fixed 
number of discreet points (usually six or seven) in order to reduce the 
problem to manageable proportions. The way in which demand for basic 
materials is concentrated in fact in a few industrial complexes (the cap! tal ' 
cities :plus San pedro..$ula) tends to validate this assumption. 
~ ....... . 
Demand was 
also assumed to be price inelastic. .This must be oubstantially true since 
substitutes are not easily available for cement and petroleum products and 
·those B'Oods are, furth'exmore, usually a small part of the total current or 
capital cost of a project., 
Projections of demand were made for 1970 (now confirmed by current data) 
and 1975. Simple regression methods we;re used involving G.lI.P. as an 
'. 
. , 
~. 
independent variable or a time trend projection. Becfl.use of the likely 
range of error, a IImax.imU17l" and "minimum" ,estimate was used. 
(II) Transport Costs: data here is patchy and varies consid.erably 
depending upon different vehicle sizes, on particular road quality, and 
on the contractuaJ. agreement with the transporters (for single or return 
journey etc.) .. An attempt wa.s made to find out from local agencies the 
various 'least cost' alternatives and a matrix of journey costs between all 
the possible production sites and markets wa.s compiled. Again "high" and 
"low" estimates were obtained. 
There was one major complicating factor in that there VIas an option 
for long distance journeys of using sea rather than road transport. This 
involved separately calculating port and sea transport costs from rather 
unreliable sources. 
. (III) Sources of Supply: because of the existing facilities it was 
felt useful to use present production sites as representing the range of 
possible alternatives. Imports were also included as another source of 
supply at constant proportion~L costs. We'assumed that exports to the 
world market did not represent .a feasible option. 
(IV) Proportional Costs: each site has different, albeit constant, 
posts of production, for raw materials, elasticity fuel etc. Interviews 
with the firms in question u8ually produced the information sought. 
(V) COAtE-·: for reasons already '~ ~~~~~~~:.....:;.:::;.t;,;;,;;;..:.;::.:;;.;;.;.;;:;:;.....;;;.;.;~ 
eet out in some detail economies of scale are difficult to quantify pre-
cisely, even before the linearisation procedure; especially so as there is 
a profileration of engineering and economic data for each industry Wllich is 
not mutually consistent. 
Diagrams 5-1 and 5-2 summarise the main data sources for economies of 
Bcale in investment costs. In prac'tice alternative function::: need to 
\ 
I 
I 
~J 
~ 
Size of Refinerv 
5,000 bd. 
10,000 bd. 
20,000 bd. 
30,000 bd. 
40,000 bd. 
50,000 bd. 
60,000 bd. 
70,000 bd. 
80,000 bd. 
90,000 bd. 
100,000 bd. 
120,000 bd. 
150,000 bd. 
200,000 bd. 
400,009 bd. 
H 
Scale Coefficient 
1 McLean + 
Haigh 
(1950) 
$12.5m. 
25 m. 
40 m. 
60 m. 
110 m. 
.71 
Dia~am f-I 
Refinery Size and Investment Cost -
2 Garner 
(1962) 
5 m. 
9.3 m. 
14 m. 
16.5 m. 
21.5 m. 
25 m. 
39 m. 
.80 
Manne4 
(circa 
1960) 
tt 7.3m 
10 m. 
15.5m.' 
27 m. 
40 m; 
- -
.66 
Pratten5 (1971) 
(a) Index (b) 
100 
85 
66 
52 
.66 
100 
75 
56 
44 
40 
.59 
1. McLean & Haigh: liThe Growth of Integrated Oil Companiesll op.c1t. 
2. Garner in United Nations Seminar: "TechniQues of Petroleum Develonment" op.cit. p •. 192. 
30 Hubbard in " .. 
" 
It It 
" 
It p.218 • 
SheU6 
(1971) 
Index 
, 
130 
100 
77 
58 
53 
.57 
Hubbard3 
(1962) 
$180. 
4om. 
62m. 
80m. 
.58 
/ 
4. A. Manne: "Programming Data for the Petroleum Refining Industry" in "Industrialisation and Productivity" Bulletin 
No o 10, ppo57-74. 
50 C. Pratten: "Economies of Scale in r4anufacturing Industry" op.cit. Ch.4, and Pratten and'De~'1 ''The Economies of 
Scale inJlritish Industry· (Introductory) II 1965. 
6. Shell Oil Compan~: unpublished estimates. \\ 
/, 
_"~'A_ .. A"""~~,",;~J."''''''''''_''''''.''t.loio:~''';';r~~"lMfM;loIUJ'');k~~oII2:~~~~JIj~IfI!I~~1J_~~!iI..I.~i.24~~*'i'4t,':;J~~~lL.,'L~~~;~J~ 
Table [ .. 2 
Investment Costs in lfm (1962>, 
Capacity T.I1'~. \0/ • Germany(a) U.S.A. (b) India(c) 
33,000 1.6 
66,000 2.3 
100,000 3.0 6.5, 3.6 
200,000 4.8 10.8 6.4 
300,000 9.0 
400,000 7.6 18.0 10.8 
500,000 21.5 
1,000,000 30.0 
Central American fixed investment figures are: 
Guatemala: 
El Salvador: 
Honduras: 
Nicaragua: 
Costa Rica: 
140,000 T (1962) - $6m. 
90,000 T (1962) = $3m. 
210,000 T (1968) = $lOm. 
235,000 T (1968) = $11.6m. 
. 115,000 T (1968) = $6m. 
"Tlpical" LDC(d) 
I II 
2/2.5 
3.5/4 4/4.7 
6/7 8.,5 
10/12 14 
310,000 T - $lOm. (1969) 
" ~ . From U.N. Studies in the Economics of Industry; Cement etc.'" erf' ~ 
(a) Dry process: exel. clearing land etc. 
(b) Wet process - includes elaborate buildines; covers large amount 
of quantity control equipment, dust control equipment and 
electrical machinery 
-(c)' 1963 Prices - United Nations "Industrial Development in Asia and 
the F1ir East". op.cit. p.63. . 
(d) "Hinimum costs" for developing countries (I) based on "estimates of 
major companies. (II) based on a sampling of firms in LDC's. 
- ...;:.>t_ 
, ..... . 
. \ 
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be taken to cover the va.rious estimates of the .scale f.unction. This 
was somewhat easier for Cement since the U.N. h~o provided a 'standard' 
o-U. 
profile for LDC' s, but for,\refinine the possible variations in 
the complexity even of simple, non-~ refineries makes the standardis-
ation of estinates difficult. The technique used to ensure that the scale 
function repx:esented Central America coste '?:as to :lesume that while the 
function (or the linear approximation to the scale function) had the srune 
gradient, it passed through a point representing central American data~l } 
In both models it VTas necessary to reduce the investment cost to an 
annual charge which involved making assumptions about likely depreciation, 
maintenance and rate of return. And the static model required linear 
approximation of the function, Qoth of these procedures involved a marein 
of error and required a further spread from a "high" to a "low" estimate 
of. capital 'costs • 
(1) This technique is used by Ana !y!artirena de Martel: "7,n,te,r-r.;A-cion y 01 
££onomico de escala." OPe cit. .Also used in lv:. Cart\1y (ECIEt Study) 
",Ipdustrifllisation in a I,a.tin Amerj.c:m Common 1,~aJ'ke't" OPt cit. Ch. 9. 
As reg~.rds the ~ of establishments, we va:riously assume full usc 
of capacity and a given degree of underutillsation. 
Labour costs' are oven more difficult since there is no 'standard' 
cost relationship: too much depends on the manning and productivity of 
each plant. . Fort1.U1ately, labour costn are a trivial proportion of total 
refining costs and not too high for the cement case: in the cement example 
an attempt was made to derive a scale function, linearise it and include 
it in the calculation. 
Results. 
1. First let us take the "static" example. In the cement (refining) 
case the model w~s run on ~ (eight) different sets of assumptions; for 
, fl.....1' 
economies of scale)degree of ut!lisation) transport costs and demand. 
Clearly this does not'exbaust the possibilities for sensitivity analysis 
but it does give some basis for evaluating the significance of different 
types of error. 
The type of t~ .. ~ obtained for each estimation is summarised for 
.cement in Diagran 5-!) in a highly apprc~iated fo~, giving some of the more 
interesting configurations. The "savine" of optimal' over present plant 
tn.c.o..so:r p.e. "'.' __ ~ dist!ibution is ¢2·lm. or l09(tJ"IAAJ" ~ ~. 
The overall results signify the following. In neither .industry is 
the present near-autarchy optimal. However the "optimal" 801 ution re-
presents an overall improvement in cost of production and transportation of 
~;~" 
.5 to 15% in the cement case; and a similar amount ~ slightly greater ran,s-e 
of error) in the petroleum refining case. This may not seem high but one 
should remember that in both industries a high proportion of the 
, 
Diagram~5 
ReGulS! 
Assumption I Assumption II 
..... 
.s:0rl..!'ll::juration Cost in g,m. Configuration, ~ost in tim. 
·01001 17.95 *11001 19.475 
*11001 18.00 *11101 19.60 
10001 18.275 *11111 20.05 
10101 18.375 10111 20.45 
01101 18.60 *01001 20.74 
••••• · .... 
*11101 18.835 • •••• • •••• 
01011 190065 111001 (Best imports) 23.00 
10011 19.116 • •••• • •••• 
• •••• • •••• 
11011 19.275 01000 (Best single 27.78 
10111 19.60 location) 
01111 19.80 
*11111 20.05 Assumption III 
-
01010 20.255 • *11001 22.50 
10010 20.40 *11101 22.95 
11010 20.50 *01001 23.1t2 
10110 20.755 '10001 23.535 
01110 20.975 10101 . 23.84 
11110 21.225 *11111 . 23.85 
00101 21.975 01101 23.885 
.010001 22.160 10111 23.90 
~01000 22.3 10011 23~.925 
00111 22.335 • •••• • •••• \ 
01000 - 22.35 • •••• • •••• 
110001 22.40 111001, 27.0 
-
~, 
'101001 22.47 101001 ~ 27.0 
11000 22.56 110001 2.7.1~ 
10100 22.79 ••••• • •••• 
100001 22.91 01000 30.03 
111001 23.00 
--PI 
11100 23.06 
'. 
><" ~. 
" 
, . 
cost is proportional to output - notably crud.e oil in refinint';. 
In the petroleum refinine case the "best" solution was a single 
refinery on the Atlantic side in Costrt Rica but if assumptions were chanB'cd 
to eive a lower weight to c::tpital costs then a two refinery solution was 
optimal. For the ce~ent industry case, on all assumptions, a ,ninfle 
plant would be grossly sub optimal and the best solutions was a two plant 
set-up (in Salvador and Costa Rica) with a. third in the' case where capital 
costs are given a lower weighting. If the tariff could be lowered to l5i 
for cement then ir.1ports could be more attractive in the peripheral areas 
and this would make the single plant option less costly. 
In an attempt to narrow the range of error the bias introduced by 
linearisation of the economics of scale function was correct and for one or 
two. of the examples. The effect of the bias is to exaggerate the capital 
costs of the centralised and autarchic solutions and to understate the 
capital costs of the two/three/four plant solutions. 
The main implications of the study is that notwithstanding the range 
of error in estimations, there is unambiguously a loss in efficiency from 
the autarchic solution which probably is about lO~~ of the average delivered 
price of the commodities (excludin~ tax and distributdS markup). The 
advantages of centralisation seem more obvious in oil refining since bulk 
transportatiolf of products by sea means there is not such a tr~,nsport cost 
diseconomy aD for cement. 
In practice the closure of existing plnnt in the interest of rationalisa-
tion is not likely to appoal and so for this re;:won the time-planning model is 
employed as means of establishing the benefits from future rationalisation. 
2. . \ This involved sliehtly different ul:ie of data. And a different set of 
I' 
I 
I 
i 
~ -
;0) .• 
assu-"llptions. ~Sc:.o..,J:. f r' d r;ol f A . .', rRto 0 10.':, is a~stune ; 1:J/-: or sensitivity JlUrpOflGS. 
The annual demand in cement, is conntant. b:::tsed on an arithmetic increase. 
VIe also assume thl'l.t every second investment io an ndditiona.l kiln (or 
refininc unit). As before, a Aeries of efltimA.tes was mnae bAI::ed on "hiCh" 
and "low" investment and transport costs. 
lin example will be taken from the various runs for the cem~nt industry. 
If we take initially a discount rate of 10;( and. 1.9.! transport CORtR, a..'1d t 
take the best of three ordering combinations and compare it vrith the 'closed' 
solution, we get: 
p:pen Solution - w(w, t~ 
Total Discounted CostS(~/M) 
Terminal. Value 
Of which manufact-
u!ing costs are .' 62·275 
Clo,Aed Solution 
74·68 
Of which transport • 
costs arc 18.187 (intrarebional trading 
costs) 
10'350 (costs within 
national 
boundaries) 
The following combination of time cycles and phRsing was ind.ieated: 
Open .Qlosed 
eycl.~ start ~ P:icle !'Ita,r·t ~ , 
Location 1 24yrs. yr. 1 600,000 4 yrs. 1st yr. 100,000 tons 
2 24 tt .. 15 408,000 4 yrs. 
" " 
68,000 " 
"", 
3 12 " II 10 168,000 4 " 11 " 56,000 " 
4 12 " " 6 144,000 4 " " " 48,000 " 
5 6 " " 2 108,000 4 II " " 72,000 " 
-
It can,be seen that th~ro are ndvanta&es to be derived from a coordinated 
approach. Optimum time cycles are considerably leng~hened by allowing tho 
possibility of trade and tho optimum kiln size very substantially increased 
in several ca,ses (quadrupled or quintupled) to permit econonies of scale in 
'. 
'. 
manufacturine and labour costs. Hm'Tever, transport costs rise r~,pidly 
too with increased interchange and almost offset the potential gains, 
though on balance, deferring construction and incurring n transport 
cost penalty is beneficial. There are smaIl proportional costs to 
be considered too, but on the assumptions chosen about 5 - 73~ of cement 
costs could be saved, with a time phasing policy. As we have only 
. 
considered a very small number of ordering sequences (6) it is very 
likely that a better sequence could be found. 
What this lIoptimum" solution implies is that Guatemala effectively 
- ~ ~a4!'\'" &_.-$ ~~ 
becomes the main reeional producer ofXccment for "1 e next five years 
planning period, with Costa Rica supplying itself and Nicaragua. In the 
sixth year Nicaragua produces initially for export, but later for self-
sufficiency apart from some supplies to Teeucigalpa. 
In the following- diagram one can see the importance of international 
trade'under the "optimum" system. 
\, 
J 
J 
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Trade production (over year 0) 
Year I 61,00OT 86,OOOT 
2 86,000'1' 17t>,00OT 
3 129,OOOT 258,OOOT 
4 l72,OOOT 344,oOOT 
5 215,000T 430,00OT 
6 186,OOOT 516,OOOT 
7 235,OOOT 602,OOOT 
8 240,OOOT 630,OOOT 
9 280,OOOT 774,OOOT 
10 170,000T 860,00OT 
11 l87,OOOT 946,00OT 
12 204,OOOT 1,032,60OT 
13 265,000T 1,118,00OT 
14 290,OOOT 1,204,oOOT 
15 78,OOOT 1,290,OOOT 
16 102,OOOT 1,376,oOOT 
17 130,OOOT 1,462,OOOT 
18 • 84,OOOT 1,548,OOOT 
19 116,OOOT 1,634,OOOT 
20 112,OOOT 1,716,OOOT 
21 l26,OOOT 1,79B,OOOT 
22 1,880,OOOT 
23 l,962,OOOT 
24 . 2,044,OOOT 
The level of trade rises to a peak of nearly ,OO,OOOT declining 
towar~s the end of the cycle (~e fixed cycle concept artificially 
deflates the later predictions of trade). certainly, fn.r more trn.de is 
envisaged than at present or in the recent past - and this excludes 
border or seasonal traffic. 
However, it is worth lookinC a.t some of the simplifications that 
have been made to see how the results would be affected. One of the 
sienificant features, nnd weaknesses of the ,~xercise,is that tho results 
- ... ;1&'-
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are susceptible to the influence of whatever sequence is used for examininl3' 
the reGions. Six sequences vlere examined eiving the followine totrtl costo: 
(¢tOOO) 
1, 2, ;'. 4, 5 03' 505 
5, 4, ;, 2, 1 80'163 (chosen) 
4, 1, 3, 5, 2 82· 871 
3, 2, 5, 1, 4 03' 544 
5, 1, 4, 3, 2 84'389 
2, 1, 4, 5, 3 03-768 
Had. a more exhaustive analysis been carried out a lower "optimum" 
might have been reached. If a discount rate of 15~~ is taken, this 
does not greatly affect the relative advantae,e/disadvnnta.r.e of centrAlised/ 
decentralised solutions but the overall magnitude of costs is considerably 
-
affected. If a high~r set of transport costs are taken a more decentr~l-
ised pattern is made to look slightly more attrac~ive. On the other hand 
a higher estimate of economies of scale would make the centr :.1ised pattern 
more attractive. 
-These results, and similar results for oil refining indicate the 
type of gains that could be obtained from a staggering of investment. 
However, this still leaves the question of how individual states 
might be affected. 
.. 
The distribution of gains. 
J;n effort has been made to shOYl the type of maeni tude of gains from 
rationalisation. r~at misht this mean for individual partner states? 
If we take first of all the "static" example and calculate straightforward 
income gains and losses, ignorin6 for the moment foreign exchange savings 
and employment effects. In the case where there are unemployed resourceo 
the countries which do specialise have an income gain and the countries 
which surrender prOduction lose; their 10so being offset by gains from 
cheaper products ass~~ing that a pricing system is to distribute gains from 
more economical production. Let us take just one example, cement, where the 
optimal solution produces gains of about ¢3m. p.a. in straicht cost reduction, 
on the basis of production in a 560,000 Ton PC~ory in El Salvador and 
270,000 Ton p.a. in Costa Rica. 
HoV/ever, the turnover of production is not a measure of "income gains" 
which is perhaps more appropriately measured by local (i~t..Central Americ~ 
val ue added pI us the value of local raw material s (and any subsequent mul ti-
plier). If the consumption gains were spread in p'roportion to the market 
and 'a.ppropriate assumptions made. on costs the following picture emerged. 
Guatemala 
E1 Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Costa Rica 
Weifare (Consumption) Gain 
+1. Om 
+ -75m 
+ • 3m 
+ • 3m 
+ • 6m 
Ga.in _ORf! to NI"l.tionn1 Income 
in prod~ction and transport) 
~ - 3·0m 
¢ + 4·0m 
~ - 1485m 
¢ - 1-75m 
¢ + 1·20m 
It can be seen that gains are of a smaller magnitude altogether than the looses 
from totally ceasing production in one or two countries and for this reason 
abov~~t is difficult to see how this solution co\ud ~ itself in 
practical terms. 'A similar table could constructed for all the poasible 
ass~~ptions; but the s&~e type of result would be likely to emeree. 
In the oil refining case, the 'no.tional income' content in production 
is very much less, since refinin~ consists largely of tho use of imported 
raw materials and capital equipment. In this case, if we tAke the exaMple 
of the "optimal" sin6le refinery a,t Costa Rica Mel contrast it with the case 
i 
\ 
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where there are national refineries under the Bet of assumptions where 
~~o1u .:\' 
overall gain is about l~fo (¢e·Sm P.~., the following picture emerges: 
Yl,elf:n:lt..{ C.Q.nsuJYl.p.tion) G:=ti.n GalnLlo~s to lL~t.i.o.n~l 
l.!l.c;l.Q.8.!!. 
Guatemala ¢2 r 8m ¢ - .9m 
El Salvador 1- 30m 
- '45m 
Honduras 1·85m 
- '5m 
Nicaragua 1- 30m '- '45m 
Costa Rica 1·25m +2';m 
In this case the tlgains" are much more evident than the loss to national 
income from winding upon existing plant. 
Another way to look at the problem is entirely in terms of foreign 
exchange saving. This will depend largely upon 'import content' of 
production. In the above (cement) example about i of all costs are 'local' 
whi~h correspondingly reduces the vAlue of the 'savings', relative to'national' 
production but for petroleum products almost all costs of production and 
I 
transportation are 'foreign', so raising the magnitude of net foreign ex-
change savings. 
From a practical point of view, employment' considerations are likely 
to 100m large and it can be seen that rationalisation will inevitably lead 
--
to a.llitl. contraction of employment in the industryJ and of oubotantial 
magnitude in individual countries. ~~iB is unlikely to be politically 
acceptable in any event~pecial1y for major employers like cement works • 
.. 
For this last reason in particular it is perhaps reasonable to assume 
that the cost of reoonstructing are likely to bo sufficiently large, 
especially in employment terms, to outweigh the gains; certainly in the 
cement case. For this reason there is practical virtue in looking at 
!~~ure planning. The method of assessing the diotributlon of gains would 
be the same albeit more complex when considered as a flow of future return~. 
" ; 
" 
" 
,j 
Assuming that it is possible to calculate gains and losses satisfactorily 
this still leaves us with the need for a basis for 'trad1.ne off' those gains 
and losses over a substantial n~~bor of projects. 
Though no. attempt 1s made here to work out the results of a full inveslment 
policy involving several industries, it is clear that a good deal more is 
involved than combining the optima of individual se'ctors: (1) 
(i) such a solution ignores the tequity' objective of the investment 
policy. A constraint would need to be introduced to ensure at least a 
minimum pay-off for all the partners. While this would not ~ivo us a global 
optimum; at very least, the 'second best' solutions could be quantified, in 
overall income terms or foreign exchange savings. 
(ii) a major problem would present itself with the priCing of products. 
Hitherto we have rather blandly ~ssumed that trans-national pricing would 
distribute the benefits of increased efficiency between the consuming states. 
This is juot a. little too ca.valier an assumption givell that most of the firms 
are probably owned by overseas investors. These firms are concerned with 
maximising global profits not with any Central l;nerican welfare criterion; 
and under the investment policy their degree of monopoly power in Central 
America is increased. Yet, unless a 'controlled' pricing syatem is introduced 
, . 
this could drastically effect the distribution of benefits and the trado 
balan~e between stntes. It is unavoidable therefore that the type of pricing 
control operated under the Integration Industries Agreement be enforced, based 
on cost ~deli~es.(2) This could create difficulties in ns~uch as it 
circumscribes the potential profitability of overseas investors and for this 
reason a SUbstantial government stake micht be necessary in these key industriea~3)' 
(1) 'lhere is a good deal of useful discussion of the problems of an investment 
policy iri this context by J. Baranl3on: "'1'110 Role of Mul tinatiom\l Companies in 
~atin American Integration" Heath 1972. ' --
(2) One effort to work through tho implications of such an exercise is contained 
in R. Robsons "Project Evaluation of Multinational Pl;mts in AfrieR" Journnl 
P.T.O. 
'.,' 
" . :. ' 
. . 
. ' 
of Industrial Economics 1971, pp.105-111. 
(~) ~here is a whole variety of organisational possibilities from purely 
. privately o~~ed multinational companies, to multinational state enterprises, 
and multinational joint ventures which are being explored in the Andean group 
and have been discussed in J. Ba.ranson ~ and !oM.D. Little: "Regional 
International Companies a.s an Approach to }~onomic Integration" Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Dec. 1966. 
" '.""" .. -
\. 
r 
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This pricing problem would be further complicated if exchange rates were 
allowed to fluctuate in the region. This is not a completely insurmountable 
problem (the EEe agricultural policy has survived despite several parity 
changes) and it could serve as an impetus to closer monetary integration, 
already fairly well advanced in central America. 
(iii) so far we have been concerned with rather simplified industrial 
structures, ignoring input-output connections and the possibilities for 
'external economies'. In petroleum refining in particular tho gains from 
centralisation are greater than this simplified analysis might indicate. The 
construction of six refineries has stifled the emergence of a petrochemicals 
industry based on local feedstock, wh~ch would have been possible for a 
, . 
in.. 
40,000 or 50,000bd. refinery basedlsay) Costa Rica. This has gravely 
impaired the prospects for plants produci~g PVC, polyethylene and ~~onia 
usIng local naptha and generating considerable value added for the region. 
, 
Concl usion. 
The two cases chosen, most notably the oil refining case, demonstrate 
the diseconomies of the preDent unplanned policy and the advantages of 
rationalisation. Even given the questionable nature of some of the 
assumptions) positive conclusions emerge and it is .. inferred that a policy 
could be ,devised quantifying the gains and losses in particular sectors 
and~trading them oft. 
, . 
.. 
.. F· -. 
?,! \\ • 
General Concluoion~ and Policy Implications of the C~Re Gtudl:.!!!l 
Much of the pasic argument of the thesis haa been dev&loped and 
summarised on a chapter-by-chapter basis. However, it is worth trying 
to draw some general conclusions, and particularly from the case otudiea. 
In Chapter 4, it was argued that a regional investment policy involving 
the planned location and time phasing of investment was a necessary condition 
for the development of basic intermediate and capital goods industry given 
the existence of substantial economies of scale and very small markets. 
Such a regional investment policy would focus on a few sectors or industries 
at a time rather than nt all aspects of possible trade. 
If a purely ad hoc allocation and bargaining procedure were to be used, 
. 
economies of scale might well be outweighed by uneconomic locational choice 
and little would be gained unless these locations were chosen explicitly to 
compensate the 'backward' par',,',3 of the COIlll1)on Market to compensate for other 
losses from membership. 
I 
Various attempts were made to see how precisely the gains from a 
planned allocation could be quantified. The use ~of both static and dynamic 
models was employed. For the cement industry where the centrifugal influence 
.~ 
of transport coats is powerful it was still found after a detailed 
consideration of likely costs, that cost savings (overall) of about 10 per 
.. 
cent might be achieved, by oither reducing the number of plants or clse 
staggering expansions from existing plants. For oil refining, tho refining 
cost is a small element of the wholesale (let alone retail) price but even 
than a significant Daving (5-10 per cent) could be made if a Dingle refinerY 
were used at L\dbn (Costa Rica) or in Panama; also there would be savings 
'. 
'. 
in respect of petrochemical feedstock. In both cases the 'statuo quo t 
would have to be taken as given and time phasing is, in practice, the only 
way in which practical savings could be made at this stage. 
Further ReRearch 
Further work· could be done both by extending the scope of the case 
studies and adapt~ng the methodology. 
1. The mora industries that could be studied and costs quantified, the 
more a meaningful picture could emerge, and the greater the prospects for 
successful 'bargainillg' and trading-off of alternative projects. 
Ultimately it would be necessary to programme a cost minimisation solution 
for a whole set of local -(industry-\vide) .. optima, taking into account 
vertical linkages as well as possibilities for inter-industry specialisation. 
An attempt to broaden the range of industries studied was made, for 
caustic soda, paper, iron and steel and plate glass. Most of those 
industries do not prcsently exist and the information is hypothetical -
except for tpe caustic soda plant. For this reason they were not 
incorporated in the main thesis, though proVisional results lend considerable 
support to the argument for joint phasins to rationalise future industrial 
investment. 
2. The programminB' exercise could ea,sUy be modified and improved. 
SensitiVity analysis was a little crude, and it could be argued that the 
variability of results did ~ot justify the precision obtained by using an 
electronic computer. Within tho framework of the models employed, it would 
be interesting to look nt 
(i). the effect of increasing the number of discrete markets and therefore 
of potential journeys), 
3. 
(ii) the effect of incorporating eeomotriq market growth in the capacity 
expansion model. 
However, it was considered that the cost and timo involved in 
reprogramming-the model for the computer was unjustified in view of the 
inherent uncertainty over data and particularly over the elusive economies 
of scale function. 
3. Very little was done to experiment with different 'sharing arrangements' 
or baxgaining solutions. To do this would involve consideration possibly 
of 'game theory' or less formal techniques designed to obtain a maximum 
benefit solution Bubject to constraints. It is out of this that a 
comprehensive regional investment policy might emerge • 
• The management of the 'trade-off' process could be a very complex one, 
Also, in addition to 'gains' and 'losses' beine assessed in income terms 
there migh~ also be a call to achieve balance in respect of employment 
creation, technology transfer or foreign exchange saving • 
. Policy Implications 
In both ageregated and disaggregated - industry by industry - terms 
it h~s been shown that unplanned and uncoordinated induotrial devolop~cnt 
in economies of scale industries would be most likely to lead to a wastage 
of scarce capital (and of foreign exchange) and 'an unsa.tiafae>tory 
agglomera.tion of activity in already favoured locations, It is difficult 
to see how any other solution than a 'regional investment policy' could be 
,effecti va. 
The major criticism of my conclusion wc;>u1d b~ that it is "politically 
, 
" 
f 
4. 
unrealistic": C'overnments will not accept such a 1005 of sovereignity, 
and those that do are of doubtful longevity. That could be true. But 
governments who find it "politically unrealistic" to accept a regional 
investment policy would in all probability find it equally difficult to 
accept substantial fiscal transfors to countries only marginally poorer 
than themselves; or to accept the loss of sovereignity vn1ich is involved 
in any economic union which goes further than tariff reduction. It roay 
well be that economic integration between developing countries jp general is 
unrealistic if the participants are unwilling to accept its implications. If 
that is t he case, then a great deal of effort is being expended, in va.in. . 
This in 
turn raises once again the whole question of the rationale for integration 
and the (very limited) options. 
~~ere this thesis tries to break new ground is to take the case of the 
Central American Common Market not in its optimistic, burgeoning, phase 
as others h~ve done, but after a serious crisis; and it tries to explain 
how unequal gains generated by market forces quickly lead to disintegration. 
The moral would appear to be that 'economic nationalism' which the 
modern theory of customs unions takes as its starting point, is alBO the 
reason why customs unions founder. ~he effort of small countries to 
establish their own industrial base cRn'only be done conjointly with other 
nations with similar characteristics, and in a manner that requires a higher 
degree of cooperative effort and planned rczourco allocation than has been 
evolved in Central America or in any other regional arrangement yet devised. 
If this response is not forthcoming then the Central Americ~ and most other 
\...(~,~ 
small nation~will have to rid themselves of the illusion that they can 
?~ ., 
~~e~icien~i~s in r,entr~l Ameriq~n 
ptaU,s,t,1M} Data 
1. 
Economic rese~rchers in d0veloping countries need to be mindful 
not only of the normal hazards of using economic dEttn, as outlined by 
!Lor(~enstern;l: but of the additional problems which arise when working 
in countries where statistical services are weak, much of the economy 
is non-monetised, and communications poor. 2 Central American 
Governments are if anything more inefficient, inexpert and corrupt 
than most others and this will inevitably be reflected in the data. 
The fact that in some countries statistical offices and Central Banks 
(let alone planning bodies) have only been created in the last decade 
or so, has not helped in getting continuity over time. 
\iherever possible the author has tried to check official data with 
, 
primary sources, but this is difficult. Generally, trade statistics 
are fairly reliable; population and national income s~atistics less so; 
unemp10ym~nt and agricultural production f!.gures very poor. 
(a) Trade "Statistics: even in advanced industrial countries such as 
the U.K., miscafculation of imports and exports h~s been serious in 
recent years and there are in all situations problems over such 
transactions as intra-company trade, Hevertheless, Central American 
official sources have indicated that they have additional problems in 
calculnting imports, which are important for revenue as well" as 
general statistical purpoaes: 3 
1. O. More;enstern: "On thA Ac,curncy of F.con.Q.!llic Obs~rvation", Princeton 1963. 
2. W. Stolper: "Plt'J.nnint>; vrithout 1!'Ftctl'l", Carnbrid.c;e (;:ass) 1966. 
3. ".C~rusen of error in cxterl1n.l. ,tradp. in the c.ountries o"f Centr::l1 Americ::ttl , 
Direction General de l!:stadisticas, Guatemala (i.:in. de i:conomia) 1966. ' 
'. 
'\ 
2. 
1. Over-rapid rotation of staff leads to inefficiency (rapid 
rotation is an anti-corruption device). 
2. !t.any forms are not completed properly a.nd others are ille~ible; 
attributable partly to ceneral illiteracy and poor quality staff. 
3. There is large-scale false declaration, especially uncler-
ilivoicing of imIlorts, though the predominance of "specific" 
rather than ad valorurn ta.riffs helps to mi tie'ate the effect 
of this. 
4. There is confusion because of differences between fAUCA, the 
Central American tariff code, and lroECA, the international goods. 
5. Confusion over origin is a problem especially in intra-regional 
trade. 
6. Smuggling is a major industry. Borders a.ro long and poorly 
guarded and heavy protection of consumer goods provides an in-
centive.' ArmY'officers and senior officials are known t~ 
'abuse their duty-free allowances. Another good example was recent 
t cotton-scandal' in Nicaragua when millions of dollars worth of 
cotton were smuggled out through Costa Rica to avoid export duty 
while false returns were submitted for exports under the national 
quota. 1 
One way of illustrating these discrepancies is to take a random 
sample of items figuring in trade between contiguous countries. There 
shoy[d be no disparity in weight and a small disparity in value reflecting 
any difference in transport cost betvleen the last point of valuation of 
exports (f.o.b.) and the first check on import value~ (c.i.~.). 
ever, the following tables are illustrativo. 
How-
,1. Economist Intelligence Unit. Qua.rterly Economic Review, Janua,ry 1912. 
~. 
3. 
-lJem J!li.cRl~aF',Ua c. i. f. imI20rts 
from (Costa Rica) 
Costa Rica f.o.b. 
'( tp ;U:cat'~ e'X'I2orts 
A B C D 
y\eight CUT) Value (~) Weight, .y.alue A C 
(J 21-01-01-01 1,094 57,816 1,017 50,955 1·07 
()42-02-00 1,407 195,900 1,220 156,000 1·09 
(J44-01-00 2,024 165,500 1,802 12tl,500 1·1? 
(J51-01-01 13,055 459,123 11,951 294,000 1·05 
C)91-02-02 2,231 1,142,000 1,886 897,000 ,1'19 
~61-01-07 1,861 149,040 2,067 176,200 • 90 
02-00 ) 
03-00 ~ 5,918 588,750 10,318 1,042,000 ' 57 
09-00 
681-07-00 2m395 648,500 2,513 618,000 '95 
El Salvador c.i.f. imI20rts Honduras f.o.b. e orts 
(561-02-00 
~52-02-03 
~43-02-00 
~61-04-00 
::t21-01-00 
(J54-62-01 
(J44-01-00 
(JOI-03-00 
~ 
" ~urces: 
f 
~ 
., 
(from Honduras) 1.:.0 .r.."l 
A B C 
Weight (MT) Value (¢) Weie;ht 
23,741 801,000 24,490 
3,445 980,000 2,344 
43,074 1,530,000 43,925 
1,393,000 23,400 1,342,000 
1,531,000 468,000 1,443,000 
1;,990 2,700,000 13,706 
'26,944 5,909,000 26,040 
2,690 880,000 2,213 
"Qommerio ;rxterior de Nicaragua" 1968. 
"Annu~rio de COmril€!rio Exterior de Costa Rica" 1968. 
"Anpllario Esta.dintico" El Salvador 1968, 
'. 
Salvador 
D 
Y'alue 1::. C 
550,000 '96 
776,000 1'45 
990,900 • 98 
18,725 1·04 
439,500 1·06 
2,525,000 1·02 
1,967,000 1·04 
821,100 1·21 
]1 
D 
1·11 
1·20 
1· 32 
l' 56 
1·27 
·85 
• 56 
1·05 
] 
D 
1'4 
1·26 
1· 56 
1·26 
1·06 
1·07 
3·1 
1· 97 
.. 
In practice, there are divcr[;cncies of 5 per cent in weiGht 
valuation and much more of monetary value. In some cases {lincrcpancios 
are very la.rge. 
While im~ort statistics are more likely to be reliable than export 
statistics, the latter are important and even the import sta.tistics are 
far from reliable • 
. (b) 1\lltional Income statistics. These are subject to rnuch greater errors 
than trade statistics especially when conversion to COMmon curreno~es and 
ToI~t- f'J~ f\{.«ICM 
constant prices is involved. An attempt was made by theJ . in 1962 to 
produce a "coJ(J(ected" and continuous series for 1950-62 with all countrie:3 
gives on a comparable basis for comparison, B.nd where possible this series 
1 is. used. 
, 
An estimation of the r~~ge of error likely to be encountered can be 
obtained by looking at the statistics of Guatem?la. In 196~ there was 
a revision of the data resulting in a 50-60 per cent "increase" in the 
G.n.p. (dat?' from U.N. National Accounts Yearbook). 
-' llli 19..5.& 1222 .l2.29. 122I 19 ~8 12.5.2 1960 
I (original) 493 563· 623 646 ·638 651 679 
II (rovised) 728 807 962 984 1,010 
. The sources of error in national accounts are likely to occur as follows: 
. , 
(i) A(!'ricul tU'l"e: rlfTicul tura! value added is difficult to calcula.te because 
1. Joint Planning Mission: "IUstorical statistical Series -1962 (Gua.temala.) • 
'. 
, 
--------"T 
5. 
of the existence of a substantial sUbsistence sector. 1 Subsiotence pro-
duction can be calculated on an extensive or restrictive basis, and consist-
ency is very difficult to achieve. A recent su.'t'Vcy of p.ericul tural 
statistics in Central America concluded: "the problem of obtaining data 
plaeued the researchers throuehout the study. Except for a few years, 
information on consumption is very scarce in Central America". 2 
No attempt is made to sep~rate agricultural production for export 
and domestic use, because of statistical difficulties. There are a1 so 
. 
anomo1ies because of discrepancies between crop and calendar year. 
(ii) Industry: the problem here is also due to the lack of census data, 
and the proliferation of small units of artisans includinc many Indians 
making handicrafts. Censuses have been few and far between (Guatemala 
three, the last in 1958; El Salvador 1951, 1956, 1961; lUcaraeua 1958; 
Honduras 1966; Costa Rica 1951, 1951, 1964; and a Central American 
Industrial Survey in 1962) and series are connected by volume indices 
of dubious reliability and whose relati ve ~eighting is likely to change 
as industrial structure changes. Industrinl statistics frequently ex-
clude the large artisan sector .. Guatemala's 1958 Census excluded all 
urban establishment of under five men, and all ~al establishments. 
The Nicaraguan census of 1958 excluded small artisan firms with a valuo 
adde~ under ~200. The 1962 Central American census excluded firms with 
under five men. 
•• 
COI!Lllercial, ,industrial (and agricultural) censuses are sllbj ect to 
large errors due to fiscal' fraud "/hen profits are being concealed. 
1. L. Fletcher, E. Graber, IV. 1f.crrilJ. and E. Thorbeck~:·'Gu::),teJ'T)1l1A.'s Economic 
,Develonment: the role of A,ericultu"C'e". University of Iowa ~1970, p'.23. This 
study estimates that the subsistence sector contributes 20 ncr cent G.1J.P. 
approximately. . \ 
Und.erestimation of subsistence production may lena to errors of substantial 
, . 
, I 
., 
.' 
6. 
With the service sector there are particulnr difficulties involved 
in calculating the effect of the partially empJ.oyed street vendors 
and others who may have good reason to avoid investig~tion by the 
authorities. Capaci ty utilisation is difficult to Ntlculate 
meaningfully" and tho value of fixed aaseto. 'l'hcrc El.re problems 
involved in deciding whether to include in Itmanufacturin~" items 
such as the processing of coffee, which accoUnt for 20~( or more of 
manufacturine v.alue added in some countries. 
(iii) Price Ind.ices: in conv~rtin6 to real terms we nced good 
price indices. Most of the countries have consumer price indices, 
but wholesale price indices are less reliable. Guatemala has 
comprehensive and multiple price indices,' as do El Salvador and 
Costa Rica. Until recently Honduras and Nicaragua did not appear 
to-have anything ,more satisfactory as G.D.P. deflators than cost of 
livin6 indices. Errors are compounded at a sectoral level. 
However, the rate of inflation is very small in all countries and 
small changes are easier to monitor than large ones. This is not an 
area where errors are serious. 
macni tude. United llations : ttY;orId Economic Survery 1969-70" p.O; 
S. Kuznets: "Hodern EconoT,tic Growth" 1966. 
2. Batelle lnst! tute U.S. Department of Agriculture: "Projections. pL§.!:!PpJI 
,.;- !!&~~o:r. selected...af~ricul tural nroducts in COntrA.l .!iJn.!'rJcrJ. thro\l~ 
],..9.80", pp.1-3. 
3. flNu."Tleros indicer-l de precios en In. republica de GU9.tem~la" Direccion 
General de ~stadistica, 196~. 
.,. 
.,' 
" ",,,-
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(iv) E,'xchanc:e R::!.t&· official exchange rates are not entirely suitable 
for calculating the value of G.D.P. in a. common currency such as dollarD, 
even thOUGh the Central knerican currencies are nearly fully convertible. 
studies carried out in the 1960 1 s on n tlpurchasin.s- power parity" basis 
1 indicated the following conversion factors. 
ECLA-PPP study Offldal RA,te (unitR of currency per 
¢) 
Guatemala ·83 quetzales 1·0 
El Salvador 1·85 colones 2'5 
Honduras 1·69 lempiras 2'0 
Nicaragua 5'77 cordobas '·7·0 
Costa Rica 4'35 colones (6.66) 
Conversion factors of this kind are themselves misleading, eiven 
the difference in economic structures. Nonotheless the infrequency 
of exchMge rate chnrges and the "openness" of the economies means that 
we can regard the exchange rate as a.pproximating to the equilibrium price 
for foreign exchange. 
(v) Popul~,tion: per capita measures depend upon good/reliable, and frequent 
population censuses, which are of mixed quality. 
(c) Social Indicator,s: t!.a.cro-economic data is not only unreliable but 
disguises facts which may be of great relevance in evaluating livin~ 
. S~~ 
standards especially when tho income . distribution is highly . 
1. United Nations: ".iJ.:..ensurcment of latin Ame,r,ican Real Incomes 1.n 
~U. ~.", Economic :Bulletin. for latin Americ't, 1957 (October). -
·b. 1,. Erai thwai tel "Befl.1 :I.ncome l,eV.A,l,R .in.. Latin ,\r'leric,n.II , Review 
of Income and 't7crQ th, !\~cwhaven, U •. :;.A., 1960 (June). 
\ 
~~ . ..........,. -'-_ =-=-- "-0_ 
-'.;-,' ~ ._-----'-" --~,~~-~ ~.-" 
Dia.e. 1 in the text (Introduction and Synopsis) ohows how for 
example the income per capita in Honduras, which in not erently lower 
that that of 5Il. Salvador, understates the "backwo.rdneos" of tha.t economy 
as measured by urbanisation and industr.ielisation. Equally the 
relatively high inc~ per capita in Gua,temala obscures the fact that 
illiteracy, school enrolment and infant mortality are the lowest in the 
region and possibly in all I,atin America. Cost~ Rica's superiority in 
living standards (literacy, housing, infant survival,-doctors per 1,000 
inhabitants, nutrition etc.) is understated by conventional economic 
indicators. Note also how the "growth" of E1 Salvador's GDP is 
accompanied by fallinB nutrition in an already underfed economy: a fact 
which squares with documentation of'the declining livine; standards of 
the rural masses in El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Whercve~ possible this kind of cross-check will be mado • 
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There have be.en various a.ttempts to make quantitative B'enerali~ations 
about the size of the industrial sector, its changes over time and 
variations between countries. The relationships between the size of the 
industrial sector and various explanatory variables has tended to take 
the following form: 
(i) historical studies of advanced industrial countries~(l) 
(ii) X-section studies of comltries at different income levels, 
(iii) time series of "underdeveloped" countries. 
The third is the most directly relevant from our point of view but 
the paucity of data makes its application difficult except for richer 
countries, though this approach has been used by Kusnatz. (2) X-section 
analysis has been used more commonly, as in the Chenery study. (3) He is 
primarily concerned with the relative importance of manufacturing and 
its sub-sectors as economic growth proceeds. The 1960 Chenery study 
estimates ~ basic linear lo~arithmic regression equation, in which, per 
capi ta value added depends on per capita income, and upon popul ation: 
log Vi = 
where Vi is the per capita value a~ded in industry or soctor i, Y is 
national income per head, N is population, pia the "rrrowth el?~stici ty" 
and 0s "size elastici ty". The reeressions produced good correl~tion 
'(1) W. Hoffman: "'J:hLG,rowth. of IndustriJ:\l Economies" Manchester, 1958. 
He was concerned with nnalysinr, the shift from consumer goods to capital (;00<1s 
production as na.tions industriA.lise. 
0) S. Kusnez: "(i,U~Yltit~.tiv(; ~RnectA of tho economic e:r::oVTth .of nn.tions" 
Part II. Economic Development and CuI turnl Change, July, 1957. He w~s con-
cerned with changes in sh3,re 'of labour in va.:dous sectorn over time. The basic 
finding for his sRJTlple - which includccl few developint countries - is that arri-
ouI ture consistently 10seD manpoVier while services, and to n lesser extent m~nu­
facturing, eAin it. 
0) D. Chenery: "Pattp.rns of inrhtAt:rin.l c:rorlh" American Economic Review, sept. 
1960. 
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Patterns of Industrial Growth 
UN 
Chenery I Chenery rChenery 
Chenery Jand TaYlorrd Taylor d Taylor 
(L) (SM) (SP) 
UN 
Chenery I Chenery 
Chenery \and TaYlOrjd Taylor 
(L) (S) 
20-39 Total manufacturing 
20-21 Food and beverages 
22 Tobacco 
23 Textiles 
24 Footwear and clothing 
} 
25 Wood and cork manufactures} 
26 Furniture and fixtures 
27 Paper and paper pr()(!ucts 
28 Printin~ and publishing 
29 Leather products 
30 Rubber products 
PI 
1.369 
.978 
1.205 
1.361 
1.531 } 
2.035 
1.718 
.893 
1.582 
31 Chemicals } 
32 Petroleum and coal pro- I 1.547 
ducts 
33 Non-metallic mineral pro-
P. I P. P, p, 
1.620 
1:~~~ } .616 } 
1.444 2.250 
1.687 2.788 
1.765} -1.056 } 
2.692 3.197 
1.703 4.524 
1.642 .578 
1.998 4.943 
1.655} } 3.021 
2.223 
.690 } 
.549 
.898 
.758 } 
1.703 
1.461 
.398 
1.516 
1.110 } 
1.034 } 
1.08 
1.333 
1.600 } 
1.941 
1.440 
1.282 
1.395 
1.630 } 
"1 
1.124 
.862 
1.329 
.962 
1.030 } 
1.116 
1.041 
.857 , 
1.201 
1.395 
". 
.83 
.001 } 
.234 
.401 
.065 
.080 } 
.518 
.177 
-.026 
.438 
.257 } 
1.040 
duct..s 1.157 1.617 5.203 1.178 1.322 1.014 .164 
34 Basic metal industries 1.991} 2.143 6.463 . .817 1.474 1.649} .419 
35 Metal products 
36 Machinery exc. electricity 
37 Electrical machinery } 1.984 2.799} 4.135} 1.78} 1.63O} 1.312 .31S} 
38 Transport equipment I 2.327 .256 
39 MisccllaDcousmanufacturing 1.847 1.333 
"a "a 
-.16S } ~.208 } 
-.215 .265 
-.514 -.237 
-.748 } -.302 
-.001 -.325 
-.156 -.271 
-.198 -.666 
-.261 -.040 
-.017} .22S} 
.152 -.OS8 
:}~:} 
UN 
151 
.884 
.964 
.877 
1.008 
1.699 
.873 
1.251 
.281 
.712 
1.116 
1.915 
1.566 
1.053 
., So;uus: UN, A Study of [rublstrial Grow,h: H. B. Chenery, "PaUcma of In~ustrial' Growth", Americoll £uJnolnJc Review,' 1960;" Ii' "B. CheneI)' and 
L Taylor. "Development Patterns: Among Countries and Over Timc-, Rniew of Economics and SlDtistia. November 1968. 
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2. 
coefficients and were used for makinr,- ceneralisations R.bout {he 
pattern of erowth". The major findine was evidence of an increasing 
share of manufacturing in the economy as it grows (the "p,-TOwth elp,sticity" 
wa.s 1-,6 for industry); but on a dis<1gercgFtted level therli:' was evid~nce 
of substantial.differences in growth elasticities flnd "size" (or scale) 
elasticities between sectors (see Diag. A2-1). The study ttexplains" 70;-', 
l"'~'t~ 
of industrial growth throueh the reeression)r~ levels of incoMe per 
head, and scale effects. The main implications of the study nre a.s 
follows: 
A 
(i) there is a well-defined "noma} tI pattern of srowth, 
(ii) laeging sectors, in which the industrial ~tructure 
devia:~es from normal, ::l.rc likely to grow more 
quickly to c~tch up, 
economies of scale are probably hiChly important, 
the study also recognises substantial variations 
as well as similarities based on particular 
national factors. (1) 
'; U. N. study used newer and full er data. than Chcnery t but a 
similar method. (2) The study experimented with eight groups of 
candida.te proxy yariables for various explnnatory fr-tctors and produced 
statistically significant multiple regression equations which explained 
the variations in the normal level and pattern of manufacturine in terms 
of t~e average experience of countries studied. A total of 5~ countries 
were studied for 1953 and 46 for 1958; the datn beine pooled. 'lbe final 
(1) Ibid p.650-51; also 13.11. Sutcliffe: ",InduBtry And Development" OPt cit. 
pp.48-49. 
(2) Un! ted Nations, Department of Economic nnd Social Affairs: itA study' 
pf InduRtr5.31 Grow,t,~" l~ew York, 1963. 
" 
, 
~ 
t 
r 
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general equation is simil n.r to that of Chenery and the income nnd 
"population" ela.stici ties, both for the aggre{:.atc Aample and for 
industrial sectora, are set out in Diag. A2-l. There i3 an clasticity 
of greater than one in respect of income per. capita. income; a 1% increase 
to be associated with a 1· 37~~ increase in industrial output per capita and a 
l~': increase in population to be associated with a 1·127( increase in industrial 
output per capita. The sectoral equations are also of importance and here a 
new variable liD" enters. "D" is the ratio between actual value added and the 
"calculated" value added in the whole manufacturing secto{~) The sectoral 
equations enable us to predict changes in industrial structure as income and 
population rise: textiles, lea~her products, food, beverages and tobacco tend 
to decline in importance; paper and. paper products, chemicals, rubber products 
and me·~ru. products to rise. 
The sectoral equations are thus of the form: 
t>( + fo log Y + (log N + t"log d 
where d io the Ifdegree of industrialisation!'; Y is the incoml. per head in 
1953 per capita dollars; 1'1 is the population in millions. The coefficients 
~ 
are sienifi~antly different from th~general equations particularly in respect 
if - SL t..h r-aJ. 
of 'size', but thelranking is similar and orders of m~~itude are closer for 
the "income" coefficient. 
Another important study seeking to corroborate the Chenery findingo 
was that of Chenery and Taylor which extends the analysis to a time series 
.. 
over 1f} years and produces coefficients similar to those found in the 
X-section study. (1) They also divide the sample into three cateeories: 
, 
(1) H.E. Chenery and L. Taylor: "DeveloTlTllcnt l)::ttterns ::tTl'lon·r; countries and 
over time" Roview of Economics anel st<\tistics, November, 1968. 
(:t) ~ ~'L/ R~ s~ ~~io~ "~Wdct ~~~ 
~~~rA~ ~:.o~ ~~~ ~.w~~~ 
~ ~~,~~~~~~ ~ ~ 
-\ 
large, 'small industry-orientated, and small primary-orientated com1trieo. 
These d.ifferent ~t4tli,g h ave been used for looking at the "normAlity" 
of the industrial erowth pattern of individual countries or groups of 
countries. A great deal of any deviation from the normal pattern 
can be explained by (1." resource endowment, t1nc would expect a small closely 
packed country with ~ limi ted land area to have a high "D" \ a country 
... 
with a strong natural resource endowment the opposite. COl.mtries with 
a tradi tiona! bias to c:>..'poriine- aericul tural products Vlould be expected 
to have a low "D". The U.N. study gave considerable prOMinence to the 
role of government policy, or lack of it. ~overnment control of the 
composition of demand, the structure of national product, and the 
pattern of trade, seems to have led to a hieher level of manufacturing 
for given per capita incomes. It was shown tha.t there was a consid.erate 
"above-nomal lt ,degree of industrialist~l""in gastern.Europe and this was a 
. 
direct result of government policy. A considerable degree of government 
intervention in some of the "mixed" economies also appears to lead to a 
hi[~er rate of industrialisation. 
However; there are considerable reservations tha.t one might have 
about using a study of "Dltt s to tell us -about slgni~icant development 
features of particular economies: 
.~a) at a logical level, it is incOI'rect to argue that because 
there is a correlation between dec,rees of development and industrialisation 
that thore must be a casual connection: post hoc, ergo propt~ hoc. 
The x-section studies traced eeneral patterns of significance ~nd 
correlatt~. The relations are not normatlvc, but the best fit of n 
(1) United Nations: itA stuny of IndustriA.l r.rowth" OPe cit. p.14. 
,. 
5. 
~a.rcre sa.mple, and relationE1hipe between "normal ll and "actu~l" value-
added can only be explained by a complex of political eco(~aphic and 
economic factors in e::J.ch case. For this reA-son n, simplistic policy of 
basinG a more intensive industrialisation prot:;Ta.'rJno on findings of this 
kind c~~not otrictly be justified. "It is unfortunate that this 
pioneerinG study associates growth with industri<l.l pr-ttte:r.ns in its 
title because planners are often tempted to interpret the reerel'lsion 
equations as a blue print for a strategy of industrlalisiltion". (1) 
For example, merely to increase the share of manufacturing value Ro.ded 
could be done either at enormous or small cost in terms of opportunities 
foregone ,and use of the equa.tions tells us not?ing about the "cost" of 
industrialisation. 
(b) The application of the results of X-section analysis to time 
series projection is a familiar criticism. Temin criticised in 
principle the logical assumption behind this extrapolation and found 
that empirical testing of the Chenery and U.N. coefficients over time 
showed only limited comparability with the X-section coefficients: "the 
existence of time-series patterns of the same form as X-section patterns 
is still more an assumption than a conclusion". (2) steuer and Voividas 
also found that the X-section coefficients failed 'to hold-up for time 
aeries: "Quite pervasive X-section evidence of the existence of a 
fairly uniform pattern of industrialisation of the kind found by Chencry 
(1) vi. Hong: "A atu<.!y in the chR.nr,-eR jn the str1.'tct'llro of mMufActu~inc 
industry ::lml the ,trcule..J)A.ttnrns of mr-mufncturinl:" rodllc.t,ion in Korea, 
rraivnm A.nrl J;1n,~!'l", :Ph.D. (Colombia, 1966, (microfilm) :p.22. 
--. ~ 
(2). P. Tcmin: tt.A ,time series te!'l,.t of U"l·ttOt,DFl o( indufl,tri".l R'!'owth" 
Economic Development and Culturo.l Change, Jan. 1967, pp.174-8l. 
\ 
""" .. 
, 
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is consistent with a lA.ck of tcmporAI nta11ility of the I'rtttern. II (1) 
steuer nnd Voidd~s also :tn<'licftte th:d the:re in f~OOc1 rr'l'loon not to 
eXl)cct stability over time as many flmd::unent.a1 concU tions of the world 
economy - the existence of planning, the emergen()e of new technoloeY, 
new trade relationships - act to 'Prevent the conditions, which were 
present when ~uropeRn cOlmtries industrialised, reproducine themselves. 
However, other time series studies provide more sympathetic evidence 
based on larger s&"llples and lareer time series than the steuer-Voivinas 
stUdY~ (2) Chanery himself defended the idea of using the data for 
• 
projection purposes and the U.U. study produced results, stable over 
five years, though they were guarded as to the use the projections 
might be put to:" the model based on the standard equations is not 
intended to be used as a coin-in-the-slot machine which would turn out 
projected output levels by mechanical computation." One might 
sumlJ1arise by saying: "on the whole the question of the applicability of 
X-section results to time series considerations must be approached with 
caution from the stand-point of individual countries." (4) 
(c) The relationships in the very simplified models comprise only 
a limited nQmber of the most important variable. It was found in Latin 
America that there was a persistent tendency to "under-industrialisation", 
-, 
and a separate regression analysis gave different elasticities from the 
.. 
larger sample. A normal equation incorporating' "urbanisn.tion" and "import 
coefficients" (measurine the scope for import substitution) cave a 
SUbs~:'1htiallY bette'r fit than the other norm:-ti equations. {5) 
(1) M. steuer & C. Voividns: "IJ'Ylport_"subsii tution ~nd Chenery's TIl\tterns of 
industrial growth" Economia Intemazionale, 1965, pp.56-65.'o • 
(2) H.B. Chenery & L. Taylor: "Development P::t.ttern~, etc." OPe cit. 
(3) United Nations: "A Study of Indufltri::tl Gro~th" op. cit. p.29. 
(4) R., stem: ".Qu;)ntit~tive rnterT!.~t • .t2n::tl Eco,nomies" 1970, p'P.152-l57. 
(5) United 11ations {ECLA): "'l"ho Process of Industri~.1 Development in !,::t.tin 
America" OPe cit. pp.51-54. 
7. 
(d) All five countries are small, low in~me cOlmtries nod as 
such~unrepresentative of the ceneral sample, and incorporaUt'._ any 
bias vlhich is implicit in this part of the sample. 
(e) Statistical deficiences are considerable (Appendix 1), 
especially the hiGhly suspect estimates of manufacturin!; value added. 
In several cases this involves inclusion of coffee processing, which is 
only tenuously "manufacturing" in any meaningful sense: ,this accounts 
for 2(}7'~ of the total ,in El Salvador and. 10-15(1 in Honduras and Costa Rica. 
Also figures should be reduced to 1953 U.S. dollars which puts 
considerable strain on Central American sources of data. 
Auplicatlon to Central America 
The defects of using the findings of the X-section studies to 
make inferences regarding the "normality" of a given industrial structure, 
especially at, a sectoral level •. have been set'out. If these objectives 
• 
are not considered ove~vhelming then there are still ,serious problems of 
manarring the statistical material. 
(i) . "D" was calculated for each country sepFlXately; and for the 
'region a.s a whole for 1953 to 1969. 'l'his involved computine the 
national income (at 1953 ,prices) from GDP at current prices. Where GDP 
was not automatically denated a price index was ~sed - being the average 
of wholesale and retail prices. National income is obtained fron the 
GDP3inures. Industrial value added was obtained from tho GDP statistics 
(and denated by the same factors) and population from the U.N. Demographio 
Yearbook. .. 
(ii) For a sectoral analysis "D" was used (in 1953. 1960, 1965) 
to calculate the relationship between "normalll and ilactual" value added. 
" 
8. 
Both of these exercises, especially the second, are fraught with 
dificulty. Statistical deficiencies are considerable, as explained 
in Appendix I. The usa of price indices to deflate 1953 prices is not 
satis~actory 
altogether / as price indices arednrealistic and are certainly not 
as precisely applicable to individual industrial sectors as they are to 
the aggregate figures. The original study data was also expressed in 
u.s. dollars and currencies elsewhere are, in varying degrees, over-
valued:. an ZCLA study in 1960 indicated that freely floating exchange 
rates would be 35-15,% down against t~e dollar from the fixed parity. (1) 
However, in most Central American countries, inflation has been modest; 
and this problem is, therefore, not serious. The Costa Rica currency 
was probably the moat over-valued 'and in 1971 the colon floated down by 
20/0 against the dollar. 
, 
" 
i 
(1) .... See Appendix I, p.4~ 
\ 
' .. 
9 I. 
Results 
1. The first result, the calculation of "D", is shown on the Graph 
(Diag.A2-~. Except for 1969 (in all cascs except Guatemala) there has 
generally been "under-industrialisation" in all countries, El Salvador 
is an exception to this pattern as one might expeot from a relatively 
urbanised country which has spawned an entreprenourial class ready to 
develop investment openings. In all five c01.IDtries there is ;\ generally an 
upward trend of "D"; as import substituting industrialisation has 
proceded. Exceptional is Nioaragua, where growth in the 19601s has 
tended to come from cotton exports rather than manufacturing. Guatemala 
has a 10\7 "D" t generally, despite Guatemala City having the status of 
an industrial centre. With its larger population, much of it outside 
the money sector,. the industrial value added is less than one would 
expect for a country of that average income level and population • 
• 2. On a sectoral level, there is a pronounced tendenoy for positive 
deviations to appear most strongly in the 'traditional"industries (food, 
tobaoco, textiles, clothes and timber) and 'strong negative deviations 
. (statist~cal tables). 
elsewhere, especially in the chemicals and metal products sectors., Thore 
are some exceptions - Salvador does not have a t~nber produots industry 
. (no trees)) and in 1965 the construction of an oi~ refinery .had raised 
its ~hemicals' and petroleum products cateBory to an 'above normal' level. 
Honduras has a strong positive deviation for timber products while 
appearing to be deficient in other 'traditional' industries. There is a 
strong positive deviation for chemicals (from the big vegetablo oils 
industr,y). Nicaragua has had a atronB positive deviation in the clothing 
industry, Costa Rica also in chemicals. Considered regionally the 
"pattern is similar; a. strong positive trend in all traditional ~roducts 
'. 
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(except textiles) and a negative trend in all chemical and metal based 
industry. Over the 1953-1965 period there VIas no marked shift, except 
.towards the building up of a textile industry • 
.An analysis of the Bum of deviations from the "normal" in absoluta 
terms and regardless of sign, (expressed in percentage terms) is given 
belows 
average for countries under U.S. ~150 37.7 
Asia 31.9 
Latin America 16.4 
Europe 33.9 
Africa 36.0 
Central America !ill. 1960, !2§2. 
Region 58 51 51 
Guatemala 52 42 47 
Honduras 38 32 nte 
Nicaragua 49 39 30 
costa Rica n.e 13 22 
E1 Salvador 35 29 40 
As can be seen, most of the deviations are of the SdIDe order as the 
average for poorer countries in the U.ll. study, but there are- some very 
large deviations (for guatemala). The sum of devia.tions for the region 0..0'--. 
is much more, which indica.tes that in regional terms 
Central America conformo much less closely to the 'normal' pattern of 
the sectoral diatribution of manufaoturing output then a "typical" 
.. 
country of 13 million people and the same average income. The deviations 
are due to a very large "above noma1" traditional soctor o.nd"be10w 
normal'modern sector. 
'. 
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Stathl1c:d... T~bles for Aonendix 2 Cl/~~ ..:$~) 
Guatem~la (1953, 1960 and 1965). 
-" \'i'S3 I'~" 0 19,s 
Value Added tjM.~ % Dev. Value Added ~ I Value Added Dev" Actual UOITlal A. N. Actual Normal .h 1h. Actu.~l :n or."'..al b- No 
FooG. 'Beve:::-.:;.ge &: 
ToC2..CCO 56.0 3500 60.0 46.0 14.0 73.7 50.0 55.0 '40.0 15.0 8202 66., 42.5 38.0 4.5 
Textiles 7.6 5.9 8.0 8.0 - -11.9 8.7 . 9.0 7.0 12 .. 0 38.6 14.3 17.5 8.0 9.5 ,J 
Stoes & Clothes 11.2 605 12.0 8.5 ;05 17.3 9.6 13.0 8.0 5.0 39.6 14.0 18.0 8.0 10.0 
~.; .? od. t~ Pu...""ni ture 5.9 404 6.1 5.8 00; 7.3 6.2 5.5 5.0 0.5 9.4 10.4 4.3 6.0 1.7 
P!:per 1.1 1.5 105 006 1.7 0.4 1.3 0.9 2.6 ;.3 1.2 1.8 0.6 
Printing 2.2 2.9 2.5 3.0 0.5 ;.4 4.2 2.5 ;.4 0.9 9.0 7.2 1.6 4.1 2.5 
Le~ther 1.9 105 0.2 109 107 2.3 1.9 1.8 . 1.5 0.3 1.6 2.8 0.7 1.6 / 0.9 
Rubbe:::- 0.2 101 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.3 0.1 2.2 2.7 1.0 1.5 0.5 
C~e=icals &: Petrol 3.0 6.5 3.4 8.5 5.1 4.7 7.6 3.6 6.1 2.5 10.0 13.5 5.0 7.7 2.7 
Non-metallic 305 6.0 ;.7 7.8 401 5.3 906 4.0 7.8 3.8 9.9 12.9 4.5 6.; 1.8 
1-lincrals 
:Basic }!c~als I.; 1.1 1.1 2.9 2.6 2.6 
, 
Ketal Products 108 705 2.0 9.7 7.7 1.5 1106 1.1 9.4 8.3 8.8 2209 4.0 13.0 9.0 
Other l'!anufacture 1.4 1.1 1.1 2.8 108 1.3 1.5 0.2 
. 
9304 2.7605 100.0 100.0 39.6 11;3.0 i.123.0 100.0 100.0 41.5 219.7 175.3 100.0 100.0 4506 
,~ 
" Vo = Normal Values add~ is 126.5 Vo ::: 181 Vo = 276 
Arrived at directly. 
I , 
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El Salvador 
Ve.lue Added % Dev. Value Added ~ Dev. Value Added % ~ 
Actual NO'I'Tlnl b.. No Actual Normal h N. Actual lTo~al ~ 1k. 
~ 
I 
I?oo:i Beverage &. I ~obacco 33.0 24.6 61.0 49.2 11.8 41.0 34~3 59.0 44.5 14.5 61.1 49.1 49.0 45.5 3.5 
I 
I 6.6 1.2 1.0 5.3 9.0 1.0 2.0 12.0 8.5 9.0 1.7 1.3 !::extiles ,.0 3.4 5.4 
I 14.6 6.6 6.0 18.8 9.3 0.15 8.5 6.5 181:0'2s & Pu..."'TJ.ture 8.3 400 8.0 14.2 17.5 8.0 9.5 
, 
;\.Jood & Furniture 201 2.6 5.0 5.3 0.3 1.7 4.1 2.1 5.5 3.4 2.1 6.1 1.6 6.0 4.4 
p",...,~,.. 0.2 1.2 0.25 1.5 1.3 1.5 2.2 1.2 2.0 0.8 
IPrintins 0.1 1.6 1.3 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.2 
"\ 0.1 2.6 4.3 2.0 4.0 2.0 
!Leather 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.3 0.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 
1 
IRubber 1.2 1.4 0.6 1.25 0.65 
!cr.e:ucals & Petrol 104 2.5 205 4.9 204 3.0 4.1 3.75 5.5 1.15 12.3 7.0 0.1 6.5 5.5 
I ~Ion-~etallic 
! Ninera1s 1.9 4.1 3.6 8.1 4.5 2.2 6.0 . 2.15 8.0 5.25 9.2 ' 3.9 8.3 5.4 
:Easic !1etals 0.4 1.1 0.6 106 1.0 
.Netal Products 1.6 4.2 3;0 8.3 5.3 4.3 • 1.4 5.25 10.0 4.15 5.2 14.0 5.6 12.6 1.0 
Other r-:anufactures 1.3 204 1.2 1.2 
55.0 2:48.2 100.0 1000 0 34.6 82.7 ~12.0 100.0 100.0 43.0 13601 109.6 100.0 100.0 39.7 
.J 
Vo 59.4 Vo = 90 Vo = 136.7 
"I 
;
,1 
':::,,' ~ 
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." 
:r 
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Honduras (1953, 1960, 1965) 
''i SJ I tit:. 0 '''~ 
Value Added % % ~ Value Added J % ~ Value Added % .% ~ 10 
Actual Nomal h N. Actual Noroal .h No ~Actual 1forna1 h !h 
Food, Beverage & 1100 1700 4400 56.0 12.0 21.0 22.4 50.0 52.0 2.0 24.8 
.Tob~cco 
Textiles 0.4 2.0 105 66.0 5.1 0.45 2.8 1.2 \ 7.0 5.8 4.0 
S:::102S & Clothes 4.7 206 18.0 8.7 9.3 7.2 3.5 17.4 8.2 9.2 5.2 
"'[cod & Fu.....""'rli ture 301 1.9 12.0 6.3 5.7 2.9 2.6 7.0 6.2 0.8 3.5 
Paper 
~" ." _ ... L"l,,~ne 0.6 2.0 2.0 1.1 1.4 2.4 3.5 1~1 202 
. Leather 0.3 
-
1.0 1.0 106 1.6 1.4 
Rubber 
CllC:llcals & Petrol 3.1 1045 1200 4.8 7.2 2.8 2.1 4.6 5.0 0.4 3.3 
Non-~et~llic minerals 2.0 2.6 8.0 8.6 0.6 108 309 4.2 9.2 5.0 ' 5.1 
D?sic Metals 
Hetal Products 106 203 6.0 704 104 1.7 3.4 3.9 8.2 4.3 6.0 
other Y~ufacturers 0.8 1.4 104 1.0 
26.0 ~29.7 100.0 10000 38.0 40.0 Z.42 •O 100.0 100.0 31.7 -£ 55.5 
Vo = 39.6 Vo = 56.1 I 
\ 
I 
?J \\ " j ,- ,. 
, ",.'", __ .. ~-' _____ ~_>.:lo. _____ ..MI1i. 
.. -. ~ ,---T .. --·-·b .... --·-F ----,- --zTif-,..---------rr . _ ~.,;'" 
1953 1960 1965 
Nicarag'.la Actual Normal 1cA %It Dev. A N faA r~ Dev. A N 1~ %1l Dev. 
Food Beverage and Tobacco 13 13.3 50 62 12 23.4 18.1 54 43 1 31.7 26.2 55.8 43.4 12.4 
Textiles .9 1.35 3·5 6.3 3.1 2.6 2.2 6 6.3 .3 4.5 3.9 6.6 6.4 .2 
Shoes and Clothes 6 2.0 24 8.0 14.5 9.9 3.1 22.6 ~ 13.6 10.8 5.5 14 9 5 
Wood and :furni ture 1.75 1.25 7 4.6 _ 1 2.2 2.0 5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.8 1.5 1.5 
Pa.per .5 1.1 1.1 1 ... 1 
Printing .9 3.5 3.5 .9 1.3 2.1 3.4 1.3 .4 2.6 1.4 4.3 2.9 
Leather .45 1.1 1.7 '.2 - 5 .5 - 1.0 1.02' 1.4 1.6 .2 
Rubber 1.5 3.3 3.3 3 
Chemicals and Petrol .9 3.5 3.5 1.4 1.1 3.1 4.8 1.1 6.4 - 3·5 5.75 5.8 .05 
non =etallic minerals .9 1.95 3·5 9 5.5 2.9 8\ 8 3.0 4.1 3.5 8 5.5 
:Basic oetals .6 1.5 1.5 
I{etal products .8 1.55 3.2 7.5 4.3 .2 2.8 .5 8. :- 7.5 2.4 6.3 6.0 1 5 
Other ~~ufactures 3.5 
26 22.3 100 100 49 43.3 35.4 100 100 42.5 68.9 58.5 100 100 34.6 
Vo -= 28.1 va = 50.0 va = 92.3 
Costa Rica 
Food Beverage etc. 14 15.3 47.5 54 6.5 24 23.1 50 47 3 32 32.1 42 44 .2 
Textiles .1 1.5 2.3 5.3 3 2.4 2.1 5 6 1 4_.8 4.3 6.0 5.7 .3 
Shoes and Clothes 3.15 2~65 12.5 9.4 3.1 4.8 4.45 10 9.25 .15 4.9 6.6 s.6 8.8 .2 
'-food and furni ture 5·5 1.75 18.3 6.2 12.1 4.2 3.1 8.8 6.5 2.3 8.3 4.7 10.4 6.3 4.1 
Paper .1 .25 
-
.25 .15 
-
.3 .3 1.0 1.5 1.2 2.0 .8 
Printing .75 1 2.5 3.5 1.0 1.9 1.95 4.0 4.2 .2 2.4 3.3 3.1 4.4 1.3 
Leather .1 2.3 2.3 .95 
-
2 2 .9 1.35 -1.1 1.8 .7 
ttJ.cber .2 .6 .6 .33 - .65 - .65 .6 1 .8 1.3 .5 
~neoicals and Petrol 1 1.25 3.5 4.4 .9 2.75 2.42 5.6 4.9 1.7 8 4.1 9.9 5.3 4.4 
Non metallic minerals .6 2.3 2.0 8.2 6.2 1.55 3.1 3.2 3.3 .1 3.4 5.5 4·5 7.3 2.8 
Basic I::etals -' .6 .8 .8 
l>1etal Products 1.95 2.35 5.8 8.6 2.8 3.35 4.9 6.8 10.3 3.5 1.2 8.5 8.9 11.3 2.4 
Other manufactures .3 1.0 .9 1.6 2.0 .2.0 
30 27.9 100 100 ;8.8 -47.5 47.5 100 100 14 80.3 .76~100 100 22.3 
Va = 39 va = 68.1 Va -= 103.8 
-- i 
7 ~ d ' ,,',,-, 
1. 
Appendix II(b) The effects of economic l.ntee.!:ntion. 
Ch. 1 dealt ~ith (on p. 49) the potential usefulness of the x-section 
data in calculating the effect of economic integration by illustratin~ the 
rule of economies of scale. The Elkan and Sto~tjesdjk studies have already 
been described. 
"DII was calculate'd for various years for the region a,s a whole and tho 
"normal" value added contrasted with the sum of ttnormal" vulue added for the 
countries separately. In 1953 the regional "no!'lnal" WftS 40;( greater than the 
sum of the fragmented parts: in 1960, and 1965 the factor was 50%. The 
potential gains from integration are thus very large if seen in terms 
- the relative -importance of manufacturing output. As a pl~portion of GDP this 
wo~ld indicate a gain of 5~~ in 1965, (exclusive of secondary effects resulting 
'-
from the expansion of ,manufacturing). , 
There are ,however certain points of qu~ification in addition to the 
general doubts about the applicability of the x-section rorrressions expressed 
earlier; 
(i) the sum of "normal" sectoral value ttdded does not necessarily 
~ 
equal the overall "normal" value added for, any one -country: tltho linear 
-I' 
form of the logarithmic equations precluded consistent oompliance with the 
-~ 
additivity condition: tllat is, the condition that the sum of predictive 
values from the thirteen sectors in a given country ShOlUd equal the ,,- .. 
val ue added of the total manufa.cturing in the srune country. 
however, does not materially effect the practical usefulness of the 
equations. 11(1) Direct comparisons are made, therefore, by porcenta.ging. 
(1) United Nations: itA Sturly of industri~l BTowth" OPt cit. p.6. 
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2. 
(ii) as Sakomoto explains, the sectoral i~plic~tion of. integration 
depend upon the value assumed for "D" after integration. (l) tiD" will 
presumably increase in value as the region begins to realise some of 
the dynamic benef.its of inteeration in the long term. The effect on 
different sectors will depend on whether the regional "degree of iml.ust-
rialisation" is assumed to be the weighted average of na.tional "D" pre-
integration, or greater or less. Howevcr, in relative terms the sectors 
which show the greatest gain from integration are chemicals, rubber 
products, basic metals diverse manufactures, pulp and paper and textiles. 
(iii) It is unreasonable to assume that a common market arraneement is 
equivalent to the partner states becoming one homogeneous state from the 
point of view of industrial investment. In praotice, imperfect integration, 
uncertainty, suspicion and transport costs, partially negate the effect of 
the larger market. 
(iv) population size is a poor proxy for "size". tt) Two thirds of the 
• 
population in Central America is rural, much of it outside the money economy 
_ al toaether. The fact that mu~~ of a market may be scattered rather than 
compact has led to the notion of tlpurchasing power density" as a better 
meas~re of market size. (~ Inclusion of income per capita in the 
regression equations means that inter-national differences are taken into 
account as far as that is concerned. 
'\.. 'J ' Just as it can be shovm that a larger market'will tend to create mor~ 
favourablo conditions for mrulufacturing industry, so tho Chenery analysis 
... 
showed R. significant correlation between "size" and tho overall import 
ratio. A "bigger" unit therefore would expect to have a smaller fftrade-
gap" problem. 
(a) 'Ire Slikamoto: (lIndu~trit:l.l ilevelonment &. Interrration of Underdevel0 ed 
Countries" Journal of Common J.larket Studies, 1968 69, pp.243. 
(:11 This problem is discussed at Borne lenrrth in W.G. Demas: "ThE'! ).;conomiM o.! 
Develonment of Small Countrie!'l with SneciA.l Reference to the Cnri bber-l.n" 
McGill University 1965. 
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Aurendix .1.11 Income J1il'ltribution aT' Reeion~.1 Iptem:i-l,tfon? 
One of the main attacks on this thesis which could be made is by 
those who argue thq,t recionally b~sed industrialisa.tion is "irrelevant" 
to the Ureal" problems which are the enormous <1.isparities of income 
and wealth. r.fuis argument normally has tv/a forms and the first would 
be a~cepted by the author. This is to the effect that fundamental 
land reform and income distribution is an overwhelming need, find is 
justified not only in equity terms but for efficiency re~sons: it 
could in the long run stimulate agricul turnl oU'cput on underutilisad landsl 
it could stimulate demand for labour-intensive basic manufactures like clothes 
and footwear rather than luxury products; and because of the hieh r;),te 
of consumption of the elite eroups there would not necessarily be an adverse 
effect on savings and investment. (1) The latter part of the appendix will 
be devoted to showing the scale of inequality and how major structural reform 
• 
could assist economic growth rather than retard it,. noting this, "the ad-
vantages of economic integration ~lould not blind us to tho need for redis-
tributive.social change ll ,(2) and it must be said that development economists, 
and ind~!ed economic analysis generally, says far too little on the question of 
distribution. _ 
However, there is a more forceful version of tho argument which states 
b '" t. j' t\. 
thaj;. " Americal1 region:u integrfl,tion is a hindrance to a funda..'11ental 
structural tran£lfomation· of society.· The fact that "the lack of coromi tment 
by the O.A.S. countries with respect to wealth distribution ~ontrnstB sharply 
with the official enthusiasm •••• feir the development of regional inter,r:ltion 
(1) Inter alia: K. Griffin: "pnnerdevelonment in ~l?nnish Americ:..~" Allen 
.. &. Unwin 1968, Cha.pter 1. 
(2) r.,r,. Biel: "Re ·.iont:ll inteP.'r!:'.tion t1nd incorn~ rediAtl"i.bution: cor.rnlel'Hmt:-; or 
.s-qbsti tutes?" R. lIil ton (ed : "1~.2_yovement TOwfl,rdn JJRt.in Ame:d.c~.n Unity", 
OPe qit., Chapter 15. 
'-
2. 
systems" is explained by the fact thnt "rce:ion,qlism offers n vm.y out. of 
the •••• pol! tical dilemmas associf'tted with the proce/om of creatinG' 
sufficient new demand among the impove.riRherl IM.sses ••• ". (1) Aside from 
the distra.ction of reforminB' enerrJY it is argued that a reGional groupinG' 
(in the absence of counte.r men.sures) will lead to a polarisation of income 
. 
and wealth spatially within the region and among districts of a country, and 
probably also in class terms as a business cla.ss and ID1ionised workers 
appropri::tte a large share at the expense of peasants and the urban unemployed~2) 
However, the main beneficiary, it is argued, is "American imperinlism". 
lr.ost l,~arxist and nationalist writers on Central America have ar8'Ued 
that "in practice this (i. e. integration) has meant the eA-pansion of local 
markets in favour of foreign interests especially of the United states. That 
is, from this moment on, the imperialist deck was stacked with the sentimental 
t~p card of ltCentral knericariism"Jf (3) Galeano, writing on Guatemala states, 
.. . 
"Central AInerican intogration as now being carried out, produces nothinG' but 
disintegration of the area's wea.k national ind.ustries for tho bEll1efit of the 
integration of foreien companies. With markets widened and tariffs nod 
controls climinated, imperialiot plunder takes on new and more effective 
forms". (4)' 
(1) O. Solar: "The cRs.e~ aeainst I,atin A.meric.etn inter')';t.tion: economic and 
l'0litic~l .fllctors" ch?.pter 9 in n; i Hil ton (ed), ibid. Solar develops this 
argument by stating that "continental nationn.1ism" under the aeeis of U.S. 
power, will enhance the ability of exioting f,Ovcrnments to resist . 
forces bent on redistributing rur~l wealth and restrUct' agr~rian society in 
favourin/j the l..Ulrepresented masses". (p.128).· \oIor.n.a-
(2). The effect on the employment situation is derived from tho replncement of 
labour intensive production methods by capital intensive methods. 
(3) Alfonso Paiz: "~ .. 'lq1ird Government of the Revolution nnd Tmperiq.J.isrrt in 
GUlltemaJA.". Science and Society, SU'TIITler 1970, p. 152 ••. - .-
(4) E. Galeano: "~t.E1.ma.lA.: OccnTlied Country", Uonthly Heview l)ret:m 1967. 
\, 
Perha.ps the most influentin.l writer in this vein in Gllnrt~r 1~rMk: he 
believes (inter alia) th~t LRtin America ~RS no need to pns~ throu$h a phaRo 
of capitalist 5.ndustri~,lisation:) that it has always been in n "capitalist" 
rather than a fued.al state, and that economlc inter,ration merely strengthens 
the pO\'7er of economic interests in the metropolitan "contre ll : "rIbe bulk of 
intra Latin _~erican trad.e •••• is by U.S. co:rporRtions which OM thus 
manufacture in one Latin American country for export to another •••• ~1is 
integrationist developT:Jent augments the economic And political disequilibrium 
both within these Latin American countries ancl amonr, them ••• ". (1) 
'l1J1e author Vlould raj ect most of this formulation of the ca,se a,gainst 
integra.tion. It is important to separate out the motives of the supporters 
of inteeration frOm the consequences. The fact that the schene is beine 
supported in certain respects by some chambers of commerce and the rcprescnta-
tives of reactionary gove~~ents should not oboure the fact that regional 
integration is having' the effect of weakenine the political power of the land-
lords and their backers who are the main obstacle to change in the country-
side. (2) In fact the new urban classes have a strong interest in stimulnt-
lng agricultural demand for manufactures and increasing food output. 
Equally, the fact that the American government has blessed the agreement 
and many American companies profit from it should not obscure the fact that 
one,of the main pressure groups towards inteeration has been the "technico" 
~'l9 
group of bureaucrats vrhose' '. . VIas largely in the U.N. rather than C.I.A. 3~) 
that the C.A.e.H. has substantially reduced the region's share of trade with 
the U.S.; that the U.S. government vory strongly disapproved the dirieista 
features of the COlTh'llon Uarket; (4) and that the Andean e;rouping he,s shown 
(1) Gundar Prank: "Q:,pitA.liA1'"!1 gnd Unde:r,!1evolp'Oj"I'}.e1l.t in, 1Jr'"ttin ,Vn,~.!ic,q.", Peneuin 
1971, p.331. 
P.T.O. 
, 
(~) J. Cochrane: "The Poli.tics of P.egion,a.l I!ltep'rati,on: the Cent:r.:.~l ,/l.:YTt,eri,cpl'l. 
~fI Studies in Political Science: The Ha.gue 1969, pp.98-99. 
A. Inotai:' "The Central }\meriCA.n Com"Tlon Y·~,rket" Centre for Afro-Ar-d8.t.! 
ReseRrc~; Budapest 1970, p.62. 
C. l:!i tchell; "The Role of technocratfl in r,atin 'A.me:r:icn;n .. inteerntio,n" Inter-
American Affair~, sept. 1967. 
(3) For the role of "technicos" see A. See-al: ",The inte.cration of ~e.velopinf-' 
Countries: some thou.r;hts on E~st Africp.. f'lnd Centrfl.l ArneriCl'l,", Journal of 
Common 17arket studies, rrarch 1967, pl'.252-282. Segal also argues however that 
one of the main drives behind the integrcttion effort of tho "technicos" was a. 
" desi;re to oidestep the intractable poli ticn.l problems prcr.ented by the ruling 
sites-and to achieve some pro6ress in other directions. 
/ (4) R. DenhOIJl: "J'he role of th~ U.S. ~$ 1m (!xternnJ. sector in _th~ inte.r;r'~tion 
.. := .of IJ1'I.tin PJIlerica" Journal of Common M~.rket Studies 1968-69. P'P.199-217. 
J.D. Cochrane: "U. S. att.i tudr;~ towards ,Centr,al Americ~ inte~:r~.tlon"" 
Inter ~~erican Economic Affairs, Autumn 1964, PP.73-91. 
.. '·' .. n>-...... "'···.-.. ·, 
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how an inteCTation agreeMent can be used as a hi~1ly effective means of 
counterine: the bargaininr.~ power of U.S. multinationals to a greater extent 
than is possible nationally. (1) 
There seems some evidence to suggest that by facilitating industrialisa-
tion Ita real union will make it possible to rescue the masses from their 
desparate poverty and this cannot happen until communicationn are improved, 
the middle classes strengthened and the old fcudalists overthrovm". (2) 
Another valuable contribution is, in the long run, to break down the ob-
sessive competitive nationalism of the countries in central America which 
is a justification in part for their large armies, which represents a 
weakening of their economic bargaining power, and is a useful outlet for 
mass emotions - as the recent Honduran/Salvadorian war indicated only too 
clearly. (3) 
Economic integration, then, may be a useful element in the economic 
development of Central America, if properly manaced to offset disequili-
brating tendencies, and while it is not a substitute for more deep-seated 
reforms through taxation and land transfer, it m~ be a complement: 
"political life is a function of economic variables and •••• only by trans-
forming the economic structure in Central America will it be possiblo to 
al ter existing political systems". (4) And it ia not plausible to assert 
(1) See Chi 2. 
(2)~, M. nieder-gang: "Th,e T\7enty V:t.tin Americ!L~~ Penrruln 1971, p.289. 
(3) It could no doubt be argued to the contrary that the failure of "integration" 
to achieve 'balanced' development focused attention on a potentially divisive 
issue .. : more ~<..~...bI. .. 
(4) Quote in K. Griffin: ",P'nd,erdevelonment, in Bna.nish AmeriCA-it, OPt cit, p.7l 
from Gundar Prank: "CA.'!)i tl'Jlism and Underdevelopment in rJ?~tin J\.:rner.ic~lI, 01'. cit. 
chapter 2. To be contrC'.sted with Kwame ~;krumah f a exhortation: "seek ye first 
the political kin~domlt. ' 
'. 
that redistribution is an "alternative" approach without suzgestin~ how it 
will be implemented when the existing political sys1;ntn has successfully l'e-
sisted attempted change for so long. 
In subsequent sections we shall look at the evidence for economic 
, ~:~I 
equality and the two-way causal relationshipo, the likely irr!p::tct of 
~ ~~~ 
redistribution on economic structure) and A the impact of~integrntion on 
~ " 
chaneing economic structure and ' on income distribution. 
central America has lIby and, large a semi,feudal 
social structure ,~ by ineqtk~lity. Costa Rica is an exception but only 
in d~greetl. (1) 1 
,I 
I, f~ 
The key source 
• 
of the great inequality of bargaining power is unquestionablY the expansion 
~ 
of la.nd ovmership on the part of the few, and the , of, or severe 
limitation, on the part of the many. There is a c;:~ distr.ibution in 
all the five countries~ :IE Guatemala 21 per cent of the farms occupy 69 per 
cent of the'area, and 81 per cent of the farms (all undor 5 acres) ha.ve 10'5 
per cent of the land,and this is the most dramati~allY unequal distribution. 
In El Salvador the top 2 per cent have 57 per contor the area, and 85 per 
cent of farms (under 5 acres) have 15 per ccnt of the land. 
In Costa. Rica there 
is a larGe number of "minifundios" (farms under 5 acr~s represent 50 per cent 
of the total and have 4.6 per cent of the land) nnd 3 per cent of farmo usa 
51 per cent of the land, (thoUf;h medium sized farms are well represented). 
" If it is possible to identify the 1c,'!),:t inegali"tarian, stde in land ovmor-
ship it is Uicaraeua - there is still a heavy concentration of ovmership 
(1) J. Cochrane: "'lbe Poli tieR of Re"'ion~..1 \'InteP,j"~.tion" op cit P 291 
• •• • • 
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6. 
in a few h8ndo (~.2 per cent have 52.6 per cent of the land) but there Rre 
many more medium-sized faxrno than in the other countries: one suspects that 
this is a result of ecololJY and geo6re.phy rather than policy. 
However, statistical distributions do not tell us the full implications 
of unequa.l ownership. Some families control many farms: others o,vn no 
land. Land varies greatly in fertility and were the laxge farms to comprise 
infertile land fit only for cattle ranging or forest then the skewed distri-
bution would not necessarily indicate unequal income flows from the land: 
but the opposite could happen (and does); that the large farms a~e the most 
fertile. It is necessary to see also the extent to which unequal land 
ownership leads to unequal access to credit and government services. 
Looking at the situation in individual countries, the Guatemalan 
pr,oblem is the only one to be well documented: "the distribution of land 
in Guatemala is highl7 skewed •••• amongst those active in agriculture one 
found" that 1· 2 per cent of the fmnilies monopolise 72·2 per cent of the 
land. Moreover, the average quality of land in large holdings is undoubtedly 
superior to tho quality of land in minifundia and microfundia holdings. 'The 
latifundia ?ontrol all of the fertile land along the Pacific CORst plus the 
best coffee lands". (1), The tlmicrofarms" have on average less than one 
-Manzana (1'7 acres) and "minifundias" are farms up to 7 acres, which is 
regarded as a necessary" unit to sustain an average family. (2) In the 1950 
census tlminifundia" occupied 14'3 per cent of the land area and constituted 
88'4 per cent of the total farms. The existence of a 1964 census enables 
... 
compa~isons to be made. (3) ~hcre is some reduction in the concentration 
ratios (minifundias have 19 per cent of the land area and 87 per cent of 
'(1) K. Griffin: "Reform rotd dive:r'~ific~.tion in ::t coffee ~p..9nomYt the c~~e of 
"Gu~teT'1~lt'l." in "Unfp..shl,Q!!3.ble ";col1o""iCf-l - gssrw.n in honour of TJord Br.l.lof"h". (,Ed .• ) 
Paul Streeten, ';,'Gidenfeld &; Nicholson 1970, p.05, 
(2) Comi te Inter-americano de Desa.rrollo Agricola: ",TenenciA. de 10. 'l'i,em· 'X 
Deaarrollo Socio-]~conl)mico del P0r.ior Ao:-ricolFl. I 'bu"ltemalH - tlnother Viotm~n?", 
1Jeneuin 1971, especil=!.lly the Appendix, n 
••• r~~ ~ "£~i M taf~~~ 
(3) ".Set'·"ndo C A i lql! A D1 i G 1 d }' t di ti 0\4 en90 c;roTlecnur 0 ,on: race on enern e ~,s n s CSt 
the number) but there were nevertheless 20 per cent more in the SlTItUl fA.rm 
category. In the central region "the avera::;e size of small fnrms cleclinecl 
by almost 50 per cent as result of continued subdivision (1) and since 1950 
, 
(to 1964) the prob1el"l has been aggravated by the incrc~se of at least 140,000 
\ ~ 
more families with insufficient or no lrmd". (2) A 3· 5 per cent birt~ adds 
irresistable pressure to this growth of subdivision of land. 
The data which is available on El Sa.lvador enabled a comparative 
study to assert that, superimposed on the already serious problem of unequal 
distribution, "the concentration of the land increased from 1950 to 1961 
for the whole, and for each one of the zones of the country". (3) Over 
this period too farm Oimers dropp~-a from 108,000 to 88,000 while the 
number of ·tenants rose from 33,000 to 87,000. Honduran statistics 
corroborates this and indicate that: "landowners have been reserving 
and consolidating the best 1ands··for themselves, usually those located 
in the plains of the valleys, while they permitted the small farmers to 
settle on the marginal lands, ffcnerally in the roughest and sloying 
areas". 
(4) 
'Ihe sarne Pan American union reports helped to end Gome of the 
complacency which has envelo")ecl Costa Rica and refers to "extreme 
~ . . 
inequality of land tenur~t at once the cause and the result of the wide 
divere-encies between the SOCiRl strata that comprise the rural population". 
Not only is land unequally distributed but "there are knovm to be a.bout 
15,000. squatters or occupants without title". (5) In all the five co\mtrics 
the reports criticise the lack of attention paid to the problem in the 
Development Plans. 
(1) L. It'letcher, E. Graber, W. ~I~erill and E. Thorbecks: ttGu~.ternnJ a' R Rconomic 
DevelopTl'l(;'mt: the Role of Ae:ricu1 turo", OPt oi t., p.60-65: 
(2) Pan American Union: "JZlfl;1)-lrtt:t9,n of G.uEt;to".,~.1a.' n Develonrnf'nt Plnn 1265-62", 
1'p.160-161. 
(3) Pan American Union: ".l1'valuation of gl Salvarlorts DevelopMent ?l~.n 196')-h9", 
pp.67-68. 
(4) Pan American Union: lIF,val'tv'I;tion of HonaUrA.t~'A T>evelo'nrnent, Pl~.n 1965-62", p.47. 
(5) Pan A:nerican Union: "Ev 1 t' f C 
LlpR u::t lon 0 oRtn. Ric~.'n.....l)p,yeJQT)ment FlelD J9hS-6.9.". ~ P. 16~. 
, c~ , .... 
~~-.:..-:--~:!:.-,~--.-.--.::.-..:._---_. __ ._-
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8. 
~1e p~ttern of l~d ownernhip is one of the main determin~tn of 
inequa.lities of income and economic opportunity. 'l."hin io because minifundia 
do not provide any More than subsistence living to the avernge frunily 
:: it is estimated tha.t 5' 5 acres are needed (in Gua.temala) 
for a fa:nily (of five) for corn, and in acld.ition more is needed for clothes, 
roofine anel m~dical needs. "Annual pc:r capita income in the (lub::::istencc 
sector is probably less than ¢lOO". (1) The implication of this for the 
(2) 
economic structure of o.G~iculture can be seen from'the diRer~m below; 
referring to Guatemala. 
12.5..<2 ;t962 
9~ of % of ~: of % of 
l2onulation G. D.!:. Tlo:Qul3,t i,o,n G.n.p. 
1. Subsistence ,-
economy 71' 3 24·0 72'7 21'9 
2. Commercial 
economy 28'7 76'0 27'3 78·1 
(a)' low incomes 21·1. 24·2 20·0 20'9 
(b) high/medium incomss 7·6 51· 8 7' 3 57·2 
The subsistence sector is seen to include a largp. and increasing section 
of the population. It can be shown that per capitn G.D.P. in the subsistence 
sector, for ~bout 75 per cent of the population, declined from i97 in 1951 to 
~5l in 1966. (3) This inevitably means that the income and consumption of 
the poorest members of society has been foIling • "Few serious observers wOlud 
. ,' disagree. This has increased the pressure to mierate for seasonal work to 
the piantations and this in turn has increased the bargaining power of land-
lords. 160,000 to 200,000 persons annually migrate to the o9asts where there 
has been wage cutting of very low rates." (4) The existence of a pool of 
surplus labour prevents ino~oasod money wages in the monotiscd Dactor from 
(1) R. Hansen: "Centrnl America: Rer,ionnl Inteeration and Economic Development", 
OPt Cit., p.69. 
(2) Dio.gram from L. Flctcher, E. Graber, W. Merrill, E. Thorbeckc, on. cit.p.23. 
(~) The general dovmward tendency and the overall figuros ware corroborated by 
several sources (the Guatemalan Social Security Institute; the Putrional Institute 
P.T.O. 
9. 
offsetting the income-depressive effect of oubnil3tencc R.r~icul turc. 
Gross averar;e fa-mily incomes arc probably not a .~rcn.t denI hieher than the 
~50 per capita nuegcsted. above. (1) At the other end of the scale, J.anc1ovmero 
are able to maximise the return from the'lr lnnd throlJ.?;'h their control of agri-
cultural credit. (2) 
Surveys on income distribution h[-l.ve been carried out in In Sal vRdor And 
indicate that 75 percent of rural families arc receiving weekly incomes of 
, 
tmder 15 colones (~6) which was the figure for "the minimum weekly consumption 
expenses of a typical rural fa..'llily" , (3) and the income of the r.ural population 
as a '\Thole amounted to a figure "slightly hieher than half" that of the economy 
''-' 
as a whole. The subsistence nature of a.ericulture is such that "production for 
the internal market is mainly carried out by an immense number of rural farmers 
Vlho have no access to adequate credit mechanism, lack sufficient t"chnical know-
how,. traditionally are in want of attention from the official spheres and are 
forced to restrict themselves to '~ow productivity activitieslt • (4) :El Salvador 
probably had the Vlorst inequality - D )~ of the families received over 50f of the 
(5) 
national income in the 1950's, but the others are not far behind. In Nicaragua 
the top 1% received 25% of the national income in 1953 and more today •••• and 
livery little tax falls on the top 1?.I •••• while the remaining- 9~;: after tax, 
have incomes perc~Pti b1y lower than ~lOO. II (6) 
Corroborative evidence of income inequality from a comparative point of 
view is provided by a U.N. comparative o~udy of eieht Latin American and. fiv~ 
ind~strialised> economies: (7) two central American countries n-apea.r in the 
first sample (El Salvador and Costa Rica). In terms of the percentage of 
fl) This is borne out by the vlork of rJ~ Schmidt and Mnnual f:pllas at Wisconsin 
'in 1964-67, on migratory labour in GU:'l.tema.la (tm}1ublished oernlnar pa,per at Gl~.s~ow). 
'l1}1ey found that the averar;e annual non-mierant income '70.S n.bout ~4 '3 per Calli ta and 
¢60 for mir,rants - thoue:h there were ~erious estimation problems. 
(2) K. Griffin: "Reform ~mc1 DiversificaHon etc,". OPt cit., p.D5. 
(3) Pan .J.:nerican Union "L'val u"tion of DevelopMent Pl~n of bT.!.. 8A1 v::J.r'lor 19h5-6911 t 
p.72. 
P.T.O. 
(' 
(4) Ibid., p.G • 
..... ,,;.;r- ... (5) J. rthcus: ":rhe Central American Common ]JR.rket" OPt cit. 1>.16. 
(6) I.B.R.D.: UF.conomic neve10nment in Nicnr;u:'U~". John Hopkins 1953, p.75. 
~#~J " 
'.-" .. ' (1) Bconomic Survey of Latin A.merica. 196~: "Inco1"lo di~tribution in Vttin 
~l1l'!r) C',l.u, pp. 364-417. 
\. 
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income earned by the top 5 per cent income earners, Costa RicA. had the cecond 
most skowed distribution of the sample (35 per cent Vlent to this ca,togory) 
and El Salvador the fourth (33 per cent). Drp,zH had the worst (40 per cent) 
and the U.S.A./U.K. were both about 20 per cent. This top 5 per c~nt 
group had average incomes of about seven times the natio11al average aD 
against a factor of four in the U.S.A./U.K. This is cauoed by the co-
existence of a modern and industrial sector and a primitive Dedor, the 
/ latter based on subsistence agriculture; a great concentration of property 
ownership; and the existence of internationally established profeosional 
salaries and fees. The distinctive feature of El Salva.dor (and Costa Rica) 
is that there is an almost total absence of 'middle income' groups differen-
tiated from those at very low levels; therefore, "the inequality in the lower 
half of the distribution in these two countries io much less than elsewhere". (l) 
Time series data indicates that over time (as elsewhere) there is a growth of b 
a middle income group and a relative decline in the importance of the very rich 
and very poor. 
Evidence can also be obtained of differences in income seen from the 
point of view of the differ~nce between wage/oalary payments on the one hand 
and pnyments 'on profits and rent on the other; thou{;h functional distincti9ns 
are difficult to make when some people are partly s91f-employed and pa.rtly 
wag-e-earners. In Britain 75 per cent of the net National Income consists 
of wag~s and salaries nnd in Central America this fieure is as low as 50 per 
cent reflecting both the importance of profits and rents, and also of ac1f-
employed business. (2) ~ 
(1) ~bid., 1'.393. 
(2) U.!-!. National Accounts S~R.tistics (1968) 
1968 - percentaee of National Income as 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Costa Rica 
(a) '!f?-£'o Md M.la:r;r (b) pelf omnloymcmt (c)m:-opert;( incom,CZ, 
5011. 50% 
50·7 32-4 
52·7 34-6 
10·2 
.10·8 
11. 
Inequality extends beyond the directly economic indices of income and 
wealth to embrace literacy and education and access to law, health and soeiol 
services. The role of government is c~lcial here because of its power to 
slant taxation and. public expenditure in a redistributive manner. nowevcr, 
in all central American countries government expenditure has been very small 
compared with private consumption; taxation has tended to be regressive and 
public expenditure has only belatedly and coincidentally been allocated to 
the educational, housing and health needs of the m~ss of people. ." Consequently, 
the activities of government do little to help and may hinder. 
The Pan American Union team comented that "high rates of growth during 
recent years •••• have not resulted in a paralleled improvement of social 
levels" • (1) The diaeram below gives some indices which demonstrate this: 
,Di aP,T?Jl1 showing Social StatisticR in Centra1_ Ameri.c.A. ,{ earl:! 1260 t sJ 
-. 
Qoefficient , ~,rcenta,~e }Ip~sJ2i,t,a1 beds ~centaBe. F.stlmatcd 
of illiterac pf releVAnt I.e!..l ,00,9 po"Ou1ntion ..... "hollSin.rr 10 ;y:el'trs M,d ,8ch091.. Po·ee .inh<l.bi t.ants §e:r.vJced b;'i defici til 
~) J n p,rimary w::tterworko ~r b:ro1Z rurrtl 
schoo~ 19.60 - 1966 -(I«ti~r· (",r.) 
U965) 
Guatemala 71-9 (1962) 34 2·<1- 2·0 26 780,000 
El. Sa.l vador 52-0 (1961) 49 2·0 2-2 37 431,000 
Honduras 53'1' (1961) 40 l·a 1·6 27 263,000 
Nicara.gua 49' 5 (1963) 41 1-9 1·9 16 106,000 
Costa. Rica 15- 0 (1963) 67 4-4 4·0 62 07,000 
Central 
.§.ource: 
Notes: 
. :;;r 
- - -America 50 per cent 2-3 2·1 20 1,610,000 
Joint 'Plannine Mission from 1965-69 • 
"Housing deficiency" refers to dwellings with "inadequa.te" services and over-
crowding. There is some double cotmtil1g (l·3 between these two cater,ories nnd 
the definition is unsatisfactorily vacue. 
(1) Pan American Union; "Heport on the Contral, Ame,~l.M.n nO,velopment Plpns 
1965-69", OPt cit., p.157. 
'\ 
.,' 
~~.,-., 
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On almost every banis of comparison Gu~.tem:1.1n.n to poai Hon if) tho 
most defective and Costa Rica the most satisfactory. Of the 
Guatemalan situation the 0 .A. S./Pa.n American Union Study deseri bas the 
illiteracy situation as "one of the highefJt in LCI.tln AMerica", (1) and 
1 t Is deterioratinG'. (2) The housing oHuation is described a.s "alarming". 
Health and water services are amongst the lowest in the hemisphere. ~le 
1965/69 Plan is severely criticised for program:ne in "doing nothing to ntta.ck 
the probleM of poverty of the 95 per cent of the population that lives on 
the land". (3) 2.110 problem is serious also in the oth€Jr countriea rind El 
Sal vador ha.s been seriously criticised for allowing the social sectors to 
remain backward in cOMparison with economic infraotructure activities. (4) 
Nicaragua has special'deficiency in the health sector (5) and lithe entire 
rural population does not have even the most elemental means of collecting 
seVlaee or of eliminating excretions." (6) 
Nor is the prqblem solely one of limited social spending. Central 
American governments have invested a pitifully small proportion of public 
expenditure and investment in irriga.tion, technical assistance, credit 
storage'and rural feeder roads, thereby limitine the scope for improvement 
in real incomes. As an example of this, the cstim~ted number of farmers 
-
reached by extension vlorkors is 15 per cent in Costa Rica, 5 per cent in . 
Guatemala (very much lower if Indiana are included), 4 per cent in El 
Salvador and H;nduras, 1 per cent in Nlcaragua.(7) 
(1) Pan Americ~m Union "Bvpl uP.tron of Develon:nent 
(Guatemala) p.46. . 
tl 
{>I~ Cop. cit.). 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
K. Griffin: "Reform and. diver,RificP.:it9n etc,." OPe cit.~ 1'.88. 
Pan American Union "Repo:r.tfl etc.", OPe cit. (GuQ.temala) p.175. 
Pan .lunerican Union "Renortn etc.", OPe cit., (El Salvador) 1'.75. 
(5) Prot Amorican Union "Rc'Ports e,t.Q..", OPe cit., (Uicq.ragua) p.289. 
(6) ~., 1'.289. 
(7) n. Hansen, OPe cit., p.73. 
'. 
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The problem is m~de worse by 0. regressive tax oyste-m based almoflt 
entirely on indirect tn.xation falling as heDvily on nec(?I3si ties as luxu.ries. 
Despite the effort of the O.A.S. mission to f.lwc·cnt tnx refonn the govern-
ments (excepting perhaps Costa Rica.) . ha.ve firmly resisted a more "pro-
gressive" strllc~ure. (1) 
Any attempt by low income workers to improve their real incomes is 
obviated by endemic rural unemployment. 
Vfuat are the impiications for economic development of an une~ual 
income and wealth distribution? The two main implications are that 
first the skewed distribution of lancl leads to a "dual economy" in 
agricul ture, to low utilisation of the larEo farms and over-utilis~.tion 
of small fA.rTns leading to low productivity and inadequ..1.te production. 
Secondly, the skewed distribution of income leads to a fragmented and 
highly differentiated market -for consUmer ffoods. or the first feature, 
• 
Hansen rem'lrks: "on the large farms there exists a gro::l.t deal of unusecl 
land. of good quality. In contrast the small holdings gel'lera11y consist 
of the least desirable lands". (2) Honduras and Guatemala are particularly 
bad in this respect. On the utilised part ·of the cood "la.tifundalt eotates 
productivity-is hiGh because they have modern and mochanised techniques, 
and sO a dual economy develops based on different techniques of production 
and factor combinations; profitable to the laree farmer but inefficient over 
-. c:~) 
all. 
(1) Pan American Union "Reports etc. II. OPe oi t. t GuatemalE\, p. BS; 
El Salvador p.138; Nicaragua. p.12l. 
(2) R. Hansen, OPe cit., p.ll. 
(3) K. Griffin: "Jtnderqeye,lopment in SPanish America~! PP. cit. t pp.79-S0. 
..- -. 
On the minifundia "the technoloey of the typical (Honduras) farm 
is as primitive as can be comprehend.ed, within the meanin[:;" of the term 
agricul ture. ~le same can be said of the method of replenishing the 
soil: no more primi ti ve method exists than that "'hich is being used •••• 
the land is simply cropped (there is no fertiliser applied) until yields 
have been reduced beyond the point of tolerance and then left fallow •••• 
until the farmer is driven bacl~ by the exhaustion of nearby plots. Ylith 
ea.ch round, however, there is a net. loss both throw?,h uoe ancl throuf?;h the 
resultinc; of unchecked erosion" •••• ltfive out of six of the small farms 
do not' even have n modern -ploue;h". (1) The low productivity of traditional 
agriculture and the land tenuro system are inextricably related: neverthe-
less any attempt to distribute land without attending to the question of 
new inputs and improved farmine,' practices would propably be unsuccessful. 
The implications of this inefficiency for economic development 
is the poor performance in food production, which has !esulted in food 
imports in grovling volumes, low nutrional standards, and the pressure from 
under-cJ:lployed labour to migrate to the cities with all the problems \'I'hich 
that brines in its train.' Even in as much,as the surplus labour can be 
absorbed'in a complementary activity to subsistence agriculture such as 
seasonal employment on plantations, thero is 9:- good indication that "a 
large pool of temporary workers willin[J to work for low w~es discourages 
efficiency in e}.'-port crop production and maintains ma.r{!inal coffee farms 
in production". (2) 
Perhaps the most important development implication is that a lnrce 
proportion of the population make 1i tUe or no contribution to 
(1) V. Checchi and " ..\ssociates: "H'Q.nrlUl"'tI.s:, n Problem in Economic J)evelopmlSn,t." 
1959, p.53. 
(2) K. Griffin: ",Fefo:rrn and diver'sific::ttion e1£.11 '. OPt cit., p~89 •. 
'. 
l ~· :I. 
the Central .PJnerican m:;,rket, not only as sellers but as buyers. The 
implications of thio for the, pn.ttern of demand is to slrmt demand 
towards COnSlL'11er durables rather than tltraditional" manufA.ctures. 
It therefore a.ffects the structure of industI"'J, And in such a. way 
as to divert demand away from the more labour intensive and net import-
savine acti vi ties and to prevent thene industries (and their intermecUA.te 
supplier industries) from generating economies of scale from standard-
isation and mass production. Substantial redistribution of income would 
change the pattern of spending. One study has estimated tha.t a 150 per 
cent rise in income in the low income group would result in expenditure 
increases of 400 per cent in textiles and footwear (1) and E.C.L.A. have 
also produced estimates showing how minor cho.ngcs in the structure of demand 
can have major implications for the pattern of demand. (2) Diagram A3-1 
show the extent to which income elasticities 
are much lower on most estimates for textiles, 
clothing and food, ~han for consumer durables. One should however, be 
careful not to ascribe too much to the argu.'Ilcnt that a switch in demand 
would be employment generating in toto. . Much upper-class consumption is 
in the form of services and ~uch of that, very labour intensive (domestic 
services);.rhe E.C.L.A. study indicated that only 20 per cent of high income 
constm~tion is in the form of consumer durables. 
It has been ar&rued that income redistribution would not only have a 
'" 
structural effect, but an inflationary effect because the marginal pro-
pensity to save is less in low income GTOUpS. However, high income groups 
.. 
also spend a largo proportion of their incremental income because of the 
I~~ "demonstration effect",. and it is doubtful if there would be n .(tat infla-
tionary effect~o~;--b;pr~le:n~'i;;;s m'Qc;:~' ~~~r-;:'~~-"-
(1) Inter-American Development Bank, "AP.Ti~ulturR.1 Deve10nment in TJPttin Ar:Joric!",: 
.:t.he next Dec~,de". Y/nshineton 1967, p.107.' -
(2) 'United Nations (a.e.L.A.) "The ProccflA of D''''vc101')m'''nt 
_ . Ind.u~t:rinl.. <;; in L::I.t~i.n 
America", op • cit., pp .126-127 • . . . . .. 
16. 
demand took the form of proGsure on inela,stic ?npplics in rt, 'ricul ture. 
Diag-ran A3-2 shows the importa..~ce of cO!'l.sumption of 1'00(\ in total 
expendi ture (about 50';0. The figure is much higher for loVi income groups 
than high income &roups. Income distribution would therefore increa.se 
the demand for food markedly. Vlhatever ones position on the present 
inefficient state of agriculture, one would require to be more than 
realistically optimistic about the effects of land reform to believe other 
than that severe transitional problems (and possibly worse) will be created; 
in the form of rising food prices and imports. 
The 'arguments for more active policies of income distribution have 
been considered. Is there any~ompa.tibi1ity between this goa.l 'and that 
of reaional intecration? There is no technical incompatibility: for 
this reason countries of widely differing political objectives have been 
able to ostablish the Andean group. The question is not tho undesira-
bili ty of resional integration per se, but ilhcthe~: or not 'Parallel measures 
are tru{~n to prevent the spatial pola.risation of gains which as Odell and 
JJlany others have indicated tends to be a. concomitant of industrialisation 
in Latin AmerJca, (1) and nmongst social cla~ses. This polarisa.tion would 
be no less severe under "national" industrialination, and mi:e;ht be worse 
in so much as high, ;protection would hAve to be borne by the consumert3. 
Ue.S. multint'!:Uonals benefit greatly, ns they do nloo (arGUably with r.luch 
less 'spillover' beneri t) in the tradi tionru. a,,;ricuJ.tural economy. Some 
, effort is Slade in Ch. ;, and 4 tci evnlua.te these tendencies fUld how mechan-
iems mieht be deviDed to control them without making unrealistic political 
demands. 
'(1) P. Odell: ",;;co:-,o":'lio Intc'"X'A.t.1on n.l':cl SU:'l.ti::11 Pntternn of -;('onl)mic ne,~elon-
,ment, in J,atin'\:',erimt", J";"u:rnr.tl 0'1' 'ciop~n;n l:arkc't S'tudl'e; 19(.·e",-jl.251: .. , , 
J. S. Williamson: "Ref{ion~.J Inegu.''11i ty !'Inn the Proce~n of l1r-ttionAl Develorllnp.nt, 
Econonic Dovelopment and l)ul tural Chane€!. July 1960. 
r 
if' "... " ... , . 
.\' 
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The author attaches no credence t.o the view that regional illteffI'q.tiol'l 
has the effect of diffusin~ the reforming enorgy of Latin Americ~ 
radicals for reasons set out earlier. Indeed aIle of the main motiva-
tions behind inteer::l.tion has been the deairc to reduce external dependence 
and international inequality by development of intermedia.te nnel ca.pi tal 
goods industries. While it is obvious that all egr:::s should not be p1ace(1 
in the intesration basket, there is no fundamental reason why some of them 
should not be. The history of ra.dical reform ~tth!n national boundaries 
in Central America is not an inspiring' one; one (failed) revolution in 
Guatemala. and desultory "land reformlt or colonisation projects by all 
give Governments which had virtually no cUluulative achievements. (f J 
/ 
0) As a footnote to recent developments, it has been Ilrr,1.lOd. that the 
emergence of ultra-rightist, ul tra-cont=lervati ve mil,i tary u£orillan 
governments (all except Costn Rica) is due to the effect of rcgion31 
integration in stirring up aspirations, widoning regions and provoking 
a counter-revol utiol1a.ry t backlash t • !!. '!lion 'zek t book revic\,1, .TouY."n8.1 
pf Com.rr.on Mar.ket. Studies,1968-9. p. 357. 
'. 
~, 
.,' 
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,Diap;pun A3-1 Efltimntes of Income rn.asti~ities of TJeTTl:::lnn for r:a.,jor Gr0.1.~u.~ 
s:..f l~anufnctured GOOdfl, b::l.seri on llul ti-nr.ttion~1 D1.tn 
Key 
Co1unm 
Single year between countries (11 (2 
u 
Single year within countries (llcross section") 
Time series 
Growth coefficients of production 
(1) (2) (~) 
Food and beverages (including 
alcoholic drink) 0'5 0·6 0·0 
Tobacco 0'9 
Metals 1·2 
Machinery and transport 
. equipment (excluding passen-
ger cars) 1'5-2-0 
Chemicals # 2·1 
'Durable consumer goods 2·1 2-7 
Textiles 0'5 0·8 
Clothing. ~O. 8~ 
- o· 9 1·2 ~0.7~ 0·8 
Other manufactures 1·6 
All manufactures 
.. 
All· manufactures excluding. 
food, beverages and 
tobacco 1-3 
1. Uachinery 
2. Transport equipment 
(4) 
1·129 
0'928 
2·143 
~2'799~) 2- 327 ) 
1·655 
1'444 
1·6s7 
3. Sample excludes India, Ceylon and Pakistan, for which census covers only 
establishments havin~ 20 or more employees. 
4. Srunple includes India, Ceylon an~ Pakistan. 
Sou~c,esf A. l::a.izels; ~nduAtria.1 Growth p..nn World 'l'r::\rlEl, Table 2'1, p.42; 
H.B. Chenery, 'l!.ntterDfI of Indllstrip.l r.rowth" Merican Economic Review, 1960, 
Table 2, p. 633. 
(Diagrar.l from R. Sutcliffe, ",Industry and Devclol)r.lent tl OPt cit., p.246~ 
. "'- . " ... ~" 
'-_ .. , 
" 
'" ,_, ~ ••• _____ '". __ ""","_ON' _.,""' ____ .. 
~iarram A3-2 Composition_~~xate ConSUMption. 
lQ.QQ. 
Guatemala • 45% 
El Salvador 52 
Honduras 45 
Nicaragua 44 
Costa Rica 47 
U.S.A. 21 
U.K. 28 
Se:rvices 
32% 
23 
27 
24 
21 
49 
39 
}1on-foocl mA.nufact'll.reo 
- ". . ........... 
23')(; 
25 
28 
32 
32 
29 
33 
. Sources.:~ United Uations (E.C.L.A.) 1963 data; "!!?Lr~BS of Indllstrinl 
,Development in I,atin .AJnerica" op •. cit., p.121. 
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As background to the thesis a good deal of v:ork Wfl.S done on tho 
question of tariffs and tariff levels and pt:l.rt of this Vlork is utilised 
in Cll. 3. The basis of the Central American ~ternal Tariff was the 
Convenio de Equipaxacion Arancelaria signed in 1959 and finally rnti-
fied in 1963 with Costa Rica's accession. (1) ~~e aereement was con-
solidated with the protocols of l,~nnagua and San Jose (1960; anu r~,tjfied 
by 1963) which arranc~'ed an agreed sliding' scale for tariff harmonisation. 
The transi tiona! period was completed as ha.d been aereed in 1966 and only 
a small number of items were subsequently outwith the common tariff frame-
work: accounting for 16% of total external imports. The classification 
system (liAUeA) is very similar to tho United Nations system ,(SITC) and 
.complete harmonisation is likely in the near future. 
. From an economic point of view the basic characteristic of the tariff 
is that it consists for most products, of two parts, a speoific and ad 
valorum element. The fonner is u8u8J.ly t by far the most inportant 
element in the tariff. This is in order to avoid tax evasion by importers 
under-invoicing imports, ~ 
, . 
, ;'1],* d 
However, one implication or specific tariffs is 
that the ad valorum equivalent tends to nuctua.te considerably clependins 
on import prices (2) and f'urthonnoro, is insensitive to quru.ity 
.. 
differences and different price lines within product categories at the 
seven or eight digit level. However, there arc very few cOr.lplieating 
-(1) Sr'::;CA: ",A:r.l"rtnceLde Mua.mtFl CAntro~r1():r.icl=l-D:2.1t 1966. 
(2) 7;e have uoed eif prices from trade stntistics ao the nearest mansure. 
'. 
'\ 
2. 
" factors by way of other protectionist instruments: thore nru very few 
quotas Rnd multiple exchanB'o ra.tes operated only for a short time in 
costa Rica. 
Jhe 1 ave). of thp. COTl'Jnon '1'?riff and C,h~n,',:en q,ver rr~ 
The main wei(J'ht of research was placed in a study of t-)xternal b:r.iffs 
in 1966 and this involved looking at the main t~riff divisions that 'were 
heavily involved in recional trade. 1 
These results arc compressed into a smaller number of catesories for cUsp1a.y 
in Diagram 3-18 in the text. The major points of note regarding the 
structure are: 
(i) the tariff is sharply escalated with very high nominal tariffs 
on manufactures which are actually produced; and ne()ative protection \'lith 
export taxes (albeit combined with prohibitive import tariffs in reserve) 
,for the major commodity exports. (1) In as much as n.9.!).=so.DU?etit:l..v.~ rCl.W 
ma.terials are concerned and non .... procluced manufactures (e. g. cap! tal goods), 
tariffs are, again, very low. 
(ii) there is, however, very consideraple differentiation ~JLQ 
tariff categories depending upon whether or not the goods are produced 
locally. 
(iii) the structure is subject to constant ch:me;e, ns new product.s 
are introduced and a protective tariff is imposed. It ohou1(l, also, be 
mentioned that in 1968 a. 3CY)'; surcharge was placed on 'non-nccc/3sary' 
imports and a 20% 'vol untnrJ' surcharge on the reate 
How do,; we arrive at a gener:D. evalu::ttion of the tnriff level and 
of its sienificance in comparative terms? This fs extremely (Ufficul t 
(1), Roally tl"d s conccrnl'J only coffee, for vrh ich the cXnort tn~,es r-Lra 
Guatemalr-t (9:'); l!.'l ~-1alv~.:lor (ll~'); Cost!'\. Rica. (7,"); Ho;du!'9o (lOc:'); 
lUca.re.f,'Ua (2. 5;~). There are si'lall Bpecial tnxcs on bnnnnas (und'er lj!) a'1d 
on fish a.nd precious metn.ls. 
3. 
because diffeTent countries may have complex exchn.nco :t'8.tc re'rimr.m or 
over-Y81up.d currencies, different dee;rc(m of under-utilisation of tt).riffs, 
non-t<'triff obstacles to trooo ancl ot~er fa.ctors "Ihieh make comp:trison 
VCr"J difflcul t. Howover, one of the moat difficult p:r.ohlel;')s is to cet 
an p...{,Teed 'weighting" of tariffs Dince the subdivinion of t"triff 
. 
cateGories is very arbitrary and mere ~ithmotic averages indicf1.te 
nothing more than the deGree of subdivision of product categories; an 
administrative, not an economic factor. (1) However, whatever weiGhting 
we choose presents problems. If we weieht by the importing countries' 
volume (or value) of imports, this may mean that the most heavily 
protected goods have very little weight, as import substitution has 
proceeded to an advanced decree. Also, the structure of importo is 
itself affected by the tariff level unless the elasticity of 
Bubstitution between imports is zero. The effect of these two influences 
is to bias estimates downwards. (2) 
(1) D. l3alassa: "~.tJ.:Ucture ~f Protection 'in Develoninp,' Co~mt:r:l.e~" OPe cit. 
H. Bell: "1.!iriff Prof,iles in ta;tin .\mericl=t: Imnlic::tt,i,ons for Pric.inz 
~_t..ure r-lnd .&icopomic In.:teG'l'8.tio~" Praeger,. 1911, pp.44-49. 
(2) One way of using import wei&hts implicitly is to derive the tnriff by 
dividing the receipts from import duties by the vallte of extrn-rceional 
trade. Needless to say, it lORds to wildly misleading results as a moasure 
of protection. Nugent uses this method for CentrAl America and concl uderl 
that nominal rates m,re low, qui te incorrectly. 
J. N~ent: "k?:$ru~r.?'. ~n::?;n,ce1,n:r::i~ y c1 cO,f!,t,o, dp. nrotect,i,,?n .o.n,_~",~~ic::J, Q!mir&" E1 '-~Oq,~,c:.o Oct.-Dec. 1968, 'PP.751-766. 
The main d~~a5e to his findinffs is dealt by the inability to distineuish 
imports l1hieh are competing with protected products I.Uld those ",hieh are duty 
free inputn to the rnanufa.cturine proceos, wi thin the same c~te,~ories (e.r:. 
textiles 9nd textile fibre!'3 in rrroup 8). The appal'ent tendency of tA.riff 
levelo to decline over time, (which he shoVl!'3) is lareely due to the incrcnsc 
in the amount of duty dr,;J.wbacks or exeTl'ptionn Given on import!;.:'!. intor.meCli:'1.te 
or capitnl coods and raw materials, and not to chanse~ in protection. 
\, 
A more relevant measure is to weieht by domestic production, which 
relates tariffs to the production structu~e that ia being protected. However, 
there are great difficulties in reconciling import and industrial census 
classifications: and the result is biased in the sense that the value of 
production of protected commodities includes and is inflated by the tariff. 
The structure~f production is, itself, not independent of the tariff 
structure unless there is zero price elasticity between local products and 
imports. This has led to a search for an external weight - such as the 
world import structure but this is a sophisticated and time-consuming 
exercise. 
In Central America, the author used the nearest thing available to a 
production weiffht, where it was necessary to group together different 
categories for comparison: this was the relative importance of different 
goods in Antra-regional trade. _This is a loose measure in some respects, 
as the values of some 'goods are. themselves. innated by tariffs, and pther 
local items do not figure in regional trade (e.g. beer and cigarettes), 
but it does measure production weighting (i~e. the protective significance 
of tariffs) without getting one into measurement difficulties. It is worth 
recording that there was considerable similarity between the average nominal 
,tariffs arrived at in this way (overall 60-65%: 83% for manufactured consumer 
, goods and 92C;b for foodstuff consumer goods; 34% for intermedio.te and capital 
good~) and the ECLA estima.tes whose weiehting basis was unstated but probably 
, , (2) 
either arithmetically averaged or woighted by importsr 1~ own figures 
were not greatly affected by arithmetic weighting of the (admittedly biased) 
(1) B. Balassa. o.nd Assooia.tes: tt~.~ structure of Protection in Developincr 
.Countries" op. cit. pp. 66-67. '1}he measure of nominal protection used by 
Ealassa is, however, a more "refined ono as there is a. correction for exchange 
on evaluation; and 'excess' protection has been allowed for by direct price 
comparison or other techniques where possible. Weighting within categories 
is in terms either of regional trade data or domestic sales data depending on 
the availability of informa.tion. 
(2) United nations (ECLA): "Q,£p.Q1:'al situ"tion And future outlook of the Central 
!mortcM Integra.tion programme" op. cit. 
,. 
5 
sample. However, the effect of different weighting systems can be a1g-
nificant as can be Been from Diag. A4-l, which ia the result of a major 
EeLA study. (1) Though direct comparison is very difficult Central American 
nominal tariffs would Beem to be of the same order of magnitude 0.0 those of 
Brazil or Chile but rather less than the extremes of Argentina and very much 
higher than a low tariff country like Mexico or Uraguay or France. 
Af3 regards general changes since the inception of the Common Market, 
there has been a policy of arithmetic averaging of external tariffs but in 
many cases countries with sensitive industries have been able to negotiate 
a general increase in tho common tariff above the previous average. This 
can be seen clearly from Diagram M-2, which is reproduced from a World Bank 
survey. The number of increases is very considerably greater than decreases 
and this means effectively that low tariff countries (notably El Salvador) 
experience a considerable increase in their tariffs, while the hieh tariff 
countries (Guatemala and Costa Rica) experience only a. amall fall: however, 
. 
production structures were similar pre-integration and tariff divergences 
were not great. However, this "increase" in tariff rates did not, in fact, 
mean a rise in tariffs, as can be seen from table A4-3. If tho weighted 
- .. rost' .. ~r(f...4t 
average of pre-Common Market tariffs is eet alongside "'t966) nominal 
tariffs (both in" 1966 prices) it can be seen that in almost all casea th~re is 
,a signifi~ant upward revision of the rates, i.e. A-~. On tho ~ther hand, the 
effect of rislne import prices on specifio tariffs has been largely to reduce 
the ~tual nominal tariff from what it \Vas in 1962 (rates and prices). In. 
30 cases out of 45 on the table, nominal tarirf~ . 
.;;..; \ 
.' 
(1) United Nations (EOLA): ".Q}1J!J.9.Els_d~tl!.s.~..Lo}ll~j:!!l.E.?n..£hru:~es and 
~trioti(:ms in Latin American oOl1ntrie~H a,(!!t!:.~.~Ll_e..Y.!tLof incidenoo" in 
~~ltilateral Economio Coo]er~tion in L~tin Amerioa (U.N.: 62 II G3). 
\, 
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Cate~ory and group 
Argentir.:L 
r II III I 
Category I. Primary commodities lS.5 54.2 131 2.9 
1. Unprocessed foodstuffs ...... . 40.6 40.4 145 1.1 
2. Raw materials ................. . 42.7 65.0 129 2l.0 
3. Unprocessed fuels ............ . 1.0 - 6.9 34 0.8 
Category II: Durable, i'ltennediate 
64.7 96.9 138 36.9 
49.6 62.1 138 26:1 
and capital goods ................... . 
1. In~ennediate products ...•••••• 
2. Processed fuels ................ . . 1.2 4.0 95 22.8 
3. Capital goods .................... . 78.2 ' 84.7 ,130 45.6 
4. Durable consum er goods ..•.•• 699.7 612.2 181 79.1 
Category III. Current consumer 
n1anufactures........... ..........•.••• 66.5 110.0 175 40.4 
1. Pl~o(;essed foodstuffs and 
tobacco... ............ ...• ..•. ••..•• 142.4 136.4 180 50.5 
2. Chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal products......... ..•....•..••• 62.9 102.7, 151 35.4 
3. Other current consumer goods 63.6 108.6 , 175. 37.3 
. 
Ov el'all total. . • • . . • • • • • • • • 52. 7 91.5 151 28.8 
Brazil 
II III I 
13.4 40 20.2 
9.5 43 14.2 
19.7 38 \ 16.1 
10.2 29 34.1 
40.8, 45 39.6 
31.0 43 \ 40.5 
29.3 30 40.1 
45.1 45' 37.3 
60.0 75 83.7 
50.4 87 56.S 
56.3 91 62.8 
25.0 69 14.7 
52.0 88 55.1 
40.1 60 38.2 
<! 
Chile 
II 
-40.8 
33.5 
45.1 
53.5 
45.9 _ 
45.3 
45.5 
40.5 
83.4 
66.2 
126.4 
16.5 
64.5 
49,.2 
III 
. 93 
114 
86 
SO 
67 
73 
89 
44 
104 
126 
18a 
S2 
118 
93 
21 
5 
1 
17 
7 
19 
" . ..':t 
25 
20 
19 
18 
Source-: Santiago Macario, "Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America,u Economic B'.llletin for Latin 
America, IX, 1 (March, 1964), 73. 
" 
,-
__ .4 ____ • ____ ~. ___ .. _ .. "'_~ ____ .. _. ___ ... ~- - - ......... - ~ __ U'_ .... -.~ .~-•• _.-
/J"" \ 
I 
). ~ ~ 'J I, , • 
.-
h 
" 
\ 
J , 
~, __ I --:..- ~;;:'';';':.: 
.... 
, 
.1 
• 
)9.)66 
21.8)6 
118,005 
IH,)16 
MO.ln 
'1).)4S 
)40.1o!, 
~97.5~5 
58.347 
110. US 
~l).?94 
697 .1048 
8.'45.915 
6.604.970 
1.110.676 
1.?4L.172 
5.22(l.9~6 
27.1n.920 
',M.4 H1d., 1.!4$.m 
Tl~e. ',944.>65 
lDY-grade lwober )7 .ns 
c ... "<Iboard Box.. t.807.GM 
Cott->n Tarn. Unb1eache4 1.41).67] 
Cotton Toru. 81.,.b<4 2.7]).1)3 
BleAChed Cott->n Textile. ~nder 80 Or.,.. 1.066.)19 
Ble.ched CoLton TmUe, Over 80 UndOl" lSO"" 12.])).352 
Bleached Cotto. ToxtUo. OVer lSO ~.... 5.4lS.726 
.aTon TextU.. •• 960. S1Io 
lllanketa. Cotton 618,497 
Towel. 161,958 
C .... nt 1,7)3,905 
Structural Staol and Bar. , ,loG,019 
lrc.n and Steel Pipe •• S51.894 
UWll1n ... Rodl arrl llira 4)S.B$1 
r1n1.hod Structural 5t .... 1 He... 841,495 
W1.ndo .... lte. 286.690 
tron and Stool )!aU.,. So ....... W .. ben I. 334.SS8 
Steel Agricultural ~.nd 'I'oola 1.886.6J3 
Alwd.aUll litehe""a.. )16.194 
Other Na lIetal Contain.... 91.1..305 
lIetaUic Bottlo c,p. 1.070,55S 
P"".encer C.... 'S,84S,373 
\'NOkII 20,lB6.862 
Wood furnitur ••• pholJotere4 ......... 82,S53 
Other wood furniture • '\ 1)9.282 
lI.tel t .... n1tlll'. _ I 567.J75 
8toclc1n~., of 1111thet1o t1b .... except rlJOQ, 6)5,869 
Knit ond •• and .loop " ...... ,..th.Uco(oxol .... ,.,n)580.h52 
Knit """or or doep cletblJlt, parI ordx.dra,.,.,' 41. R7S 
knit lander or Iltep ".U "\Ire or Il.b~ cnttcn 1)),878 ""~.r clothinS. of 1m, h.e •• (uclud. knit) 2)4.~8) 
Clothin, of "001 knit (outar) 629,5)1 
Cl,,,thinl ot ~qttan knit (outer) ..-J 160.401 
Onrl ..... ar ot cotton. ncludin, ",,1\-'" . 102,519 
Clothbc, ot cottoo, p ..... or silted (outort· 1.039.702 
RatA. tlCOP' tll\ , )It,179 
8ell.,. III tr;>ol --..r..-(,. 15).$62 
Co •• ct" Ira.,1er ... and o1ailJo .. utiel.. 1,179.lLS 
Sho ...... th.r 171.IJI0 
Spert Iho-., .le'll 70,1JO 
Rubbo •• h... 41.2U 
Ut.<:hen Ind ch1oavue. or plastic .... terla1 169,16) 
Ash trap, .oap boxea, houeehold cad.et.. 
Ind adorlV!lenta . 
Baes. 'ot.ti .. al)l'l othl'fl container., ph.t.l. 
•• ta. turnitllrt fixture •• plJo.U. 
82.887 
S77.0)~ 
82~.6U 
I 
)).u, 
24S.676 
$26.822 
.. 
0.)97 
0.411 
1.299 
1.14S 
0.567 
,.066 
S.llll 
1.726 
2.1flO 
1.936 
l .. o~8 
o.s'1$ 
(I.OSO 
0,008 
1,lJ6 
0.97l 
O,5ll 
0,669 
),2)) 
lS07 
o,l.Jo 
0.26) 
1,)66 
).CX;S 
2.818 
2.787 
2.141 
1.916 
1.206 
2.669 
0.021 
0,122 
0.264 
1,194 
0,407 
1,880 
0.492 
1.08S 
2.449 
0.78S 
1.000 
1,5)) 
1.12) 
2.460 
1,S)1 
1,3)5 
10.009 
19.944 
1),816 
7.759 
14,290 
17.8h2 
8.:\1 
7./28 
4.084 
'.789 
5.060 
10.))), . 
S.14) 
1.160 
1.270 
2.ll7 
1)6 
46 
87 
97 
~8 
69 
L8 
64 
12 
96 
81. 
6S 
I 
1 
28 
20 
rro. 
Fre. 
41 
troo 
55 
58 
22 
20 
S9 
)) 
76 
)2) 
242 
'13~ 
58 
f 
5 
2) 
)1. 
16 
S 
22 
~5 
10 
S5 
10 
67 
59 
77 
131a 
,S 
129 
87 
12~ 
76 
e4 
&6 
)81 
14 
119 
&7 
150 
1)) 
400 
5) 
SO 
21 
10 
14 
34 
M 
32 
19 
)0 
32 
16 
2 
1 
10 
19 
5 
6 
16 
11 
)1 
10 
16 
11 
27 
?$ 
lL 
61 
L) 
)6 
16 
11 
12 , 
21 
11. 
21 
n 
21 
1) 
12 
26 
18 
16 
24 
26 LO 
16 
22 
~9 . 
22 
n 
)] 
27 
67 
)l 
)I, 
2S 
74 
52 
120 
20 
to 
11 
14 
141 
2S 
65 
14 
tr •• 
rr •• 
2S 
144 
66 
., 
10 
6 
a,07Y 
43 
20 
11 
~8 
26 
26 
1$ 
26 
28 
106 
22 
21 
15 
13 
u 
Jr •• 
tro. 
46 
1 
11 
IS 
...... 
~ 
~ 
56 
~ 
56 
56 
106 
56 
56 
~ 
56 
~ 
56 
La 
16 
,8 
69 
75 
61 
17 
17 
l~ 
10 
10 
10 
L1 
~o 
10 
16 
17 
n 
1~4 
2) 
24 
~g 
LS 
td. 
t) 
l.4 
M 
16 
2) 
12 
12 
IS 
"... 
10 
22 
2) 
U 
26 
10 
5) 
4, 
5S 
10 
19 
81 
78 
67 
81 
82 
1S 
59 
61 
U 
59 
122 
7) 
8S 
80 
I) 
116 
201 
6) 
14) 
161 
)IS 
1)0 
76 
84 
l~ 
58 
72 
10 
10· 
22 
sa 
loG 
8 
)1 
1B 
17 
1'-0 
20 
U 
~~ 
60 
240 
112 
f 
50 
52 
20 
26) 
19 
n 
27 
14 
10 
ro 
)) 
22 
91 
56 
75 
lCYl 
112 
19 
6) 
Xl 
81a 
SS 
62 
90 
161 
6S 
62 
L4 
78 
tl4 
79 
SO 
126 
IS 
42 
Y horaco 
eO~1l of 
ta~,::iJrl 
SO 
10; 
77 
1)7 
)2 
12£ 7> 
~9 
S 
5 
20 
72 
. IS 
11 
t7 
126~ 
55 
n 
I) 
16 
6) 
64 
116 
11.0, 
16) 
66 
58 
10 
2) 
)2 
SII 
41 )6 
to 
)9 
t9 
)0 
iI 
67 
89 
as )S 
60 
74 {J 
55 
11..) 
108 
216 
64 
110 
137 
66 
147 La. 
7S 
UO 
)1 
10 
121 
L9 
8) 
Yo! 
45 
12 
51 
59 
19 
£) 
46 
47 
5 
b 
19 
. S6 
)9 
7 
n 
10 
29 
71 
t1 
15 )1 )$ 
49 
171 
104 
58 
56 
15 
69 
12 
18 
24 
12 , 
'26 
24 
1) 
52 
19 
SII 
58 
lilt 
7S 
60 
13 
71 
S5 
64 
79 
157 
51 
66 
51 
8} 
U9 
11.6 
lilt 
66 
26 
Ll 
, ->,<!:,-
L •.. 
lno!:~ 
1$ 
l 
L 
)) 
5 
Jl 
20 
78. 
o. .: 1) 
6J 
21 
18 
I 
1 
16 
10 
1& 
116 
IG • 
1 
t 
2l 
29 
67 
59 
e 
2 
20 
)6 
17 
24 
11 
1) 
S 
17 
• 1) 
)1 
)l 
1 
24 
17 
0 
79 
29 
$9 , 
Lb-
86 
1S 
28 
2$8 
21 
SII 
S 
c J\-C 
l~ amino-; 1 ~i'priff Average of pre common I'rc Comr';on I 
(NAUCA) nt 1966~I'icCS market tariffs- 1966'r . l'Ja.rkot 'J.'nriffo ~, 
_ ... _____________ .• _ __._ •. ..P.r.~_Cp.f.l ___ .• __ •. ____ •. __ •.. _____ • _________ ._~_~_]J§?~~!.~£e_? __ ._ ---. ,.--~ _. -.1: 
(Clothes) 
841-01-02 
02-02 
02-05 
03-02 
03-04 
03-05 
04-05 
05-06 
11-01 
19-06 
~, Perfumes etc. 
',' ~5_~2-01-02 
~ - 01 .. 03 
01 .. 05 
01-06 
01-07 
02-01 
02-03 
Textiles 
652-02-03 
652-02-04 
90 
60 
75 
,{7 
60 
70 
105' 
153--
58 
56 
89 
76 
125 
34 
110 
68 
. 82 
67 
70 
Machinery-e1ectr~c81 
721-02-01 18.5 
Chomica1 products . 
599-01-01 29 
599-01-03 7' 
599-02-00 0-20 
Paper products 
642-01-02 "'. 
Cement 
_:$" 661-02-00 
Metal J1anuf. 
699-02-01 
01-01 
12-01 
14-01 
21-06 
29-06 
50 
42 
39 
42 
52 
76 
79 
26 
73 
146 
70 
46 
44 
62 
60 
21 
36 
43 
42 
42 
37 
12 
22 
35 
5 
33 
28 
25 
11 
9 
25 
20 
15 
• 
/ 
( 
+51 
+18 
-1-23 
+1 
-19 
+44 
... 32 
+15 
.. 2 
+10 
+55 
+14 
... 65 
.... 13 
4-84 
+23 
4-40 
.. 17 
-+-14 
;.. 25 
...- 6 
+ .5 
+ 21 
+- 35 
+ 22 '. 
106 
120 
117 
125 
114 
143 
134 
208 
110 
65 
86 
72 
174 
31 
123 
89 
101 
65 
65 
22.5 
22 
66 
47 
55 
35 
15 
8 
46 
-16 
-60 
-42 
-48 
-54 
-73 
-29 
-45 
-42 
-9 
+3 
+- 4 
-49 
+ 3 
-13 
-21 
.. 19 
..... 2 
t- 5 
-4 
+5 
-13 
• 
·~ ---~- . 
o.;~ A4·-3 cont,d. ) 
A B . A-.B C j!-C I 
Homin'" rl'ariff Average of pre common l're Common ! -
(WAUeA) at 1966 'Prices market tnriffs - 1;66 Horket r;'Driffs 
_. ____ . _______ . ____ . ____ .. __ Jl£i.9Jl.s. _ .. _ •. _ •. ___ • __ • __ . __ . __ ._ ... ~ j;_1.~;??:.. . .!>F.i.c_~_f.l_ .•. _____ . ___ . ______ 
~januf • Articlr:>s 
899-07-01 85 43.5 of 41.5 73 ~ 12 
07-03 105 60 + 45 1311- -31 
08-01 36 38 
11-01 45 44 +- 41 3'7 8 
11-03 75 ?2 + 53 81 -6 
15-09 88" 22 +- 66 9 -7 
Veg. oils 
412-03-07 57 50 t- '7 13 -16 
Iron & steel 
681-13-00 19 60 -41 17 + 2 
Unmil1E>d maize 
°44-01-00 110 100 +10 140 -30 
Rayon etc. 
653-05-02 105 60 +45 210 -100 
Cotton & cloth 
651-03-01 27 21 +8 
651-01-00 147 13 +1.7 18 -2.3 
Sweets etc. 
062-01-01 70 50 "- 20 100 -;0 
01-02 130 102 -+ 28 146 -16 
Furnitu:ce 
821-01-02 -?Q 100 -70 45 -15 
01-03 98 55 ~43 105 -7 
Fertiliser 
561-01-00 5 2 +3 6 -1 
09-00 5 5 0 5.5 .. .5 
Paints 
533-03-01 41 37 ~ 4 45 -4 
.... 
Par-er & box 
64i-03-01 40-45 30 10-15 
__ .:;r-
.. 
'. 
.; 
6. 
have, in fact, fallen since 1962( A-9' despite tha fact that in some cases 
m:ts-
the tariffAwas still in the process of subotuntiul upward revision. Thua 
it cannot be said th8.t Central America. io significantly more highly protected 
than it was before the inception of the C01IDnOn Market: indeed, many 
induotries seem to be having no problem of managing with lower., : ... 
protection. This is fairly clear proof, in fact, tllat the whole of tho 
nominal tariff rate does not perform an effective role in protecting at a 
predicted level. It also leads on to the next aspect of the question of 
protection, which is the extent to which nominal tariffs actually do 
measure differences in prices between domestic goods and competing imports 
as they should do if both are of significant volume and ~re homogenous and 
identical products. As has been explained in the te~t, the reaSons for 
expecting "water in the tariff!! are real, and substantial in some cases, and 
some method of quantify-ing the effect is clearly desirable. 
The approach adopted here is t·o look in detail at the tariff levels for 
one year (1966) over an extensiv-~ sample. F~rst of all a large number of 
products vrere oolected (about 140) at the seven digit level. They 
repre.scntod the Bub-categorios of the main three' digit categories appalll'ine 
in intra-regionaf trade. The nominal tariffs for 19"66 'l7ere calculated, 
using the average cif import prices (extra-regional)" and the specific tariffs 
to calculate the ad valorum equivalent and adding the ad vnlorum clement 
to it>. 
To avoid exoessive computation only sub-items of over t250,OOO value 
vlere investigated. This was somewhat arbitrary, but the final number of 
items (seven digit) is substantial and inoludes Borne cases of eight digit 
Bub-items, where they were pa~ticularly important. The cover~B'e is 
_ .:;r. 
approximately 82.5/~ of the forty, three-digit groups and 75'l~ of totnl 
intra-regional trade. Several sub-items and smaller items of particular 
interest were included. 
Intra-regional trade data is also very useful for calculatin{J' local 
prices. Prices could be estimated from local sources uaing industrial 
census data to get ex-factory prices. However, using the cif prices of 
intra-regional imports has obvious advant'ages. First, tho trade between 
Central American countries is given in SITC items as are extra-regional 
imports and, thus, there is no problem of trying to reconoile different 
systems of nomenclature as between industrinl production and trnde statistics. 
Seoondly, the use of comparisons betvleen cif intra-regional and extra-
regional prices is a direct ~easure of tho competitiveness of regional and 
ext~a-regional prices at the point of entry, whereas a direot co~pnrison of 
average ex-factory pri~es with cif import prices is not oomparable, as the 
local producers would then have a transport cost advantage (2x the port to 
cai,ita), transport cost) and neighbouring producers would have transport 
cost di~adv~ntage (their factory to the importing borde5 or oif ~inus fop). 
These transport cost factors ~y be very considerable in the Central American 
context where roads are only just being improved beyond a. primitive level. 
-However, in order to make a price comparison, it is necessary for there to 
be a Substantial volume of goods traded both reeionally nnd extra-regionally 
so that- there is effective competition operating (we assumed that external 
trade must bo 1/5 of the total). 
.. 
The do.ta thus provides us with 0. means of calculating the ratio between 
"Central American" and "overseas" prices at tho point of entry to another 
Common Market country. 
This attempt to assess protection by evaluating local 'prices' is open 
to various criticisms: 
'-
'. 
8. 
(i) the average price of intra-regional and extra-regionally traded 
products may be comparing quite different things. Even at the seven (or 
even nine) ~it level, import categories can contain a considerable array 
of products - for example, even specific categories like tyres, steel tubes, 
. 
nitrogenous fertilisers, let alone: timber . Ol~ fresh fruit comprise a 
large range of product mixes and sizes. 
(ii) a difference in price could be explained by a difference in 
quality between imported and local goods. Central American goods are often 
of shoddy quality and central American producers may concentrate on low 
quality lines leaving the high quality lines to be satisfied by specialised 
imports. Economists have, frequently, used this argumant about quality to 
avoid dealing with the "water in the tariff" problem. 
(iii) protection can take other forms than tariff or quota protection 
e.g. preferential gove~ment procurement, subsidies, tax concessions - all 
of which keep dovr.n the domestic price while protecting the firm against 
. 
overseas rivals in less favourahlo' circumstances. 
(iv) the 'average' cif import price may conceal the fact that thero 
are particular low cost suppliers which pose a direct' threat to local 
producers and against whom protection is considered necessary, especially 
as there may be a good deal of high cost importing by agencies tied in 
various ways to suppliers in the USA. 
These criticisms aro" at least part ially, met in two wayo: 
(i) in addition to looking at the average import price, the lowest 
import price was also computed (at least for supplies constituting over l~ 
of the total). This was useful from several points of view. First, it 
, 
means that protection against loVl cost or "dumped" imports can bo taken 
/ into account. Second, it ia also true. that tho' cheaper. suppliers to 
'. 
Central America' (from the Latin American countries and the Far East) are 
more directly comparable in quality to local products. 
(ii) an attempt was made to compare te.riff and price changes over t.tme. 
If the tariff seems to rise over time due to adjustments in the rate, then 
this would appear to indicate a concern to maintain the protective effect 
of the Common Market's external tariff. If, on the other hand, the external 
tariff is observed to fall substantially over time, this could scarcely be 
compatible with the assumption of an absence of !!water in the tariff" (unless, 
of course, the \' infant If industry was growing up very quickly). As we have 
already indicated, there is good reason to suppose - based on the effect on 
rising import prices on an extenlal tariff'which is largely ('specific" - . 
,~~9 ~ that, in fact, the ad valorum rates on many products are declining 
rapidly vlith minimal effects on local producers. If this hypothesis is 
borne out then there would appear to be substantial -'slack or"water in 
the tariff. 
(iii) where possible direct comparisons between prices ex factory (or 
r.'ltail) and imported prices in the shops can be made. 
The nominal tariffs at the Bev~n digit level are set out in the work 
sheets and the three digit arithmetic rates and weigllted averages (calculated 
from them (by the relative importwlce in intra-regional trade) in Diagram 3-18. 
The nominal rates tend to be high - often over 10~~. Weighted averages for 
the following categories are: 
Finished manufactures for consumption 
If 
" II industrial use .. 
Foodstuffs and crude materials 
and overall 6o-6~~. The arithmetic averages of the sample are similar. 
10. 
The comparison of nominal tariffs al1d levels of local priceD are 
instructive. As we hypothesised originally, there is very little relationship 
between the level of 'implicit protection' (column C) and tho nominal 
rates. A spearman rank coefficient for figures at the three digit level 
was -005, indicating a complete absence of correlation (ra.ru:ing in columns 
B and D). 
The magnitude of the gap between the nominal tariff and the "implicit" 
rate is also extremely larges in the case of finished manufactures for 
consumption the Central American cif prices are 2~fo less than world market 
- -
prices (taking into account the proviso that quality changes/product composition 
ch~ges may be important). In the case of intermediate goods, however, there 
appears to be need for some protection on many products. 
It is possible to make an analytical distinction into two types of pro-
duct. Generally, lo~al prices tend to be lower in the more traditional 
import substitution consumer goods industries, where there is strong 
competitio~ between regional producers but not from outSide) clothes, 
footwear, cotton textiles, furniture and lumber, perfumes, soaps, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, leather, cotton yarn/thread, almost all foodstuffs, 
vegetable oils etc., and miscellaneous manufacture~ like boxes, matches etc., 
margarine, sweets, cigarettes. 
Nominal tariffs tend to be more relevant : ',e;-~ intermediate goods are 
concerned, where, usually, overseas imports are large enough in volume to 
Bet prices, tyres, most construction steel products (sheets, tubes, wire) ~, 
jute sacks, fertilisers, miscellaneous manufactures - like umbrella~, 
regfrigerators, blankots/rugs/tufted textiles, rayon produots and synthetics, 
most steel and metal manufacturc\(tanks, machetcs), copper Wire, lead 
tubes, plastic goods (cellophane, plastic -fabrics), electrical goods 
.. I 
., 
11. 
(TV partR, batteries), glass bulbs, glass bottles. As already suggested, 
there are two reasons why this first category might be explained away in 
economic tams: 
(1) the "w.ater in the tariff" may consist of quality differences 
between regionally and extra-regionally traded products, 
(ii) the 'average' cif import price may conceal the fact that 
. 
particular low cost suppliers pose a more direct threat to local producers 
in directly competitive lines. 
Column E shows the relationship between prices of imports from the 
cheapest sources (with over 5% of the supply) and local prices. In practice, 
the findings were not significantly affected. In the case of several 
otherwise 'competitive' products (perfumes and cosmetics; Borne cotton cloth; 
boxes; ballpoint pens; industrial soaps; paints) there do appear to be 
cheaper supplies which undercut Central American producers. However, the 
previous generalisations still hold: for almost all the 'traditional' goods, 
• 
there remains substantial 'water' in" the tariff. 
(Interestingly, very many of the 'cheaper' goods come from Panama, 
Colombia and Mexico, reputedly the most efficient manufacturing countries in 
Latin Americ~. 
,j. ., Q final means of cross-cheoking the above findings was to use 
directly ~alcu1ated ex-factory prices and to compare them with import prices. 
There were two or three industrial sectors in which this was possible. First, 
.-
a detailed study of the cotton textile industry had been undertaken in the 
middle sixties. (1) My own studies showed that the two main products. . 
W SIECA (Joint Planning Mission) I Estudios Industriales: "Programa. de 
pesarollo de 10. Industria Textil de Hilados y Tejidos PIanos de A16odon" 
GUatemala, 1965. 
\ 
12. 
bleached and unbleached, both had a weight~d average coot advantage ovcr . 
'overseas' products of about 20/0, 
Unbleached - 13~: ) 
weiehted average 19l~ Bleached - 20i~' ) 
The SIECA Study' gave the following rolutionohip (in this case comparing 
ex-factory prices with import parity) Batista. -(35/0) 
Zofino ....(34~~) 
Poplin -(39};,) 
Cretona. '- (5CJ,~) 
Manta -(501;) 
Drill ~3LfJ~) 
Although the orders of magnitude are greater in this case, the conclusion is 
the same: that despite a tariff of 7q~ or more, local prices are substantially 
less than those of imported gOOdS~~) • 
. Second, the firm which owns most of the fertiliser production in 
Central America'recentl~ published its case for a tariff increase,(l) claiming 
that ,J was inadequate and asking for 25~~. My own surveys ho.d indicated 
that 25~ was, in fact, the figure by which the looal prioes of nitrogenous 
fertilisers were greater than those of imports. 
Third, a,few products, which were directly oomparable as betwcen the 
i~dustrial and trade classificatj.on wore cross-checked as rOBards 'local 
prices' updated census information on Salvadorian industry. The followinG 
prices were obtained: 
(1) "Necessidad de protection adtu'\rer.A:" (unpublished booldet prepared by 
tho company) 1965. 
\ 
.\' 
...... -"",.F- .• 
l}. 
Intra-regional 
Census trAde data. 
1Ta:rgarine ~ .6 p.kg ~ ·45 to .5 p.1q; 
l3leached cotton 
thread' tl.25 p.k6 ~1.2 
Crude steel ~ .145 ~ .16 
Steel wire ~ .15 ~ .2 
There are insufficient products for which direct comparison is possible, 
to draw any conclusions, though there is abundant evidence from other 
sOurces pointing the same way. (1) It does appear tl~t our method of 
assessing local prices does not lead to serious discrep~ncies.(2) 
(I) . On a more general level, the UN did a comparative study of US/Latin 
American prices, in which Guatemala was one of the countries of reference. The 
UN considered that the distortive effect of the Latin American exchange rate 
situation was ouch as to forbid direct com~arison. Their solution was to take \ 
food as a common base and to compare the hypothetical expenditure required to 
purchase the same goods and services. \Vhat is being compared, is the ratio of 
price X over the price of food in US/Latin Anlerican Locations. It could be of 
course, that Latin .~orican food prices are noticeably hj.~h~r or lower than in 
the US alld that would invalidate the exercise. Hovlever, on this basiS, the 
auatem~lan prices (on average) are in rOt~h parity with U1 prices, the difference 
being insignificant (but not for particular products eSPecially investment 
goodo and non-alcoholic drinks). A direct comparison of ;)l"ices at the free 
exchange rate indioates that products nuoh as beer and matohes and paints are 
substantially mora expensive but others like footwear, cotton fabricD, woollens 
and cement . are of the same order of magnitude. Ho\vever, it was impossible in 
this exercise to separa.te out "local" and overseao products. Guatemala.n. prices 
also, ··one assu''!lcs, include prepaid duty. A repoat of tho some exercise with 0. 
• 'parity rate" based on ECLA study of purchasing powar, has the effect of 
" . 
. inflating" local prices by nbo;-.t 25-3~'" However, the overall picture is ono 
in which Guatemala pricee are not seriously out of line with the USA, dOspite 
the vory high tariffs on consumer goods. "A measuroment of urica lovels ant! 
the rnrchRsina ~ower of cu.x:r~mci_as in JJrttin Ame,rlca. 1960-62"! .:Jconomic l3ulletin 
for Latin ~crica, Oct. 1963, pp.195-231. 
(2) It is useful to note also the following anecdotal information: (a) e.a. 
with reeard to cosmetics and toiletrieo the World Bank has commented ••• lIthe 
prices of toiletri':)s appear to be not out of line with priceD for similur brands 
in the: USA" R9£.I<l l3ank Report (Industry}, op.cit. p.31. (b) with regard to 
oloth1UJ, a recont study of export prosp~cts for Guatomalan productD has sho\T.O 
t~t Gu~temala's hosiery (underwear mainly) could sell competitively in the 
Un1ted States against cheap Asian compctitors; as Vlell as the oth3r commod.ities. 
Informc Economic?, ~anco do Guatemala Oct.-Doc.1969,p.32. (c) EI Salvador sells 
substantial quantit1Cs of towolo c~npetitively'in W. Europe. All these producto 
~. are heavily '~)rotected in Central America 
r ~~'-:::~ --- --'_.. _b_ ~-- ---.-.--.--.----~--~ --
... I 
\ 
" 
.. 
Effective Protection 
.. 
We need to loqk at tho value added (wages and profits), as the addition 
to national income of scarce factors of production which is 'protected', not 
the total value of production. Material inputs, themselves, carry duty and 
a tariff on the final product has the effect in part of cancelling this 
lower stage tariff. The ,formula used by Corden (1) for calculating the 
"effective protection" and thus incorpora.ting these two effects is, where 
Tj is the effective rate of protection of comparable good j 
where tj is the nOr:linal rate on product j 
aij is the ratio of the value of a 
given input i to the value of the final 
output j under free trade conditions 
(i.e. the input-output coefficient) 
t is the nominal rate on the input 
-.1 1>.el: un! t 
V1 is the value ndUed/at Vlorld prices~' 
Expressed differently, "for given world market prices this formula will _ 
indicate th~ exceso in domestic value added obtainable by reason of the 
imposition of tariffs as a percentage of value added in a free trade 
situation",(2) thus 
'V - V 1 
Ei D 1 1 
V 1 
where VI = value added in the poct tariff 
situation 
1 V 1 = value added in the "free trade 11 
1 situation 
• 
(1) W. Corden: "The Structure and tho eff~'Jtlve 
12rotection rate" Journal of Political Economy, 19 6, 
"Effective Protection" , O",c:..vc, I~", 
and U. Scott: "Industry and Trade in some Develo'Oing 
Appendix 5. 
- 'T-Ski to:vsky 
, ,also, I. Lit'tlc, "-
Countries" op.cit. 
(2) 13. Balassa: "Tnriff protection ,in induotrlt:I,l cpuntrios : an evaluation ll 
Journal of Politica.l Economy, 1965, p.577. 
• Jo. ~-. 
~, 
'. 
Corden set the conditions which are necessary to ensure rigorous 
comparisons of effective protection 011 the above definitions: 
(i) that physical input-output relations are fixed over time and 
between economies, which, in turn, presumes conotant returns to scale, 
(ii) elasticities of demand for all exports and supply for all 
imports are infinite. For very small countries like those of central 
... 6.merica, ";, ::.", this is justifiable, i. e. prices of 
exports and imports are criven. 
(iii) it is implicit~y assumed that 'value Added' does reflect the 
contribution to national income of factors of production. This implies that 
factor~ of production are in surplus, so having no opportunity cost. This 
may be true of unskilled labour but not of capital and skilled labour. The 
latter two are also overseas inputs to some extent and their earnings are 
repatriated, not 'contributing to national income. Those problems can be 
partlY,met by treating the 'surplus' factor as a traded input in infinitely elastic 
supply (i.e. having a fixed price) and measuring only effeotive protection 
of the scarce local factors, capital (and skilled labour). 
(iv) the most crucial assumption is that ~he internal price is given 
by the foreign price cif plus tariff. Corden and others acknowledge the 
fallibility of this assumption; that tariffs have redundant elemonts 
("'7ater in the tariffll). ~ince a redundant tariff has no effect of any 
kind ~~cept as an insurance to protected industries against falls in import 
prices, all calculations should ideally be based on the utilised parts of 
tariffs, an ideal which requires detailed price data and which-may not 
always be practical • It io important also in that this consideration 
applies both to the final product and t'o domestically produced inputs. 
" 
\, 
16. 
There are, however, serious practical and theoretical problems in actually 
making any calculationsl 
(i) The first assumption is clearly'untenablo and raises practical 
difficulties. Vfuere do the input-output coefficients come from? Data in 
developing oountries is unreliable and, as we have already recorded, there 
ia virtually nothing by way of raw material for a central American input-
output table. The usual technique is to borrow from industrial countries 
but in these countries the scale of operation is often very different, the 
tec}mology is more advanced and a different price struoture is conducive 
,to substitution amongst inputs. 
(ii) Even if we are able to dispose of the problem of factor price 
distortion and tho problems presented by surplus labour, there are other 
difficulties. There is the problem of non-tradeable goods, such as 
electricity. One solution (the' "Cordon method") is to treat non-tradeablcs 
as part of ~ue added; another is to treat them as raw materials in 
infinitely elastic supply, which tends to distort effcctive protection by 
• 
ignoring the value added contribution of .fuel and paYlor. In Central America. 
fuel costs are very largely imrorted oil costs and treating power as a raw 
/' material seems tfPposi te. 
" 
Also, the- return to capital may include an element of' "excess profit" 
or oconomic rent in value added and we may. with a high rate of effective 
protection, be measuring monopoly profit rather than 'efficiency'. 
· .... (iii) Eotimation of the protection of raw materials 1s areatly confused 
by the very large duty drawback exemptions for most new, and many existing 
industries. , ~ The criteria for exemption are listed in Diagram A4-4 and 
McClelland's survey indicated that the following industries were very largely 
exempt entirely from duties on imported raw materials; cardboard rund paper 
products, rayon and synthetic goods, basic chomicals and fertilioers, and 
\ 
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C::''T?..AL A.."!ERICA: SL:-='.ARY OF l'RlNCIPAI. ~~PTIO~ IN CE:I."l'P.AL A..'!ERIct..'V AGREa@.7 ON FISCAl INC$TlVES, 1966 ~FOR XEi] Th'DUSTRIlS 
Gr01::1 A 
Category &~d Description 
of Enterprise 
'iho::;~ l?rcl!\lcin~ ray r.l3.terials or c:lpital. 
goods, or t!lose tr.at produce consur!ption 
gocd..~, c::;::tainers or ser.-.i-:na."l'.l!'a::t~s 
contairJL~g at least 50 percent ~teria1s 
of Ce~tral A.-r.erican origb. 
GroU'O 3 
Tho~e t.~at produce consu=ption goods, 
se::'.i.-:r~.J.!act-,;;...-es ot' co::tai:ne:-s, pro-
vieed they r.~e si~.ifica.~t r~t contri-
~~tio~ to the b~~~~ of pal~nts, have 
a large value added even if' they have a. 
a high proportion, in value terns, of 
ra. materials, semi-~~J.f'actu....~s or 
contai."Wrs produced outside the region. 
GrOll':) C 
Those not ~eeting conditi~ u.~er 
Gro'-1!> A and B; or that only cse:!lb1.e, 
wrap, cut or dissolve products; or 
.' those li:ited ill k'M"le% I of the Agree-
JI1ent, r.a.oo:e1y: non-alcoholic m-ir.ks, 
.. ir.es, n:a."rol!act~-ed tobacco ~ 
toiletries. 
Ii' 
". 
E:.cemntion of Custo~ D'.lties and Relat~dCh~1"ges_on Im;:;orts: 
O~ r-".achil"lery 
and EquiplT:ent 
100 percent for 
10 years for 
Honduras j b'.lt 8 
years ror other 
COl:.'1tries. 
100 percent ror 
8 years ror 
Ronc.uras, but 6 
yea.""S ror other 
countries. 
100 percent rOT 
5 years for 
Hcxuras, but :3 
years ror other 
cot::ltries 
01: P.a>l Katerials, Se:ni- Of Fuel for 
processed Products and Ind~tria1 use. Exemption on Income 
Tax Cl...'1d Profit Tax ContaL~rs except Gasoline 
100 perce:lt for 5 years for 
Honduras, hilt 80 percent for 
other countries. 60 percent 
for additional J years, tiLd 
40 percent for additional 
2 yea.""S. 
100 percent for J years ~or 
p.o~uras, but 80 percent 
for other countries. 50 
percent for additional 2 
years. 
100 perce;;t for 
5 years. 
100 percent for 8 
years for Honduras, 
but 6 years for 
other countries. 
100 percent for 100 percent for 6 
3 years; $0 per- years for Honduras, 
cent for ad- but 4 years for 
d1tion4l. 2 years. other countries. 
Exem?tion on Taxes on Assets 
a."ld Properties 
100 percent for 10 
years ~or Honduras, 
but 8 years for other 
countries. 
100 percent for 6 years 
for Honduras, but 4 
years for other 
countries. 
./ 
,:; Terns set rorth in Ce:ltral k:leriCa:l Agree."lleD.t 0:1 Fiscal Incentives, 1.962, as modi!'ied b,. protocol approved by Central A.~erican Eco:lor.ic CounCil, Se?te~r l?~. 
S'~: ~ ~ 
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11. 
miscellaneous fertilisers; basic iron and.steel; metal products; eleotrio 
equipment; and miSCellaneou~~stlY plastic manufactures, women's under-
clothes, tyres, jute bags. Duty exereptions on raw materials has, of course, 
the effeot of raiDing the effeotive proteotion for a given nominal rate. 
(iv) "Water in the tariff" prevents meaningful measures of effective 
~of nominal tariffs. In order to circumvent this problem a small sample 
of products was chosen which appeared to fully utilise the tariff. 
Calculations were made for this limltodselection of products with 
what data was available. Effeotive protection was calculated on the 
assumption that all raw material inputs enter duty free. Value added is 
calculated conventionally to exclude fuel and power, but including profits> 
depreciation, interest, wages and salaries, whether or not these factor 
paYments are wrongly valued or are foreien costs: this last factor 
. 
9fficiently deflates the true value of effective protection. Coefficients 
are taken from industrial census data (Diag. 3-19 in text). 
The results show extremely high rates. Though absolute values are not 
of great significance, relative values are. . The importanco of these findings 
·is explained in the text. 
\ 
Appendix 2: .Trad.!Lill-~~ and rrrade Crea,tiol"\ 
Conventional customs union theory mruces a distinction betwoen trade 
"creation" and trade "diversion" in intra-regional trade flows. In 
quantification of these, the main reference work is 13alassa who studied 
intra-regional, extra-regional and overall income elasticities of demand 
in the EEe, pre- and post-union', (1) 
1953-59 1959-65 
Overall Import 1·8 2·1 
Elastici ty of Demand 
Intra-regional 
" 
2'4 2·a 
Extra-regional n. 1·6 1'7 
• An overall rise in the lED is considered evidence of trade oreation, 
of which there is some-due to greater regional trade, and some ugross 
trade creation" as a result of a. general tendency to substitute overseas 
imports for domestic production. A rise in intra-elasticit~ offset by a 
fall in the extra-elasticity is evidence of trade diversion. However, 
there is no indication of how the dichotomy between 'diversion' and 'oreation' 
leads to quantification of gain and loss. To some extent "trade diversion" 
.. 
tells us to what extent increased regional trade has come from import sub-
\' stitution, though it would measure 'net' import substitution rather than 
'grOSS' import substitution. ,'31 regional trade involved substituting 
overseas imports which had a high component of foreign inputs and oapital 
.. 
(1) B. Balassas "Trade diversion and trade_,creation in the FJEC" Economic 
Journal, March, 19'67. OPe cli7 
'. 
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2. 
goods it would not result in a discernable fall in the extra-regional lED. 
Conventional trade theor,y would tend to classify 'trade creation' and 'trade 
diversion' as positive and negative respectively in welfare terms. We could 
reverse the two: 'trade creation' haa no positive effect in mobilising 
unemployed resources in general and saving foreign exchange: 'trade diversion' 
involves uoth •. 
A study has been made by Wilford of these elqsticities in Central Arnerica.(l) 
Wilford's findings indicated the following elnaticities for the region as a 
whole: 
1953-61 
1)...2.25.-61) 1261-67 
Overall imports 
income elasticity of 
•. 9(. 6) demand 1'4 
Inter-trade ~.6(;·7) 4·8 
Extra-trade • 9(· 7) '9 
The results indicate Bubst~ntial trade creation without trade diversion. 
However, the findings were of very dubious validity, 
(1) very short time periods were taken (195~-61 and 196~-67) though 
the original ]alassa study also had 6-year periods: 
(ii) by 1961, the effects of the Common Market were already strong 
and the two periods chosen could not be considered as a fair division into 
pre- 'and post-union periods, 
.. 
(1) VI. Wilford: "jj;.8.de cr~..!.E..!l...l!l_the Central Amerlca'!L9.2..~~~.!l.t." 
Western Economic Journal 1970 pp.61-69. 
'. 
-
'. 
" 
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(iii) the overall lED is not constant and was known to be affected 
by the growth performance overall. 1961-67 was a high growth period 
in agricultural exports quite independently of regional trade, and,this 
may have affected overall import levels. Also in 1958-60, when there 
was a recession, imports fell sharply, deflating the IE·D without there 
being import substitution (see diag. below). 
In order to show the vulnerability of the results to the arbitrariness 
of the time period chosen, the figures were recalculated for the 1950-58 
period, pre-integration, and for 1962-69: This gave two income elasticities: 
,1220-28 ,12:20- 60 1260-62 19.62-69 
intra-regional trade 2·1 2·4 (4- 6) 4·5 
extra-regional trade 2· ~ 1· 3 (1.0) 1·2 
all trade 2-25 1-5 (1-4) 1-4 
These figures are substantially divergent from Wilford's. Trade 
diversion is seen t~ be important. Indeed, the fig\~es indicate no 
trade 'creation'. However, the calculation is dependent on the choice of 
time periods_ hiren a two year aberration from a base period is highly 
significant.· But comparing 1950-58 and 1962-69 which excludes the 
transitional period between, there has been a fall in the lED for trade as a 
whole, with the rise in lED for regional trade only partly offsetting 
that~for extra-regional imports_ 
~be true importance of trade diversion can be Been by looking at tho 
trends in imports, from outside and inside tIle region as thoy affect 
individual product categories (Diag.3-9 in the text). There is not tho 
information available to compile incomo elasticitios of demand for each product, 
but the data does suggest the moat important features. There are some cases 
'. 
'. 
" . 
the central American Common Market is evidently ~ . - ,largely on 
the basis of product specialisation rather than inter-industry special-
isation". (1) This is seen clearly in Diae.3-l0 in the text. There 
are several spectacular cases wi thin l)roduct categories; Salvador dominates 
the textile industry. selling largely to Guatemala .. Guatemala dominates the 
synthetic te;x:tilc market with Salvador as the main recipient. Wi thin the 
stocking industry and knitwear there are similar reversals indicating 
~roduct specialisation at a fine level of disaggregation. 
other indirect evidence of the evidence of trade creation is that 
intra-regional trade has led to a stabilisation and in some cases a 
reduction in prices in commodities such as textiles. Most of the trade 
has been in products which are generally not subject to economies of scale 
and whose production is relatively simple. "ThUB, at present, economic 
integration~ by creating a large market, has encouraged a certain degree 
of competition and specialisation, and the higher protection associated 
with 'it has not led to generally higher prices ror :purchasea:,,(2) 
"There has tended to be within the region itself a. fairly high degree of 
competition. The increased regional oompetition has helped to achieve 
relatively ,high levels of effioienoy and low costs •••• The general 
oompetitive situation whioh has developed in this industry (textiles) a.s 
existing plants throughout the region Beek to take advantage of the large 
market •••••• has apparently resulted in lim! ted price increases if at all. It (~) 
'~ 
.. (1) World :Bank Report on the Central American Economies"l OPe cit. (Main Report) t 
Appendix A, p.9. 
(2) lbid. (Introduotio~P.(li). 
(~) ~. (Report on Industry), p.19. 
'. 
...... ..;;- -
The same is true of processed foods, shoes and clothes. 
To conclude this section, a good deal of circumstantial evidence haa 
been looked at, which indicates that part of the growth of regional trado 
is "trade creation", a resul t of competition between existing producers; 
and some is also direct import substitution of extra-regional supplies 
("trade diversionn ). No quantifyable result seemed possible: McClelland 
makes an educated guess of 500;6 of the trade now being of an import 
substituting variety and it is difficult to see how one could improve on 
the estimate. 
) . 
.. 
\ 
Appendix 6: The (ost compos! t,ion of Central AmericAn Industrial. Production 
In calculating the tables in this appendix, the following assumptions 
were made: 
(a) the ~atio,of imported to overall costs is computed at local 
rather than world market prices. It is, of course, possj.ble that for a 
protected good, foreign exchange payments for inputs and factors could 
exceed the cost of the finished ~~od at world market prices, bought in 
the absence of tariffs. In this case there would be negative foreign 
exchange saving. However, here we are concerned with the national 
income effect which may well include tariff protected factor payments, 
and the cost of protection is dealt with separately, later, 
(b) the coefficients that apply to production on averaee and in 
the.year of the census, are appl~ed to that part of the production 
which is exported to COmmon Market partners in 1968, 
(~) we ignore iterative procedure in calculating the local/import 
content of raw materials, 
(d) all wages and salaries are regarded as 'local' payments 
though some ~emuneration of overseas management is doubtless included, 
~n practice, 
(e) fuel and power are assumed to have a 100% import content 
.. ' though both oil refining and electricity generation have a. amelI local 
value added too, 
(f) packaging is assumed to be split 50/50 into local/import 
costs, an approximation based on the Costa Rican and Honduras cens~ses. 
(e) Guatemalan data is pot available and BO the coefficients 
d?rived for E1 S~vador are applied to that country, as an area with a 
comparable degree of industrialisation, 
'. 
-~ -~ -~.'1 
~ 
2. 
(h) there are very few products from other CACM countries which 
figure as intermediate goods or raw materials but where they appear they 
are treated as Itimports" to avoid double counting. 
To some extent the i~ - content of marginal new firms is greater 
than the average. Examples can be given of the very intensive use of 
imported components in certain p~~ducts. 
~vo examples can illustrate this; both heavily involved in regional 
trade; FERTICA, a fertiliser firm, and I~~ELCA which produces (or assembles) 
fluorescent tubes and glass bulbs. 
( 
In the published accounts of Fertica, figures indicate that less than 
15"tb. of the value of final sales is actually an import saving. (1) Thus 
at 1965 production: 
cost~ Rican nranch E1 Salvadorian BrAnsh 
Sales 
Imported Raw Materials 
Overseas payment of interest on 
Finance of imported capital 
equipment 
¢5,a68,00o 
¢4tO~3,OOO 
¢ 775,000 
~pparent Dalance of Payments gain = ¢l,060,000 = 
¢1,682,000 
$1,541,000 
¢ 204,000 
¢ - 63,000 
Even at current prices the net savinf!, (which finances profits for the 
Panamanian H.Q. and local wages and salaries) is a small proportion of 
turnover. However, imports are 25% cheaper than Fertica's products and so 
(1) SIECAJ "Apnlication for ft tariff increase by Fertica." SIECA/C/XX:VI/OT 4 
Guatemala 1965. 
\ 
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the economy in fact loses foreign exchange (approx. circa ¢lm). :n.:.-
_ :, . Most chemical 
plants, in fact using bought-in raw materials and which enjoy a substantial 
tariff protection probably lose foreien exchan5e (net), and some cause a 
fall in real income. 
The low' local value added in assembly industries has given rise to 
friction between the states with one partner complaining that they are 
foreign goods merely repacked and labelled locally, and a. special protocol 
has been dravm up to prevent goods abuse. A documented case is that of a 
"Special" Industries - fluorescent tubes and glass bulbs. (2) In 1967, 
Salvadorian statistics indicated that INPELCA had roughly the following 
breakdown of costs: 
Value of production ¢2,667,651 (of alternative imports ~1.176,000) 
JJocal Overseas 
Raw material inputs 72,065 lt2~5,576 
Wages and Salaries :.~OO,OOO 40,000 
Packing etc. 60,000 100,000 
Fuel and Power 10,000 30,000 
Interest, profit ,depreciation 85,000 700,000 
Tot;:!ln ·5~O,OOO o· 2, 1 ~O ,000 
-... 
\ 
~ ... 
It is difficult to be precise but on reasonable assumptions the whole 
operations were costing ¢l,OOO,OOO p.a. in foreign exchange (net), for 
which the return was a gross contribution to national income of local 
payments amounting to under ¢500,OOO, some of which represented rewards 
to Bearce resources that could have been used elsewhere, i.e. there is a 
. 
large loss of real income (net). 
It should be stressed that we are leaping ahead here to embrace the 
cost of protection and that 'is a different concern. In the examples 
quoted there is, in terms of local prices, a national income gain to the 
producer country (¢530,OOO out of ¢2,668,OOO) and that is all that we 
have, so far, been concerned with. However, it must be stressed that there 
are many firms with even lower 'local' content than INPELCA and many enjoy 
comparable protection. 
II 
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Cost Structu~e of Central American Industry 
CllU Category 
201 l:eat Preps. 
202 Daily Prods. 
203 Fruit & Veg 
Preps. 
205 Cereal Preps. 
208 Sweets 
209 1:argarine 
mimal Foods 
l:iscellaneous 
212-3 Alcohol(Beer) 
220 Cigarettes 
231-2 Spun & woven 
textiles 
233-9 Jute & other 
fibres 
243 Clothes + 322 
241 Snoes(s~rnth) 
244 Other textiles 
25 uood Prods. 
26 Furniture 
212 Paper & Boxes 
280 Printing 
291 Leather 
300 Tyres & other 
rubber 
311 Fertilisers 
Other Chemicals 
inorganic 
313 Paints 
319 Perfumes etc. 
Pharmaceutical s 
Diverse Prods. 
Total Value 
of 
Production 
1968 
744,000 
3,542 ,000 
647,000 
15,503,COO 
4,401,000 
26,069,000 
16,951,000 
1,812,000 
17,485,000 
18,869,000 
73,000,000 
4,911,000 
18,303,000 
14,054,000 
800,000 
insignif. 
13 , })O, 000 
14,410,000 
16,200,000 
1,300,000 
insignif. 
"10,390,000 
260,000 
1,082,000 
2,744,000 
9,719,000 
~o 
Local 
Raw 
Materials 
63 
.74 
25 
44 
22 
43 
42 
56 
8 
12 
50 
65 ) 
24· 
32 
11 
2 
32 
13 
3 
4 
I El Salvador 
(./J 't:J 
Impcrt~ ~ 
R.l.~. &: 
Power 
1 2 
4 .1 
18 
7 2 
22 2 
20 43 
39 1 
3 
4 2 
3 
6 2 
2 
14 1 
22 1 
36 1 
21 1 
70 1 
52 2 
26 2 
45 3 
32 
37 
14 
22 
1 
1 
't~ ~ ~ 
PackaRing Foreign Wa~es 
ImniU:ts &. ~ .. __ lsa1aries 
13 ! 10 - 69 14 
3 6 76 ~ 6 
13 
4 
19 
8 
2 
-'10 
11 
a 
1 
1 
3 
4 
9 
8 
9 
6 
14 
15 
. 25 26 
11 46 
31 26 
\ 27 41 
41 43 
8 62 
12 13 
7 36 
9 60 
2 65 
16 24 
25 33 
37 . 
21 11 
73 2 
59 56 
28 32 
52 4 
31 14 
40 3 
22 10 
30 11 
12 
13 
19 
1 
5 
7 
12 
7 
9 
18 
19 
17 
8 
21 
) 12 
\ 23 
15 
13 
8 
8 
16 
16 
7" 
Resid 
-ual 
-Value 
Added 
3 
12 
Men 
e:n.u-
-loyed 
21 
153 
37 33 
30 1584 
22· . 445 
19 545 
11 183 
23 54 63~~80 
60 " 235 
32 6470 
~·cf· 
Fit'kroS 
2 
6 
3 
125 
12 
1 
6 
3 
1 
1 
60 
15 651 2 
41 2501app 105 
25 975 33 
5? 80 1 
40 
13 
12 
25 
31 
48 
49 
52 
43 
1400 
515 
1700 
460 
148 
26 
165 
180 
675 
62 
10 
75 
29 
2 
2 
2 
a 
16 
insecticides (713,390 ,000 3 61 1 5 65 5 7 23 140 7 
soaps ~14,810,OOO 6so 
321-9 Petroleum Prods. 28,600,000 16 4 1 80 3 11 80 1 
332 Glass 1,225,000 36 1 37 ;32 31 185 2 , 
T7:j ))4-Y CeJilent froa~, J,062, 000 :; 2 19 17 30 13 il 46 275 ~ (~ll 
rAJ 341 Ir"l1 J:,Stool 1~8()£ OC(} 1'?.P.tf • Ze: it.. .k'. t£. '.wz .". ; '. I,", J2.~; 
... ' __ .• d1 ... ' .• " ...... ~~7':'· •• ?· ,.,,'" to"'" .... ,.",.. • ..... ,_ •• ,,_'<1 Om" 1 t ,,"1 : tit. f I is ' .'W ,,"U ?::}.~,:~',:.:,'>:.IiW,.~,~~,,:i:::4:,:,"::.M;!t 
342 Alutrlniu!:l insignif. 
350 1:eta1 Manuf. 20,500,000 14 50 3 1 53 15 17 15 840 27 
360 1:ining 
mac~inery insignif. 
370 Electrical 
nachinery 21,900,OCO 2 41 2 3 44 3 13 40 570 20 
383 }.~otor Vehics. 7,108,000 4 68 68 4 14 14 335 5 
395 Records 2,284,000 2 6 1 7 2 l8 73 121 2 
399 Other plastics 8,787,000 1 45 3 t 48 2 22 28 690 17 
TOTAL 663,600,000 23 26 1 3 28 25 12 35 52000 4600 
also semi-
I:1a.nufactures 
2052 Grain :i[il1ing 
(wheat) 19,450,000 overseas 5 3 
2053 Rice t:i11int! 11,320,000 90 4 
2073 Sugar (crude) 31,923,300 47 5 4 1 10 7 
2096 Coffee Preps. 7,905 48 8 
2311 Cotton etc. 
clearing 62,700,000 66 1 1 2 
N.B: Imports are from all sources and could include regional trade by error 
S~~~ __ ~~ .. ~ ~ ~&"~:..- \'~ Gs'-$~)~ 'I 'ct'lo. 
,J 
I 
'!'~ ~ 4.<;/ 
IY / ,I;· ,~~: /' 
r'! 
, ' 
b 
II Honduras: . 
01 ~'I ~" 7<> % c;: r. 7.;t I" /0 /-. '" 
C11U Cat egg'£:[ Value of Approx Local Imuorted ~ Packa...o1.ng Snares Locr~ i'1a~s Resid. Uo. -Firms . 
Production Fixed R.M. R.M. & & fI'!n:o~ & '!±t. ,mrkers Invest. Power If!8.terial ~ ~. 
201 l!eat Preps 14,119,000 3,060,000 4.2I:l 62 2 1 2 62 5 1 11 464 11 
202 DairJ Prods. 5,630,000 2,011,000 5.4m 36 10 5 1 3 40 22 16 22 450 11 
2C5 !.:i11ed Prods. 45,163,000 7,820,000 6.3m 64 16 1 2 1 65 19 3 13 534 14 ~ 
?I"\-'" Cereal Prep. 8,790,000 2,490,000 2·30 48 14 2 3 1 50 18 f4 18 1133 53 -vb 
207 Sugar Prods. (;0,300,000 561 6 & S"l1cets 15,860,000 9,165,000 3.8m. . 18 2 3 4 5 20 12 9 59 
205 Diverse 
Foois 13,670,OCO 3,072,000 8.4m 43 14 3 10 3 48 24 14 585 16 
212-3 Drinl:s 38,400,000 10,000,000 - 19.Oc 6 9 3 1 8 11: 12 10 1249 21 
alcohol 27,165,000 
220 Tobacco & 3,064,000 -. -
cigarettes 10,770,000 6,360,000 1.7m 3 14 5 14 6 10 32 13 45 406 ./ 5 
231-2 Spun & r.oven 
cottons 6,645,000 3,245,000 10.8tl 5 33 6 3 5 42 21 32 1045 '5 
241 Sh::>es 2,010,000 1,000,000 1·1m 24 22 1 1 25 23 29 23 419 20 
243-4 Clothes 11,855,000 4,144,000 5· 26m 10 42 1 2 11 44 18 27 1789 50 
25 ~lood Prods. 28,140,000 10,677,000 20.2m 38 2 4 6 38 12 21 29 5130 12 
260 Furniture 4,436,000 1,648,000 1.5m 18 28 1 3 18 32 19 31 685 27 
270 Paper &. Pulp 
prcducts 25,237,000 1,900,000 6.9m 88 1 1 - 90 4 9 456 3 
280 Printing 
products 5,251,000 3,216,000 1·3m 6 23 1 6 24 43 27 1144 40 
290 Leather Prods. 2,904,000 930,000 2.2m 46 18 2 1 46 21 13 20 240 14 
• 310 CheI:lica1s 
essential 816,000 171,000 1.2m 39 3 5 8 4 43 16 15· 26 86 4 
Paints 1~157,OOO 371,000 .6m 47 1 10 8 5 56 12. 22 64 3 
Diverse Chems. 13,466,000 6,015,000 12.Om 6 27 2 11 6 12 40 16 32 1158 16 
33 Ce~""nt & o :tier 
10,055,000 5,150,000 14.Om 10 6 12 3 6 11 26 16 41 167 26 
35 Metal Prods. 6,748,000 2,490,000 3·5m 4 48 .-3 ..:. 4 4 55 19 22 698 21 
37 Electrical 
equip, 448,000 327,000 .2m 21 3 1 _ J 25 22 52 49 4 
33 T-r3!1Sport 
equip. 4,637,000 2,587,000 5.5m 37 3 ·3 - 43 46 16 - 893 36 
39 Diverse 1.!anuf. 6,270,000 1,195,000 2·9m 62 2 2 - 64 10 26 279 13 
TOTAL 288,900,000 178,000,000 27 22 2 3 2 21 30 12 31 20027 506 i \ 
i"~-", Includes co~~ee pre~aration, rice milling etc~ N.B. Value added does not include services$ net sales f;om ~ >' :.' r- r ~ uti~l&$ stJ1d //11111 trlJ/J~rt, OJ t; " , ",~,,~ " .•. J.'. .•• __ " 
c ~~ l'i'-<L.u.,.« ',.) 1./0, III costa Rica 
~o I" j;' ")0 ),) 1~ 'Ju 7" 
cnu f" • Value of Fixed Local Imnorted Fuel local Itl~ Wag:es Residual ITo. No. "a<;egory 
. 
* -~ 
-Production Investment R.}'~. R.i!. &' 
.r-r-h. &. ~ ";lorkers Fi~s (Inc. Packaging ~ Power Sals. ~ .. .s 
spares) 
201 Meat Prods. 48,215,000 5·17 11 4 1 11 5 4 20 363 23 
202 Dairy Prods. 56,236,000 12.69 63 6 2 63 8 8 21 934 127 
203 Frci!; & Veg. 
Prep_ 7,222,000 2.46 11 ' 54 2 11 56 16 • 11 259 19 
~O5 ~:il1ing 321,638,000 88.63 2349 347 
206 Cer8a1 prep. 57,600,000 15.80 66 9 66 9 5 20 2665 329 
207 Sugar,sweets 87,033,000 59.6 34 9 2 36 11 17 38 3769 834 
14,098,000 6.4 500 18 
209 Diverse 78,485,000 20.85 44 23 
210 Alcohol (mairly 3 44 
26 7 23 1074 143 
{3"irits &: 
..LJee:r 92,058,000 28.60 6 9 1 6 10 7 77 an} 47 
22 CisC'...rettes & -' 
tobacco . 33,720,000 11.8 20 11 5 
231-2 Sp~n & woven 
20 16 1 51 260 12 
textiles 43,785,000 46.1 12 35 2 12 37 19 32 1721 ' 28 
233-9 Jute f.:. other 
fibres 9,150,000 3.37 6 57 2 6 59 11 24 552 57 241 Shoes 23,700,000 7.54 15 28 1 15 29 18 38 1797 347 ; 243 Clothes 60,100,000 8.08 5 '52 1 5 53 13 29 2689 858 ?- ~700d Prods. 32 ,100,000 '23.00 34 5 3 34 8 28 30 1793 249 -) 26 24,200,000 9.69 13 
. Furniture 31 2 13 )3 19 35 1616 414 272 Box & Paper 21,450,000 5.48 9 70, I 9 71 12 8 430 19 280 Printing 32,555,000 16.46 
·39 1 40 32 28 1452 67 291 Leather 9,820,000 3·13 32 28 1 32 29 15 26 471 104 300 Tyres 9,OOO,oCO 6.13 26 28 3 26 31 16 27 212 16 311 Fertiliser & 11,333,000 4 61 4 61 5 30 
other morgan 103 
chemicals 1500 313 & Paints 62,000,000 11 39 1 11 40 15 34 319 Others 
321-9 Petrolelli~ Prod 
332 Glass Prods 4,456,000 .63 5 58 1 5 59 It) 20 99 7 334/9 Cencnt 18,860,000 10.14 6 35 2 6 37 20 37 859 85 ;;: Al Eetal Uanuf 26,315,000 12.84 1 50 -3 1, -53 14 32 1011 220 ~-+-360 Machinery 11,390,000 4.14 2 42 3 2 45 27 36 516 64 370 Electrical 
machinery 6,673,000 2·57 1 44 2 1 46 16 37 481 205 ~:'!""'I 383 liotor Vehics. 18,375,000 9.3 10 34 2 ,10 36 22 , 
.32 1560 40.3 I I jl IJ ' ! - Y I'; J7 2,J 6-,12 lqy 
--- .. - ... _- --------- - ----- ----------
Nicaragua: structure of Gross Value of Production:i962 
> 
Raw Raw J=,.....t 
f : . ~ .: Material llat ~ 
;.- ,~-"-"!" ....... _(f~ ~'"" % U~· Power 
~ . ( -
Pood Products 6.1 54·4 5·9 
Textiles 20.4 15·8 14·9 
Shoes 13.6 26.4 .6 , 
Clothing 30.0 26.6 5.1 
Woodwork 9·5 35.5 5·7 
Furniture 16.2 24·6 7.9 
Paper & Products 61.6 .2 8·7 
Leather Products 10.5 44·3 2.8 
Rubber Products 39.2 7.0 
Che:r::ticals 51.8 8.6 4·0 
Petroleum Products 13.1 10.1 
Non-Metallic Products 3·9 . '18.0 20.8 
Metal Products . 54.0 .2 7·5 
Annual Report of the Central Bank of Nicaragua, 1965 p.124 
,J 
~"1~~ 
E . local 
-r ~. R.l~. 
12.6 54·4 
35.3 15·8 
14.2 26·4 
35.1 26.6 
15.2 35.5 
24.1 24.6 
70.3 .2 
13.3 44.3 
46.2 
55.8 e.6 
83.2 
24·7 18.0 
61.5 .2 
\ 
\'lages 
12.6 
23.8 
23.5 
19.9 
23.6 
~ 
5·5 
14·4 
18.9 
15·4 
9.0 
3.8 
17·3 
16·4 
O~ 
~~. 
20.4 
25.1 
35·9 
18·4 
25·1 
45.6 
15·0 
23.5 
38·4 
26.9 
13.0 
40.0 
21·9 
\.N 
0\ 
• 
:.! .. 
"j. ',' 
Appendix 7 s.~eclfic Ca.uses o,f Unb,alanced. Devel0n.ment 
in Central America 
The following factors are amongst those that can frequently be used to 
explain a good deal of the variation and they will be tested for relevance 
in a Central American context: 
(a) wage costs 
(b) "market potential" 
(c) distribution costs 
(d) proximity to raw materials 
(e) proximity to manufactured supplies 
(f) capital costs 
(g) taxation 
(h) fuel and power costs 
(i) availability of skills, managerial staff, 
general industrial services. 
(1). W§ge Costs: especially in labour intensive industries, differences in 
labour costs should be-important, though they may be outweighed by differences 
in productivity. However, wage cost differences are sufficiently small as t~ 
b~ of no significance to potential investors. As can be scen from Diag.A7-1, 
differences between sectors (and firms) are greater than those between 
countries: ~he labour market is highly imperfect. New investors' costs 
will be as much at a "negotiated" as a. "market" rate. Certainly there is 
1 
of~~ . 
no evident tiP advantage to any one countl1~: the contrast with Panama is ~~. 
illuminating. 
(2) "ivia.rket Potential": this is a quantitative concept which measures the 
attraction for particular locations of an array of markets; thero being an 
,-
analogy with physical gravity. (1) 'lbe existence of a high "potential" l/auld 
(1) Chauncey Harris: ",The market as a f::tetor in the loea1isa.tion of industry in 
.the US.\" Annals of the Association of American Geoc;raphers, 1954. 
~;~"'!!:.,~_._~w, ~. 
"",." 
~iag'!am Ai-I. 
Avera.ge Co.at of Labour bl Indm.lt,r.ia1 Sector (1969) 
(in cents per hour) 
Q1J! Costa Rica El Salvador Gu~.tcmala. Honduras Pflns!!':Jl 
20 30 17 33 26 80 
21 33 33 c47 64 96 
22 56 20 20 116 
83 31 32 34 36 
24 31 27 36 32 67 
25 32 ;2 ;2 68 
26 35 34 41 43 66 
27 27 6a 
28 53 38 67 40 90 
29 ;2 32 . ·31 28 49 
30 ~ 
31 41 31 61 44 103 n it 
32 34 ;2 ' 69 41 8} 
33 37 25 41 33 83 
, 
34 6a 45 33 110 
35 31 35 33 34 85 WI 
"I 
36 42 46 ;8, 173 ' ' 
37 33' 35 36 90 
38 35 39 40 41 89 
39 -..43 28 25 35 ' 75 
Notes: Costs include insurance and employers' social security payments. 
". 
Sourcez 'ILO "Informe a. las GobiQCm9 de Costn RieEt, El Snlvn,dor, GUI1.temn1as 
, H.0ndu~as!. N.i.£r-r~g]a and Panama; S(?bre El CODto de Mano de Qbre.. en TJatin AmericA-". ~ 
\ . 
'. 
:' \ 
: I 
t : 
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2. 
" \\fIo\~~:
indicate a high level of attractiveness forA - . ''''''; industries aiming 
for a regional market.' ~Will wish to be as near as possible to the main 
purchasing centre in order to maximise sales, especially if there are 
economies of scale in the industry. " ..... ",,-~. ~ ," (,:' 
Potential is measured F 0.. fo.oJ:'l~"'" ~ 
C;-' ]..{ 1. e. Markets accessible. to producing location ~ 
~ d? (Economic distance from X to Market M) 
- where n is a 'power' representing the declining influence of distance. 
cJJ.~ 
The i ~ib~:: :"",:'f for selling is determined by the purchasing power of 
surrounding markets and inversely by the "economic distance". (1) The question 
is what each of these variables mean~in practice. Some writers have used 
population in the numerator but this will be misleading if there are 
r 
I 
I 
f 
differences in income level and income distribution. (2) "National income" i 
would be a better measure. The denominator is even more difficult, as the 
"economic distance" will be compounded of transport costs, risk and physic 
factors and other obstacles to trade. Transportation costs, themselves, are 
usually complex and depend on the route, product carried and type of vehicle 
among other things. Geographic distances have been used as a proxy for 
"economic distance" (3) which is reasonable only if the terrain and road , , 
system are of even characteristics throughout the area. We also need to 
consider the nature of the "decay function", as transport costs do not 
(1) This term is discuosed in VI. :Beckermanna "'pietance and, .the pattern of. 
Intra-European tra.d.e" Review of Economics and Sta.tistics, 1956, p.38. 
(2) Colin Clark: "Indus,trial location rind economic potenH.al '! Lloyds :Bank 
Review, Oct. 1966; uses populntion as a measure. An index of population 
weighted by income distribution is used in A. Ha.zelwood: "An ApprOAch to th~ 
analYsiR of the Apatial distribution of the rnarket of East Africa" Oxford 
Institute of Economics & Statistica, November 1969, pp.243-61. 
(3) Discusoion in M. Linnemann: ",M, economio analysis of trMa flows" North 
Holland, 1966, pp.25-30. 
'I 
generally decline directly in proportion to distance: a root function may 
be more appropriate. (1) Of the two implicit "gravity models" used in 
Central America, one did not publish the model used, (2) and the o~her used 
on least squares regression of distance on cost without considering other 
possible functions. 
" 
An attempt was made to calculate the market potential for a series of 
producing locations in central America as follows: 
= y=nZ y=l Mx _ My Dxy 
Mx is the "market" of X, the producing 
loca.tion 
My is the "market" of Y, the consuming 
loca.tion 
Dxy is the economic distance betwoen 
them. 
In this case. the markets were assumed to be concentrated in the capital 
cities and measured by the national income (GNP). Distances between pro-
. 
ducing points (also taken to be the main city) and other consumption points 
w~~e the geographic distances. All other markets were ignored. The results 
were retested for distances as a square root .. 1'" function of potential, 
as well as linear function. 
(1) A linear function is used in W. Elkanl ",Estimating New Zenlond' s 
manufacturing output in .f..1'ommon MA.rket wi th Au~tra.1 iA-" t Journal of 
Development Studies, Jan. 1968. 
CAnE! "'Centra1 Arnericnn Transporta,tion Study, 19§A-6S; Vol. I. 
\ 
, 
t 
t 
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I 
I 
I 
r 
t. 
r 
I 
~ ~T~···'··· 
Ratios of Economic Potential and. GNP (Gul'l.terna.la. "" 100) 
Q1lf: Potential I 11 
Guatemala 100 100 100 
El Salvador 58 96·5 98 
Honduras J:~ 29~ Jointly 33· 5~ Jointly 35~ Jointly II 17 46 26·5 52 32 50·0 
Nicaragua 44 46 53·0 
Costa Rica 50 37 52.0 
Given that the absolute values of the figures are of no particular significance; 
relative magnitudes may be, Guatemala closely followed by Salvador, is the 
major source of advantageous market potential; Costa Rica the least well 
placed. Considered relative to their GNP, E1 Salvadorta "effective" market 
is greatly increased and Costa Rica's greatly reduced, though this effect is 
blunted if the decay function is made to operate lesa sharply (as a root of 
the. distance rather than proportional to the distance). 
(3) Distribution Costal the effect of distance can also be seen from another 
point of view in terms of the distribution costs of one regional firm 
Bupplyine the whole regional market, assuming the latter is unaffected by 
transport costs. In this case we are concerned to minimise<fM x dn for each 
location. 
If we take "n" as 1 for simple illustration, VIC obtain the following 
indices - from Guatemala 18'4 
E1 Salvador 15·0 
Honduras . 
(treated as one)19 t 7 
Nicaragua 21·7 
Costa Rica 36.0 
The differential would be greater or less depending upon whether n is greater 
or less than one. However, 'the indices do show that Salvador has a 
geographical advantage being situated nearest the "centre of gravity" of tho 
area; and that Costa Rica is strongly disadvantaged. The other three 
\ 
countries having a similar ranking. 'We would expect on the basis of this, 
that reeional industries, especially those with tlbulky" products. would have 
-
mora of a prefer~nce for El Salvador, than Costa Rica. 
(4) Capital Cost: availability of capital is determined by commercial b~ 
(who lend short term to prjnle borrowers at around 10%); national 
development institutions ('financiers.!) who lend long term at 8-12%; and 
other sources, moneylenders etc. Inter-country differences are not great 
but Costa Rica (Via its nationalised banking system) is strict. Honduras 
and. Nicaragua (via theENF and Il\TFOMAC) are noted for active promotional 
work with lending activities-in foreign companies. (1) 
(5) Taxation: the main element in taxation which affects net investment 
especially,-is the system of investment incentives and this procedure is 
now being harmonised. However, personal taxation varies considerably and 
also company tax or existing companies. The effect on business activity is 
almost certainly alight: if anything personal taxation is heaviest in Costa 
Rica and E1 Salvador. 
(6) Fuel and Povlcr Costs: dif'f-~rcnces in fuel and power costs arc not great 
in generai. All five countries have oil refineries near the main production 
centres, which guat'antees an availability of Bunker ",C". El ectrici ty tariffs 
have varied' ve;Y considerably in the past, (2) but normally for big projects, 
bulk supply of electricity can be negotiated and for most production centres 
there is a common price • 
. (1) Intemational Business Corporation: "The Central American Common Market: 
projects and problems in an inteB!ating economl" 1969, pp.43a.46. 
(2) Un! ted Nations (E.C.L.A.) ",com,arative Study of b'lecirical Tariffs; 
Central Amer i ea and }1nnpma" ElcN 12 CCE SCS/40 1966. 
I , 
.l 
" 
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6. 
(7) Proximity to Raw Materials and Manufactured Supplies: C~~~;-~s 
"'-s 'l e.. .. S' 
difficul t ,_ I in the absence of knowledge about 
factor endowments: we can only assume that they are randomly distributed. 
The second is not all that important yet, as input-output linkages are so 
few ant. except 'in textiles and clothing, 
(8) "Externa.lities": an important explanatory factor in industrial location 
has always been the benefits from establishing in a built up area with 
available skills and infra-structure so as to realise external economies of 
scale. This is virtually impossible to measure but a series of 
will give one some indication (DiagJ~3 in the text). 
Though these indicators are very scrappy, they do indicate the weakness 
of Honduras and Nicaragua as existing centres of manufacturing (which is 
compounded in Honduras as there is a split between Tegucigalpa and San Pedro 
Sula) ~d also as having a very poor road network (which cannot be explained 
away by low population densities, as Guatemala's is equally low). Costn 
Rica has advantages in respect of the literacy and level of education of its 
workforce. 
.' 
Summa!ll of the various factors influencing location, only the last could 
be said to explain the grossly disadvantaged position of Honduras and 
Nicar~~, whose market potential and labour costs would not seem to be 
seriously unfavourable. costa Rica's position, as a partly dissatisfied 
t b c.orl-t • par ner could be explained y market potential ~d labourlbut other factors, 
i.e. its stability and established democratic'tradition, tend to act in its 
favour. 
'. 
I 
~ 
Appendix 1-2. Dia~am showing indexes of notentiRl 
9E.E Potential of <lL~ <.ill 
Guatemala (City) ¢1,645 m Salvador 5,215 
Honduras n 1,285 
Honduras S 775 
Nicaragua; 1,400 
Costa Rica 1,035 
, 
'216,500 9,710 
San Salvador ¢ 950 m Guatemala 5,215 
Honduras N 1,425 
Honduras S 780 
Nicaragua 1,263 
Costa Rica 665 
9,348 712,700 
Honduras N - San 
Pedro Sula ¢ 476 m Guatemala. 11,404 
Honduras S 403 
El Salvador 413 
Nicaragua 1,115 
Costa Rica 285 
3,356 75,520 
Jointly ~ointl:l 
Honduras S ¢ 285 m Guatemala 712 
El Salvador 755 511B m 125,300 
Honduras N 403 
Nicaragua 456 
Costa. Rica 256 
2,582 70,300 
Nicaragua. ¢ 730 m Guatemala 1,425 
El Salvador 950 
Honduras N 365 
Honduras S 505 
Costa Rica 1,248 
4,493 114,200 
, I 
. 
'"' 
Costa Rica ¢ 820 m Guatemala 1,025 
El Salvador 627 
", _7 - Honduras N 295 
Honduras S 295 .. 
Nicarngua. 1,353 
3,595 
, 
111,700 
\ 
CASE STUDY 
Appendix I " 
The Cement Industr~ in C~~~~ __ ~erica 
The exercise of evaluating the benefits of a joint multinational approach 
to industrial (project) planning in Central America was applied first of all 
to cement. There were several reasons for this: 
(a) First, it is an interesting 'marginal' case where the centrifugal forces 
of "economies of scale are well balanced by the centripetal forces of high 
transport costs. Cement is an industry which enjoys substantial economies of 
scale both in the use of capital equipment and labour. However, these 
economies of scale are not self-evidently sufficient to justify centralioation 
into a unified plant because cement is a bulk 'low unit value' product which 
carrieD high transport costs. This can be clearly demonstrated from a simple 
numerical example. Imagine two markets, 500 kms. apart, each with a plant 
serving markets of 200,000 tons ~er annum. Take a price of ~30 per ton. 
If producti'on were to be concentrated into one plant of double tho Gize then 
1 it is possible that economies of scale would reduce the cost of ~25 per ton. 
lIowever, half the market has now to be supplied at a distance of 500 kms. and 
~ . 
with a (likely) transport cost of 3 c per ton km.; ~7.5 per tOll is added to 
the overall average cost (including transport). Decentralisation is, therefore, 
more ~fricient'. Tlus makes a whole host of assumptions about pricing policy 
and so on and it can also be seen that with a larger and more complex situation 
ill 
. ...... -1--
1. An approximation based on' fieures employed later. Alao see J.S. Bain, 
"Barriers to NEtigmnctition" op.cit. pp.228-48. 
'. 
2. 
simple hand calculations would be inadequate and a more sophisticated programming 
approach is called for to arrive at an optimal solution solution. 
(b) The technology of cement production is relatively simple or at least 
fairly uniform and is particularly suitable for X-national comparisons. 
(c) The indust;y is of key importance as a 'building block' in the process 
of industrialisation. The construction industry depends critically upon it 
and as the 'local content' of cement production is hiel1 its impact on import 
substitute is significant. 
(d) It is one of the few important and well-established industries in Central 
America with a good body of data to draw upon both on the pro'luction side 
and from the regions' experience of intraregional trade. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that the issue is by now academic, there being a clear 
. 
commitment by each of the Common Market countries to 'go it alone' as regards 
cement production. However, it is necessary to isolate two quite different 
. 
questions: first, the 'static' question of whether, given the existence of 
high fixed capital costs in ccmpnt production in the Central American market, 
there should be 1, 2,3, 4,'5, •••• n produceG: second, the 'dynamic' question 
of whether, given the existence of a group of . 'national' producers, any 
expansion of capa'city can be phased to give a better degree of utilisation 
taking into account the possibilities for regional trade and plnnned staggering 
of investment. 
Hypothesis: 
There is some a priori evidence to support the argument that the.present 
'national' policyl haa produced an inefficient and costly dist;ibution of 
plant. 
~-------------------------------------------------------------------,-~---~ 
1. This is something of an oversimplification: the volume of intraregional 
trade is growing. 
" 
1 
1 
J. 
(i) levels of capacity utiliaation have been generally low. From diags. 
la to le, it can be seen that rarely over the last decade or more has 
capacity utilisation for the region reached 70%; Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, especially the latter, being below this level. It is, however, 
difficult to be dogmatic about a 'reasonable' level for the cement industry;l 
a UN study considered 90% "normal" for industrialis~d county2 and some 
anxiety was recently expreosed when the UK level r"ell from 90 to 85%.3 It 
can be seen from the diagrams if, that spare capacity will be very high in 
the early seventies, even ,assuming that the present 'boom' in demand 
continues. 
(ii) prices are very high by international standards. In 1962 ICAITl4 
argued that Central American prices (at current market rates of exchange) 
were above the level of other dev~loped and developing countries, e.g. in 
Central America the average market price per bag of 44.5 kilos in the capital 
cities was $1.56 ranging from 1.93 to 
Central America (ave.) 1.56 
Hexico City .88 
Tokyo .78 
Bonn • 80 
1.2: 
Manila 
Buenes 
Caracas 
1.14 
Aires 1.4 ) 
1.36~ 
two of the 
highest in 
Latin America • 
-------------------------------.~------------------------------------------------
1. It is also difficult to calculate: (i) Capacity is defined in terms of 24 
hour operations, but may bo shut down for short periods. (ii) Expansion does 
not take place precisely on Jan. 1st and cannot be credited wholely 'to one 
year or another. (iii) Some spare capacity may be necessary for engineering 
reasons or as a contingency for peak demands iithe annual demand pattern is 
irregular. 
2. United Nations (ECAE~) tllndustrial DeveloP.E.1!.nt in Asi~ and in the Fa~ 
~" Vol. 4 UN 66 II 1322, po354. 
3. The Economist, Nov. 15, 1969. (Prices and Incomes Board Report). 
4. Instituto Centroamerican~ de Investigncion y Technologia Industrial 
"Informc Sobre La In ... c!1:is~ria de Haterialas para la Construction cn Ccntroamcricana". ' 
Torno I 1963. p.l47. . - .-_._-.. 
\ 
.';Jt0-
4. 
In the last few years local prices have fallen somewhat (the average 
is now nearer $1.25). By "ray of contcmpor,'lrY comparison, the UK price (it 
is a 'basing pOint' price fixed by central agreement) was $.65 per bag 
until very recently and a recent study on India suggested a figure of about 
the same order. l averaged throughout the country. 
However, the problem of high prices is shared by other small, poor, 
developing countries as in East Africa2 , where in the E.C.A. sub-region the 
average price, exfactory, in 1967 was $1.33 per bag) (In 1965, Ethiopia~u~ 
$1.75 per bag; Madagascar %1.60; Uganda $1.60; Halawi $1.65i' due to the. SM.~ $c.Ale. t8.~ './ 
. , and also to the high local cost of packaging, power 
. and fuel. 
The. 'high Central American prices could be due to many factors but t\vO 
stand out as most likely. One is a high burden of fixed costs due to the 
hign capital coats in developing countries, small scale operation and low 
usage of capacity. Th; second is monopolistic profits (arising from 
oligopolistic marketing and pricing policies or else "pure" monopoly 
pr~tected l~cally by transport costs). On the othor hand one would expect 
labour costs'to be less than in the moro industrialised countries. One of 
the more important subsidiary functions of thio exorcise will be to explain 
th~ high prices. However, there is an initial presupposition that the 
importance of fixed charges in uneconomic 'national' plants is partly 
responsible. 
Thus, we have an initial hypothesis that the 'national' rather than 
'regional' character of the industry is a source of inefficiency and high 
cost. This will now be elaborated at some length. 
Cement TeChnology.:' 
Thore are few variants of the process used in producing portland grey 
-----------------------------------------------------------------1. Vo Fodder:, Cement Industr! in India (Quoted in A. Manne: "Investment for 
Capacity Expansi,ol!" OPe cit. , 
20 United Nations ECA "Report on t1'!e Cc.nl.ent. Indus.t~n F..ast Africa" E/CN/14/INR/80. 
'0 United Nations· "Studies in the EconomiCs of Industri:' Ce"mentand Nitrogenous 
Fertilisers" UN 63/II/B3 pp.I-30. and UN "Industril11 Developl1].e!l.t in the J."C!F~~" ~. op.cit. PPo351t-3650 
_,'",-- '''''''",.~.,,_"~ _r_'" ___ . ____ ~~_~-~_--.--~ ____ ~ ____ ~ 
"", 
, , 
5. 
cement (portland 1) which is by far the most import{mt product consumed from 
the industry. Cement is produced in two stages. First, clay materials 
(gypsum) and limestone are combined in a kiln to produce clinker. This is a 
weight losing process, i.e. 1.5 tons limestone makes 1 ton cement; and thus 
plants are almost always 're~ourae based' - i.e. sited netU" the quarry. The 
'clinker' is then milled to II fine powder for packing. (Often the clinker 
can be treated as a finished product and transported for milling elsewllere). 
The methods of manufacture may broadly be divided into the 'wet' and 
'dry' processes. The latter involves fusion of dried materials in the kiln 
at high temperatures. The former involves no drying and the kiln is fed a 
slurry. The choice of process will depend on the raw materials (those with 
high water content ohould use the , ... et process) t on the costs of fuel and 
power locally (the wet process uses 20-25% more fuel and 4-8% less power), 
and 'on the availability of finance (the investment cost of tho wet process 
can be lOO~ lower) 0 The wet process has an advantage for developing countrieo 
just beginning production in that it is simpler yo operate and produce a 
good quali t:r product, and it is fair to say that the '\-Jet' proceos is the 
typical modern large scale method of production. 
The 'dry' process also admits the possibility of a vertical 'shaft' kiln 
as opposed to the traditional horizontal or rotary kiln technique: this io 
an old technique that has been updated for use in small size installations. 
Howcv~r, until very recently only one out of a hundred plants in Latin America 
used this process.l 
The United Nations have argued strongly for the vertical .ohaft in LDC's 
and it will doubtlc3s become more common. 
There are five plants in C.A., all privately owned. There are also two 
in Panama at either end of the Panama Canal Zone and with the growing interest 
1. Data from Cembureau: World Cement Directory. 
'----.,...------- -- -. -
6. 
of Colombia in a Central American connection one mir;ht mention the close 
proximity of the big 500,000 tons per annum plant at Barranquilla. However, 
we shall confine ourselves to those in the five Common ~farket countries. 
1. Location and Technical Data etc. 
Cementos Novella, S.A. is a 'long standing company that \'1as producing 
just outside Guatemala City before the Second \~ar. The plant is of the usual 
rotary, horizontal type but uses the dry method. Reserves of local limestone 
are good, very close to the capital and gypsum is brought from El Salvador. 
The Ilonduran plant of Cement os de Honduras is in the Cortez province of the 
North, 30 kms. from San Pedro de Sula (at Rio Bajo) , the major industrial 
centre of the country. This location is· suitable for serv~ng the North-wes~ 
of the country, but connection with the capit'al~ Tegucigalpa, San Salvador 
and Guatemala is by secondary roads which were, until very rccentl~ of poor 
~ , ' 
quality. (It benefitsAfrom having local supplies of limestone, clay and 
gypsum). The process is rotary-horizontal. this time being of the ~ 
~f:JL>,ij: 
variety and'Uates from 1959. The Nicaragua plant is, again, a ~ process 
establishment of some antiquity (dating from 1941)0 It is situated 170 kms. 
from ,the capital at San Raphael del Sut which involves'a short but difficult 
journey to Managua. The Compania Nacional Product ora de Cemento is 
associated with financial interests close to the President of the Republic, 
Gener~l Somoza, and this, at least partially, explains some of its more 
idiosyncratic features. The Costa Rican plant, established in 1964, by 
" Industria Nacional de Cemento is the newest in Central America, producing 
also porcellain and white cement. It is situated 50 kms. from San Jose at 
, 
Agua Caliete (Cartago Province). The wet process is employed but the new 
capacity currently being installed incorporates the dry method. Tho 
Salvadorian Company (Cementa de El Salvador) has had a change of site since 
'. 
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1965 when serious faults developed on the production side" nnd a new factory 
was built at Metapan, 125 lems. from the capital nenr the Guatemala border. 
It might also be mentioned that the Panama City plnnt is a new dry (roatry) 
plant while that at Colon useG the wet process. 
2. Production and Capacity 
The Guatemala plant consists of four kilns totalling 900 to 1,000 ton/day 
capacityl which for a 300 day year is 270,000 - 300,000 tons p.a~ The four 
kilns are of approximately equal size, expansion taking place in 1956, 1962 
~'; 1966'4. The relation between production, capacity and demand (apparent 
consumption) can be seen in diag. la. Ge~erally speaking, capacity utilisation 
has oscillated around 75%, but the situation has been less healthy in the last 
few years. What is perhaps more surprising is that the company are now 
planning to double their capacity'by another 1,000 TID by building a new plant 
• 
at Sonorate on the road to the Atlantic coast. This is based on optimistic 
assumptions about the derive\demand for cement that is likely to be required 
in the construction of work associated with the major Eximba1 nickel extraction 
project2, the reconstruction of Champerico port and other anticipated major 
developments. 
The Honduran experience3 (diag. lc) has been of an extremely rapid growth 
of demand both internally and in the main export markets. Thus two expansions 
of capacity were necessary within five years of the project corr~encing in July, 
1959. Subsequently, a major kiln expansion lifted total capacity to 210,000 
1. ~apacity is usually defined in terms of tho kiln size but the clinker mill, a 
railway siding etc. could in theory be the constraint on further output. 1000 TID 
was the figure given by the manager and is presumably about right. Sometimes it 
is assumed that 10% capacity should be loft idlo for safety reasons and not be 
included in the overall figure; this practice is not followed here, Note also 
that referenceG to 'capacity utilisation' may be ambiguous if there are large 
fluctuations in demand during the year: peaks not met yet by production would 
have to be catered for by extra storage. 
2. "Plan Desarrolo de Guatemala 1969-72. Part II" pp.62-63. 
30 The Honduran cement induc~.ry is discussed in some detail in "La Vivicnda en 
Honduras" abusing in Honduras) Pan American Union, 1964, pp.140-l50. 
J 
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tons, which is almost twice tho present level of production. The present 
three kiln plant s~ould suffice for some· time, but there has been periodic 
discussion of the need for a new plant in the South. Perhaps the present 
improvement in the S.P.S. - Tegucigalpa road will bind the presently divided 
Honduran economy close together and San Pedro Sula will retain its monopoly 
positiono 
Nicaragua, for some reuson, has consistently installed capacity well 
ahead of production required and over the whole history of the present four 
kilns, there has been frequently a utilisation rate of 40-50%. 
Costa Rica, the newest producer had installed a 350 TID kiln in 1961 
.. 
which has been run at full capacity over· the last five years. The capacity 
quoted by the firm is l15 t OOO tons, which implies an annual working of 330 
day~. Various changes have been made to enable the plant to operate at a 
particularly high leve1 of efficiency. A new Y~ln with a capacity of about 
250 t OOO tons per annum is to be installed. 
. The pre-1965 Salvador~an plant consisted of two kilns wh~ch operated 
close to full capacity (90,000 tons per annum). Little is known about the 
present plant but it is believed to hav~ a 150,000 tons per annum c~pacity 
which is approximately the level of present (1968) output. 
'. 
9. 
Diae. 2 
Apparent Consumption of Cement in Central America 
GUATEl1ALA EL SALVADOR 
Production Exports Imports Production Exports Imports 
1950 1+6,000 
1951 57,000 
1952 59,000 
1953 67,000 29,000 32,000 
- 1954 68,000 50,000 18,000 
1955 78,000 56,000 40,000 
1956 72,000 80,000 20,000 
1957 96,000 88,000 .7,000 
1958 122,000 90,000 12,000 
1959 116,000 82,000 8,000 
1960 119,000 85,000 14,000 
1961 129,000 74,000 18,000 
1962, 124,000 2,000 65,000 20,000 
1963 160,000 12,000 79,000 It ,000 27,000 
1964 190,000 24,000 90,000 9,000 37,000 
1965 231,000 36,000 80,000 3,000 87,000 
1966 201,000 9,000 142,000 4,000 40,000 
1967 196,000 8,000 151,000 13,000 37,000 
1968 192,000 13,000 32,000 159,000 46,000 40,000 
1969 212,000 
--~----------------------------~------~~-------------------------N   ~oduction figures from Direction 1. Production figures from "~arto 
General de"Est ;adistico. Printed Compendio de Estadistico" 1952-
by SIECA (Quinto Compendio de 57) and into Com endio etc • 
.Estad; ntico") 1968. (1957-67 • Confirmed by "Indicatores 
de C.B. de El Salvador". 
2. Pre-1956 figures (indices) given in 
"Guatemala en Cifrus". 
" ~--3-. Export/Import Data: SIECA 1962-68. 
"Annuario Estadistico de Comercio 
Exterj.or". 1959-62 from ICAITI 
1Study of Construction Industry). 
, 2. Trade Figureo from SIECA and 
national trade statistics. 
.. 
(Rounded to nearest 10,000 tons) 
--. 
I 
i 
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HONDURAS NICARAGUA 
Production Exports Imports Production Exports Imports 
1950 
1951 
-
1952 23,000 17,800 8,qoo 
1953 25,000 
1954 25,000 23,000 17,000 
1955 28,000 28,000 19,000 
1956 ~7,500 42,000 8,000 
1957 31,000 42,000 2,000 
1958 32,000 40,000 5,000 
1959 11,000 17,000 35,500 4,50(: 
1960 37,000 10,000 1,500 31,500 3,500 
1961 42,000 . 12,200 40,000 5,000 
1962 55,500 17,000 45,000 
1963 60,000 18,000 55,000 ·4,000 
1964 70,000 17,000 • 59,000 12,000 
1965 94,000 24,000 65,000 10,000 
1966 101t,000 28,000 85,000 10,000 
1967 111,000 29,000 7,000 96,000 2,000 
1968 123,500 28,000 9,000 102,000 2,000 
1969 107,000 
~ r1.~ -' • oduction data from SIECA and 1. Production data from firm: 
Compendio Estadistico: Honduras, pre-1959; 'IBullctiQ. 
Direction General de Estadio Estanistico; Nicaragua. 
2. Imports ana exports; ICAITI; SIECA; 20 Trade - National trade 
national data. statistics; SIECA, etc. 
~ -.,:;:: ..... 
.. 
, ...... -:.r ' -, 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 . 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
N~ 
Iml?orts 
31,000 
32,000 
40,000 
45,000 
50,000 
58,000 
65,000 
60,000 
66,000 
74,000 
'81,000 
87',000 
78,006 
25,000 
7,000 
2,500 
2,000 
CasTA RICA 
Exports Production 
33,000 
116.000 
116,000 
116,000 
L Data on Trade from ICAITI/SIECA and the "Annua.1 Annuario 
Comrerico Exterior de Costa Rica". 
2. Date on Production from the plant. 
\, 
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What stands out quite clearly is that tho' present capacity expansion 
plans in Costa Rica take no account of sparo capucity in 'Nicaragua; and 
Guatemala's proposed expansion is being undertaken independently of the 
situation in Honduras (and El Salvador). 
3. Consumption Trends 
. 
(A) Consumption trends in Central America can be seen from diags. 1 & 2 a-f 
(based on "apparent consumption", i.e. production + imports - exports). 
There has been a gradual, at first sight, an exponential increase in 
demand since 1950 disturbed by three main cyclical movements. First, the 
"boom" in construction in the early and mid-fifties lasted until approximately 
1959, and was particularly significant in E1 Salvador and Nicaragua; second" 
there ,was a levelling off - in some cases, a fall in demand - in the period 
1959-62; and thirdly, a more recent "boom" in construction until the present 
time, though this has tapered off-in the last three years. Cyclical 
disturbances are less pronounced in Guatemala and Costa Rica. This is 
probably explained by the fact that, at least by Central American standards, 
they are the two more diversified and stable economies. 
Demand projections were made first of all in the basis of a semilog 
time curve 'to establish the rate of growth of demand over the period 
1953-1966. R .-
-
% ~eometric increase 
Guatemala: log C = 4.7491 + .03505t .9786 
(.0018) 8.4 
El'Salvador: log C = 4.8034 + .02456t .8301 
(.0042) 5.8 
Honduras : log C ;: 4.2410 + .03867t .9098 
(.00455) 9.3 
Nicaragua: log C = 4.4l~24 + .03313t .9259 .. 
( .0031+9) ?9 
Costa Rica: log C = 4.4641. + .04249t 
.9839 
(.00199) 10.8 
" 
..,.. 
I 
E·a. 
\ 
I 
-" 
.• ':t_~. 
~~ 
(B) It was felt that it would be more satisfactory to try to establish a 
functional relationship between cement consumption and the activity level 
of the construction sector. A linear correlation was desired between the 
rate of growth of cement consumption and the rate of growth of the 
construction component of GDP. This is not a very satisfactory exercise in 
practice, as national income statistics in Central America are unreliable 
in general, and particularly unreliable for the fragmented private building 
1 sector. Also, there were serious problems of reducing sectoral figures to 
constant prices with only general price indices: the two countries with the 
most serious inflation did not have any other than 'current price' estimates 
of construction GDP (Costa Rica and Honduras). 
However, for what they are worth the following relationship were 
established for two countries (Guatemala gave a negative correlation 
coefficierit) •. 
E1.Salvador log C = -1.52 + .8545 log GDPc (R2 = .779) 
Nicaragua log C c -3.1328 + .9888 log GDPc (R2 ~ .9531) 
(Both use ~ta at constwlt prices; 1962 prices for El Salvador over range 
1953-1967; 1958 prices for Nicaragua). 
In both cases, cement dem~nd is growing more slowly than the s~ctoralg~~ 
However, because of statistical deficiencies, this approach was not pursued 
further. 
(C) ~inallYt it was felt useful to try and e~tablish a rolationship between 
per capita consumption of cement and income per capita on an X-section.basis. 
So ~ sample of 19 Latin American countries was tru~en fo~ 1966 and a ·correlation 
log consumption per capita = 1.3827 + 1.2989 log ~ per capita 
1. An ~y.ample of this is the enormous discrepancy (up to 50%) between estimates 
of cons ~Ction GDP by the Planning Office (OFIPLJUi) and by the Central Bank in 
Costa Rica - see Table 5-A-4 "Evaluation of Co:::;ta Rica's Economic & Social 
Development Plan 1965-68". (Plan American Union). 
20 The data for consumption and national Income (converted to dollars at the 
official rate of exchange) were obtained from Pan American Union statistics. In 
Bome cases 1966 fieures were not available and 1965/64 figures were made to 
suffice (though consumption -income statistics were consistent on a year for 
year basis.) 
14. 
Vlere there to be a "normal" relationship then the following consumption levels 
would be predicted:-
'normal' 'actual' 
Guatemala 63.6kg. per cap. 43.5 
El Salvador 50.3 II " " 60.1 
Honduras lfo.} " " " 31.8 
Nicaragua 65.8 " 
" 
II 56 0 8 
Costa Rica 8705 " 
" 
II 88.0 
Several features of this X-section are interesting. The income 
coefficient is about l.} :. demand for cement is expected to grow at 3(1)6 
faster than the income level of the 'region if X-section figures can be used 
for projection purposes. The other point is that Central America generally 
'under-consumes' cement given its income per head. Even the countries that 
are over or at projected levels, were, at that time, at the peak of "boom" 
periods. However, it is possible ,that the income elasticity of demand is 
~ . 
. lower for smaller/poorer countries in the sample and, again, because of the 
statistical material, wh~ch for a one-year X-section is dubious, not too much weight 
was placed o~ those findings. 
In diag. 3 a projection from the first simple model is set alongside the 
official projections made in the early 1960's. It can be seen that 'early 
industry projections were far too low. This, if nothing else, demonstrates 
the hazards of projecting demand for an unstable industry: in all the national 
cases the trend being artificially deflated by the dominant influence of the 
1958-62 "depression" which also served as a base for the projections made at 
that time. 
(D) Cement ConRumers: 
There is not a great deal of information available on the use of finished 
cement by sector. However, the Annual 'Annuario Estadistico' of El Salvador 
does give some information on tho usage of primary inputs and from the, 1968 
~ition' the following input-output relations were eotablished (by weight -
tons) ; 
-~ 
Ding. 2 
rL'ojectlol1l:1 of Demand (Tons) • 
.,. 11& •• 
Gua.temala 19(\) l~ 
ICAITI (Study in 1961/2· 185,000 to (over 
"- 215,000 . 200~000) 250,000 
Joint Transport Study (1963) 230t~00 295,000 
.. 
CABEl/Joint Planning Mission (1962) 240,000 300,000 
(Time series (1953-68) 270,000 380,000 ) 
!!l Salvador 
ICAITI 110,000 to 
120,000 (160,000) 
J.T.S. 170,000 220,000 
(Time Series 205,000 280,000 ) 
Honduras 
lCAITI (60-70,000) ( 80,000) 
J.T.S. 62,500 90,000 
(Time Series 80,000 110,000 ) 
liicarn5:!;!a 
ICAITI (90-110,000) (130,000) 
J.T.S. 80.000 110,000 
(Time Series 105,000 150,000 ) 
Costa.Rica 
ICAITI 90 .. 1.50,000) (200.000) 
J.T.S. 1.50,000 178,000 
(Time Series 17.5,000 265,000 ) 
" 
\ 
I~ 
" 
ement 
Droducts 
Marble works 
tubes & pipes 
Cement & 
concrete Blocks & 
Posts 
House & 
Build-
ing E2E.-
. tractors 
Road 
Brid-
ges 
con-
-tra-
ctors 
Rest 
5,150 600 3,535 6,950 23,750 860 131,000 
________________ +-____ . ______ ---------------------------------~--------t~'~------------------~---
10 360 37,500 
1,710 800 1+15 39,500 
It can be seen that the 'cement products' industry is of almost trivial 
importance by comparison with other cement users taking about 12% of the total 
and so the linkages from a local coment industry cannot be considered very 
large. What is also interesting is that even building contractors are small 
consumers by comparison with "the rest" which comprises small private sales 
(possibly to small contractors via retailers) and sales direct to government. 
'In terms of the importance of cement inputs to the value of production in 
these various industries, the following input-output ratios can be established, 
for the value of cement inputs as a % of final production. 
Asbestos Cement Products .12 
Marble \-Iorks .097 
Concrete Tubes & Pipes 
Blocks, Posts etc. 
However, it should be stressed thqt these are very much more labour 
intensive industries than cement production itself, and one could infer that 
the employment effect of having these industries is correspondingly quite large. 
However, it would not be correct to assume that the absence of a cement 
.. 
industry is in any way connected with the absence/Size of a cement products 
industry: in 1962 Costa Rica had (in terms of men employed) the largest 
products industry in Central America but no cement plant.1 
1. "Inforrne sobre 1a Industrias de Materiales para la Construccion en 
Centroamerica" op.cit. Tomo 1. Cuurto II,' 3, 5. 
16. 
(E) Consumption and Trade 
Ifror.1 diag 1+ it can be aeen that there are two main trends taking place 
in the role of international trade. First, regional import oubstitution has 
been pursued almost to completion. , The remaining 1% or so of demand 
unsatisfied by iocal production could well be accounted for by specialised 
cement products- porcellain cement etc. The second discernible trend is the 
growth of i~traregional trade. This is still not too important ~ the highest 
% of regional demand was 12%'0£ consumption 'in 1965 - and the average over 
the last few years has been between 5-1(1~ of regional demand. The main trade 
flows can be seen below for 1966-68. 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Guatemala 21,~ Honduras 
1200 M.~ El salvador~ooO T Nicaragua ~. 7,500 T 
Costa Rica 
Guatemal~O T, 25,500 ~duras30Q~ 9tOO~l Salvado~5:500 T Nicaragua, 900 T 
Co'a-a. Rica 
Guatemala , ._~ ~duras "'-..~.QO(jT a~,70~ 30,50OT~El Salvador/' 7,6.50 T 
, , 
NicaraGUa.~ 200 T 
Costa Rica 
The trade which exists is almost entirely confined to the Northern 
triumvirate (as indeed is most of the Common Hm'ket's activity).1 
~ 
1. However, one feature is distinctly odd; the existence of two-way trade in 
·'1',' 
a homogeneous product, even in conditions where there has been no problem of 
domestic capacity ~hortage. The Honduras/Salvador trade is eusier to explain. 
Salvador supplies the remote regions of the south of Honduras (very emall sums 
anyway - less than 596 of the Honduran total), while Honduras exports to San 
Salvador along the main highway from San Pedro SulB. ("the El Arnatillo gatc\vuy"). 
It appears that the Honduran producers found the Salvadorian market morc stablc, 
organised and offering better prices (even with transport cost) than their own. 
The practice of Guate~ila importing growing quantities from El Salvador while 
continuing to export growing quantities is 'morc difficult to explain perhaps in 
terms of seasonal ca.pacity bottlenecks in both countries occurring out of phase 
or else border trade. 
";i: 
DiD,g. 4 
Internationnl Trade in Cement 
0 
(1) (2) (3) 
. 
1955 4,000 158,000 130,000 
1956 3,700 135,000 105,000 
1957 3,300 125,000 105,000 
1958 5.900 205,000 105,000 
1959 9,700 317,000 100,000 
1960 12,000 326,000 90,000 
1961 20,000 720,000 95,000 
1962 26,000 934,000 87,000 
1963 43,800 1,443.000 94,000 
1964 56,500 1,566,000 84,200 
1965 80,000 2,380,000 50,000 
1966 44,200 1,320,000 18,000 
1967 50,600 1,568,000 9,438 
1968 76,224 2,213,000 9,160 
Col. (1) Weight (MT) of products traded intraregiona11y. 
(2) Value ,($) of products traded intraregiona1ly. 
(3) \~eight of products imported from outside __ the region., 
(4) % of apparent consumptfon satisfied within the region. 
Statistics from SIECA Annual yearbooks of external trado. 
" 
------------ -----
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40 Cement Prices 
We have already said that Central American cement prices are high by 
'r/orld standards. However, pricing is complex. There is price discrimination 
e.g. governments v. private consumers. Also, Honduras sells to Salvador at 
%1.15 per, bag (cif. Salvador 1965), but its official ex£actory price at the 
same time was %1.35 per bag. Guatemala has a different price for bulk 
purchase (%1.15 per bag) from individual small bag sales (%1.25 per bag). 
In other cases, conflicting figures are given by government and industry 
(e.g. Costa Rica or Nicaragua) as to the cxfactory price. In some cases 
this could have been due to misunderstanding; the 19wer figures in each 
case is taken as the exfactory, the higher as the capital city price. 
Consumer taxes confuse the issue too at a retail level. The conflicting 
data.is set out in diagram 5. 
The follo\'ling are taken as contemporary average exfactory prices; 
Guatemala $1.2 per bag 
E1 Salvador $1.25 per bag 
Honduras $1.55 
" " 
Nicaragua' $1.55 
" 
II' 
Costa Rica $ ,B ,II II 
-... 
Diagram 2. 
~')C- ,;..~, Ca--.t p~ ~~...L A~ 
~ ~~. . % lees J.n per 1959/62 1963/4 1966 1968 ~2.5 kilo bag 1969/70 
Cl'Qatema1a 1025(1) .9 (10) ~3) ~) 
C~) 1.35(2) c.. . ~ ( .~ 
1.25) (3) 
1.2 ) 
1.15) 
1 1.~i(4) ,-
.~ 1~lO 
~l. Salvador 1.25(1) 1,25(2) (4) 1,5.(4) 1.45 "~oJ.0 
~) (retail-San ~~) Salvador) .35 1.35 
1.45(1) 1.61(9) 
(~~) 
l-.t~nduras 1.4(5) 1,:}5) 1.24 (:» 
~:tcaragua 1.95(1) 1.95(2) 1.57(6) 1.54(6) 1.54(6) 
1.65(7) (~...a) (retail .. 1,65(7) 1,65(7) 
. Managua) 
~c:;,sta Rica ,R CB ) .8(8) 
" 
"------------------------------------------------------------
~ 1. These figures are obtained from the ICAITI study on the construction 
industry. Investigators obtained data from governments and were not clear 
whether retail or wholesale cr exfactory prices were being given. It does 
nppear that the prices given are generally retail prices. 
2. Joint Transportation Study Pt. I, p.188. 
~ 
3. 1966 and later cement prices for Guatemala given in "NumeroD inqiccs de 
precios de la republica de Guatemala" (indices show prices unchanged since 1960) 
and Bulletin Estadistico de Guatemala, 1969/70 data from the firm. 
4. Obt'ained from Bulletin Estadistico.1 El Salvador: Vol. 70-71"72. 
5q Data from plant management (August, 1969). There are also exports to 
Salvador at cif. Salvador, $1.14 per bag, 1966. • 
6. Data from company (interview 1969). 
" " " 
(questi'onnaire 1970) 
8. Data from Hinistry of Industry in San Jose, 1969. $.8 seems reliab1o; 7.6c 
is transport to San Jose. 
9. uyht~nda en Honduras ll gives an estimat,ed exfactory price for 1963. 
'. 
10. Figure from , Industrial Census. 
• ~uatemala 
20. 
It is also significant that prices have also dropped appreciably in 
recent years. The effect of increased scale may have been to 10vler the cost -
it may be also that' in recent years there has been some price competition 
between Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, as each company strives to increase 
its share of the market. 
Extra-regional imports are no longer of any importance in Central America 
and it would be misleading to quote recent import price's as they probably 
refer to specialised cement products. Imports from outside Central America 
have been negligible except for Costa Rica (before 1965) Honduras (before 1959) 
and, very occasionally, El Salvador and Nicaragua in small quantities. The 
following gives some idea of the level and degree of fluctuation of prices of 
bulk imports of several thousand tons (figures - M.T. at % per ton) - data 
taken from Central American import statistics. 
Diagram 6 
1962 1963 1961t ~ 1966 
~ Salvador %34 ave %32 ave.' (1:1..900 at %22.7) 4,300 at ~23.5 
(Germany) 
(5,300 at %33) 
(Panama) 
It()nduras 
- -
~j,caragua (5,000 nt %23) 
-
~ 
(VI. Germany) 
. ~osta Rica i2l ave. j!19.5ave. 8,500 at $14.5 7,800 at $19.5 1,600 at i19.5 (Japan) (Colombia) (Colombia) 
....... ;.;;::' 15,000 at $23 15,ltOO at ,. 4,000 at %37.5 (Germany) %29 (Japan) (Japan) 
21,000 at $21 
(Venezuela) 
23,000 at %20.5 
(Colombia) 
''-. 
\, 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
t 
.\ 
I 
I 
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Of the two big bulk importers, Costa Ricu has traditionally been able 
to get cement from overseas at about $20 per ton ($.9 per bag or 6 colones). 
This, however, excludes tariff, part handling charges, and railway costs from 
ports which probably add up to t~2 per ton. (This tallies with estimates of 
cement retailing in Central Costa Rica at about 9-10 colones per bag before 
1965). As the present exfactory price is under 6 colones, Costa Rica has 
clearly no need of protection, and the p~esent Common Tariff of $10 ncr ton 
• plus l~~' is quit~ r~.dundant: (it works out at an ad. valorum equivalent 
of 5Cf;6 on a Shipment of $25 per MT)o The other countries have always been 
protected at this high rate and except for Salvador, in small quantities, they 
have never seriously resorted to importationo 
One further feature of note is that for some suppliers with a regular 
trade to the area there are stable prices over time: Colombia sells 
-. -
consistently at $20 pe~ ton; West Germany $23 per ton eif. Central American 
ports. -This compares with exfactory Central American prices of Guatemala $27; 
El S~lvador $24; Honduras $28; Nicaragua %34.and Costa Rica $18 per ton. 
With port handling charges of --on average - about $5 per ton, and rail 
charges to the main centres of consumption, about $2 per ton, it is fairly 
clear that transportation costs without a tariff are an effective protection 
of a high cost industry in all cases except NicaragUa. However, a 5~~ tariff 
is excessive even for that industry and partly for this reason Nicaragua has 
~ 
been able to impose a consumption tax of l5~& in recent years. 
Cement Costs, 
.. 
While it is not possible to give a satisfactory analysis of the broak-
down of costs without comprehensive data there is a good deal of indirect 
• Prior to 1964, Costa Rica had a different rate from the others. As a major 
importer its tariff was only %4 per ton; about 15~G on a $25 per HT shipment. 
'. 
,l';;' 
~~, 
---. ---- ---,--- - -~--.- -- -, -,~ ~ - -'"',.. -~"""" 
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evidence and fragmentary pieces of data which can give a fuirly accurate 
profile of variations in costs of the main inputs. The inrorm~tion available 
is set out in Diagram 7. There are some approximations and in several cases 
less sophisticated methods were applied: the 'missing' figuro was assumed to be the 
'average' of those of the other countries. With the cost of packing, a minor 
cost, the figure was Simply based on the costs of the one country Ii/hie},l had 
data. 
One must also say at the outset that one would' expect consideraole 
fluctuations in cost due simply to the local situation regarding the quality 
of quarry and limestone. 
As far as proportional costs are concerned there is a general uniformity 
in cost levels in all cases except that of raw material and packing costs in 
Guatemala (1958); this is despit~ the existence of substantial spare capacity 
in some cases ~d diffe~ences in age' and location of the plants. Only in the 
case of packing costs and "lorking capital char,ges is there insufficient 
dat~ to come to any reasonably firm conclusions. 
Labour costs vary somewhat but of the four estimates taken in the last 
few years, there is orily a small dispersion about the $2.5-$3.5 per ton 
range. However, it is believed that the labour force does not greatly 
increase in size, if at all, as capacity is ,uti1ised'more fully and, thus, 
the cost per ton will fall in Honduras and Nicaragua as the plrult approaches 
~ 
:full capaCity. 
Depreciation and related costs are high for those plants where there is 
.. 
substantial under~tilisation of capacity, namely Honduras and Nicara6ua. 
These values depend initially upon the assumptions, particularly as regards 
, 
the rate of depreciation. 8% (On a straight line basis) was the figure 
quoted by several accountants. -
'. 
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Diugrum Z ~cd: ~ ~ PnrC~ ($ r.,rT~ 
Guatemala El Salvador Hondura.s Nicara./!ua Costa Hiea 
A B C D (t~~). F G (t't$<f) ce7p) (L~6P Q~i) O!fu.q) ( 132V ,j/ 
.!:roportional Costs ~~ !cn-l;~) 
.:t. Limestone ) raw 2.8 1.8 to 1 - (2) 1.7 
material 2 
Gypsum .9 .8 
~. Packing l·')..· 1.4 2 to (1.5) (1.5) 
4.5 
~. Power 2.1+ 1.5 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.6 1.5 
~. Fuel 4.7 2.8 2.75 (4.5) 3.5 3 
',-
I 
"- 18.3 (10-12) 10-12 (10-12) (10-12) 
......... 
G. Labour Costs 
per unit of output- 4.6 5.0 2.8 3.75 3.35 2.5 
workers - overhead \ 
',- & staff 
............. 
I 
... 
I 
Investment-related Costs ! i 
~. Depreciation at 896 of ! 
fixed investment. 4 3.8 . 3.2. '1. 7.6 8.3 (4) 
e. Spare Parts at C}6 ) 1.5 (1.4) 1.0 '1 (2.8) (3.3) (1.5) 
~. Repairs ) 1%) 
, In t per ton capacity 
Total Est. Costs (20.5) (20) (18-20) '1 . (24) (26) (14) 
,~ 
JW,c.J,. w .~ 
,~ 
Exfacl,ory Price 32.7 26 29 (23-25) 30 36 20 
.- ,.,~ 
.. 
.. . ~ 
\. 
-{' 
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NOTES: 
A. Information from 1958 Industrial Census when output was 120,000 T and 
capacity 150,000 T .. l!"ixed Investment in· this year was $6m. Staff - 400 men. 
Electricity: 1-065 cents per K\fu per ton. ~Jorking capita.l charges at 5% of 
"circulating capital".. . 
B. Data obtained from the compan~l1O>OutPu~ was 210,000 T and capacity 320,000 T. 
Fixed investment $lOm. 
Electricity cost is l.lc per K\oJh. Fuel oil is $2.82 per barrel (1 barrel per 
. ton of cement). 
C. Data obtained from the 1961 Census: output was 75.000 T and capacity 
90,000 T. Fixed investment %3.8m. Staff 240 people. Electricity cost is 
1 0 65c per K\ih at 140 KWh per ton. 
D. Data from 1967/68 Annuario Estadistico (Vol. III) 'Industria, Commercio y : 
Servicios'. Output was 170,000 T. Staff 275 employees. Electricity costs· 
are 2.20c per KWh for 100 K~lli per ton. 
E. Data is obtained from the firm: capRcity in 1968, 210,000 T; output is 
105,OOOT. Fixed investment is $lOm. Electricity costs are 1.8c per K\~l for 
140 K\'Jh per ton. Labour costs 'v/ere obtained indirectly from the 1966 ·c~nsus: 
•. Haw rnateria~ costs were obtained 
from' . "Evolution de desarrollo de la Mineria de Honduras", . Ministry of 
Natural Resources 19700, 
F. Data obtained from the firm (1969): production is 105,000 T and capacity 
235,000 T. Fixed investment is $11.6m. Staff, 240 workers (ave, cost $1,500). 
Electricity costs "arc 3c per K\'Jh for 86 KvJh per ton. 
G. Data obtained from the firm: production.& capacity are 115,000 T. Fixed 
investment is t6-7m. Staff is 200 men. Labour and Raw Materials cost as a % 
of total cost from "Annuario Estadistico" 19680 Electricity (ave. of night 
and day; 1 • .5 K\fu for 110 KHh per ton) o· 
In view of the difficulties of assessing some of the costs it is very 
difficult to give a reasonable idea of the likely pretax profit margins, 
but given this qualification, it is possible to obtain rough orders of 
magnitude: 
(i) Guatemala 1958: if the extremely high figure for raw material and 
packing charges is accepted then there would seem to.be a rate of return on 
capital of 8-10%: with an interest rate of about 6-7% and a gearing ratio 
ofl:l this would ~ive a return on equity of 11-12%. \Vhile this seems 
eminently reaso~able it is, probably a considerable understatement - with 
some of the profit element being included in the raw material charge. 
(ii) El Salvador 1961: thero appears (on the data provided) to be a 
very large rate of return - about 24% on capital :.almost 40'}~ or equity 
assuming the gearing ratio. above •. _ While this seems too high it is not 
clear which costs are underestimated: most are, in fact, drawn from the 
census. 
(iii) Honduras 1969: there appears here to be a low return on capital 
(less than or approx. 8%) which gives a return on equity of about the sarne 
order. This woul~ appear to square with the low rate of utilisation and 
t~e eagerness of the company to sell at below normal prices in foreign 
markets. 
'. (iv) Nicaragua 1970: despite the extremely high costs and underutilication 
of the plant, the rate of return 011 capital of about 10'}6 (equity la6 approx)l 
- . =- - is reasonable. This is due to the very high prices charged by .. the plant. 
I. Balance sheet in 1968 shows - 81 out of 91 million cordobas fixed 
investment as share capital. 
'. 
26. 
Officials of the Nicaraguan government expressed in confidence to the author 
their vim'l that profito were probably much higher. \Vhen questions were put 
~ -.tS!:'q.( 
to the Company .. was sho'lrn financial data ... ,hieh purported to demonstrate a 
rate of return 9n capital of 12-13% consistently over the years 1967-1970. 
This squared roughly with ~~ own estimate. 
. . 
(v) . Costa Rica 1970: the firm claimed that ~ of its exfactory price 
was profit which would indicate a rate of return on capital of about 12% -
on equity of 16%. This very ,respeetabl~ margin appears to be borne out 
by the cost data which is available, but government officials believed it 
to be a significant understatement. 
Whatever tho validity of these estimutes they do show up quite clearly 
one of the main effects of economies of scale. In addition to tho need for 
greater depreciation provision, in order to ensure a reasonable return on 
capital (lQ?6 would probably be regarded as an absolute minimum in Central 
Americaw~here is neg~gib~e tax), the proportion of the exfactory price 
whicn consists of profit and interest will be ~xtremely high if plants are 
small an~or underutilised. 
-
. ",-
\ . 
" 
International Cost Comparison: taking into account the extremely hazardous 
· assumption involved in comparing prices botween countries and over time, 
some attompt was made'to see to \~hat extent there is divergence between 
.. ""'., the relative importance of different costs between the Centr~1 .. Amer1can 
countries and by comparison with American, German and Indian cases (see 
diag. 8). The following poin~s come out clearly: 
(i) Much of the high cost of products can be attributed to low capacity 
utilisation. This depreciation cost is the only one that is seriously out 
~,-':--,::.-:: 
~~~~~ 
'- ;;." .. 
of line and if costs are scaled down to what they would be at 9~b capacity 
utilisation level, then depreciution and maintenance costs arc not too 
divergent throughout the small X-section sample. 
(ii) even then, investment costs seem somewhat higher than those of 
Germany and India - approaching those of the US; where highly automated 
equipment is used. 
(iii) electricity and power costs are generally slightly higher, but 
the difference is not significant. 
(iv) labour costs (when scaled down to 9~~ capacity level and assuming 
no change in the labour force) come out rather less than in India and 
Germany, but the crudity of the comparison is such as to discount the 
importance of that finding. 
International comparisons will be clearer if each of the major items 
of expenditure is examined separately. 
(i) Investment Costs 
It is difficult to come to any firm conclusions on 'normal' investment 
costs beca~e of the difficulties in obtaining comparable data. Investment 
costs refer to an assemblage of costs; plant and. quarrying equipment, cost 
of erection, power plant, land clearance and improvements etc. which will 
vary according to the technical requirements of the firm~c location or 
accounting conventions (e.g. whether some costs are capitilised or treated 
as running C03tS). For example, in the U.S.A. there is a preference for 
material handling equipment and quality control devices which are not 
required in developing countries. In developing countries theta is 
considerably greater or different requirements for land clearance, community 
development buildings, power ~lants and transport connections. There is, 
also, a formidable problem of reconciling international data in national 
\ 
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\~ Diagram 8 
Costs Eer ton of Cement 
U.S.A.,(a) India (b) German;y:(c) Costa(d) El Salv_(e) Guatemala (f) Honduras (g) T (h; l'J.caragua 
llO,ooo 200,000 . 200,000 Rica ador 320,000 210,000 235,,000 
200,000 T Capacity T Capacity 115,000 90,000 T 'Capacity, 50% 90% 45% 90;6 
T Capacity T Capacit9 T Capacity (f*~ Utilised Utilised C~~ (~) Capacity Capacity 
Proportional: 
Raw Materials .67 2 .6 1.7 2.5 ? '1.0 2.0 
Fower' 2.1 1.45 1.55- 1.65 1.65 1.5 2.5 2.6 
Fuel 2.4. 2.5 3.5 3~0 2.6 2.8 4.5 3.5 
Others (Packing' etc.) • 5 1.4 1.4 . 
(50% packed) (100% packed) 
Labour 7 & 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.8. 3.75 2.0 3.5 1.75 
(Direct & Indirect) 5.8 
Investment 
- Depreciation 4.9 2.8 2.8 4 3.2 3.6 7.6 4.0 8.8 4.4 
,4.5 
- Spare~ etc. 1.2 .65 (oaintime only) 1.5 1.0 1.4 2.8 1.5 3.3 1.6 
(a) Based on data in U.N. "Economics of Industry - Cementll 
plant & quarry equipment, buildL"lgs and storage, land etc. 
~~ 
op.cit, p.22;A9~o capacity utilisation: fixed investment includes 
(b) Indian data from Fodder op.cit. (90-100% utilisation of capacity). 
(d) As in Diag. 7 - (gr. (e) As in Diag. 7-(c) 
(g) As in Diag. 7-(e) (h) As in Diag. 7-(f). 
(c) German data. U.Il. studies; p.21 (wet precess). 
(f) As in Diag. 7-(b) 
!\) 
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Table 2-
Investment Costs in 11m (19..£2l 
Ca:gn.city T • .E, •• f?:.' H. Germanl (a) U .S.A.(b) India(C) IITypiclll" LDC(d) 
33,000 1.6 I II 
66,000 2.3 2/2.5 
100,000 3·0 6.5· 3.6 3.5/l~ 4/4.7 
200,000 ·l~.B 10.B 6.11- 6/7 B.,5 
300,000 9.0 
400,000 7.6 18.0 io.8 10/12 1L~ 
.500,000 21.5 
1,000,000 30.0 
Central American fi'xed investment figures are: 
Guatemala: 140,000 T (1962) - $6m. 
90,000 T (1962) = $3m. 
210,000 T (1968) ~ $10m. 
310,000 T ... %1001, (1969) 
El Salvador: 
Honduras: 
. 
N:Lcarasua : 235,000 T (1968) ~ $11.6m. 
Costa Rica: . 115,000 T (1968) = %6m. 
, . . II' . , 
From U.N ~ Studies in the Economics of Industry; Cement etc.1I oj. ~ 
. . 
(n) Dry process: cxcl. clearing land etc • 
-.. 
. -
Wet process ... includes elaborate buildings; cover~ large amount 
of quantity control equipment, dust control equipment and 
electrical machinery 
(c)': 1963 ?rices ... United Nations l~ndustrilll Development in Asia. and 
the Ell!' East". op.cit. p.63. 
(d) "Hinimum costsl' for developing countries (I) based on "estimates of 
major companies. (II) based on a sampling of firms in LDC's. 
29. 
currencies and obtained in different time periods. However, the following 
table (9) conveys approximate orders of ~agnitudes (it refers only to "graos-
roots" plant costs not to total necessary fixed investment)o 
The U.S. figures which are the only ones comparable to those in Central 
America are explained by the considerate complexity of equipment. The 
Central funerican investment costs of three of the four plants are of the 
order of 50";6 higher than "typical" developing country costs. This is partly 
explained by the difference between "grass-roots" and total fixed investment, 
but some of the larger cost is probably explained by ocean and land freight 
costs to Central American sites and difficulties of erection on remote sites. 
(this isrnot uncommon experience - a plant in an Indonesian case study had 
an investment cost, twice that of U.S. plant of two thirds the capacity).l 
As a result of these larger investment cost, depreciation, spare parts 
and other costs based on fixed investment are proportionately greater • 
. 
(ii) Labour Reguirements 
The UN. study on the cement industry also gave approximat.~ figures 
for manning'in the Y~nds of situation found in developing countries. Except 
in the quarrying operation, there is little scope for capitat!labour 
substitution, and the main influence on manning is scale - there being 
considerable scope for economising on labour with Inrg?r capacity. 
1. L.E. Doyle: "Inter-economy comparisons: a case study" 
. , . ~Cement-rlant in Indonesia) 1966. 
'. 
(a study of 
.. 
£apacity, 2 Japan 
DiaGram 10 
CA..M~-. 1 
. ~abour Needs by Han Years 
U.S.A. 
"Typical" 
Underdeveloped 
Country 
r 
30. 
, Central America 
l 
50,000 T 
100,000 T 
70-85 
110-140 
Guatemala: 1962 - 375 people! 
200,000 T 
300,000 T 
400,000 T 
500,000 T 
1,000,000 T 
124 
164 
248 
290 
75 
96 
128 
150 
150 
140-180 
2~0-300 
380-360 
(293 manual)1968 _ 467 " 
El Salvador:1962 - 221 " 
(110 manua1\968 _ 2.50 " 
Honduras: 1962 - 357 " 
(267 manual) inc. asbestos 
plant. 1968 - 350 II 
Nicaragua: 1962 - 263 " 
(230 manua1\968 _ 325 " 
(250 manual) 
~---------------------------------------~----------------------------------------
1. Assuming '2,400 brs. per man year. 
I 
2. Excluding quarry labour. 
Source: U.N. "Studies in The Economics of Industry" op.cit. 
The Central American countries that provide data indicate an 'above 
normal' manning of 50-l0Ct;&. This could be due to the prevalence of old 
machinery, to the use of labour intensive quarryinB techniques or sheer 
ineff~ciency. Thus tho "cheap" labour of Central America is offset to a 
substantial extent by lower productivity. This can be seen from tho 
'. _or - diagram below giving labour costs per ton produced in t" vlhat .. is significant 
is that the higher Central American costs are accounted for 1110re 'by 
managerial/supervisory staffs. rather than labourers' wages. 
)f' 
• ~:(' );)er ton) 
cement) 
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Hanagerial Labourers Total 
Switzerlandl .36 1.46 1.82 
Germany 1 .49 1.96 2.45 
U.S.A. 1 100 302 402 
Guatemala (1958) 1.3 "2.4 4.7 
El Salvador (1967/8) 2.8 
Honduras (1966) 1.45 2.3 3.75 
Nicaragua (1969/70) 3.4 
Costa Rica (1970) 1.4 1.1 2.5 
1 Kenya (1968) (.9 to 2.5) (09 to 1.5) 
1. Non-Central American data, reprinted from Hans Reiclteld: "The Cement 
Industry in Ken:t:~" Economic Research & Development Papers: Markerere . 
University (No. 124). 
~: Generally speaking fuel requirements are technologically determined: 
2 million kilocals for ~ ton of cement by the 'wet' method and 1.6 million 
by the ", dry' method. 
The absence of coal and natural gas limits the choice of fuel in 
Central America to fuel oil. The major scope for variation which affects 
the use of fuel oil is the use of the 'wet' or 'dry' process (the latter 
consuming 25% more. However, this choice is largely technical determined 
by the water content of the limestone. The cost of fuel oil in Central 
America is not greatly in excess of that in other locations though the 
effect "of building local refineries has ?een to eliminate tho pos6ibi~ity 
of cheap bulk purchases of imported fuel oil.1 However the differential 
is not great. 
1. CABEl - "Investment 0 ortunities in the Central American Common Market 
1964" pp.36-37. United Nations ECLA) "Cor.rnarative Btudy of glectricit..Y;, 
Tariffs in Central America" E/CN.l2/CCE SC5/41 (1964). 
'. 
32. 
Electricity: power requirements normally vary from 100-150 Kvlli per ton and 
electric power is an important input COD~. Here it is difficult to compare 
costs as the tariffs of Central American companies are complex, and cometimes 
determined on a negotiated basis. The cost of electricity in Central America 
is over 2c per KWh except in Costa Rica; and this is several times the rate 
for industry in most industrialised countries and even Latin American 
countries. But many plants have their own power units or bulk negotiated 
ratios. Average industrial tariffs are: 
Application of the Mode~ 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Costa Hica 
2.4c:'.per K\fu 
2.6 
2.6 
3.0 
2.4 
1.4 (two companies) 
So far we have built up a case for showing that much of the high cost 
and ineffic~ency of the cement industry is due to the fact that production 
is based on small national units. Using the model set out in Chapter 5, 
an attempt will now be made to estimate come of tile gains that might be 
obtained (or might have been 'obtained) from regionalising production. 
The various components of the data are as follows: 
A. Demand: demand projections are used, from the previous studies of 
consumption. \ve also assume: 
(a) demand is purely inelactic .. 
(b) demand in any consumption area is concentrated in discrete 
points, i.e; the capital city or regional centre. l 
1. This assumption is validated by the estimates of demand - by department -
given'in the Joint Transport Study, pp.219-237. 
\ 
~-~ .. 
B. Economies of Sc~l~: the linear approximation to the economies of scale 
function for investment was derived as follows: 
(i) the "typical" developing country relationship was found with "high" 
and "low" estimates. The UN study in cementl referred to an cxercise in 
which the investment cost of various plants were compared X-sectionally on 
a comparable basis and also engineering estimates were made of likely 
investment costs in LCD's. The following ran go of figures was produced 
which appeared reasonable; producing two curves, one using the upper set 
figures, the other using the lower set. 2 
" 
,50,000 Tpa $ 2.2,5 to 2 • .5 ·m. 
100,000 " % 3.5 to 4 m. 
200,000 II % 6 to 7. m. 
400,000 tI %10 to 12 m. 
800,000 tt $20 to 22 m. 
1. U.N. "Studies in the Economics of Industry," op.cit. 
. .. 
2. These costs include quarrying, basic building and storage facilities, 
transport costs on imported equipmcnt, installation of eqUipment and 
land preparation. 
\ 
of 
r 
3 .tt. 
If log capacity is plotted against log fixed investment, then this gives 
an elasticity factor of .7 approx. These two curves \'1ere reduced to linear 
approximations over the range 0 to 800,000 Tpa. which is the upper limit of 
the Central American market for 1970. 
I 1¢l,900,OOO + 19c 
I ~;t2,100,000 + 19c 
where C is the capacity in tons per annum 
I is the investment cost in t. 
Now, the line must be assumed to represent also the economies of scale 
/ 
function of individual Central American plants. However, it is known that 
in fact, the Central American costs are somewhat higher than these average 
"grass-roots" cost and so the line is assumed to have the same gradient, 
but pass through the point represented by'the Central American data.1 
CaEacit:r:: Investment Cost I.c. at 1260 Prices 
Guatemala 325,000 t10 m t10 m 
Honduras 2l0,000 t10 m $8.5 
. 
Nicaragua 235,000 $11.5m tlO.O 
Costa Rica 115,000 $6 m $5.4 
Thus the app'roximations are: 
I = 4.2 m + 19~ 
or 4.4 m + 2+c::. (Nicaragua) 
I = 2.2 m + 196 
or 2.4 m + 2lC (9uatemala/San Salvador) 
I = 2.7 m + 19C 
p ~Costa Rica) 
or 2.9 m + 21w ~ 
I = 3.l5m + 19~ 
or 3.35m + 2lcC. (}tonduras) 
1. A similar technique is used by Ava Maritana de Martel: 
:r:: economico de escala" op.cit. 
. . 
"Intef)racion 
\ 
......... -
This has to be reduced to 
depr~ciation is 
maintenance is 
1/ \'lInormal pre-tax 
1 an annual charge. It is assumed that, 
8%2pa on straightlinc method; 
4% of fixed investment 
return on capital is .u?~ 
25% of fixed investment. 
However, this figur'o is rather arbitrary chosen and 'estil1k'ltes are also 
made on the assumption that the annual capital charge is 35%. 
These are clearly approximations, but are generally of the riGht order 
of maE.,"lli tude. Thus the annual capital charges are: 
25%A 3Z%A 25%B ,?59~B 
Guatemala/El Salvador 6""" • + 5.25C .8"'+ 7C .55 "'+ 4.750 .7~+ 60 
Honduras .8 + 5.250 101 + 70 .775+ 4.750 1.05+ 6c 
Nicaragua 1.1 + 5.250 1.5 + 70 1.05 + 4.750 1.4 + 6c 
Costa Rica .725+ 5.250 100 + 70 .675 + 4.750 .9 + 60 
In order to simplify the calculations we take the highest estimate 
tt35%A)and the lowest (25%B) for testing. 
As far as labour is concerned this must also be expressed in terms of 
indivisibilities as the economies of scale function is also convex. 
~ 
, Readings were found for total spending on wages and salaries per~output, 
at near to full capacity. 
However, there are considerable difficulties involved in dealing with 
~ each~individually, and so a general function is taken, based on earlier data 
on labour costs. This is added in~ tI::o . ~d\AQ. ~~ t:~ • 
1. The summation of different annual components on fixed investment is discussed 
in A. Me!fett & A. Sykes: "Finance and Analysis of Capital Project~" Longmuns 
1963, pp. 39-42. The use of a simple 'annual charge' approach is, howevor, open 
to criticism e.g. the straight line deprociation estimate assumes that the life 
of equipment is known (i.e. no Dubstantial/change) and that this convention, 
. technical 
rather than replacement cost method, is followed. 
2. The Honduran Oensus: (1966) indicates that 8% is about right. 
! 
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Diag. lOb 
Summary l~trix of Transport Costs (Maximum) % per Journ~~ 
San 
Guat. CitI Salvador Tegucigalpa S.P_~. Hanagua 
8 22 20 28 
6 2 12 15 23 
20 12.5 10 .1 22 
28 24 17 22 2 
San Jose 
42 
,38 
35 
17 
~an Jose 44 37 .30 40 17 2 
lmports (Total cost) 41 
.... 
(1) Guatemala 'I.~, .85"", + 6.25C 
(1) EI Salvador I \01.85"" + 6.25C 
(1) Nicaragua'!, 1'1.35 M + 6.25C 
(1) Costa Rica:t ... $ .975",,:'" 6.250 
(1) ,Honduras :c .t1.075""t 6.25C 
B Proportional Costs • 
40 4,3 
(2) 11.2""+ 8.5C 
(2) ~ 1.2 .... + 8.5C 
(2) , I.8~+ 8.5C 
(2) i 1.3"+ 8.5C 
(2) 11.4"+ 8.5C 
42 43 
In addition to labonr and capital charges there are proportional costs 
39 
which are estimated to be %11 p.t., except in Costa Rica where they are %7 p.t. 
. . 
(based on Diag. 7). However, the major item is transport costs. 
C Transport Costs 
Transport cost data is readily available, but not always reliable. 
Diag. 100. shows a range of data available from various studies. l Thore are 
. . 
great~varieties of cost depending not only on distance but on load size; 
road quality(.asphnlt, gravel et~; return or single journey; and the current 
l 
._ • .;#'< state of demand and supply in the trucking industry. Diag. lOb gives a 
simplified matrix based on the above figures with some rounding and deduction 
for individual journeys. However, these transport costs nre likely to change 
I. United Nations (E.C.L.A.) "Transportation in Central America" E/CN.12/CEE/ 
324. 
\ 
39. 
over time, and with the larger transport flows which could be entailed by 
specialisation patterns thut are likely to result from more concentruted 
production. So a separate lower estimate is made for transport costs and 
these are j less than the previous estimates. Finally, provision is allowed 
for the fact that the more costly journeys to the extremities could be 
reduced by barge or coastal ship journeys from say Puntarenas to Acajutla. 
This trade does not now exist, but on the basis of information supplied 
by a Panamanian shipping company in the cement trade and knowing port 
handling charges, it was possible to hazard guesses as to some likely costs. l 
It is quite possible that bulk rates of this kind could be obtained because 
, of the possibility of transporting "clinker" in bulk, and milling later. 
. . 
1. However, the crucial factor here is port waiting timo, sinco sea journeys 
in the area cost about $1 per ton per day for cement and should normally take 
three days over 500-1,000 kms. However, ships are frequently kept hovering 
outside port for five or six dayr, due to congestion. According to information 
received, a 3 day sea journey can easily take' ten days. As a fair approximation, 
%8 per tqn could be taken as reasonable for a 'typical' journey. As regards 
port costs, there is a significant disparity betVleen parts but costs depend 
significantly on bulk shipment, \"hether the load passes through customs or 
merely over the wharf, or on the current state of disrepair of the port. Port 
costs in the main ports vary between $2.5 and 7.5 per ton, but a working 
figure of %5 per ton is used for each port embarcation and disembarcation. 
Thus the sea and port costs are taken at %18 per ton-for all journeys between 
distant Central American ports. Given the port-capital transport charges we 
get the following cases where totnl transhipment costs are lower than road 
journeya: Guatemala City to San Jose. - Costa Rica ($25): El Salvador to 
San Jpsc ($26): San Pedro Sula to San Jose ($22.5); San Jose to 
Guatemala City ($27): San Jose to El Salvador ($26): San Jose to S.P.S. 
($23.5). ~ Central American Transport Study. ·Vol. II Part 8. 
o • II ' II " " Vol. I I pp.393. Ii> or SIECA: 
"Analysis and Perspectives of Ports in Central America" SIECA/INFR-STTH - l/D T.3. 
40. 
Results 
The model was run on a series of assumptions. The results in terms of 
I 
possible feasible solutions is set out in Ding. 12. 
Assumption I 
Assumption II 
Assumption III 
Assumption IV 
Assumption V 
Assumption VI 
(a) Transport costs are the ~~nimum 
(b) Economies of scale are run on a minimum assumption~~~ : 
indivisibi1itieo. 
(c) A tariff against imports of 50%. 
(a) Transport Costs are the maximum. 
(b) Economies of Scale are on a minimum assumption 
regarding indivisibi1ities. 
(c) A tariff of 5~~. 
(a) Transport costs are at a maximum. 
(b) Economies of scale are run on maximum assumptions. 
(c) A tariff of 50% 
(d) Transport Costs - intermediate, i.e. high but 
excluding the more extreme journeys. 
(b) Economies of scale is a maximum. 
'c) A tariff of 5~~. 
(a) Transport costs at a m1.nimu~. 
(b) Economies of scale maximum. 
(c) A tariff of 5()j~ 
(a) Transport Costs intermediate. 
(b) Economies of Scale maximum. 
(c) A tariff of 2.5?~. 
Various things come 'out of the results quite clearly: 
(1) In no case is the nutarkic solution 
(li) However, the overall cost advantage 
solutions is only small, 10.5%, 5%, 
out of the various assumptions. 
\ 
optimal. 
from the optimal 
6.59!; 5%, 15.5% 
- ., 
," :~ ~-, 
Assumption I 
ConfiC,juration Cost·in ~m. 
·01001 17.95 
·11001 18.00 
,10001, 18.275 
10101 18.375 
01101 18.60 
·11101 18.835 
,01011 19.065 
10011 19.116 
11011 19.275 
10111 19.60 
01111 19.80 
*11111 20.05 
, 
-01010 20.255 . 
10010 20~40 
11010 20.50 
10110 20.755 
01110 20.975 
11110 21.225 
.... 
00101 21.975 
·010001 22.160 
-
·01000 22.3 
,00111 22.335 
01000 ~ 22.35 
110001 22.40 
-"-~ 
"10100,! 22.
'
1-7 
'11000 22.,6. 
10100 22.79 
loooo,! 22.91 ... 
111001 23.00 
-
. 11100 23.06 
" 
',,' 
):,.> 
~' . 
........."""" ... < -~.-.. ---~. ::~~'~ -.~ -,."' ...... -.- - - --.~- --->. -, 
---
piagram 12 
Hcsu1ts 
. . 
Assumption II 
ConfiGuration 
·11001 
·11101 
*11111 
'10111 
*01001 
• •••• 
• •••• 
11100,! (Best imports) 
• •••• 
, 
• •••• 
01000 (Best sinGle 
location) 
90st in gm,' 
19.475 
19.60 
20.05 
20.45 
20.74 
• •••• 
• •••• 
23.00 
• •••• 
• •••• 
27.73 
AssumptioIL.l.!! 
*11001 22.50 
*11101 22.95 
·01001 23.',2 
,10001 23.535 
10101 23.84 
·11111' , 23.85 
01101 23.885 
10111 0::; 23.90 
10011 23~925 ' 
• •••• • •••• 
• •••• • •••• 
111001 27.0 
-
101001 .. 27.0 
-
110001, 27.15 
• •••• • •••• 
01000 30.03 
.. 
---- .... 
\, 
. ""~""'-'''''I''''''''''' 
-' 
(iii) Except for the most conservative assumption (II), the 
most acceptable pattern of development is for Salvador or Guatemala or 
both to produce witn Costa Rica, and for Honduras and Nicaragua not to do so. 
(iv) If the tariff is reduced to 25% then imports do become 
a good deal more attractive; however, only if the tariff were reduced to 
around 15% would an optimal solution involve any imports at all from outside 
the system. 
(v) In all cases a singl~ regional cement plant would be grossly 
sub-optimal, in the best case 15-20% worse than the optimal. 
Various of the assumptions implied by the model were then tested to see 
to ... ,hat extent it had produced a distortion. 
(i) the assumption that demand is price inelastic, and the static nature 
of the model can be tested by trying different estimates of demand., The 
mode! is run on the assumption of what might be the, demand in 1975. 
(ii) \'le have also 'assumed 10OC~ utilisation of capacity and if this 
, 
assumption is relaxed this, would also have the effect ,of increasing fixed 
capital cost~, und thus a'more decentralised solution, as the linearisation 
would take place over a larger range of capacity. 
(iii) One of the likely errors arises from linearisation. If we take 
the three cases of, one tEl Salvador) plant; capacity, 830,000 T.p.a. 
- -
or ~ plants (El Salvador & Costa Rica) 560,000 T.p.a. and 
270,000 T.p.a. 
or ~ plants 
In tho first case the difference between the investment 'prpdicted by 
the curve and that by linear approy~mation - $.5m. 
In the second case the difference between the investment predicted by 
'I~ 
the curve and that by line~~. +~8m. 
'. 
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In the third case the difference between the investment predicted by 
the curve and that by linear approximation is $.4m. 
These can be reduced to annual charges of - ~.125m; ~m; %.lm. These 
sums are far too small to affect the raru{ ordering seriously, but the 
general effect "is to exaggerate the capital costs involved iXl either a very 
large or five/four very small plants while underotating the capital costs 
of two or three equi-sized plants. 
(iv) Another line of criticism is that we have taken all costs at 
market pric,es and have not distinguished between market ~d "shadow" costs. 
-An intereoting new approach to this is set out in the Little-Nirlees HanuallJfi~,+a-t,' 
~ ~~..JJa .~~,~ "t:..JJ.(j 
which would othen/ise have saved or earned foreign exchangrindirectlY t or ~ 
"nrm-trarleables". If all prices arc quoted at world market prices a cost 
benefit analysis can be carried out, with the aim of findine a oolution which 
minimises 'tradeable costs' i.e. : foreign exchange. 
It can be seen: from a quick check that deduction of non-tradeable costs 
, 2 
has little effect on the result, but us the inputed coefficients are 'so I, 
dubious it is scarcely worth dQing a detailed calculation. 
Implications of the Re~ult~ 
Let us assume that we adopted what appears to be one of the more realistic 
,of the range of possibilities - say Assumption It what implications does this 
have for the economies of the countries concerned? 
1. O.E.C.D. "Hanual on Project Evaluation" Purt II. 
~ 20 As we lack a full Central ~nerican input-output table it is extremely 
~ ". difficult to establish the full import content of elements of the cost. If we ~ ~__ use the figures provided for Mexico in one of Little's case studies (pp.238-249) 
~ fixed investment: 68% Tradeable. 1076 Labour 22% Residual (of which 68~6 is 
fI...,. lradeablc, ~Cli6 non-tradoablei 1 Z ~ e. in total 75~6 approximately tradeable; 
r"~nnsport~for,the service sector as a whole, tradeable value is about 50% 
but this is very approximate.~ ~;~) , 
Labour Costs 6~~ tradeable (excluding skilled people and management). 
Electricity 85% tradeable I 
Fuel 9q6 tradeable (u guess - in Mexico, Fuel is locally obtain~d). I 
Raw Materials Nost non-tradeable - I : 
'. L 
Ii 
, ..... '-'-~ 
~----------------
--_._---------------------_. ,-.~~, ""-"! 
First, let us take the theoretical figures and assume that the companies 
pursue an orthodox pricing policy in which consumers pay for the cost of 
transport. If we had a 560,000 ton factory in El Salvador and n 270,000 ton 
factory in Costa I~ca then the annual capital and labour charges in the two 
cases would be :'%7.8 per ton in El Salvador; $10 per ton in Costa Riqao 
Given the variable costs \'/hich \'Ie have hitherto assumed, this means exfactory 
costs of %19 in El Salvador and $17 in Costa Rica, i.oo 
(1) 
Theoretical 
"Optimu!n" Market Prices 
( if optimum solution 
were ado;eted) 
Guatemala 23.5 
San Salvador 20.0 
s.P.S. 30 • .5 
Tegucie;alpa 28.5 
Managua 28.0 
San Jose 17.0 
(l.) % per ton 
Theoretical 
"National Prices" 
(if five plant '. 
solution were 
adopted) 
24.5 
23.5 
27.5 
34.5 
30.0 
19.0 
(~ .' 
Actual Prices 
22 
25 
28 
38 
32 
22 
There would be a general gain in 'consumer welfare' in all the countries, 
except (marginally) in Guatemala and San Pedro'Sula. However, the main benefi't 
of the neh' dis~ribution of plant accrues. to the producing countries - Salvador 
and Costa Rica. The effect of decentralisation on annual cement costs would be 
.- , 
(approximately) Guatemala $400,000; El Salvador t800,ooo; Honduras t180,ooo; 
.• Nicaragua %250,000; Costa Rica $lt50,OOO. 
~ 
r 
What is much more significant is the effect on national income as the 
"saving" is, to some extent, reduced value added. 
(i) there are no multiplicr effects, / 
We assume that 
(It 
(ii) that the benefito of transport conts accrue to the fiVe countries on 
the same basis as if they had "national" .production, 
(iii) that the "local content" of tho following components of expenditure 
is as follows: 
- . 
- ~ ~ ....... -----.--~,--..--~----
fixed investment 
ElectriCity 
i' I 
-------------------
Fuel 15% 
Labour 75% 
Ravl 11ateria1s 85~~ 
These are only guesses, but they do give UQ a set of figures with which 
As a result of increasing their output ffom a "national" level to being 
regional planto, El Salva.dore 200,000 t.p.a. to,560;000 t.P.~; and Costa 
Rica~ 160,000 t.p.a. to 270,000 t.p.a~; guin %3,700,000 and %950,000 
.(\~ v...li"U"/Io\O - , 
respectively in terms. -
The annual "loss" frogl ceasing production is: 
. Guatemala c' %3.35m. 
Honduras c %1.6511\. 
Nicaragua c ;t.65 M. 
~ 
-
To all countries there is an increase in value added to the transport 
, 
sector (6~6 local costs)'.- $4.150\000 in tot~l - divided in proportion to 
consumption. 
Thus the net balancing out of "local inc~me" gains and losses is: 
Guatemala %-3.0fl\! . 
El Salvador %+4.0,... 
Honduras $-l.85N.·. 
Nicaragua $-1.85 ttl 
Costa Rica $+1.20 ~" 
or In order to save the region about 10% of cement annual turnover $ ~m. 
~ 
(or about two t~±rds or ~hree quarters of that in foreign exchange) there is 
" _ also a "saving" in the form of reduced local payments in the former producer 
states. Thus, although one can demonstrate the theoretical advuntages of a 
more centralised pattern of ,pro~uction, there would be a considerable 
~ Tedistribution problem in offsetting losses and ~preading bcnefita as the 
gains and losses on the income side are greater than the savinGS from mor~ 
efficient cement production, in individual cascs. 
'. 
~ 
Conclusion 
Some of the inefficiency and high cost of the industry can be attributed 
to the duplication of plant. IIo\oJever, if we also take into account the high 
transport costs of the Central American area, the savings from centralisation 
. 
are relatively small and there is a significant range of error in estimation. 
If the theoretical solution were turned into practice,' there would be serious 
income and employment effectSin individual countries which might be considered 
sufficiently inconvenient to avoid accepting a rationalisation of production. 
Proira~~ing.Mode~ II : Time Phasin~1 
We have asserted that there are two aspects to the "optimum capacity" 
problem. Here we'shall deal \"lith the second. To what extent is it desirable 
. 
to select a capa.city for a. proposed plant above present requirer:lento in 
antic~patiol1 of the growth of the market? The problem of securing an optimum 
plant capacity lies in the fact that a larger plant, though enjoying economies 
of scale; will'operate below full capacity initially, when heavy fixed charges 
will have to be carried. Conversely, a. pla."lt ,which is too small \d11 puss up 
benefits from economies of scale. Our aim is to work out a time path for 
investment which is optirmal, minimising costs, for u given market growth, 
social discount rate and economies of scale factor.. 
Data Used 
(l) Disoount rate. there i~ little guidance herc~ 10% Deems an absolute 
minimum as a rate of time preference in the risky and unstable environment of 
- Central America; 15% was tried for sensitivity purposes. 
(2) An annual demand increment was obtained by approximating to the 
growth path of the last few years'. The result will be biased towards excessively 
6mall plant sizes in later years'. 
,1. A. 'Manne: "Investments for Capacity Expansion, Size, Location nnd Time, 
PhasinPi.".op.cit. 
':,,:: l 
., :~- ;--:t 
~--
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(3) For investment and other non-consi;ant costs, there are various 
elements: 
(i) the investment cost itself every p years, but made once and for all 
time, 
. (ii) annual charges directly related to the investment cost, such as spare 
parts, maintenance etc., adding, perhaps, 3 or ~% a year. 
(iii) A more difficult problem was labour \'/hich is known to enjoy economies 
of scale, but in no easily quantifyable way. It is assumed (somewhat arbitrarily) 
to enjoy the same economies,of scale, function and to have a fixed capital 
labour relationship such that, in Central American conditions, labour costs 
come to something like 5% of fixed investment. Thus, 8-10% of the investment 
cost needs to be added or discounted at 10% to infinity, which is equivalent 
to 8~~ of the investment cost.l 
Also, -the plant will have to be replaced after depreciation. If we assume 
as in the "static" example, that the plant \'1ears out after every l2~ years, 
then there is an annual "replacement factor" such as to add 15~~ to the present 
2 . 
value of the investment, assuming straight line depreciation. 
So ... le need to add 95-100";0 to the investment costs. This is near enOUGh 
to 100% to assume that doubling is a reasonable approxim~tion • 
Therefore, if the original function is 
then we can assume 
. 
log I =·-1035 (0).715 
log I = 2070 (c)·715 
. Two further adjustm~nts are called for. First, very often in the cement 
industry additions to capacity take the form of extensions to existing plants 
.. 
rather than new ones. Some idea of the average number of kilns can be obtained 
from Cembureau, the world cement directory, which provides the following 
1. A. Merrett & A. Sykes: op.cit. p.9, ("Cush flo ... /s into perpetuity"). 
2. Ibid. Ch. 2. 
'. 
, . ....., 
. j 
I 
1 
~ 
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evidence of Latin America kiln sizes (1963). 
One kiln 32 
two II 22' This distribution may just give figures for 
three It 15 plants at different stages of the life cycle 
four " 10 though it can be seen. that even then, there 
five 3 is a considerable number ,'lith several kilns. 
We adopt Manne's convention of assumine that every other extension to 
capacity is in the form of a new kiln rather than a new plant, and with 75% 
of the investment cost. 
Second, above a certain. capacity range of kiln, economies of scale are 
no longer so important and so it is assumed that above 400,000 T.p.a. the 
curve is linear. 
Resulte:, 
The basic object of the exercise was to establish the benefit to be 
derived from multination~l planning. If we takc, initially, a discount rate 
of 10',.6 and the lower ~stimate of transport costs and, ;jf we take the best of 
threc ordering combinations and compare i~.with the 'closed' solution, we get: 
(for ordering 5, 4, 3, 2, 1). 
\\ " . -'. 
Open Soluti?n (~ t:nk) " " /. •. 11 ! Closed Solution l.. wlt~iMl'~.l 
Total Discounted Costs 
Terminal Value 
Of which manufacturing 
costfr ?U'e 
Of which transport 
costs are 
$80.463m• 
62.275 
18.187 
(i.e. jntraregionnl 
trade transport costs) 
Optimum time cycles etc. (U-Q. (v.) ~ •. 
1 
1 
74.68 
10.350 
" (i.e, intranational trade 
transport couts r" . ~ 
.50. 
\\ "~ 
\\ 
" . ~ clJu,.£ S6~ ... 
---. 
cycl,e start siz~ Si£le start ~ 
--"- . 
Location 1 21t yrs. yr. 1 600,000 l. yrs. 1st yr. 100,000 ton 
2 24 
" 
II 1.5 ~08,ooo 4 
" " " 
68,000 
" 
3 12 " II 10 168,000 4 " " " 56,000 " 
4 12 11 " 6 144,000 4 " " " 48,000 " 
.5 6 " " 2 108,000 4 " " 
II 72,000 11 
It can be seen that there are advantages to be derived from a planning 
approach. Optimum time cycles are considerably lengthened by allowing the 
possibility of tradejand the optim~~ kiln si~e 'very substantially increased in 
several cases (quadrupled or quintupled) to permit economics of scale in 
manufacturing and labour costs. However, transport costs rise rapidly too with 
increased interchange and almost offset the potential gains; though on balance, 
deferring construction and inourring a transport cost penalty is beneficial. 
There are small proportipnal costs to be considered too, but on the assumptions chos ... 
en about 5-7';6 of cement costs could be saved, \-/ith a time rhasing policy. As 
\-Je have only considered a very small number ,o~ ordering secluenc.:.s (6) it is very 
likely that a better sequence could be found. ' 
What this "optimum" solution implien is that'Guatemala effectively becomes 
, -
the main re3ional producer of cement for the next five year planning period, 
, 
with Costa Rica supplying itself and r~icaragua. In the sixth year, Nicaragua 
produces initiu'lly for export, but later for self-sufficiency. Later, Honduras, 
-~ 
El Salvador constrict plants though largely for self-sufficiency apart from 
'- supplies to Teg'J,cigalpa. 
-,,4'" -
.. 
In the following diagram, one can Dee the importance of international 
trade under the tloptirnunl'system. 
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Trad~ Producti~l~ (over year 0) 
Year 1 6l,OOOT 86,OOOT 
2 86,0001' . l72,OOOT 
3 l29,oOOT 2,58,OOOT 
4 l72,OOOT 344,OOOT 
.5 2l5,OOOT 430,OOOT 
6 l86,oOOT 516,000'1' 
7 235,OOOT 602,OOOT 
8 240,oOOT 630,OOOT 
9 280,oOOT 774,0001 
10 170,OOOT 860,COOT 
11 187,OOOT 946,OOOT 
12 204,oOOT .1·,032,600T 
13 265,OOOT l,llB,oOOT 
14 290,OOOT l,201+,OOOT . 
15 78,oOOT 1,290,OOOT 
16 102,OOOT 1,376,OOOT 
17 130,00OT 1,462,OOOT 
18 84,OOOT 1,548,OOOT 
19 ll6,OOOT 1,631, ,OOOT 
20 ·l12,OOOT l,716,oOOT 
21 l26,OOOT l,798,ooa.c 
22 l,880,OOOT 
23 l,962,OOOT 
-24 2,OI+4,OOOT 
The level of trade rises to n peak of nearly. 300;OOOT declining towards the 
irl~ 
end of the cycle. (The cycle concept artificially deflatos tho later 
predictions of trade). Certainly, far more trade is envisaged than at pre~ent ~, 
in the recent past - and this excludes bordor or seasonal truffic. 
However, it is worth lookin$ at aome of the simplifications that have been 
made to see how the results would be affected. 
Computational Dotail: one of the significant features, and weaknesses, of the 
exercise is that the results are susceptible to the influenco of whatever 
\ 
, 
, 
'-
-. 
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sequence is used for examing the regions. Six sequences \'/Cre exo.mincd 
Had a more exhaustive analysis been carried out, a lower "optimum" might 
have been reached. 
Discount Rate: if a discount rate of 15% io taken, this does not zreatly 
o-r crl" 
affect the relative advantage/disadvantage of ce~tralise~ decentralised 
solutions but the overall magnitUde of costs is considerably affected. \'1ith 
low transport costs and the same combinations as before, we have: 
• 
Ordering, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 60.333 
5, 4, 3, 2, 1 59.549 (Closed - approx. 63.75) 
4, 1, 3, 5, 2 59.990 
Transport Cost~: if a higher set of transport costs are taken, a more 
decentralised pattern is made to look slightly more attractiva: , 
Orderin~ 
~ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 82.833 
5, 4, 3, 2, 1 87.067 (Closed is 86.276) 
It, 1, 3, 5, 2 85.L~13 .. 
3, 2, 5, 1, 4 89.799 
2, lt 4, 5, 3 82.071 
2, 4, 3, 1, 5 85.806 
In this case the optimal solution has much shorter time cycles thWl the previous 
optimum (every country produces from an eurlier date) ruld trade is, therefore, 
much less imports. 
53. 
·"O!~~" ~y~ Sturt Size 
-
Guatemala 6 yrs ... 3 yrs. 150,000 
El Salvador 12 
" 5 " 204,000 
Honduras 8 " 2 " 112,000 
Nic~ragua 8 
" 5 " 96,000 
Costa Rica 6 
" 
1 " 108,000 
Therefore, with a higher transport costs assumption, there would be smaller 
plants and a much more "self-sufficient" solution. 
Economies of S~: purely for cross checldng purposes, an estimate was also 
made of the effect of assuming an extremely small economies of scale factor. 
In this case, labour and other non-investment economies of scale were 
assumed away and replacement too. A less significant economies of scale 
parameter was also chosen, i.e. I = 525 (C)·8. 
~he effect of this on the overall results is not all that significant. 
In this case the "closed" solution has terminal costs of 53.78m and three 
year cyc·1es~(\4sillg a 1056 discount rate and "low" transport costs ).> __ 
vthe open solutions have costs· as follows: 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
5, 4, 3, 2, 1 
4, 1, 3, 5, 2 
3, 2, 5, 1, 4 
2, 1, 4, 5, 3 
2, 4, 3, 1, 5 
51.07 (all four year cycles) 
62.04 
52.69 (mostly six year cycles) 
63.6&. 
52.959 
53.427 
Even in this caso there are small gains from lengthening the time cycle 
~~ .. to four years, by phasing in regional imports. 
Demand: the computer programme was not adapted to deal with this geometric 
gro~th, though this would hav~ been more realistic than arithmetic growth. Tho 
e:. - '\ ~ 
-~-~{.~ 
- ~4.i 
: 
effect of a geometric growth would be to produce optimul time-cycles of 
gradually increasing, rather than constant length. 
Conclusion: under a considerable array of different as~umptions, it can be 
shown that there are gains to the region from planning out future capacity 
expansion multinationally in such a way as to permit larger kilns with better 
utilisation of capacity. In so much as planning uhcad already exists in the 
region, it will take three years or so to use up existing spare capacity. 
In that period the new Guatemalan'plant (capacity since 300.000 T.p.a.) 
and an extension to the Costa Rican plunt (capacity 250,000 T.p.a. approx.) 
are to be installed. \~ere these plans to be put back for several years, 
these two extensions could provide any new Central American demand over the 
subsequent 7-8 years if the other three countries could be persuaded to 
maintain only their present capacity. 
CASE S'lVDY 
Appendix II 
Petroleum Refinin~ 
~oduction: 
The second study VIas of the petroleum refining' industry in 
Central America. As in the case of cement there has been an evolution 
of refing capacity based largely on national markets, and the building 
(and ex~ension) of refineries has proceeded rapidly over the 1962-69 
period. By 1970, there were six, and average capacity utilisation was 
1 
as low as 50f0. As \rlth the cement industry, any cooperation would at 
this stage be, of necessity, a time-planning op~ration rather than a 
.. . 
location decision, but it is of interest to spell out the implications 
of existing policy. 
Central America has no known oil or natural gas reserves though 
oil companies have made exploratory efforts notab~y in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua. Refineries 'ha've been therofore "market-based" rather than 
v 
"sourco based" or "export" refineries, and the Central American countries 
number amongst those of small developing countries seeking to achieve 
partial import-substitution by refining. The case for import-substitution, 
in Central America is accopted in principle as a starting point, as did 
2 
. the U.N. The hypothesis 'to be testod is that the allocation of rofining 
,.~ ~ 
Capacity in 'national' refineries is grossly sub-optimal in as much as it 
leeds to a neglect of the sUbstuntial economics of scale in refinory 
investment costs. 
-
1.. 'As compared with a figure of 95fo on the overall rafing operations of 
one major (Shell) - direct information. 
2. United ll'ations (E. C.L.A.) tI~"!. inteeration economic? de Central-america; 
eyolllCd on Y 110r flllcctiyasl tLa refineria de pebo1 cae; en Centra-3roerj C:i) 11 
(E/mr 12/CCE/GT.IND/3) 1956. 
,~ ~ ~~ ... '_~9.» __ " "'>-M 
- -. - -
'I 
! 
I 
i 
2. 
However, there are neveral problems involved in studying this 
industry from the point of view of a location/time planning, prol)raming 
approach: 
{i) it is arguable whether refining is, oconomically, u separate 
indust~J. It usually represents one stage in tho operations of vertically 
integrated lmlltinational firms and as such tho concept of "price" and 
"profit" is less likely to be meaningful than in other industries. 
(ii) r~fining technology is a good real more com:plex than in - sa.y -
a cement plant, and there are many possib~lities in respect of ancillary 
equipment depending on the crude used and market served. To reduce these 
refinements to easily manageable pieces of data is difficult. Technoloey 
1 
is also changing the method of production rapidly. 
Therefore, there is a good case for initially looking at; 
(1) refining technology. 
(11) the nature of the oil industry as a multinational industry. 
A. Oil Refining & Technology 
}s the technology of oil refing is inextricably tied up VIi th its 
econom,s, some basic background should be given. The tv/a factors which 
determine the product output of a refinery are' 
-(a) the nature of the crude oil input. 
(b) the complexity of the refinery, which is itcelf determined by 
market requirements. 
'" A very simple refinery could consist of little more than n diotillation 
.. ~ column with faoUi tieD for extracting the various fractions • 
.....,." -
1. e.g. in the last fevr years 'there has been a big step 
development of 'hydro-cracking' to increase petrochemical 
froe a refinery: IIf11 (> - u,,:+. in Pornnoctivo", 
Society, (1970-71), (J.T. Jenoen & M.F. Stewart. 
• 
forward with the 
foed-stock yield 
American Chemical 
_---.------- -7'--' refinery easos (sarno for fuel) 
light gasoline or gasoline (of various "octane" ratin60 
naptha fraction. -r.>- and possibly including como virain I na~tha if requiro~ • 
~de oil 
... heavy gasoline 
I 
/ 
:> - - kerosene 
gas oil & 
____ ----~~~------ diesel oil after 
"hydro" treating 
Fuel oil 
->->---- or tlBunker C". 
The composition of "the final output will depend on the API rating, 
(~ inverse of cpecific gravity)and to Borne extent on the source of the oil. 
I 
The fo~lowing diasram gives an indication of tho significance of a chango 
in specific gravity. 
Gas 
Gasoline 
Kerosene 
Medium crude 
(circa, 300 API.) 
l.~ 
Diesel & Heating 
oil 18.0% 
Fuel oil . 
Heayy Crude 
(say around or lees 
than- 200 API.) . 
67.~ 
Tho heavier the crude - the less gasoline and the moro the fuel oils 
10 
a very heavy crude (e.e. Bac...Raquero of API 11 0 ) would give only 2 - 3% 
gasoline: and a light crude (~ay 35°) could yield 30% gasoline. 
1. United Nations, tI~echniQ.uep of Petroleum Develonment"; Articlo by O&r, 
Page 182. 
1 
Product yields are varied by the addition 'of various proceso units. 
(a) a cata.lytic reformer: this has the offect of ra.ising tho overall 
gasoline yield (16% t~ 20% for a medium crude) and improving its quality. 
(b) a catalytic cracker: this unit cracks heavy fra.ctions down to 
gasoline and other, heavier, fractions. In this way the gaso1ino content 
can be greatly inoreased, usually at the expense of fuel oil. 
It is reasonably vru.id to assert that a combination of theso throe 
basic processes plus variation in crude composition can meet almost all 
variations in market requixments that a country io likely to facol : though 
in some cases imports or exports (e.g. of a product like Keroseno which is 
, .'subsidiary and of which it is difficult to va.ry the yield) may be approp-
riate. One significant feature of the largo refinery flexibility is that 
we do not have a real 'joint product' problem since the petroleum products 
in surplus (or at least the 'heavy' fractions) Can be reducod to others. 
Gasoline itself is derived from naptha which can be convected to gasoline 
or used as a petrochemical feedstock. 
2 
B. Tho International Oil Industr~ 
Theroonomics of refining cannot be understood in isolation from that 
of the rost of tho industry. The mean features of tho industry are three. 
first its largest firms are vertically integrated, owning exploration, 
production' • refini.ng, transportation and marketing facilities: second, 
because o~ geographical exigonces producer countries do not overlap very well 
~1th consumers and so the firms are often 'multinational'. third, concentration 
.,:;- - . ""~ .. 
of ownership is considerable, \\1 th \ .' dominant world wido concerns, 
1. There are several other processes that are likoly to be encountered in 
practice too: 
(a) "hydro-finishing" and other deoulphurisntion processesl to romovo 
tho sulphur compounds that are common especially in Vonezualan ~rude. 
(b) petrochemical polymerisation and extraction units: this vdll be 
discussed. . . _ • • Ono of the main by-produots of cracking is the 
production of refines which are the basio building blocks for many potrochemical 
. . products. ,. 
~2. Tho industry is described by inter alia: Edith Penroses "Tho Loree IntQlllatioUiJl .' - ~rxelo.DinP~\mtTiies'" 'l! Tanzer "~bQ PoliticaU..Q.Qll.oIDy or International Oil and the :- v ___ lle.ct.::..Q:QUJi:il:;t.e s. London 1910. 
-; " ::;' >-
;-~-=~ ~ 
," 
" , 
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/concerns, 1 and this has led to behaviour of on "oligopolistic" kind. 
This is a greatly oversimplified pioture however, Thore are many 
'seoond-rank' oil companies; Phi~ips, Continental, Burmah, Humble and 
Italy's state run ENI, which are very significant; though the "majors" 
control two thirds 9f the final market. One of the features of the smallor 
operators is that they tend to be deficient in one or othor section of tho 
vertical chain and thus to lack the short term flexibility and seouri ty of 
the largest companies. Th;i.s partly explains why they have lost sone of thoir 
share of the market in recent years. Also, connected with tho existance of 
"independents!! is the non-international nature of many segments of the 
industry e.g. Pemex controls all aspects of " Mexican Oil, while other countries 
have :partially nationalised or "independent"parts of the jproduction process. 
On basis of information provided by Shell, independents havo 30% of overall 
G~ 
opGl'ati-ons turnover (mainly" . J supply) and l~ of refining capacity, both 
figures falling. 
However, th~ main point of dispute is the degree of price campeti tion 
in the industr,y, and this in turn dictates the extent to which the 
multinational companies are ablo to disregard nation~l interest. Opinions 
varY strongly. Gritics of the industry argue that the industry operates as 
i 
collusive or price-led oligopoly with each firm earming subatantial ~monopoly' 
profits, -and saving sufficiently small competition to be ablo to fix "transfer 
prices" between parts of a company of crude, "knowhow", services, etc. 
2 . ~ 
regardless of national bound~ries. These prices are fixed to maximiso 
~~ "seven siters") they ure, Standard Oil-Now Jorsey (brand name - Easo) 
Shell, D.P., Standard Oil - California, Mobil, Texas (Toxaco), Gulf. 
2. This is a somewhat oversimplified interpretation of the lin~ of arbUomont 
to be found in P ~ Odell. IIOil & \70rld Powcr~, (peneuin 1970) 'and' Rennard c 
Geoc-raphy of 0U, Bell 1963, Oil: The Now Commandinr. Height"l FabiC\n Rosearch 
Series, 251, and also in lit Tanzer "The Political Economy of Oil" Ch.2. J E Harthorn: 
"EI Petroleb', "Emnresas Pri vadas y GobiernQ," 1967, Ch.9. . 
~ 
6. 
CJf' profits in a preferredwuntry, with disregard for the taxationlforoign 
exchange p~tion of any client stato. Prices would bo mt in tho final 
product market to ma.xi~ise overall profits to the industry 
and by deducting back marketing, refining and transport 
costs one would ob~ain a crude "price" which includes a substantial prof! t 
element to be appropriated in royalties by the exporter country or retained 
as profit by the company. In so much as thero is competition in the industry 
it is, according to the critics, of a non-price variety i.o. firms try to 
expand their share of the retail market by providing more attractive marketing 
outlets, or their share of refing capacity by offering favourable construction 
agreements, and in this way create a market for the highly profitable cmude 
oil. But:it is in the interest of no firm to reduco the product price which 
would have the effect of eliminating the profit for vrhich they are competing. 
However, the companies. would argue that price competition is extremely 
1 important; that it has been induced partly by tho influence of independent 
oil producers shorm of marketing and refin~g outlets who try to improve thoir 
market position by price cutting, and also by the pressure of governments 
in potential oil·producing countries insisting that thoir oil deposits be 
developed post-haste (with the implied threat of using ~n independent) and 
so creating a s1 tuation of 'over-supply'. Whether for this reason or 
'. 
improved -t.cchniques, crude prices fell steadily over the last decade, and 
"transf'er ll prices bear an increasingly close rela.tion to the market prices 
" as determined by "arms length" sales (between companios or from independent 
1. e.g. R Cha.ndler liThe Myth of Oil Powor", International Affairs, 
Oct 1970, pp 710-718. 
'. 
y 
sellers) • 
However, the picture varies greaftly from place to place. In somo 
cases the~ is~ar evidence that companies have exploited, collectively, 
their po~ions as crude oil suppliers: 
. 
1 India is perhaps tho worst example • 
However, oven in that case the government had tlle counter of importing 
cheaper Russman crude. Central American countries, with no bargaining 
p~wer, unsphisticated governments and little global importance are likely 
to suffer particularly badly from the oil companies' nctivities. 
One further point is the practice of havin6 ~'posted prices" for 
crudo oil exports (and products). This system was partly introduced as 
a guideline to transfer prices, but is preserved largely at the bidding 
of exporting countries who by fixing a national export price are able to 
preserva a base for taxation evoluo.tion and for ensurine that exports are 
• 
'fairly' valued in terms of foreign exchange. 
Such has been the trend in world demand and supply, that actually 
traded world crude prices are nO~T significantly less than 'posted' prices. 
This can be seen from the diagram below: the tree market prices 
"'~ .. ~!!..' 
represen"V~ales between companies or from oompanies to independent 
refineries or vice versa • 
. "'-0:'- 1. See P. Odells "Oil & World Power" OPe 01 t. Ch. 7. p.140. 
M Tanzer liTho Political Economy of Oil" OPe oit. .. 
\ 
8. 
(Venezualian prices of API 25.5 crude: as recorded in 
Petroleum Press June 1970, pp 215.) 
Ave. 
-
1968 ~ 
Posted Prices ~2.25 ~2.25 
Ave realised price 1.82 1.81 
. 
Discount offered by 
.43 .44 (15%) 
Company selling crude 
oil. 
Product prices are also fixed on a 'posted price' basis, but-
tthey are more flexible and confirm better to reality. 
However, in sO much as an integrated company handles cross-border 
trade, say from a rofinery to distributors, or from crude supply to 
refinery there is no obligation upon it, except convenience, to prico 
the transferred fuel at either IIposted" or tlarms-len~~11 (market) pricos 
- U!lless a government insists, upon it.. The ability to solI crude and products 
c..>~ .~k..all.... 
at above • .narket'" prices depends on the degree of control which one oil 
, , 
Company has over retail outlets (or refining). This control is likely to 
be greater in small developing countries like those in Contral America. 
This has led,to a growing interest in independent refiners. However, 
-there has been mixed experiencevth independents. They Can make a 
substantial 1I10ca1" profit when there is a "bearish" crude oil market, 
~ut they c~n easily find themselves in difficulties when crudo is scarco, 
and when the ~go profits go to independ~nt crude auppliers. They have 
about 10% of the world capacity, but this is deolinging and most countrios 
Seem now to prafer the established oil companies for stability. 
4he Central American Indusf;y. 
The Central American situation will be discussed under sevoral 
\ 
i1 
i' 
, 
t j 
I 
headings, belov,' .. "olflever the salient points arc as followsl 
• 
First, imported oil is the only significant supply of fuel. Local 
energy requirements are being increasingly met by hydro-electricity, 
but there is no known local oil or natural gas or other fuel. Ding. 1 
gives the profile of energy supplied by the electricity industry. 
Second, consumption of oil products is gro\rlng rapidly, somewhat faster 
than GNP, due in some measure to the interest now being shown in 
industrialisation. Third, ~oreign exchange is seen to constitute a major 
constraint on development and import saving one of the main goals of policy. 
Of the total Central imerican import bill in 1963 fuel coots (direct) 
were 1%, though this has declined sinceo 
Finally, the marketing and refining of oil is almost entirely in the 
hands of the main oil companies notably ESSO (Standard Nev, Jersey). 
Production & Exploration 1 
All the five countrios (and Panama) have favourable oil legislation 
v~th generous concessions for exPloration. Despite promising geo~ogical 
structures interested wanted for a period after~50m had been spent in tho 
1950's without result. 2 No commercial discoveries had been made, though 
thera have been shows of oil and gas. The main activit~,has boen concentrated 
on the Atlantic coasts of Nicaragua3 and Honduras. Tho Paten region of 
Guatemala attracted attention for a long period, but exploration in now 
being made in the Atlantic arid Pacifio coastal zones. Costa Rica is also 
.. 
experiencing a revival in interest. The particular attraction of the area 
1. Dotailed information is given in Petroleum Press Service 1969 (November); 
alao in ICAITI. "qeological Resources in Contral America". 
2. Left vang and nationalist spokesmen in several countrios, especially 
Guatemala, claim that oil was discovered that tho oil companies are holding 
the deposits in reserve. \ 
3. Economist Intelligence UnitylBullotin No 3 1970;6aya ~40m has boon spent 
there over the last 40 years. 
, 1 
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10. 
are the favourable attitude of all the governments to foreign investment 
and the generous concessions. This is helping to offset previous 
frustration. However, nothing bas yet been found. 
Demand 
The growth of demand for petroleum products is interesting from two 
points of view - the trend rate and in terms of product composition. 
The trend rate is shown in Diag.2. (graphs 1-6). 1 
Over the long period; 1950-68, we can get the following semilog 
regressions. 
Log consumption ( E1 Sa1vado~ .,. 3.3956 + .02496 t R2 a .9812 
(Guatama1a) 
( .001226) 
R2 = 
= 3.3666 + .02510 t .9542 
Uronduras) 
( .001910) 
R2 a 
= 3.3435 + .02113 t .8429 
(Nicaraguv 
( .003271) 
R2 .,. a 3.3187 + .03541 t .9699 
( .002154) 
(Costa RiC~ = 3.3076 + .02593 t R2 = .9190 
. (.002698) 
This implies geometric growth rates of 5.9%, 5.9%, 4.9%, 8.3%, 6.2%. 
Howevor, there have been movements around tho general trend and especially 
Over the 1966-69 poriod there has been a signhficant increase in demand 
of about 1~ p.a. overall and over 15% p.n. in Honduras. In almost all 
Cases projections made in the early 1960's by planning bodies were 
conservative. 
~ -.--------------------------------------------------~----~~-------------
1. In all cases demand is expressed in terms of barrels per day of crude oil 
(on the rough conversion rate of ~ barrel per day = 50 metric tons per annum 
of crude). This assumes a 350 day year and a conversion of 7 barrels per 
MT ton or a 365 day year and a conversion of 7.30 barrels per tIT ton which is 
close to tho world average. 
'. 
", 
4(,0 200 m,I •• 
1!C>It","~;:~·1 
~ lOO 200 300 ~m. I. ""~-:-._._._. 
· .. 
. -~ .... " 
\ 
I 
11. 
In terms of consumption, DS a function of growth in GNP, the fol1~rln~ 
relationships were established: (over 1950-68). R2. 
-Guatemala log consumption Q -1.192 + 1.276 log x .955 (.045) (.096) 
El Salvador s II 11 .. 
-0.683 + 1.039 loc; x .9U3 (.026)( .046)' 
Honduras : 
" " 
.. 
-10219 + 1.252 log x .892 
(.065) (.154) 
Nicaragua : 
" " 
II 
-1026
r 
+ 1.410 log x .954 (.063 (.108) 
Costa Rica : 
" " 
Q + .200 + 0982 log x .903 ( .0'"(0) ( .ll}} 
The coefficients diverge considerably, in two countries thoro bing a rato 
of growth around that of the GNP and in the tr~ee others, a rate of growth 
substantially greater. 
Diagram 3 given a'" indication of consumption by product. Data is not 
n 
complete, but gasoline demand as an overall percentage of output consumed 
amounts to loss tha.m 20/0 in Honduras (over a long period - in 19~8/60 a's 
well as 1969) and is as hi~h as 34% in Nicaragua' Costa Rica is inter-
mediate (28%;and around 30% for over several years) while El Salvador 
and G~~temala seem to be at roughly the same level. This goneral pattern 
indicates a gas~1ine consumption (including aviation" fuel ~'1:.igh and low 
octane gasoline), of around 30% of the total, which conforms to tho 
overall Latin American pattern. The deviations are probably expldnod 
by 'abnormal' luxur,y car consumption in Nicaragua: on the other hand 
'.Honduras_is a poor country with appalling roads, much of the national 
income being generated in the Northern banana grOwing areas where thoro 
fs little opportunity for a high degree of car usage. .. 
Kerosene is used for paraffin heating - lighting and COOking by low 
income families. Its use is ver,y well developed in Salvador (18~ of total 
comsumption) but less so elseshere - 5.5% to 9% - ~nich is about tho Latin 
American Wend. 
_____ lIlIwili'j(""t ...... " .. ~.. ' .. ·lIOIrf1'· 'G.._"4j.' •. o/':'.r:.::::":'Ll:.:Lm.r;~ - '-.~.....; ...... , .... ~ ___ -1 ____ ~ •.• (I) 7 ' -",-./,,", , ~~ ;0-':-- \\ 
.. 
Production and Demand Pattern~ 
, 
, 
E1 Salvador Nicaragua Costa Rica 
1958-60 1967 1962 -1968 1964 1968 
Consump- Consump- Consumption Consumption 
tion tion ! 
L.P.G. .5 2 - 2 
Honduras 
1958-60 1969 
, CoX'...sump- Production Ex-
tion ports (bb1s/day) 
-
35,500 (1%) 
Guatemala 
1958-60 19~8 
Consump- Produ-
tion ction 
-
39,000 (2%) 
South 
American 
";~,,. _____ n 
- --
1965 
consumption 
1.5% 
Gasoline 39 27.5 30.5 34 32.5 28 19 675,000 (18%)282,200 28% 693.000 (25% 3CJ% 
Kerosene 14.5 18 7.8 10 . 5 8 . 5 182,000 (5%) 6.5% 138,000 (7%) 8.5% 
Diesel Oil) ) ) 28) 39) Gas Oil ) 32 1,013,000 (2~~)572,300 
) 53 ) . )52 '58 ) 44.5 58.5 72.5 64% (690,000 (2~b 18. 7]6 \6 7" )59.8 
Fuel Oil ) ) ) ) (739,000 (37% 28.~) • 
Bunker C ) ) 28 ) 24) 19) 1,587,000 (4_2%)],£B3.000 , ) ) ) 
Lubrication 2 1.5 ) 4 2 4 3 3 
and others ) 
Waste/etc. 
200,000 (5%) consumption 3 -
- - -
Data derived fro~ (1) pre 1963/4. Import Statistics; as in ECLAt~ossibi1ities for 
integrated industries in Central America": 1963. 
(2) Subsequent figures from annual "Annuario Estadistico de 
Co~ercio Exterior" of SIECA. (Cuadro XIV p.34.) - plus production 
figures from refineries 
Conversion Rates: D4. ton = 8.5 barrels gasoline 
IN. ton = 7.25 barrels diesel oil 
IM. ton = 6.95 bar:e1s residual fuel oi1~ 
1.5% )13.5 ) to 
)15% 
-
~;>South A~erica (Data from Cuadro 
32. E/CN 12/744:.·La I ..... ~1J.,.tr.;a 
Petrochenica en A~erica Latin;). 
.P' .~" 
,( 
J2a~~":':f}~ 
12. 
The major clement in consumption, but a declinine one, 10 the 
heavier fraction of gas oil/diesel oil and fuel oil. Diesol oil is 
consumed very largely by diesel porlored motor v:hicles and as such will 
tend to increase in proportion to tho rise in commeroial road traffic. 
Fuel oil is the fuel for many manufacturing establichments (asp. cenont), 
for thermal electrical generating uni~s (which are being replaced by 
hydro-powor) and by the railways. ~n Costa Rica the most 'developed' 
country, diesel oil fractions are IlI'.lch more important: in Honduras it 
is the other way round reflecting the relative i~portance of rail v. road 
transport and the form of development of electric powor eeneration. 
The relative changes in tho importuneD of the differont consumption 
fr~ctions seen below for the region as a whole: 
!2.4§. l2.2l .lli2 12,66 
- .. 
Gasoline .l&fo 26% 3C1fo 31,b 
Kerosene 4% 5% 7% % 
Dieseljllue1 Oil 75% (5% 58.5% 57% 
Asphalt 1% 2fo 2.5% 1.5% 
Others zp '4'0 2%' 1.5% 
The profile corresponds incooasingly to an American pattern as 
regards gasoline (but ~ European - which io much more sparing in this 
. 'respect).. One feature of the Central American product range is tho 
negligible importance of "others": this io duo to tho absence of any 
real demand, as yet, for petro-chemical foedstocks. 
c. Refinine: 
DJ.ag. 4 shows the basic information on plant size, distribution and 
ovmership. The mast significant featur~ i 0 the smallnoss of tho plants. 
the other is the role of the big companies. How did this evolve? 
'. 
...... _ ... , 
.. 
" 
~, .. 
I 
.. 
, 
Diag. 4. 
Refiner:>!: ovmed b;y,-
Guatemala - (Atlantic) 
60% Standard California 
40% Shell '(Bataanse 
Petroleum N. V. ) 
Guatemala (Escuintla) 
100% Texaco 
Honduras (Cortez-Amlantic) 
100% Texaco 
El Salvador (Acujutla) 
6~ Standard Jersey 
35% Shell 
Nicaragua (Managua) 
100% New Jerse, 
Costa Rica (Li~on) 
85% Gulf (sold in 
1968 by Continental 
oil alias Allied 
Chemicals) . 
Po "nma (Les Minas Bay) 
33~ Ultramar-Courtaulds 
33~% Universe Tank ships 
3}~ lratiunal Bulk-carriers. 
. . 
. 
Production and Capacity of nefinorioa. 
..... .. ___• H. __ • _ 
Size of (barrels per Expansion Current(}.~) Featuras 
.,;;;d;.:;;ayu..)4.;.;....-E;.::;s.;;.ta;:;;... b;,;;J;.;;i;.::;s.;.;.hm_e;;.o;.n.;..;t;..;;. ______ ..:::.c.~9..ity . 
3,800 (in 1963) 
9,000 (in 1965) 
10,300 (in 1968) 
to 12,000 
(in 1965) 
to 14,000 
(in 1971) 
12,000 
14,000 
2,800 b.d. 
cat. rcfbrrn~r 
3,300 cat. 
reform 
\..&w·~~· 
1, 600~ 2, 100b.cI 
hydro- . • 
uni t. J.~'!.wt~·~ 
14,000 (in 1963) 
8,000 (in 1966) 
to 7,900 
(in 1965 
currently 
adding 
14,000) 
\ 
14,000 
21,500 
(14,000 
operat~ 
ional) 
8,000 
(disputed) 
2,600 reform 
cat., 10,000 
hydro-
do su1phuri sation 
8,000 cat. 
reform. 
3,000 
the mal 
cracker 
1,200 cat. 
reformer. 
75,000 27,000 ~ 
cracker 
8,400 
c-X. re fo mer 
+ bitumen 
+ visbreriking unit • 
.. 
r 
I 
'< 
, ~" 
The case for refining: this was established in the mid 1950's.1 The 
basic arguments for refining were in t~rms of· possible import-saving 
through the contribution of value added locally rather than elsewhore; also 
from the fact that transport costs on imported crude oil are less than 
2 transport charges on products; 
employment creation; and the poss\. bili ties for a "spam-off" to petrochemicals - vt 
in 1960, with demand growing on al~rend and regional' market of 
30,000 b/~ this seemed a real possiBlityo 
There were of course problems. To achieve net import substitution 
makes assumptions about prices of products and crude, before and after, 
. "Ii, - :,r" ' and there are problems of achieving a proper product 
balance and disposing of surpluses of particular products. 
Given a. commitment to refine the question was then one of selecting 
a sensible regional strategy. And this involved dofing an approach to the oil 
companies. The following aiternativ6S were open; 3 
1. One Was for the governments to ask the leading distributor in the 
area, Standard Jersey, to make arrangements for refining. Prior to 1962 
tlfli'l:scor:wany had been a dominant,if not a monopoly supplier, and if they 
refined there would be a minimum disruption to tho distribution network. 
On the other hand it would give the company a perfect regional monopoly 
as competing.distributors would have to buy from a 'hostile' refinery • 
. . 
. 
-", 
As far as the company itself was concerned the advantages were balanced 
by the costs and risks 61' tyine up a large amount of capital in Q region 
, ,:;r. " 
, 
1. (E.C.L.A':) (vyasJ~)=Uni ted 1,ration~ttli.efinQCiOn do' potro190 y Qc~it~e 
Uincrale~1I (La industria quinnica llosada), 1965 Mexico. 
2. Due to the need for separating the products and carrying them in 
smaller comPartments. 
3. 11 Tanzer: tI~he Political Economy of Oil", ,op ,c1 t. oxplqins in ChI 2 & 9 
the possible roles of client governments and putative ref1r\'B companios. 
which is unstable and which wa~lroad.y yielding a. good profit. 
Standard, or no~ the other advantnges of using a 'major' are 
the ease \'lith Vlhich any imbalances in product supply can be coped TJi th 
and the • security' of having both a reputable oporator and a guaranteed crude 
source. 
2. A "l:xJ.y of trying to get these advantages wi thaut strengthening 
Standard's position would be to approach another major e.g. Shell. 
This would have obvious attractions for the Company as they could then 
obtain control of the regional market without the costly and difficult 
job of competing on tho retail side. The great danger here~s that Standard 
would see their crude outlets threatened and seek to build a competitive 
refinery and thus precipitate wasteful competition. 
3. An a.lternative idea would be to have an "indopendont" or elso a 
publicly run refinery (on a turn-key basis in the latter case) .~SUming 
that there is a technically bompetent and financially reliable refiner available 
, there is the risk of not having a guaranteed crude supply;and "indopendent" 
refinors have no~ had a happy history in recent years. Ideological bias 
probably rules out public ownershi.p, let alone regional public o,wnership 
at the present time. 
4. A fourth possibility is for the oil com,anies themsleves to collaborate 
in building a refinery. This is prima facie the most sonsible solution and 
. , 
several small African coungrios havo employed it - indeed companios like Shell 
a~e themsleves cooperative ventures. Howvver, ono is told by tho companies 
.. 
that this approach presents serious "administra.tive difficultieo". 
As it happened the course of future developmont was determined by Sholl, 
, 
who had previously boen active only in Guatomala, when it made a firm offer to 
, 
; 
" 
': ~ 
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~lild a large - 10,000 bd ~ refinery for Salvador. As tho movo was 
considered a unila.teral act by the other countries and Standard was 
obliged to take defensive steps to protect its position, tho pattern of 
development was established on a competitive rather than a cooperativ~ 
t$-Plnne~~rse~'p~posed an additional project for Salvador (of 10,000 b.d.) 
. 
and another for Nicarasua ( of 5,000 bd); Guatemala emb~r~ed upon an 
extremely small project (of 4,000 bd) on the north cORst, which was initially 
managed by the constructing companys (Beaux Bridge) then taken over by Shell" 
(and later partly bought out by Standard California). A scramble tbok place for 
the remaining countries which wanted to refina (Costa Rica and Honduras) 
and the other big Central American operating 'major' - Taxaco - established 
a second refinery in Guatemala, this time in'the south in 1965. In Costa Rica, 
several companies had been compoting from 1961/2, - Texaco and Phillips (a largo 
. ~ 
'minor' vnth strong crude oil interest in Venezuala) - and thore several 
• 
proposals for "turnkey" projects. Competition was so strong that the companies 
were accused of interfering in Costa Rican politics by offarine, over the 
th~ heads of the government, public amenities, and in particular a road from 
the north co~st to ,the capital - to compete with tho railroad monopoly. 
Phillips won, thouGh ever since then thera have been severe probloms with 
I the refinery. The only remaining refinery project - on tho Atlantic coast 
Data from ~ ,,,ttcion ll Special Supplement. ~ A San Jose nowspaper) 
in 1970; and as given by Costa Rican ~~il -;;r~;~t~v~:g:, 
',-;- A~ 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
The refinery incorporated an expensive catalytic cracker which failed 
to work: there were thus unexpectedly heavy capital churges. 
Local markoters refused to cooperatie with the company and usod hoarded 
stockpiles of imports whon the new refinery came on stream. 
A very expensive managoment dnd technical agreement with a refinery 
construction contract wfuich escalated costs boyond Qxpectation. 
Delays in starting. 
Inadequate share capital and large short term fixed interest liabilitios. 
The company claimed that its salos prices wero fixed too low':s 'U:D~. 
\ 
-----------_._._------_._--. - ---- _. ----.-._--- -
of Honduraa - was constructed i/l968 by Texaco. 
Since the establishment of the refineries several have boen expanded 
by the adding of further distillation units - as in Diag. 4. So far the 
establishment of refineries has not been accompanied by free trade, and by. 
-discrimination against retailers fram other companies • 
. 
However, one must add that without the act! vo support of the government.; 
. 
it wouldrnve been difficult for the duplication to have proceedod as far as 
" 
it has purely on the strenglh of oil company preferences. The reasons for 
governmental enthusiasm for their own oil refinoeries is not too for :ho seek; 
(i) noneconomic reasons e.g. prestige and security: 
(ii) import-saving: national governmonts perhaps tend to exagerato the net 
(as opposed to gross) import saving and see oil refinincr as a major part of the 
import substitution process. 
(iii) employment: . the benefits for a refinery in terms of men employed is 
very small indeed, but the prospect of 100 - 200 jobs is a oonsiderable induce-
ment where unemployment is a serious~roblem and Texaco were able to oxcit 
considerable popular support for their bid to builq a refinory at Limon by 
(exaggerated) promises of jobs. 
-(iv) revenue: both as extraregional produced i0Ports and as locally 
manufactured products, petroleum is a major source of revenuo. In tho absence 
o+, . : ... .' a complicated agreement over duty a.llocation thore would be :problems 
. 
for all those countries which agreed not to produceru ~ ~ (). ~~~ S~ •. 
given the nature of oil refining in Central America it sooms 
not unreasonablo to support two hypotheses: 
(a) such is the duplication of plant and the dogree of/control bt!, 
the oil com-:1anies that thore is little or no gain in foroiC1} exchnn'Io fDom, 
"~mE.0rt-substi tution". 
\ 
'~::~~1 
~ 
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(b) that such inefficiency as occurs is 1areoly tho result of wasteful, 
unplanned location of pla~o 
Hypothesis (a) As regards the benefits from i~port-substitutiont the critical 
factor is the:Jprice of crude rela.tive to the pricE) of product's. Most of the 
agreements between refining companies and eovertlrnc:mts refor to the fact that 
"crude" and product prices are based on "posted prices ,Caribbean". If tho 
oil companies were to take full advantage of this clause and sold to the 
refinery at "posted prices", and if it could be assumed that products would 
alternatively be bought at "posted prices" then the same differenco gives some 
idea of the gross foreign exchange Savings made by a refinerY.b In fact 
crude of the low specific gravity needed by th~se refineries (it is 380 API 
reconstituted crude) has been posted in VenezUela,l at ¢2.80 to ~2.85 por 
barrel I for the l~st few years. If ono takes 1969/70 product prices and 
"weight" by the output of a "~ypical" refinery the average is ¢2.55. ThUD 
the imported products would be cheaper than the crude, let alono locally 
refined products, if one were to buy products at Upoated" prices. 
This in italef' a meaningless result al3 the "posted" pricos of products 
.,.~ lkcJ;; cJ ' 
"thanj crude posted prices both diverge 
from the "real" transfer pricos. Howev~r, it doos indica~a that wore the 
eompanies to use their position to the fullest adVantage, they could for~e 
a gravely unp~ofitable solution for the local sUbsidiary. Let UD assume 
however, that the most benofici~l circurnstanoe~ prevail. 
", .11'" -, .. 
First, the oompany obtains a maximum discount on crude oil. During 
1969-70 this broueht mho crude prico down to ¢2.00 (data confirmed by both 
Costa Rica~and Guatemala~sources) Second, the alternative of i~portin8 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Figures from Platts Oil IndicQ.s; '( Potroleum Preas Servico} 
'. 
products would take place at no less than posted prices. 
Let us now assume that a simplo 10,000 bd.' Central Amorican refinery 
cost ¢lOm. At least 80% of this cost is foreign eXChange.!: The D1lnual 
capital charge of the rofinery if we assuwo deprociation ovor 12 yoars 
a conservative rate of return on the refin~ry of 10%, works out at 17% • 
. 
Add 3% for repairs and maintenance (say 1/3 of that local cost); then one 
has a minimum annual capital outlay of 600 por barrel with at the most-
15c per barrel local cost • 
. Operating costs contribute 5c ~er barrel. 2 If wo assume 
a 50% saving on transport costs which are currently ~out 300 per barro1 
from the Caribbean for crude then the following ca10ulation can be made 
of prices cif Central America, or ex-refinerY. 
Pre-import SUbstitution (weighted posted priess) ~~st import ~tbstitution 
Products ~.o. B. venezual~ 2.55 
Transport costs .45 
f/~r'~ 
crude (with full 
discount) 
Transport cost 
of crude 
Operating costs 
- fuol 
labour & others 
Capital costs 
.20 
.15 
.60 
-~~ 
Even on the optimistio figures taken, there is no quantifYab1e saving 
in financial terms,o The gross foreign exchanGo saving is about 200 per 
barrel >, and - 50 net. Thosa esti~~tes 
could seriously be affected by a small rise in tho crude prica ~or fall in 
discount) and by possiblo savines on the produot side. 
1. One I..)~ assumes 7%; ",~Ubbard in l1...w.ted nations "Techniques of Petroleum 
DovelopT!1ent" OPe cit. p 22g.t. Tho .onlyX'11ocal" item is tho oonstruotion coot. 
2. Baaed an Guatemalan data. Of the total cast, about 75% io local. 
\, 
.. 
'j> 
-.... .. '';-
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Experience seems to justifY a pessimistic conclusion. Refinery 
~ 
managers that the talked to, explained that in fact the refineries 
ran at a "loss", when th~ir rofinery prices were geared to posted prices in 
the Caribbean (even though the way that the comparicon' ",vas mado gtmorally 
favoured the company, e.g. in Costa Rica, the oxfactor,y price was computed 
on the assumption that any landed imported products would have had to pasS 
through several of the companies costly pipeline and storage facilitieo when 
in practice they would not). Data from tho Guatemalanrofinery gave tho 
follovring allocation of product "prices" (or allocation of costs). 
-....;;;--
Barrells per annum i price per barrol~ 
Gasoline 6 ........ roo,ooO-,_ ..... -i· ··4039 (super) 15 000 . ( 
, -....415,000 ...... - - .. - .3.56 regular) 
• 
Diesol 
122,000 4.05 ) weighted average 
~3.05 per barrell. 
727,000 3.22 
J 915,000 2.27 
. 
Kerosene 
Fuel Oil 
It would appoar that in Guatemalan exfactory prices are geared fairly 
closely to "posted prices" through. a. difference as. small as 5 - 10c barrel 
can be highly important. 
The validity of the i~port SUbstitution exercise dopends critically on 
certain assumptions that are somewhat dubious! 
(a) that the company obtains the maximum crude discount. 
However, the Costa RiCan government and press have recently published a full 
expose of the affaria of the looal refinery,HECOPE, which WaS under the 
effective oontrol of Phillips Oil Co. .. Amongst the more damaging revolationa 
Vias the fact that Phaillips (or Allied Chemical Co.) were, despite claims 
to be obtaining a maximum discount, habitually over-invoicing their Coota Rican 
subsidiary by 5c per barrel (which was franY~y admitted) and that on one or two 
\ 
occasions over-invoicing had been by as much as 800 por barrol! 
As a reoult of these activities (and the other factors listed earlior) 
the refinery has been running at a "loss" (~2m.in 1968) and tho Company has 
tried to get help from the government before selling out. 
(b) that the alternative is importation at no less that posted product 
prices. The "posted" product prices are not a minimum however, and it is 
widely acknowledged in the oil industry that shrevm buying policies (or intensive 
competition in marketing) could obtain good discounts from CuracaO or Aruba 
/" 
or Panama refineries. 
(c) that the "retained" contribution of the projoct to the national 
income is as large as indicated. The net import substitution would be groater 
if the capital and operating costs made a greater contribution to local value 
added. The figures chosen are arbitary and rough, but it anything exaggerate 
the 1I1ocai \I contribution. It is almost certain that the saving in transport 
costs is exaggerated. 
Though little data is available, it is probable that as several Contral 
American refineries do make "paper losses" and as they also enjoy protection 
from imported products)that in fact the 'net local value added' is dellsory 
Or even negative. It might be 'egressed that where tho product pattern is 
biased away from gasoline - as in Honduras - then there i~ less need for 
'r,econsti tuted crude and the import saving is much greater. IroniCally I the 
,",,041 occW" 
Honduran market where this, was the last to be supplied. 
~ However, it can be stated with some confidence that the foreign oxchange. 
component of refinery operating and investmont costs in Central America is 
greater than the direct saving of local refining over tho importing of product;. 
A~d.so, import SUbstitution does not in fact 'save' foreign exchange, 
\ 
22. 
Hypothesis (bJ Most writers on tho Central American scone have arglled 
that the refining industr,y is irrationally or8anised. Undor the heading 
"problem of duplication bf investment impaot of national compotition" 
the World Bank Missionl , comment" at the present timeit appears possible 
to single out only the case of petroleum refineries as an example of an 
industrial branch whose structure has been severely affectcd under cxistincr 
national competition" (they do not consider the coment situation abnormal). 
Odell comments "Central America provides an excellent case study of the develpp-
ment of refinery capaci ty iil countries where the demand for petroleum products 
is insuffi~iently great to justify its constructi'Ou.1I 2 
The Pan American UnionJ also single out the industry for criticism, but 
in a more circumspect way: Ita! though the struoture of industry is apparently 
deficient because it involves small refin~ng units the committee believes no 
complote .judgement can be nade of tlus matter, but it is clear that six is an 
excessive number". , 
The criticism was due to the fact that the sacrifice of 'economies of 
scale I benefits in plants results in higher fixed' costs (offset by Davings in 
tr~lsportation costs on the finished products). Als~, the demand pattern of 
petroleum products is'such that simple small refineries cannot produce tho 
required quantities of gasoline - they can yield only 20% instead of 30% • 
. ,Therefore, they havo the choice of installing a t catalytio crackine' unit 
which adds' greatly to the capital costs and,wbich is simply unfeasible below 
'-:~ a'certain capacity, or importing easoline. This latter policy hac be~n adopted, 
It . 
1. World Bank Mission Study Vol. IV. (Industry) (WI! 170a) 1967. p 34. 
, 
2. P Odell in "Economic Geottraphy of Oil", OPe cit. gives a detailed case 
.history it the Central Americal situation. Tho quotation is taken from a 
silminar paper on tho Oil IndUstry (L...s.e:.1963). 
3. Pan American Union "Report on the Central American Daveloument Pl nns ane! 
the process of Economic Integration, 1265-62" op~ cit. p 94. 
23. 
"owever, in order to save on the chartering of extra tankors, gnsoline is 
imported in the form of reconstituted or semirefined cruda with a high 
gasoline content. 1 Clearly this ~Teatly.reduces the potentinl import 
saving considerably. Finally, diseconomies are accentuated if there is a 
desire for petrochemicals as this adds to the demand for light fractions 
(naptha). In thismso cracking in unavoidable, and thus very small 
refineries, as in Central America, cannot hope to serve as a basis for a 
petrochemical industry. 
The 'bostsll of inefficient dap1ication of capital costs have to be 
~S/1'f4~ 
carried~here are various poa!bi1ities. ~~ the costs could be passed 
on to the conswmer in higher product prices. This does not appear to happen 
in a dramatic way, but there is some evidenco th3t it might still be an 
important .facfor. 
There are differential 'tarriffs (i.e. between the external tariff and 
the local~cise tam), on gasoline, of ~ in Guatemala and 7% in E1 Salvador. 
Thore are also restrictions on product imports where this is competitive 
. eN 
with local productsjin Nicaragua. Also, various discounts which used to be 
Offered (for example on bulk purchases of fuel oil by the railway companies) 
are no longer available. : . , . , I. , ' II 
Second, it is quite likely that at least part of the effeot of 
2 additional costs on the consumor's cushioned by reduced government revenue I 
;-=' -------------------------,'1:'"', ----
1. In Coota Rica this Vias not doneoand when tho cracker broke down the 
refinery continued to operate on 30 AP1 crude. As thera was a surplus 
of fuel oil the refinory could only operate at 60% capacity, because 
there wasno outlet for the surplus product. 
2. Virginia Watkin: Tax & Tax Harmonisation in Central America _ 
Harvard Law School, 1967. 
'. 
r 
',- J 
II1II' 
"there is a presumption that the burden of direct loss has boen borno by 
government revenues since there is no evidenco of-increased costs of these 
products to consumers"l or "the rise in :production costs has not yet been 
translated into a corresponding price increase but this is apparently due 
more to a decreuse in tax pressures on this branch of industry,,2. Unfortunatiy, 
. 
there is not a great deal of evidence to back this up as can be seen from the 
figures belowJ on total fuel tax yield on imports and local products. 
The following gives some indication of the taxes and tariffs employed. 
~ 
Guatemala: Gasoline: 19.6 cents per gallon (+ 5c. p.g.) 
on iW:ports 
Diescl: 5.3 " " " " 
Others: .1 
" " " " 
E1 Salvador: Gasoline: 25.6 " " " (+7c. P.g.) 
on imports 
I Diesel: 2.6 " " " 
Bankor c: .7 II " " 
u 
Honduras: Gasoline: 19.8 II " \I (imports 34 c.p.g. ) 
Diesel: 2.6 
" " 
11-
Nicaragua: Gasoline: 17.00 II 
" " 
(+ controls on imports) 
Diesel: 3.3 
" " " 
Oosta Rica: Gasoline: 34.0 
" " " 
(import 4tl c.p.g.) 
• and 75.% on diesel O'.!l.~' o c.p. g • fuel in 1969) 
. 
1. World Bank Mission Study Vol IV, (Industr.1), Op. cit. p.)4. 
·2. Pan American Union "Report on the Contral American DoveloEment ~lnns eta", 
01'. cit. p. 94. 
"J. f' 1 f --.t-e, 
'. 
I' 
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nW~~i~· (~) 
Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Conta Rica 
. 
1960 
1961 4.L. 
1962 5.7 5.6 3.9 5.4 4.0 
1963) 6.8 6.3 2.2 4.7 4.5 
1964) 
1965 5.8 7.1 2.4 .5.9 5.4 
1966 10 13.8 2.1 5.6 6.3 
It appears that there has been no consistent loss of revenue since the 
refineries were introduced. However, it io difficult to make any direct 
comparison because of the amount of tax exemptions and the variation of 
taxes by product. 
As the tax amounts in most cases to three times the average ex-refinery 
price of gasoline it would be very eaGY to offset the increased cost (at 
least as far as gasoline is concerned). 
A third possibility is that the companies themselves absorb the cost 
by squeezing profit marginG in distribution and by running the refineries 
if necessary at a loss. The oil companies would still have a strong incent-
ive to secure an outlet for their crude oil which would protect their 
existing marketing system or else help to make inroads into a new market. 
The pre-oupposition is that the oil companies are concerned to ma.ximise 
thei~ overall profits rather than the profits of any one stage of operation. 
This is the basic thesis of many writers on the oil industry who assume 
"-.;;<"' that profits and looses can be IIshiftedll easily for\oJard or baokward via 
.- ....... 
variations in transfer prices and that·,the fu.nction of refinery is largely 
to secure a crude outlet. ' , 
Rel'jional Trade 
To what extent d<? the refineries try to mitiga.te the cost of small ocale 
,If 
by regional, trade? From Diagram 5, it can, b~ deduced that there io virtually 
no trade between the countries except in the form ofoupplieo from tho 
f 
I. 
I 
I 
1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Diarsram 2. 
Total Product . 
, Imports (H Tons) % of Consumpt:i.on 
(extraregional) 
917,000 
958,000 
1,023,000 
710,000 
557,000 
66 
63 
60 
25 
16 
26. 
fntraregional Trade (M Tons) 
139,000) El Salvador to Guatemala ) 
164,000) + Costa Ilica. 
229,000) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
205,000 El. SuI. to Guate~ 
.. 16% gasoline 
78% l~erosene 
75~6 fuel/Diesel oil 
24,000 El. Sal. to Costa ~~ 
Rica - 4~~ gasoline 
3% kerosene 
5~p fuel/Diesel oil 
130,000) 80,000 El. Sal. to Guate~~ ) - 2l% gasoline ) 12% kerosene 
) 6~6 fuel/dieael oil 
) 50,000 El. Sal. to Costa 
) Rica - 34% gasoline ) 2% lterosene 
) 64$6 fuel/diesel oil 
54,000) 
) 
) 
) 
El. Sal. to .. 43% gasoline 
Costa Rica 7% kerosene 
125,000) El. Sal. 
). Honduras 
) 
- ) 
90,000) El. Sal. 
) Honduras 
) 
) 
500,1 Fuel/ ~icsc oil 
to - 42% gasoline 
14% kerosene 
44% fuel/ 
diesol oil 
to - 38% gasoline 
l?,,~ kerosene 
45% fUe1/ 
dieoel oil 
. .. (45,000) El. Sal. to Honduras 
l.I?re-\~ar) 
From SIECA "Annuario Estadistico do Commercio Exterj.or" 1964"5-6-7 .. 8. 
and "Compendia Bxterior ll 1962-63. 
'. 
refinery at Acajutla to those countries whicll were not yet producing. 
There is no evidence of intra-regional trade being used to sup;.lly deficiencies 
in one or other products, though El Salvadorian exports tend to have a 
higher proportion of gasoline than the output of the refinery itself. 
However, there-is no product specialisation in regional trade. Seon 
together with extra-regional imports it is clear that the five countries are 
heading for self-sufficiency in petroleum products. 
Trade, at this stag:, may not necessarily be beneficial. If oil 
companies were to force their retailers to sell products from the "home" 
refinery then there would be additional transportation costs without 
compensating economies. On the other hand, it is conceivable that a 
programme of planned staggering of extensions to capacity would be beneficial. 
It would appear to be of advantage to test out the model used in the 
previous chapter to see to what extent economies of scale are being lost • 
• 
To do this we have to identify the various costs of refining and trans-
portation. 
(a) Proportional Costs 
proportional 
The most important/cost is that of crude oil.1 In an earlier example 
it was explained how a reasonable estimate for crude oil, (Fob) was based on 
evidence from Costa Rica and Guatemala (Atlantic). _In 1969/70 posted 
prices for 380 API crude were $2.80 - $2.85 per barrel, and average 
discounts were offered giving an effective fob p~ice of $2.00 - $2.05 per 
barvel, to both refineries. In 1969/70 also, posted prices for 25.50 API 
were 2.25 per barrel and average realised prices tl.80 per barrel. The 
1. Nicaragua "Annuario de Central Bank" (1966) chows that 7710 of total 
costs ex-refinery are crude oil imports c.i.f. 
\ 
"- =- -
28. 
discount in this case is proportionately somewhat less, and, in practice, the 
price paid for reconstituted crude has been higher. Thp followine prices 
were paid by Allied Chemical for 100,000 barrel shiploadsfrom Venezuela;l 
an overall average of %2.35 per barrel, against a %2.80 pos~(price. 
Posted Prices 
1967 2.04 
2.34 
__ July, 1967 %2~80 
.---/ 
2.33 
" 
2.33 
" 
2.33 11 
2.58 
" 
1968 2.68 
" 
2.68 II 
2.68 
" 
--
Feb., 1968 
2.05 " 
2.05 II 
The price at anyone time will reflect local and global supply and 
demand conditions for particular times, and for parti'cular crudes: the 
series above reflects the tighter market caused by the war in the Middle 
East in June. 1967. 
For the most part the crude required is in the very high API range but 
the following gives the range of crude posted prices: 
~ 35 to 370 j\Pl $2.7 / $2.8 per barrel 
31 to 32 " 2;55 tt tt 
26 to 29 " 2.3 " 
II 
.. 
16 " 1.85 11 " 
12 to 13 
" 
1.67 ff II 
1. Data from government officials. 
'. 
'" ,~ -
Tho other element in the crude costs - c ~ i. f .' is transport. A study 
1 
on Guatemalan ports estimates that the .crude fare to Atlantic ports is 
22.5c per barrel (at 7.5 barrel = I metric ton) and 40c per burrel to Pacific 
ports (the difference being 12.5c per barrel or 90e per HT for use of the 
Panama canal). In fact journeys to the more distant ports will cost more 
than to those of Costa Rica, but the difference is probably negligible. In 
fact, tanker charges have a tendency to severe fluctuations depending on 
supply and demand factors. The variable element is expressed as an AF&\ 
factor. 2 The researcher was informed that in 1960/70 the charge for Puerto 
Barrios, Guatemala was 2,5c per barrel which is very close to the figures 
above. 
Thus, it would seem reasonable to predict in 1970 world market 
conditions a c.i.f. price of around $2.3 per barrel at Atlantic ports and 
%2.5 per barrel at Pac~fic ports. As a realistic conversion rate for this 
density is 7.5 barrel per 11T3 the cost of crud~ oil is $17.25 per HT and 
$18.75 per MT. 
By way of comparison it is interesting to compare these 'a priori' 
c.i.f. prices with those which are given in the trade statistics:4 
1. SIECA: Costos en Puertos de 
Guatemala". 
2. R~fers to a scale divided by the American Tanker Brokers Association. 
3. Crude oil 400 API = 7.6 barrels p. MT 
350 . 7.4 
" " " 
AP1 = 
250 API 7.0 " " " 
.. 
= 
4. Taken from SIECA "Annuario Estadisticos de Commercia Exterior: 1266- 8" 
'. 
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" 
1964 1962 1966 li§Z ~ 
Guatemala 1905 24.0 27.0 22.5 
E1 Salvador 19.15 21.0 18.0 1806 20.2 
~ . ( ) ~ f~ cw.e. Nicaragua 34.50 27.7 20.0 20.2 19.1 
in 
@Eel'MT 
"'-
. ",~, .. ,. _., 
. . 
Costa Rica 18.4 16.5 
P~nama 1702 17.2 17.2 17.2 
The figures appear to confirm the general orders of magnitude thouGh 
those for Guatemala and Nicaragua are particularly high, both over one and 
two year periods. 
In addition to the crude oil directly cOllverted there is ulso a 
demand for crude as fuel for the refinery which adds 5% to the costl or 
about 90c per ~~. There is also a small quantity of chemicals etc. required, 
such as caustic soda. 2 
electricity 3.7 KWh per barrel of crude 
sulphuric acid 1.15 lb. 11 11 
caustic soda 021 lb. 11 11 
, 
If electricity (all have their own gener~tors) costs 1.5c per K\fu 
(average) and sulphuric acid $100 per NT cit, and caustic soda $70 per !-IT, 
then we can add another 10c per barrel and 75c per NT. 
~~ can assume that r·roportional costs are $19 per HT on the Atlantic i 
and $20.5 per HT on the Pacific. I 
(b) Labour Costs 
These are not 'proportional' but sufficiently smull as not to be taken 
too s~riously. A rough guide to manning is 100 men per 5,000 bd. capacity 
rising roughly to 400 men per 2Q,OOO/30,000 B/d capacity. 
1. The efficiency of a simple refinery is about 95~. ~arllcf in "Technigues of 
Petroleum Development': opocit. pp. 
2. A. Hanne: "Pro rammin Data for the Petroleum 
Industrialisation and Productivity Bulletin 10, 
\ 
" • 
• 
'I 
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The Central American refineries seem to be oomewhat more economic 
than this in their use of labour. 
Capacity 
Puerto Barrios l2,OOOb.d. 
Escuintla l4,OOOb.d. 
Acajutla 
Men-employed 
64 workers (+7 
senior staff) 
87 people in 1965 
declining to .§Q 
incl. 45 manual' 
\</orkers 
Annual \vap;e Bill 
$260,000 (60 per barrel) 
%225,000 (4.5c" II) 
1 
I j 
I 
:! 
Managua 8,000 "',J. 
(expanding to 
22,000) 
100 people est.(B.5c per barrel) I 
Costa Rica 8,000 ' • .1. 120 people 
Evidence is patchy but a rough estimate of 6c per barrel for labour 
see~s reasonable enough. Though this ignores the economies of scale factor 
for labour, it is probably suffiCiently small as to justify overlookincr it. 
(c) Investment Costs 
This is probably the most important item as far as we are concerned, 
but also the most difficult to quantify. It is extremely difficult to 
establish a ~imple relationship between investment costs and refinery 
capacity because of the complexities of refineries and their ancill~y 
functions. The factors that have to be established are several: the fixed 
investment cost (with construction, freight etc.) of the ~asic' units, 
-~ 
distillation columns, reforming units, cracking units.~ theoe,"battery" 
or "grass roots" costs must be addedwnecessary, but auxiliary equipment 
. ,. 
such as electricity ge~erators, compressed air system, buildings, loading 
equipment, storage etc.; and finally, more complex refineries will havo 
, 
suplementar.y functions such as aromatic extraction' units, lubricating oil 
and asphalt unito, isomcrisation, visbreaking etc. 
~ regards capital costs, there are several sources of information 
(Diag. p). '. 
----------------- _._------
r------.--~- -~-~ ----- --
~~~J ;;j 
\\ 
\ 
Size of Refinery 
5,000 bd. 
10,000 bd. 
20,000 bd. 
30,000 bd. 
40tOO~ bd. 
50,000 bd._ 
60,000 bd. 
70,000 bd. 
80,000 bd. 
90,000 bd. 
100,000 bd. 
120,000 bd. 
150,000 bd. 
200,000 bd. 
400,OOO.bd. 
Scale Coefficient 
, 
f 
1. l{cLean + 
P.aigh (1220 ) 
$12.5m. 
25 m. 
40 m. 
60 m. 
llO m. 
.71. 
Dia~ra.~ 6 , 
Refine~! Size <4~d Investment COQt 
Garner 2 Manne4 
(1262) (circa 
1960) 
:t 7.3r:. 
5, m. 1.0 m. 
9.3 m._ 15.50.' 
1.4 -me 
16.5 m. 
21.5 m. - ;.27 m. 
25 m. 
39 m. 40 mo , 
--
.80 .66 
~ 
Pratte:? (1971) 
(a) Index 
1.00 
85 
I' 
66 
52 
.66 
(b) 
100 
75 
56 
44 
40 
.59 
1. HcLea.~ &: Haigh: liThe Growth of Integrated Oil CompaniesH op.cit. 
2. Garner in United Nations Seminar: "Techn:iques of Petroleum Development" op.cit. p.192. 
3. Hubbard in 11" It It It 11 If p'~218. 
6 Shell 
E:ubbard3 (1971) 
Index (1962) 
<t t18:::. 
130 
100 
77 40:1. 
./ 
58 62::1. ' 
53 
. , 80::1. 
.57 .58 
4. A. Han.'1e:, "Programming Data for the Petroleum Refining IndustryU in "Industrialisation and Prcductivityff Bulletin 
No. 10, pp.57-74. 
5. C. Pratten: ItEconomies of Scale in r4anufacturin~ Industr:rtl 
Scale in .J1ri tish Indus try' (Introductory)" 1965. 
6_ Shell Oil COOlPa.t1y: !!J1plJblisl!ed (?stiJJJ,ites" 
-----------------------------~,-------.. --.. -------.-----------
op.cit. Ch.4, a..'1d Pratten and Dec..'1 "The Economies of 
~ 
.l, 
! -~,:;.-; ~,~~~ 
-~~ 
: . ,'" 
~~, 
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Thus we have a considerable variety of assessments. This is not 
entirely unsurprising since the cconomieo of ocale factor will vary at 
different points along the size range. I have estimated in the range up 
to 100,000 bd., which is in the range of maximum economies. Also, tho 
extent to which utilities are added will considerably affect the final 
result. Of the various estimates of scale coefficients, i.e •• 7, .58, .66, 
.57, .66. the arithmetic average is .66. This is not a very scientific 
method of evaluating the scale function, but it does eliminate extreme 
results and bring us'a figure close to those of the more reliable estimates, 
(e.g. Hannc or the Cambridge Study). 
Costs of investment vary by location, degree of over-valuation of 
currency and time, none of which can be allowed for systematicallY; and by 
refinery complexity.l 
. It is also useful to know the "minimum" size of refineries und the 
range over which economies of'seale are felt. ,As regards the minimum size; 
simple distillation refineries have been built below 10,000 bd. Belo\'1 
10,000 bd. is the so called "bantam class" refinery class. These are nO\1-
adays similar to large refineries, merely more compact. Thore have been 
extremely small refineries of this type - a transportable 1,000 bd. refinery 
of 'the US Navy, and a 1,000 bd. topping unit which has been established in 
1. There are various points here: (u) addition of u cruck~ng unit of 
"normal II size is believed to raise the costs of n simplo distillation 
refinery by 55% approx. (!>ratten) t .55-6(Ytl~ (Oarner) or lOOl~ (Hubbard). 
According to Hanne, a catalytic cracker \'lith the same charging capacity as 
the refinery would raise costs by .5~b. ,~ 
(b) A desulphurisation unit would vary greatly depending on the constitution 
of the crude, but the Cambridge study calculateo on tho basis of u 12% 
addition to costs. 
(c) The difference between a' "battery" unit and a complete refinery is 
obviously considerable. The Cambridge study says that 5~~ should be added 
for the:;c auxiliary functions. Garner argues tho.t for emaIl rcfinerieo 
(lO.OOO:bdJthe figure may be 60-70p of the total cost, falling to 30-40% 
in large refineries. 
(d) The "developing country" cost penalty - udditionu1 transport costs 
mainly - could contribute about 2~6 on further costs in the more out of the 
"Io.y locations like Central America. 
" 
Isra~lo 1 In GUatemula1f:as established a L~ ,000 bd. plant t prefabricated in 
the USA; a topping unit, unifier, and catalytic reformer and storuee. It 
was built for $5m; includin~ housing etc. In a sense, these very small 
bantam refineries do have advantages - in maintentlnce for example - but in 
other senses they are clearly at a disadvantage. Though there are quite a 
few bantam class refineries, perhaps one of the smallest currently operating 
is the 3,000 bd. unit in Barbados. 
Others that could so classified are: 
Paraguay "'-5,000 bd. (being extended to 10,000 bd.) 
Cambodia 10,000 bd. 
Jordan 7,.500 bd. (being extended to 15,000 bd.) 
Guinea 10,000 bd. 
Liberia 10,OO~ bd. 
Sierra Leone 10,000 bd. 
Martinique 11,000 bd. 
Ethiopia . '11,000 bd. 
• 
Bolivia has five very sm~ll local refineries (under 6,000 bd.) using 
lC'':al crude:,.5 
<Gen.orally, except .in rare circumstances (Central American boing one), 
refineries are not built below 10,000 bd. 
. The next stage is the lightweight zone - 10,000 to 30,000 bd. Most 
refineries in small developing countries are of this claso. 
The major conomies of scale are in the 30,000 to 100,000 bd. range 
(midcheweight) when catalytiC crackers can be installod too. Above 100,000 bd. 
(heavyweighl'r~On6mies of scale arc maximised, though they have been leGS 
2 popula.r •. 
·l.M. Tan~er: ."'fhe Rolitical Economy of Oil" op.cit. 
2. Note that refining technoloeY' io not static. A fundamental chango in 
design took place in the 1960's bringine rofinery units mora clo~cly togethor. 
There has been a steady rise in both average and rn~imum rofinery size over 
time and it is likely that this trend \.,.ill continuo. According to Pratten 
(p.34) there is an increaoing oupply of 200,000 bd. refineries becauso 
distillation units of that size are no\'1 being built. It io expocted that 
400,000 refineries will become more common though EO far there are no economics 
of scale above 200,000 bd .• 
,", , ...... " .... -
" 
"..".,' 
, 
These general trends can be seen from the following distribution 
of refinery sizes - of new plants being plunned and constructed in July, 
1970 (in bd.).1 
0-20,000 
20-40,000 
40-60,000 
60-80,000 
80-100,000 
100-120,000 
120,000-160,000 
140-160,000 
over 160,000 
0-10,000 ) 
10,000-20,000 ) 
20,000-30,000 ) 
30,OOO_lfO ,000 ) 
Numbers 
none ) 
7 ) 
4 ) 12 8 ) 
17 
15 
9 
9 
4 
} 
none 
. An attempt to assess an economies of scale functions was made using 
}anne'~ data, which should be feasible, as we know the Central America~ 
fixed investment costs and the dimensions of the local refineries. It 
might be felt that it is somewhat cavalier to assume away inflation in 
refinery investment costs over time. In fact, there has heen virtually 
no inf1ation'in refinery costs. 2 
1. The medit).R.. size is thus about 60,000 bd. a.nd the most popular rWl[;e ,'f 
40,000/60,000 bd. Thero are n2 true bant~ references lUld 11 lightwoight 
and 1§ heavyweights. The other 50 Ule middleweight. 
. .3. Investment cost indices from the monthly Oil and Gas Journal (19/t6 ':" 100) 
!22!i 1960 t.26Z 1968 !222 
-Refinery inflation 180 228 287 304 329 (index) cost 
f) 
Construction & Design 1.71 2.21 2.77 2.82 3.18 Productivity 
Nelson (True Cost) 10,5 10,3 104 108 106 Index 
, 
I' 
'I I: 
. ,I 
,j 
Guatemala - Galvez (i) 
(ii) 
- Esquintla 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Costa Rica 
:r;t .. i..t; 
4,000 bd. 
lj,OOO bd. 
9,500 bd. 
14,000 bd. 
10,300 bd. 
7,900 bd. 
8.000 bd. 
Predicted Actual 
$ 6.0m 5.0m 
l2 .. 0m (1) 10.6m 
ll.!)m (2) 9.0m 
13.0m (3) 7.5m 
Il.5m (lr) 15.5/l7.5m 
9.5m (5) 8.5m 
Il.8m (6) 13.5/20m (?) 
Though the general orders of magnitued are correct, thero are somo 
quite serious discrepancies and a tendency for tactual' costs to be lees 
than predicted. This should be ,due to the fact that 'actual' investment 
costs can represent quite ~fferent thihgs and a good deal depends on the 
accounting co~ventions employed in each case • 
. Because of this, it w~uld not be senoible to construct nn economies of 
scale relationship on the basis of local data. It is, therefore. done on 
the basis of a common function derived from Manno's 1960 data, with both a 
"high" and."1ow" estimate (2~ loos), The iinearisation involves n straight 
line seement drawn as a least square linear regression line over the range 
in which thero is a production possibility, i.o. up to 50.000 bd. Now this 
(1) Includes a 2.800 bd. cat reformer. 
(2) Includes a 3,';00 cat. reformer in a 9.500 bd. plant. Data from Dept. of 
Economic Studies, Sector Externo Estadistico. 31st Dec. 1965 - deduced from 
data on overseas investment. 
(3) Includes desulphurisation and 2,500 cat. reformer. 
(lr) Including 1,600 bd. cat. reformer. Two different e:ltimatos were given to 
the lluthor by the government. There waD some confusion about wha.t could be 
.included in the fixed costs (e.g. a gift of land from the government). 
(5) Includes n 3,000 pd. cat. reformer. 
(6) This plant is assessed on the basis of having a 1.200 bd. reformer nnd 
3.000 bd. cracker. $13.5m was the official valuation of the rofinery in 1968. 
Gulf are believed, hO\-Iovcr, to ha.ve p:1id $l7m for an 85% staltO (inc1udinB 
goodwill; pipeline; stocks). ' 
37. 
simplification does involve certain biaseD (in fact, it makes tho "docontral-
ised" solution less attractive). However, these can be corrected for later. 
The two solutions are: 
~5.2m plus %600 per barrel/day (i.e. $12 per NT) 
or $3.6m plus $500 per barrel/day ($10 per NT) 
or 
This has to be reduced to an annual charge ~ 25 to 30%. 
.L Thus reasonable estimates of the annual capital charge are; 
$3 per}~ capacity 
$3 per MT capacity. 
Demand 
Demand prOjections and estimateD have been discussed. However, \-Ie need 
to make several assumptions in':calculating annual demands 
\a) that for the purpose of ~he exercise there is a uniform product~ petroleum -
and that there is no problem of particular product shortages. This assumes a 
fa~ deal about the flexibility of both crude and refinery, but is not un-
reasonable, given the ~ssumPtion already made. l 
(b) that demand is concentrated at a series of points. Clearly it is not. 
but it does. not affect the overall result if fuel products have to pass 
through or are held in stor"ge depots in the main cities before beinG dis-
persed to smaller distribution points. It is assumed that the cost of 
retailing and storage is ±ndependent of the configuration of the pattern of 
production. 
(c) that demand is price inelastic. Jgain. this is not true entirely but it 
has to be remembered that especially with gasoline, small price changes in 
e»refinery cost are swamped by taxation changes anyway. And there is no 
substitute for gasoline for cars. 
1. The balancing of different markets with different supplies io another cxercioo 
o~ 7onside~able signi~icance: i:i. v/essells "Study of the Optimum Location for ~ 
rehnert' ~n "Proceed~n s of the 2nd s mpo~ium on the Davelo ment of Petroleum 
Resources" U!1 Economic Commission for the l!"'ar East. Vol.2, 19 }, pp} .7-
I 
. ! 
I 
2. It seema reasonable t6 take 15% as a rate of return on rislcy equity and (56 
on bor.rowed capital. \<lith a gearing ratio Slightly biased towards loan financo 
an overall rnte of return of 10% seems reasonable. Then we n:Jsumc a 10 year 1 
: depreciation period. This would give effectively something liko 2~~ pn. To J ~":' " ~~~t~S c~::.added maintenanc •• n~::it-. etc. adding pot-haps 5$: to~~:"",:"ua.~. '" 
"1.8 ;J • 
Diagram Z 
Transportation Costs 
San Sun 
&om/to Guatemala c. Salvador San Pedro Managua Jose Tegucigalpa 
l'.scuintla 1 •• 0 7.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 lLI-.O 
tSalvez 10.0 10.0 6.0 11.0 6.0 16.5 
itcajutla 7.0 3.0 10.0 8.0 6.5 12.0 
l>u.erto Cortez 12.0 90 0 1+.5 12.0 !).!) 11.0 
l-lanagua 13.0 12.0 15.5 10.5 15 
timon 9.0 8.0 6.5 9.0 3.5 15 
::Imports (incl. 33.0 32.0 32.5 34.0 31.5 '.1.0 <0% tariff) 
'-
Notes 1. The cost of sea journeys purely on the Pacific or Atlontic side io estimated 
at $2per ton between any pair of ports, not very apart; for longer journeys -
say 1,000 krns. - assume %3t9 %4. These figures were given by Esso Central 
America for coastal tarucer ¢osts. Import statistics (1965/6) seem to indicate 
transport costs (c.i.f. - f.o.b.) between Salvador and Costa Rica at about 
~4 per ton. To pass through the canal is a jurther %1 per ton. 
2. 'The following road and rail haulaga rates are "available: 
, , 
i~ .... ta from (Guatemala City from Port (San Jose) 
:~ "-~A Port (Escuint1a from Port ~~dy op.cit(Esc~int1a t? Guatemala City 
(Puerto Barr10s to Guatemala City 
Puerto COl'tes to San Pedro Sula 
Acaj4tla:to'San Salvador 
P. SOl"l)~a to Hanagua 
Managua to Corinto 
Limon to San Jose 
$4.5 per ton (gasoline) ~6.75 (tuel oil) 
$3.25 (gasoline) 
$13.5 (gasoline) 
~2.25 (crude oil) 
$4.5 '(fuel oil) 
$14.0 (fuel oil) 
$4.5 (F.N.H. Figures - Railway Co.) 
($2.5 (F .E.S. Figures - Rai1\;lay Co.) 
(~4.5 data from refinery. 
$3.0 (crude' ) 
$6.0 (products ) basic rates 
$3.6 (direct information) 
%4.5 (F.E.P Railway Co.) 
3. On' some routes, land transit at 30 per ton km. is tho cheapest form of 
trnnsport; e.g. Tegucigalpa to San Pedro Sula; Acajutln to Guatemala City; 
Escuintla to San Salvador • 
. "",-
\ 
I 
I 
39. 
Transuort 
, 
The key feature of transporting petroleum products is that there is a 
big disparity between land costs (pipeline, road, or ~ail) and sea costo as 
the companies make use of coastal tankers which do not need'to berth in ports, 
but can discharge through short pipelines to \vaiting storage tanks. Thus, 
sea charges are very small, and this greatly reduces the 'economic distance' 
bet\",een markets. 'There is, however, negligible trade between countries (as 
opposed to within countries) and as such it is difficult to build up a 
reliable body of data. Table? gives an approximate estimate based on what 
was felt to be realistic matrix of probable costs based on information given 
1 by local oil distributors, railway companies etc. 
Results ( 
Assumption I. The model was run first of all with the above transport costs 
tha~ seemed most reasonable from the point of view of past cxperience. 
Secondly capital costs were based on the likely coots for a 'cracking refinery' 
and with fuel imported on the assumption that fuol imports at 25-300 APl 
carry the ~ame proportionate discount as 'heavier' crudes. Thereforc, tho 
capital cost function is $2\100,000 + $6.4 'p.NT and fuel costs are $16.5 p.T 
(Atlantic) and $18 p.T (Pacific). There were seven markets and seven sources, 
A "separate" market is allocated to Tegucigalpa a.nq, to the Atlantic zone of 
Belice and Guatemala. The tariff was taken to be 20% ' 
1. There are various simplifications involved in this analysis: (i) ratos 
differ for "clean" oils (paraffin, petrol etc.) and "dirty" products (fuel 
oil) the latter being more expensive to t~ansport. (ii) oxcept in tho fow 
cases where pipelines are actually used (c~udo oil linos from P. Somozn. 
to Managua; San Jose to Escuintla) the possible advantage of pipclintffor 
• bul~ tran~port is not seriously considered. If there \~ere a largo reeional. 
ref~nery ~t would undoubtedly be feasible to conoider a ~~jor pipoline project 
along the isthmus. (iii) no systematic allO\vunce has beon made for the smull, 
but not insignificant costs of loading and unloadingi takinG in and out of 
storage the various products for transport. See Part III; "Refinin[5 and 
Transport" in United Nations "Techniques of PetrOleum Dcvelo'pment" Ol).cit. 
\ 
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On the figures given, the optimal solution is a sin(jle refiner:t: at 
Puerto Limon in Costa Rica supplying the entire region. Because of its 
location it obtains crude more cheaply and is able to supply the whole area 
with less transport costs than anywhore else. The 'overall' annual costo 
of %79.3m are %7.lm less tha~the present 'national' solution or ~~ cheaper 
(i.e. about $3 per ton or 35c per barrel). This contrasts \ .... ith aome other 
results:-
best two locations ' ;t80.0m Nicaragua & Costa Rica 
II II 
" and San Salvador best three locations ;t80.lm 
bAst four locations $82.6rn 
" 
it 
" 
" "and Guate-
mala (Pacific) 
best five locations $84.4m all except MatiaB Galvez (Guatemala) 
A three location solution would, in fact, have cost only a negligible 
1.8% more than the optimum. 
'. 1 
Note, however, that any other single refinery than Costa. Rica would 
have been much more uneconomic than six separate refineries. includinc tho 
original idea of a single refinery in Acajutla - San Salvador. Thus the 
benefit of economies of scale are less than the differences in overall coats 
as between different locations of a single plant. 
Assumption II. The model was then run for the same trans~ort cost. but for 
a 'simple' refinery situation with capitnl costs at $1,300,000 + $3.7 per 
.. .. .-
1. The situation of the Panamanian refinery in respect of location is similar 
to that of Costa Rica. 
\ 
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·1 
·~ ond fu:>l at $19 or %2.0.5 por ten. In thill cnna thl.~ (liDCCOilCOf or howing 
a 'ti"lO refinery' z.olution, Ccatu. tli.cu UltU Ilic,:u'i1t::UU, tho lu.ttor ual''Vinc; ol1ly 
tho Nicaragua o:u'kot. una tho cout ot thio (or the m.::.rCinlllly more OXPCl1tili'iTO 
.oin(;lo ro.fincr"J at Coste, lliea) 10 about ?/,~ arcut.~c,r tlL:.I.a. tho moat t dCcolltrnliocd f 
c;rOt\ter. So thero in little o.dvuntD.go to cc:mtrn1.1cmtion on tho.;)Q nnauil'l])tiol1u • 
.L~':Q.~t:i?E .. .!!..J;.. Il: tho 'lOtlOr t eatirJ:lto of' crlpitru. cant io ta!~Qn. (i.c. 
/f1.1o .,. tttm liT) then thio furthor crodos tho advo.nt;li~OO ot a. ro~1.or,.,u refinory. 
An :U1C1.~o:lcod eatimato of. tr:m.'3portution chnrgea \-lould hnvo the Mtl1e 
effect. 
sisni:J:ic.mt. ~lh~ iollou.l.ng cstiIJ.:ltc:l wero roda of tho d.:I.£.t'orc:'lco bct\/COl'l 
C 
tho. capitn.l coots used ill tho linQar ll.l?prox.1m..1.ticn 1 lUld the ClllJital coot 
rc·'lu litra1.eht otf the .curve - Cz (c.'lJd.t.al cost no in v.a~Ul-:ptiol1 II). 
Fer 000001 C1 - Cz = 11.05 M S.l? u + $l.22~ 
l].llll ca .. Ca :6 17.58 .. l;!).71 = + j1'1.7Zlll 
001011 Cl - 02 n 13.65" 1).95 ~ .. it .?J.~'l 
100001 c1 ... 02 tJ 12.35 - l~.&> a ... /'J"1.'''!)::Z 
oolOOl °1 '" Ca " 12.35'" l2.;o r. .. ~{ .O:,xn 
010100 C1 - 02 u 12 .. 35" 13.95 n .. fI,J..(Xlrl. 
I.EJ oxpcct~u. tho offect of line.:.lriDat1on ~o bacn to tillfloto' tho (;ootlJ 
o..ithcr or v0111 lurco or t/01.7 omill pl:.m.tu 'While do:£lt4titl!; the c!!cct or two 
plnnt::) or about oqu-ll l;ize tlt the lJoiut ilt' ~.:4ich tho dJ.:r!Cl~QnCG b~t~·oon. the 
ctX'o and the l::l.l1G 1£1 e.r'Qntast. ~h,')ueh tho ot1vnuta.:;o of' tho n1nt;lo v. tot."lly 
.. 
&:'lro':. rlos1t1 vo davinti011 m,cClltraliscd Golution 1!J no 
Caco for opl1ttir~ ir.to tvo cr 
• 
t1.roo )."ofhi.Cl"$.t?O or o"uul D.h~o. 
lr2. 
Assumption V. The effect of a 10"tG rather "than a 20";6 tariff makes relDtively 
little difference. The only major change is that small amounts of imports to 
the remoter locations become marc attractive thus reducing the cost of some 
of the two or one plant solutions. 
Assumptions vi. Capacity utilisation: hitherto, we have assumed that any 
plant established would be fully utilised. However, in practico because of 
the time phasinG problem, and risk of breakdowns, factories would be built 
larger than the market with a corresponding increase in the importance of 
fixed capital charges. ~le took an assumption of one third of capacity undor-
utilised, linearised the economies of scale curves over a longer range, and 
as a result, the effect is to increase the attractiveness of central:tsed 
plant: These results can b~ompared by soeing the follOl..ring table of annual 
costs. 
1,. Cracking- "High" 
. capital cost. 
2. No cl'ackint:! -"Uigh" 
capital cost. 
Optimal Solution Six Refineries 
$%902m $86.4m 
/ \ I" Yes No Yes No 
%78.5m %79.2rn %81.6m %86.1~ 
/ \ I \ /\ I \ 
3if "Lov/" estimates of Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
capi tal cost. (no r:I 8 r:! 8 r:! 4 r:! 8 ' . 
cracking) ~ %77. lm.-e7 .5m to77. m f~7 .2m to7 .6m %8l.6m $8}+aJ3~'.4m~ '!: ~ /. . I' / \ \ " I '" ,____. ............. ____ 4. 661% Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Ifo Yes No --res No 
. %78.3m %77.1 %79.7 i78.5m $79.0 $77.8 $80.4 $79.2 $83.7 $78.6 $88.2 $81.6 ~ 
utl.lisation . . $91.0 $84.0 .. ~ 
Yes No 
t93.6 j!86. ilm 
Thus, there is quite an array of possible savings' depending Oll the 
assumptions made, but roaoonable asoumptions indica.te a oubstantin1 positive 
savings. 
The implications of the rcsultn nre ns follows.' If we trutO the foreign 
exchange cost of the industry at about 7~% of production coots and 10~~ of 
crude transport costs then the region as a ",'hole could Duve about $'7m a year 
in foreign exchange from the "optimal" solution, On reasonable aSDurnptions, 
if this~l~re distributed in price reductions accordin~ to countries' mnrk~ts 
then the annual saving would be: 
Guatemala :: $2.5 m. 
El Salvador ::: $1.2 m. 
Honduras .= $1.65m. 
Nicaragua ::: $1.2 m. 
Costa Ilica :: $1.1 m. 
However, there is also a loss of 'local value added' to local producers 
and a gain to those in Costa Rica, (compared with the 'national' solution)2:-
G~emala -$ .9m 
E1 Salvador 
- % .45m 
Honduras 
-$ .5m 
Nicaragua 
-$ .4.5m 
Costa Rica .. $2.3m 
If the assumptions arc correct then there would be benefits to the 
industrial producers oven without further adaptation, i.e. tb~ gain in 
foreign exchange savings is greater than the loss in local value added. In 
order to make the scheme acceptable, however, Costa Rica would have to 
distribute some of its benefits in the form of reduced product prices, 
especially as local producer countries do secm to place some significance 
on the contribution which refining makes to their economies. 
Concern over sm~ll size has so far been largely ,directed at tho fact 
'~ . 
that small refineries result in a wasteful establishment of capacity. If 
we look at the time dimension, the point to be noted is that with a regional 
1. There is no correction for linearisatien error. 
2. Ignoring multipliers, leakages etc. 
\ 
t.. . , . , 
~ .. 
market of 50.000 bd. refiners have already built a capacity to 80,000 bd. 
which should not be rea.ched until 1975 at the ca.x-liest. The data was, 
therefore used in the dynamic model. 
(a) as in the. cement industry case we apply alternative di~icoul1t rates 
of l59~ and 10}6. 
(b) we take demand increments which represent straight line approY.imations 
to the curvilinear growth of demand are (in 11T per year): 
"2" "Hi51\" 
Guatemala (N) 7,000 10,000 
Guatemala (s) 38,000 57,000 
Honduras (N) 10,000 15,750 
Honduras (n) 70.BOO 15,750 
El Salvador 20,000 30,000 
Nicaragua 20.000 31,900 
Costa Rica 7,500 15,'150 
(c) for the investment cost function we took what was the most reliable data 
sO'.'rce, Manne, (i). For contrast, the model was also run on a very hieh 
investment .cost assumption, using Hubbard's data (ii), and a. very low one, 
using Garner's data (iii). 
In addition there are ·the annual charges; spares, maintenance, etc., 
adding 4% a year. Labour is not an important element of cost but on the 
basis of previous figures it accounts for something like 3.~~ of investment 
cost~ at 10,000 bd. and we could reasonably assume that this relationship is 
maintained over the ranges we arc considering. Thus, 7% of the investment 
cost needs to be discounted at 10% to infinity, which is equiv:alont to 7tj~ 
of the investment costs. If we trute a replacement factor of 15% which would 
be necessitated by a l2~ year depreciation period. then wo noed to add in 
total 85% to the investment costs. Therefore. the cost functions nro: 
(i) log I :: 7 ,81t5 (lo~ c) .61 
(ii) log I :: 12,780 (log c)·6 
(iii) log I :: It740"(10~ c),72 
l 
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Above 400,000 T.p.a. the curve is linear. 
As in the cement case, we assume that every other extension to capncity 
is of the form of.a new distilling column rather than a new refinery and 
this saves 25~6 of the cost. 
Results 
(1) If \ve take initially the investment function (i») a discount rate of 
10% and the best ordering combination (2 5 4 3 6 1) we get the following 
(in $m): 
Qpen solution (plus cost of crude oil) 
Terminal value 
of which investment costs 
" " transport costs 
plus crude oil costs 
129.46 
66.73 
62.73 
280.00 
153.2 
:}.oJ+.6 
48.6 
280.0 
/ 
Optimum time cycles are: 
Location 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
'Qpen' 
cycle 
2/t yrs. 
24 " 
24 " 
21+· " 
12 " 
2'+ " 
Solution 
start Si7.o (Tpa) 
Yr. 1 912,000 
23 168,000 
13 480,000 
17 504 ,000 
6 372,000 
10 509,000 
'Closed' "national" solution 
cy,c,le start size 
6yrs Yr. 1 228,000 
6 II 1 42,000 
6 " 1 120,000 
6 " 1 126,000 
6 " 1 186,000 
6 " 1 126,000 
There are considerable advantages to be derived from a planninc approach. 
Optimum ti~e. cycles are considerably lengthened to permit economies of scale. 
However, the effect of unalterable crude oil costs is to restrict the saving 
to about 5% of the total cost, c.i.f. delivery point, or 15-20c. per barrel. 
However, even this is a substantial saving. 
(2) If we experiment with different combinations of locations this has 
little effect, the following difleront estimates were obtain~d for the 
"open solution". 
12345 6 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
4 3 6 5 1 2 
254 3 6 1 
513642 
361245 
Terminal Values of which Investment Cost 
129.8 
131.2 
132.5 
129.465 
139.25 
133.65 
l 
.\ 
I 
-------------------_ . .,._--_. __ ...... - .... - ..... 
The sp::-ead is quite significant {Uld no doubt one could get, after 
exhaustive testing, a better solution than the optimum indicated. 
(3) If we take a higher investment cost function (ii), then tho total 
terminal costs are: 
.. 
,~ .. 
"" ~ Closed 
12345 i80.o (investment costs (127.0) 222.0 
54321 182.2 (investment costs (126.2) 
4 3 652 182.2 (investment costs (132.5) 
The savings over the closed solution are now greater, significantly, 
than before - almost lq~ of the total,cost including crude price; again 
with 24 year cycles replacing 6 year cycles. 
(4) If we take a lower investment cost function, 
~ 1 2 3 4 5 137.6 (investment cost 85.0) 
54321 
4 3.6 5 2 
(iii) then we have: 
Closod 
Ilt1t.4 (investment cost 
96.8) 
In this case, savings are. much less than in the first one; about 2.5~~ 
of the 'total; due to the limited scope for economies of scale. 
It is 7lear, therefore, that the choice' of data chosen is very 
significant in affecting the ultimate result. The function {i) seemed 
most reasonable in the light of our knowledge of tho region but the solution 
is subject to a considerable degree of error. 
Another variant is to consider the variation of the discount rate. 
This ~hould muke a decentralised pattern of production loss attructive than 
the total capacity installed in the first three yeurs needs to be slightly 
~ - more than in the "closed" system; and tho effect of introducint ~ 15% discount 
rate is to give returns in the immediate futuro n hiehcr weightine_ In fuct, 
the difference is not greatly significant. 
'-., ., ... 
,..;, 
Concluding Note: Petrochemical Opportunities l"orp.Pjone 
The construction of six local refineries which are extremely simplo in 
technoloeY has prevented the emergence o.f a p.etroohemicnl industry in t<?ntrnl 
America based on local feedstock. In so doing it hus forogone not only the 
direct benefits of import-substitution, but the whole range of "external 
economies" and linkage effects that can be obtained from petro-chemical 
"complex" development. l 'If we take demand for the main products which have, 
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artificial fibres - then we estimate that there is a potential derived domand, 
in 19~t for basic petro-chemical feedstock (reducing to naptha equivalents) 
of 200,000 to 300,000 tons p.a. This would add about 10,000 bd. ~rude charge 
requirements to necessary refinin~ capacIty which is 50,000 bd. today und 
'--
could be 75,000 bd. in 1975. 
It is estimated that 40,000/50,000 bd. is the minimum size for a 
refinery which is contemplating petro~chemicals production. This could bo 
. 
reduced to 20,000 bd. in unusual circumstances. The main constraint is that 
a cracking unit is required and these have a minimum size and ~onsiderable 
economies of scale.. The present 8,000 bd. Costa Ricrul refinery with a. 
3,000 bd. catalytio cracker ~s held to be wasteful in the extreme. Thereforc, 
two refineries with a minimum size of 25,000 bd. each would Bcem to be the 
most we could entertain on a Central American plane'nnd~)reoent autarchio 
'policy has stifled this industry. 
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